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ABSTRACT
Fallible Justice: The Dilemma of the British in
The Gold Coast, 1874-1944
By
Neal M. Goldman
Advisor: Timothy Alborn
This dissertation studies the manner in which the British administered justice as
a technique of colonial administration in one of its West African dependencies, the Gold
Coast, during the first seventy years of formal colonial rule. In this study that covers the
period from the creation of the Gold Coast Colony in 1874 to 1944, I argue that the
British were caught between their honest desire to deliver prompt and fair justice to their
Gold Coast subjects and their perceived need to support indigenous authorities through
whom they wished to govern despite their recognition that those authorities were too
often focused on fostering their own political and financial interests to the detriment of
justice as the British defined it. They desired to preserve traditional courts and law in
part to support those through whom they ruled while keeping to a minimum the costs of
governing the colony. I also demonstrate, in the context of an old and relatively well
developed non-settler colony, the inability of the colonial authorities to adhere to a
consistent policy particularly when faced with concerted opposition from their subjects.
This was the case more often than not in the Gold Coast despite the common
assumption by colonial legal historians that the rule of law was one of the
characteristics of British imperialism the colonized found least burdensome,
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
This dissertation studies the manner in which the British administered justice as
a technique of colonial administration in one of its West African dependencies, the Gold
Coast, during the first seventy years of formal colonial rule. It is a study at the
intersection of British and African histories. Although It sees matters primarily from the
perspective of the colonial authorities, the views of Africans of their colonial masters
and the agency of the colonized is often heard and seen, since the consequences of
the administrative and judicial processes discussed in this dissertation had a major
impact on the lives of Gold Coast residents as well as on the legal landscape in Ghana
after independence.
Law, as Richard Rathbone, has noted, was one of the languages in which
Africans addressed the colonial state, and, in some cases spoke to one another.1 As
such, the relationship between the colonial executive and the colonial judiciary, both
directly and through the Colonial Office, is of interest to those who study the manner in
which the British dealt with colonized peoples in other parts of the world. Britain’s long
tradition of judicial independence and deference to judges’ decisions was the cutting
edge of British cultural imperialism conveying the Empire’s adherence to the rule of law
in contrast to what was seen as the arbitrariness of indigenous custom (as well as of

1

Richard Rathbone, “Law, Lawyers and Politics in Ghana in the 1940's,” in Contesting Colonial
Hegemony: State and Society in Africa and India, edited by Dagmar Engels and Shula Marks, eds.,
London: British Academic Press, 1994, 227-247, 229.
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executive fiat).2 This tradition came to be challenged, albeit not overcome in the
colonial Gold Coast by both the educated coastal elites who felt alienated from
indigenous tribunals and the colonial administration who often believed that the courts
were undermining colonial authority.
In this study that covers the period from the creation of the Gold Coast Colony in
1874 to 1944, I argue that the British were caught between their honest desire to deliver
prompt and fair justice to their Gold Coast subjects and their perceived need to support
indigenous authorities through whom they wished to govern despite their recognition
that those authorities were too often focused on fostering their own political and
financial interests to the detriment of justice as the British defined it. Moreover, I
demonstrate in the context of an old and relatively well developed non-settler colony the
inability of the colonial authorities to adhere to a consistent policy particularly when
faced with concerted opposition from their subjects notwithstanding the common
assumption by colonial legal historians that the rule of law was one of the “least
objectionable features of British imperialism.”3 I intend to explore how the
administration of justice was used as a tool of colonial rule. I examine the question of
who the judges were, the manner in which the executive crossed the lines and

2

This idea of cultural imperialism as expressed though the rule of law is
expounded at great length by Edward Said in Orientalism, New York: Pantheon Books, 1978 and Culture
and Imperialism, New York: Pantheon Books, 1993. See also David Pimentel, “Rule of Law Reform
Without Cultural Imperialism? Reinforcing Customary Justice Through Collateral Review in Southern
Sudan,” Hague Journal on the Rule ofLaw, Vol. 2 (2010): 1-28.

3

L. C. Green, “The Common Law and Native Systems of Law,” in International and Comparative

Law of the Commonwealth, edited by Robert R. Wilson, Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1968, 81107, 81.
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compromised judicial independence and how British racism prevented the
advancement of African lawyers to places on the bench during most of the first four
decades of the twentieth century. We shall see how the colonial power created a dual
system of courts, native tribunals administering customary law and theoretically
independent of, but in fact subordinate to, British common law courts. Finally I shall
demonstrate by examining criminal procedure, matrimonial law and land law how the
courts operated, how inconsistently the British behaved and how they repeatedly failed
in convincing the people of their soi disant infallibility.
I shall show that the professed British desire for indirect rule never came to full
fruition because they did not and could not trust the traditional authorities to carry out
British policies.4 Moreover, they were faced with two sets of indigenous elites, the
chiefs and the educated intelligentsia, neither of whom gave them much comfort.
Indeed, the interests of these two groups conflicted in many important respects as
when the British forced the latter to litigate their disputes in the traditional courts of the
former, the heads of which the coastal elites usually did not respect. The British found
that they had to choose one group or the other as agents of their rule, but did not
exercise their choice in a consistent manner.
Seen repeatedly in this study are three groups of players, the British colonial
administration, the traditional authorities and an elite of generally well-to-do merchants,
ministers and professional men living primarily in the coastal communities of the Gold
4

As long ago as the mid 1930's, Lucy Mair argued that the policy pursued by the British in the Gold
Coast was not so much indirect rule as it was laissez faire with the British lacking the will to impose direct
taxation on its colonial subjects although the chiefs could levy taxes on their subjects for specific purposes
in accord with traditional law. Lucy P. Mair, Native Policies in Africa, New York: Negro Universities Press,
[1936] 1969, 157-158.
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Coast. The background, selection and the responsibilities of this first group are
elucidated at some length herein. They were almost always graduates of the four great
British universities, Oxford, Cambridge, Trinity Dublin and Edinburgh and came to the
colonial service by patronage and individual selection rather than by competitive
examination. The second group includes the chiefs of the several indigenous states
and their councils. These states, existing for many, many years prior to the arrival of
the British on the Gold Coast, were usually quite small with economies based on small
farms raising food tor the farmers’ families on land allocated by the chiefs. The chiefs
were chosen, or enstooled, by the people from among a few families deemed to have
royal lineage. As they were enstooled by popular choice, they could also be removed,
or destooled, by vote of their subjects and were those beholden to those members of
their communities, most often their councillors, with the most political influence. Until
1944, these chiefs and their councillors made up the indigenous or “Native” tribunals
that decided disputes between and among their subjects. With rare exceptions, they
were not conversant with English and were illiterate in that language. The third group,
usually described herein as a coastal elite, were most often graduates of missionary or
other European style schools, spoke and wrote English and frequently had English
university educations and professional training. Ever since the crushing by the Gold
Coast administration of the Fanti Confederation in the years immediately preceding
establishment of the Gold Coast Colony, an event I discuss in the next chapter, the
British had often expressed their distrust, if not their fear, of this coastal elite, many of
which were involved in the creation of early form of westernized African government,
residents principally of Cape Coast, Elmina and Accra, many of whom were men of
-4-

means and who had a relatively long history of engagement with British merchants, on
which basis they asserted a claim to leadership, but who might form a nucleus of
opposition to British rule. The traditional authorities and this coastal elite more often
than not were competitors for leadership roles and distrusted one another, the former
believing the latter to be ignorant tyrants and the latter fearful of the former as
deculturated and out of touch with the lives of the people. The British all to often
disdained the members of the coastal elite as what we might call “wanna be”
Englishmen. Rather than turning to this group for more than incidental support, the
British chose to rely on traditional chiefs whom they believed were supported by the
bulk of the indigenous population and who would be readier to comply with colonial
policies, yet whose authority over their subjects was all too often arbitrarily and unfairly
enforced and was inconsistent with British concepts of justice. Thus the British found
themselves between two sets of elites: a coastal elite of educated and professional and
mercantile men who sought a larger role in the governance of the colony and a larger
set of traditional chiefs and councillors who had for centuries been the leaders of the
populace.
In the second and third decade of the twentieth century, the coastal elite was the
source of judges of the lesser, or inferior, courts, e.g. police magistrates, as well as
unofficial, that is to say, non-governmental members of the Legislative Council where
they were able to express their opinions but rarely carried the day in the face of a
majority of official members who were officers of the central colonial administration.
From about 1913 onward, two or three of the most prominent chiefs also sat on the
Legislative Council although they never were appointed to British judicial positions.
-5-

A substantial portion of this dissertation concerns the dual court system in
operation in the Gold Coast Colony: British courts and Native Tribunals. The latter were
seen as the most significant criterion of chiefdom, from the operation of which he and
his councillors derived most of their income. I discuss below the manner in which these
courts compelled attendance of parties and witnesses and how decisions were reached
and the supervision given to them by British officials. In the British courts, customary
law was privileged by requiring that the judges apply it in resolving disputes between
local litigants. Until 1910, a disputant could choose to have his case determined in
either British or traditional courts. The 1910 Native Jurisdiction Amendment Ordinance,
however, severely limited, over the staunch opposition of the coastal elites, expressed
principally by Joseph E. Casely Hayford, access by Africans to British courts despite
repeated evidence that the Native Tribunals that would now often be the only forum for
resolving disputes were not being fairly or efficiently run. To both of these policies, the
coastal educated elite expressed intense opposition, opposition that continued almost
throughout the period under study but which failed, until 1944, to alter the British policy
of favoring the traditional chiefs in the administration of justice. We shall see that this
dichotomy of often conflicting interests was a major reason that British rule was both
weak and inconsistent both in policies demanded by the Colonial Office as well as in

-6-

those created in Accra itself.5 Indeed, it was, as Anne Phillips has pointed out,
“impossible to find a consistent expression of the objectives of colonial rule.”6
Lonsdale and Berman argue that the Kenya they studied was “paralyzed
between the opposing demands of a ‘West Coast’ and a ‘South African’ policy – or, as
we would prefer, between the conflicting requirements of peasant and settler political
economy.” They argue that the authority of the colonial state rested on a “compatibility
of interest between the big men of both peasant [by whom it appears they mean the
chiefs and elders of the indigenous communities] and capitalist production [by whom it
appears they mean plantation and mine owners].” However, unlike the situation in the
Gold Coast, they argue that capitalist production required appropriation of African land,
creating very different tensions than those that existed in the Gold Coast where only a
small percentage of land was subject to concessions to Europeans.7
The British were not the only colonial power in Africa having to deal with
choosing between educated elites and traditional chiefs. The French, too, faced this
choice. They opted to grant citizenship to a small group of Africans in four communities
in Senegal many of whom received French educations and who were granted access to
French courts as two elements of what the French deemed to be civilization. At the
5

Mair argues that the British responded to “spasmodic pressure” to pass legislation to control the
chiefs that they then did not enforce. Ibid. Lawrance, Osborn and Roberts, in the Introduction to their
volume of essays, explore the question whether the weakness of colonial rule derived from a continual
restriction on funds and a shortage of personnel or whether the colonial state, having imposed law and a
stable economic and social organization was, in fact, a strong state. Benjamin N. Lawrance, Emily Lynn
Osborn and Richard L. Roberts, “Introduction,” in Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks, African
Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa, edited by Benjamin N. Lawrance, Emily Lynn Osborn and
Richard L. Roberts, Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2006, 3-34.
6

Anne Phillips, The Enigma of Colonialism, London: James Currey, 1989,13.

7

John Lonsdale and Bruce Berman, “Coping with the Contradictions: The Development of the
Colonial State in Kenya, 1895-1914,” Journal of African History, Vol. 20 (1979): 482-505, 482, 500.
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same time, they felt “duty bound to respect ‘traditional’ West African customs, thus
permitting those of their Senegalese subjects to resolve disputes in the traditional
manner according to traditional law.8
Law and Colonialism
According to the historian/anthropologist, Martin Chanock, European law was
“the cutting edge of colonialism, an instrument of the power of the alien state and part
of the process of coercion.”9 Chanock’s unconditional opinion was not unique to him.
The noted German historian of imperialism, Wolfgang J. Mommsen, expressed a
similar view when he wrote: “There can be no doubt that the imposition of European law
and European legal procedures upon various peoples in the non-Western world was in
the first place a means of establishing and extending imperial control, formal or
informal.”10 Benjamin Lawrance and his colleagues argue that the purpose of the legal
system was to engage the natives in the colonial project, and that validation of colonial

8

Alice L. Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa,
1895-1930, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997, 74. Muslims, however, even those with French
educations, could opt to submit their legal disputes to Islamic courts. Ibid., 88.

9

Martin Chanock, Law, Custom and Social Order in the Colonial Experience in

Malawi and Zambia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 4, quoted in Roger Gocking,
“Colonial Rule and the ‘Legal Factor’ in Ghana and Lesotho,” Africa:Journal of the International
African Institute, Vol. 67, No. 1 (1997), 61-85, 66.
European Expansion and Law: The Encounter
of European and Indigenous Law in 19th- and 20th-Century Africa and Asia, edited by
. .
. See also
.
10

.

International Political Science Review,

. 3

.3

3

33

3 8
....

.
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authority required that subjects have a means to “aspire to justice,” to facilitate
commerce, to prove external legitimacy and to reduce African resistance. Certainly, as
we shall see, the British authorities repeatedly expressed their desire to see to it that
the indigenous courts rendered fair justice without exploiting the people.
A reader of these sentiments could reasonably conclude that law was the
principal, if not the sole, vector through which the European powers imposed
themselves on subordinate peoples, even more important than military force. That is
simply not true in the case of the Gold Coast. Indeed, while British law and legal
principles were important elements in establishing and maintaining imperial control in
the British West African colonies in general and in the Gold Coast protectorates and
colony in particular, a more nuanced view, I submit, will show that British law was not,
as P. Fitzgerald put it, the “central mode and legitimation of the imperial project,” but
was one “tool,” in Michael Doyle’s words, to implement imperial objectives.11 I attempt
to show what those imperial objectives were and also to explore the manner in which
colonial judges used that tool.
In this study, we shall see that the British had no consistent imperial policy,
shifting initially between abandoning the Gold Coast forts to the merchant community at
11

P. Fitzgerald, “Custom as Imperialism,” in Law, Society and National Identity in

Africa, edited by Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, Ulrich Spellenberg and Ulrike Wanitzek, Hamburg, 1990), 23;
Michael W. Doyle, Empires, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986, 354. It cannot be doubted that
the enforcement of English mercantile and commercial law greatly benefitted not only English merchants,
but African ones as well, of which there were a great many on the Gold Coast. John D. Hargreaves,
Prelude tothe Partition of West Africa, London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1963, 30. See
also Adewoye, supra, 14. (“A very potent factor in consolidating and stabilizing colonial rule was the
imported European legal process. In the hands of British colonial administrators, law was a veritable tool,
stronger in many ways than the Maxim gun.”)
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the behest of the Treasury and retrieving them at the importuning of missionaries and
humanitarians intent on quashing the domestic slave trade, then wavering between
leaving the Gold Coast and establishing a colony.12 For almost two hundred years, the
British evidenced no interest in a permanent presence on the Gold Coast, limiting
themselves to small forts from which they conducted trade, first in slaves and later in
tropical commodities. Such a conquest would require not only power to suppress
hostile opposition, but education, an investment in the economy and “an efficient
judicial system suited to the state of social progress.”13 Even after the Colony was
created, the British waffled on such issues as imposing direct taxation and European
land tenure, creating more autonomous indigenous courts and generally ruling
indirectly. But, unlike their countrymen in India, the British were present on the Gold
Coast for almost two hundred years before they created formal courts for the resolution
of disputes between Europeans and Gold Coast Africans, nor did they at any time
during the first nine decades of the nineteenth century seek to change the rules
governing property. The leading expert on the imposition of European law on India and
Indians, Bernard Cohn, has written that “One of the first problems confronting a colonial
power after establishing de facto or de jure sovereignty over a new territory is to set up
procedures for settling disputes arising within the dominated society, and to establish a
whole range of rights in relation to property and obligations of individuals and groups to

12

Robert O. Collins, Europeans in Africa, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971, pp. 62-

63; H. L. Gann, and Peter Duignan, Burden of Empire (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967),
12.
13

Ibid., 10-11.
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one another and to the State.”14 Although, as I discuss below, the British ordained the
establishment of both British and Indigenous Courts following creation of the Colony in
1874, they did little to alter the form of land tenure as they had done in India and
created no obligations to the colonial authorities by imposing any direct taxes until
World War Two.15
These failures to change land tenure and impose direct taxes are a recognized
mark of British weakness in colonial administration of the Gold Coast Colony, a
weakness derived from an unwillingness to pay the cost in treasure and lives that they
believed would be necessary to enforce a firm policy in either of these areas and were
exceptional within the Empire as a whole. As J. E. Casely Hayford, a British educated
African barrister and early Gold Coast nationalist, put it, the colonial administrators were
without direction and too concerned with promotion and mobility.16 In discussing the

14

Bernard S. Cohn, “From Indian Status to British Contract,” The Journal of

Economic History, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Dec. 1961): 613-628, 613.
15

Phillips, The Enigma of Colonialism, 123.

16

J. E. Casely Hayford, Gold Coast Native Institutions, London: Sweet & Maxwell,
Ltd., [1903] 1970. Hayford was the son of a prominent and prosperous Methodist minister who was
educated at a Wesleyan school in Cape Coast and then Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone. He served
as a teacher and then principal of the Wesleyan school. He edited and co-owned two English language
newspapers published in Cape Coast before going to England to study at Peterhouse College,
Cambridge, and the Inner Temple. While practicing as a barrister in the Gold Coast, he edited the Gold
Coast Leader and co-founded, along with John Mensah Sarbah, the Mfantsipim School in Cape Coast.
Upon Sarbah’s death he became President of the Aborigines Rights Protective Society and was a
founder of the National Congress of British West Africa. Hayford wrote a number of influential treatises
on land policy noted below and served on the Gold Coast Legislative Council. Magnus J. Sampson, Gold
Coast Men of Affairs(Past and Present), London: Dawson’s of Pall Mall, [1937] 1969; Magnus J.
Sampson, ed., West African Leadership: Public Speeches Delivered by J. E. Casely Hayford, London:
Frank Cass & Co., Ltd. [1951], 1969; Magnus J. Sampson, Makers of Modern

(continued...)
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British failure to impose modern European concepts of land tenure, Anne Phillips
argues that the British were anti-modern and anti-capitalist in West Africa and saw
themselves as the guardians of a pre-capitalist order, paternalistic and concerned with
the “dangers of a modern economy,” slowing change wherever possible to avoid the
perceived evils of wage labor and to prevent the spread of European individualism that
had been adopted by the coastal African elite.17 She contends that the colonial power
could not enforce change because of its reliance on and commitment to the traditional
authorities whose power and influence would be undermined by that change.18 So, too,
Thomas Hodgkin saw the colonial state as feudal in nature, with the Secretary of State
as sovereign and the Governor as principal vassal, lacking in internal consistency and
responding in an uncoordinated manner to various stimuli.19 Indeed, the British
establishment prided itself on its ad hoc response to events. George Padmore quoted
Lord Cranborne, a one time Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the Colonies,
saying “‘We have no cut and dried pattern. We have adopted and adapted existing
systems, changing them readily as the need arose and experience taught.’”20 This
pragmatic approach was based on British perception of African character and trends
but, as Sara Berry noted, they “rarely exercised enough effective control to accomplish

(...continued)

Ghana, Accra: Anowuo Educational Publications, 1969.
17

Phillips, The Enigma of Colonialism, 1, 3-5, 7

18

Ibid., 11.

19

Thomas, Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa, New York: New York University
Press, 1957.
20

George Padmore, The Gold Coast Revolution, London: Dennis Dobson Ltd., 1953, 4.
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what they set out to do.”21 Berry’s perception is right on the mark insofar as the
evidence from the Gold Coast discloses. Thus, until World War Two, Britain failed to
impose direct taxation despite almost a century of efforts to do so. It failed to save the
tropical rain forests despite repeated expression by its chosen experts of the necessity
to do so to prevent dessication of the land and destruction of the cocoa crop.
Even some of the Colonial Governors themselves recognized the lack of
consistent policy. Writing in 1908, Governor John Rodger told the Colonial Office that
he had studied Gold Coast history going back seventy years “as recorded in official
despatches and elsewhere” and that colonial administration had been characterized by
“lethargy and ineptitude.” He went on to say that “it is difficult to trace either continuity
of policy or rigour of administration in the history of this colony.”22
Judges and Administrators
The relationship between the judges and the administrative officers in the Gold
Coast Colony is a separate but also a significant issue in this study. In the United
Kingdom as well as in the United States, the separation of the powers and functions of
the executive and the judiciary is fundamental to the Anglo-American concept of judicial
administration. Yet in the Gold Coast Colony that separation was, at best, partial. As
one scholar and African judge, Austin Amissah, has noted, “[t]he judicial tradition
21
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bequeathed by the British colonial administration to the African states was not such as
would encourage the kind of judicial independence of action of the other branches of
government as is associated with the American courts. The position of the courts was
that of an adjunct of the executive.”23 Judges were considered to be no different than
other colonial officers serving during the pleasure of the Sovereign. “The position of the
colonial judges, which was akin to civil servants, coupled with the fact that they served
in any one particular country for only a limited period of time, a period which could be
shortened by transfer to another place if a judge proved uncongenial, must have further
weakened any desire on their part to appear in the image of a Coke.”24 Amissah argues
that the practice of reporting on the judges to the Governor and the Colonial Office was
inconsistent with judicial independence and that the courts were but an extended arm of
the executive to be used for enforcing imperial policy and “to underpin the
administration.”25 “By and large,” Amissah claims, “the judiciary did not fail to come up
to the expectations of the government” in those few cases in which important policy
issues or the image of the government were involved.26 As we shall see below, Henrika
Kuklick’s research on the origins of Gold Coast colonial officials disclosed that they
were all treated as administrative officers, even those whose duties involved hearing
criminal cases and appeals from indigenous courts.
23
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Simenssen argues that the Colonial Government saw judicial independence as
an “anomaly” unsuitable for a “basically authoritarian” system of government. He notes
that the Government made regular efforts to reduce the jurisdiction of the British Courts,
e.g. the Chiefs Ordinance of 1904 that put the power to destool in the hands of the
Administration, and the Native Jurisdiction Amendment Ordinance of 1910 and the
Native Administration Ordinance of 1927. He contends that the real motive and
rationale behind the continual professed effort to reduce the expense of litigation was
hostility to local attorneys and the educated African elite and the desire to protect the
colonial state from the perceived nationalist threat of these groups and to protect
European companies from the competition from African merchants.27 Such evidence as
exists in the archives does not fully support Simenssen’s somewhat cynical view.
Rather the archival material demonstrates that in legislating as to native jurisdiction, the
British were aware of the problem of the expense of litigation and sought to limit the
imposition of what the British felt were excessive fines and fees. While this evidenced a
sincere desire to reduce the expense of litigation, British efforts to carry out that policy
were weak and ineffectual because the burden of enforcing the rules set out in the
ordinances fell on overburdened District Commissioners who lacked the time to review
native tribunal judgments unless one or another of the parties appealed and who were,
in the first instance, administrative officials, not independent judges.28
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Historiography
Until as late as 1999, few historians gave attention to colonial legal history. As
Anthony G. Hopkins noted, “[c]olonial legal history is one topic that has been signalled
but scarcely explored.”29 I shall try to fill that lacuna in the process addressing several
historiographies that touch on, but do not primarily focus on, colonial law in the Gold
Coast.30 First among these is the historiography of common and customary law. Next
is that of colonial administration such as the studies of Anthony Kirk Greene and
Henrika Kuklick. The third approach, taken most recently and influentially by Frederick
Cooper, connects colonial law to the related issues of economic development and
nationalism.
Law and Custom
Before engaging in an analysis of the historiography, I look at concepts of law
and custom. Law is not a static concept. This is particularly true of the common law, a
system of normative rules that developed in Great Britain, but more so in England, over
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the past one thousand years by means of judicial decisions and parliamentary
statutes.31
Law represents standards of communal behavior and guides that behavior not
merely by negative means, that is by civil and criminal penalties, but by offering positive
criteria against which members of the community can be judged. Nevertheless, many
definitions of law include the coercive effect of state power, for unless violation leads to
negative consequences for the violator, it is not law.32
Common law derived in England from customary law. Thus they are not so
much different in kind as in a stage of evolution. Sally Falk Moore argues that law and
custom are more alike than different and that custom, like law, can and does evolve
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and change.33 Custom is based on the day to day practice of the community, that is
what people do as opposed to the normative position of law, that is, what people should
do. Not every custom rises to the dignity of law, but such custom is a material source of
law out of which a norm is manufactured.34 It has been said that customary law as
applied by lawyers is a “distortion of something and that something is custom before it
becomes entangled and appropriated in the colonial situation”; it is separate from the
social relations that are integral to true custom.35
Common law courts decide cases on the basis of established rules, rules that
bind the courts as well as the parties. These rules, embodied in the concept of stare
decisis, are enunciated by higher courts, generally courts of appeals, and disseminated
to lower courts, and are fashioned from often conflicting rules. To disseminate these
rules implies written decisions or judgments so that reference can be made by future
courts dealing with similar matters.36 By contrast, customary courts determine matters
on the basis of habitual conduct taught by family and community to be proper human
behavior, the source of which is often considered to be divine and which is enforced not
33
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by corporal punishment or imprisonment but by communal criticism and even
ostracism.37 In the Gold Coast, reliance on precedent was not a part of Akan customary
law – each case was decided as if it were the first of its kind, because no record of the
judgments of customary courts was made.38 The primary purpose of the customary
courts in the Akan area of the Gold Coast was not to enforce a “right” or an “obligation,”
as such, but to prevent discordance in the community, to keep or restore peace and
harmony and to assuage injured feelings by a decision that all parties would accept.39
Nevertheless, writing in the late 60's, Max Gluckman, a social anthropologist of the socalled Manchester School that focused on conflict, postulated a balanced society while
some of his colleagues emphasized what Lyn Schumaker describes as a pursuit of the
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nature of conflict and change.40 In his model of a balanced society, Gluckman argued
that reasonableness and responsibility was as much a part of customary law as of
common law.41 Gluckman’s argument defines the dispute among legal historians as to
the relationship, if any, between custom and law. Gluckman contends that custom as
applied by the Barotse among whom he lived and worked, and by extension by all
indigenous peoples, was as much “law” as were the rules applied by European courts
and those of the colonial powers in Africa. Indeed, as we shall see, the common law
courts of the Gold Coast were obliged to apply customary law in cases between
indigenous peoples and sometimes in those where Europeans were parties. While the
purpose of this dissertation is not to resolve the dispute between those who claim
custom is law and those who contend that it is not, description and discussion of the
manner in which justice was administered in the Gold Coast necessarily touches on that
dispute, and we shall see how some of the common law judges viewed custom.
It has been argued that the customary law of the Gold Coast peoples was not
adapted to modern commerce as it came to be developed in the latter part of the
nineteenth century.42 Nevertheless the common law courts of the Gold Coast
recognized that there are “many roads that lead to justice,” and permitted, indeed were
required by the Gold Coast Supreme Court Ordinance to permit, customary law to
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flourish and treated it with respect in most instances, provided that, in the opinion of the
common law courts, they conformed to “modern standards of civilized values.43 Jörg
Fisch argues that the British generally had to allow indigenous courts to exist and
indigenous law to continue to be enforced in order to stabilize European rule because
imposing English law at the behest of a small group of Europeans would have risked
resistance and unrest. As a result, the British created and maintained legal inequality
between Europeans [who had access to British courts] and natives [who, as in the Gold
Coast, generally did not, but who wanted to have such access] by giving Europeans
control of native courts and law theoretically “in order to do justice.”44 Similarly, Samuel
Assante asserts that enforcement of customary rules was merely “a sort of imperial
dispensation within the larger framework of English law, that often official contempt for
‘native’ law was hardly veiled” and that rules for dealing with custom, such as the
repugnancy doctrine, were based on a “tacit premise . . . that English law enshrined a
higher set of values than Ghanaian customary law,” an expression of the cultural
imperialism referred to earlier in this chapter.45 But driven by the pressures of
commerce, colonial administrators began to modify customary law in an unsystematic,
indeed ad hoc, fashion. The evidence I have found in the Gold Coast archives and in
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judicial decisions of the British courts fully supports Fisch’s and Assante’s view that
customary law was tolerated rather than supported and was controlled by English rules,
such as the repugnancy doctrine, more about which below, and appeals to English
judges who may not have fully understood the customary rules they were obliged to
enforce.
Bertram argues that attorneys were prohibited in Native Tribunals not so much
as Simenssen would later have it because of hostility to attorneys in general and the
local elite in particular, but because forensic advocacy was not a customary practice
and attorneys were not readily available outside the large towns on the coast.
Moreover, Bertram contends, untrained or ill-trained “bush lawyers” fomented litigation
and tended to obscure rather than elucidate the truth.46 Firmin-Sellers attributes to
Danquah the view that since attorneys cared little if anything for customary law,
permitting them to appear in Native Tribunals would cause those Tribunals to lose their
identity as administrators of the customary law. She argues that the British feared the
native elites would unduly influence the uneducated chiefs who, they thought, were best
suited by experience to lead the people. In their typical racist fashion, they considered
the elites to be “detribalized troublemakers” divorced from their indigenous roots.47 The
evidence found in judicial decisions of the British courts of the Gold Coast does not
support either Danquah’s or Firmin-Sellers’ conclusions, particularly when one
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considers that were all parties in customary courts to be represented, no party would
have a particular advantage in influencing the decision makers.
In Max Gluckman’s chapter in Kuper and Kuper and in his contribution to Ideas
and Procedures in African Customary Law, based on his study of the Barotse of southcentral Africa, he argues that the concept of reasonableness and responsibility in trade,
contract and tort law is as important in African customary law as it is in much of British
law. Gluckman implicitly exalts British common law comparing it favorably to traditional
law which he praises for its similarity to common law. This dissertation seeks to apply
Gluckman’s thesis by arguing that the colonial common law judges made law that was
attractive to indigenous Gold Coasters because many of the core concepts embodied in
the judges’ decisions were already familiar to them.
Lauren Benton most recently contends that all colonial powers used similar
techniques to sustain and structure multiple legal systems to stabilize the colonial order.
Of course, she says, the colonial state dominated that order by requiring that appeals
from indigenous courts be made to their colonial courts and by regulating the conditions
under which such appeals could be taken. This process homogenized traditional law
while making it less reflective of local differences and the social context while creating a
colonial common law much as English judges had created a law common to all of
England from disparate local sources.48 She goes on to argue over the years, the
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common law courts “subsumed in one way or another all jurisdiction including
‘traditional’ forums given special status by the state, essentially saying that all courts
were British courts. This was particularly true in the Gold Coast, I show, where British
courts held that Native Tribunals existed as courts only because of legislation. Benton
also argues that British law, like British courts, was dominant; such dominance “was
what made legal pluralism possible. . . . Indigenous law was recognized precisely when
it could no longer offer a true alternative to the power of the colonial state.”49 My study
demonstrates that the British judges and administrators identified the rule of law with
rule by law and that they constructed purposeful differences between colonized and
colonizers as well as colonial cohesion. They changed local law into an imperial
common law. I examine here how the government and its agents, the judges, created
and implemented that law. The judges, who, in the common law tradition declared what
the law was, carried out the government’s program of developing resources while
maintaining the differences between rulers and ruled and reinforcing the power of the
former.
It should be noted, as Sara Berry has done, that some pre-1993 works criticize
the “structural and jural paradigms” set out in the works of Gluckman and Marxists such
as Rothermund. These critics ( e.g. Berry) see African society as more fluid, dynamic
and ambiguous than those they criticize.50 Berry argues that custom continued to
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change even after ostensibly being fixed in judicial decisions. One may also argue that
British judges changed custom, as they often altered common law rules, to fit in with
colonial developmental policies. The evidence found in the decisions of the Gold Coast
Supreme Court establishes that British judges often created customs based on
conflicting expert evidence adduced to them, but it also establishes that customary law
was less fluid than Berry would have it, albeit not entirely rigid, in what Berry calls “an
era of intensified contestation over custom, power and property.”51
Administrative History
Henrika Kuklick, who studied Gold Coast administrators, argues that so-called
indirect rule became individualized personal rule by junior officials who were given
responsibility to oversee the conduct of traditional authorities, particularly how these
latter functioned in their judicial capacity, but who were not supervised closely enough
by the colonial government to prevent them from exercising more power than they
otherwise might or should have done.52 She points out that senior colonial office
recruiters eschewed the idea of competitive examinations in favor of personal
interviews looking for applicants with social polish, a characteristic valued over practical
knowledge, men with “a keen sense of justice,” primarily from the upper classes who
did not have to seek an economic return from their education.53 However, she argues
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that the colonized of the Gold Coast pressured their chiefs to oppose unpopular colonial
policies and thus compelled to British to compromise in the face of such pressure to
prevent the chiefs, their principal agents, from being seen a British tools and thus losing
the respect and obedience of their people.54 Kuklick argues that the public school
background of those chosen to fill the post of District Commissioner that stressed and
unswerving loyalty and faithfulness to tradition led to the Commissioners offering an
indiscriminate protection of chiefly authority and customary practices.55 Kuklick ignores
the creation of the Colonial Legal Service in 1933 and only deals in passing with the
magisterial role of the District Commissioners. Thus a gap exists in the picture of the
British colonial administration. She, Anthony Kirk-Greene (who was a colonial official)
and others have gathered very useful data on the class origins, education and
professional background and service of colonial governors suggesting the homogeneity
of class and education.56 Benjamin N. Lawrance, Emily Lynn Osborne, Richard L.
Roberts and the contributors to their volume of essays,57 as well as Jonathan Derrick,58
have looked at the role and influence of native interpreters and clerks as intermediaries
between the British and the indigenous peoples, but there exists no studies, such as
Kuklick and Kirk-Greene have done with respect to administrative officers, as to colonial
54
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judges and such a study is sorely needed because the judges, a narrow subset of
colonial administrators, exercised so much authority over disputes in what was deemed
to be a litigious society where judicial proceedings occupied much time and financial
resources, because they often represented the principal connection between the local
populace and the British administration and because they held ultimate jurisdiction over
decisions of the traditional rulers.
These studies and this dissertation fit into the context of “political structures
values and understandings of the colonial,” but I would move the conversation forward
by showing how the judges fit into those experiences, values structures and
understanding and how they contributed to the purposeful construction of differences
and colonial cohesion, i.e. by changing local law into an imperial common law, by
exerting a monopoly on criminal procedure and the trial of serious crimes and by
asserting their power to have the final say on appeals from traditional courts in land
cases. Since the judiciary played such a significant role in the colonial bureaucracy and
the manner of colonial rule, historians of British colonialism should be interested in
filling this lacuna in their study of imperialism, a lacuna derived in part, I submit, from
the British aversion to lawyers in general and to colonial lawyers and judges in
particular.
Nationalism and Economic Development
The shifting nature of the “politics of difference,” as Frederick Cooper calls it, is
illustrated by the relationship between the elite common lawyers of the coastal
communities and incipient Gold Coast nationalism. Björn Edsman’s thesis is that Gold
Coast nationalism is not linearly descended from the alliance between western
-27-

educated mainly urban coastal elite and traditional chiefs in opposition to colonial land
policy. Rather, he contends, the traditional chiefs were adapting to colonialism while
the elites were seeking to participate in a society being created by the British through
membership in the legislature and the judiciary. Edsman argues that the educated
urban elites tried to manipulate tradition and its symbolic representatives, the Chiefs, in
their own interests while proclaiming that they were defending traditional law and
custom as chiefs gained political power. He goes on to say that Hayford and his
colleagues “claimed social affinity with the British and the society they represented” and
that John Mensah Sarbah and his colleagues worked to adapt the ideas of the British
judiciary to local conditions. According to Edsman, they believed that English law was
an engine for social change and that it was necessary to make traditional courts part of
and subordinate to the Supreme Court and to codify customary law along English
lines.59 Over the course of the period covered by this study, both coastal lawyers and
other members of the coastal elite as well as traditional chiefs found places in the
legislature, although they did not become a majority until after the close of the period
under study. Moreover, slowly, indeed, very slowly, Africans moved into judicial
positions, at first as Police Magistrates, and, finally, in the 1930's onto the Supreme
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Court. It can be said then that they adapted to colonialism.60
Some historians, among whom are Martin Chanock, Gordon Woodman, Jap de
Moor and Dietmar Rothermund, point to the interplay of law and colonial exploitation.
Chanock argues that both indigenous people and Europeans used the law to compete
for resources.61 He accepts the British rationale that their reluctance to impose
individual ownership tenure was related to the colonial government’s concern that
development should be orderly. Rothermund more recently argues, however, that
Europeans purposefully tried to turn land in Africa, and particularly in the Gold Coast,
into a commodity, a condition that previously existed only in Europe and, by insisting on
specific boundaries of estates, to effect a shift of cultivation and pastoralism into
commercial agriculture. Woodman, however, in the De Moor and Rothermund
collection of essays, agrees with Chanock that access to land and resources is the
central theme in colonial history, but argues, contra to Chanock and Rothermund, that
the British failed impose English land law in both the Gold Coast and Nigeria. Rather,
the British creatively utilized colonial law, an amalgam of common and customary law,
to develop a legal system that enabled them to maintain peace and order, one of their
principal political objectives being peacefully to exploit indigenous resources.
60
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Rothermund’s thesis is similar to the view of the Critical Legal Theorists that the British
used law for political purposes, to enable European exploitation of African resources.
Kirstin Mann’s and Richard Roberts argue that law both facilitated and restrained
colonialism as well as provided a window through which to view colonialism. Similarly
to Rothermund, they see the British as purposefully utilizing both common and
traditional law to enable them to exploit Gold Coast resources, but, as Woodman
argues, because the British felt compelled to respect judicial decisions, they were
unable to carry out their initial intentions. Moreover, I contend that the judges’ shift from
directly imposing common law land tenure to creation of a hybrid colonial law where
British judges determined what traditional tenure was amounted to strategy and
technique. Similarly, Beverly Grier urges that the interests of British capital required
that the bulk of the population remain in traditional communal economic and political
relationships because cocoa was cheaper if produced on non-alienable family or stool
land.62 Contrast these views with that of A. L. Loveridge, who served for years in the
Gold Coast administration, who argues that traditional tenure impeded economic
development by obscuring the nature and extent of the rights of individuals participating
in communal title.63 As I shall show hereafter, this view ignores the well developed
decisional law defining the rights of such participants as undivided interests in the
property entitled to be consulted and to agree with respect to alienation of property.
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Chanock argues that both the native peoples and the British used law to
compete for resources and that British reluctance to impose individual land tenure was
evidence of their desire to encourage development of peasant agriculture.64 In this he is
consistent with Grier’s view. While the archival evidence found in London and Accra
supports the British desire to create and maintain a peasant agriculture, the motive for
such desire is less obvious. Clearly it was easier for British firms that purchased Gold
Coast cocoa to deal with an atomized market, but there is no evidence to prove that
British opposition to plantation agriculture was motivated by a desire to support British
chocolate manufacturers. It could as easily be, as Harrington argues, that the role of
the British was to assist the natives by “‘grafting’” on to indigenous institutions,
particularly judicial institutions, such British ones as would push the natives toward
modernization and make them part of “civilized nations.”65
Frederick Cooper, one of the leading experts on West African history builds on
and criticizes both Berry’s reliance on customary law and nationalist historiographies.
As Cooper has pointed out, some of these “reveal the hypocrisy of Europe’s claims to
provide models of democratic politics [and] efficient economic systems . . .,’
demonstrating both the “stultifying effect” of colonialism as well as the dead hand of
tradition that colonialism inconsistently and contradictorily supported.66 Cooper has also
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taken another look at British African colonial history as written by post-independence
African historians. He argues that many such historians privilege early resistance and
emphasis on sovereignty but, he says, sovereignty was not the only, and perhaps not
even the main issue for many African societies. Also involved was a “history of smallscale producers and merchants for whom the overseas connection offered
opportunities they did not want to give up as well as oppressions they wanted to
contest.” Cooper points out that recent studies see the anti-colonial struggle also in
terms of protecting the power of certain elites to exploit the people and the privileges of
the ruling class.67 Cooper seeks to rethink the nationalist metanarrative, pointing out
that some of the greatest economic successes, of which cocoa production on the Gold
Coast stands out, did not depend on colonial initiatives but were inspired by Africans
themselves and do not fit within the bounds of subaltern narratives.68
Cooper concludes that understanding colonialism requires a social analysis of
power relationships, that these relationships were not entirely one way and that western
ideas of reason and progress could be and were utilized by colonized people for their
own purposes. Examples of this approach may be seen in some of the settler colonies
of southern Africa, colonial governments reduced their commitment to involvement in
British justice in favor of the traditional authorities who would be able to exercise some

67

E.g. Mamadou Diouf’s study of the Senegalese nineteenth century Wolof king, Lat Dior Diop.
Mamadou Diouf, Le Kajoor Au XIX Siècle: Pouvoir Ceddo et Conquête Coloniale, Paris: Karthala, 1990.

68

Frederick Cooper, “Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African
History,’ The American Historical Review, Vol 98, No. 5 (Dec. 1994): 1516-1545, 1521, 1523, 1530.
-32-

control over detribalized industrial workers.69 Finally, Cooper concludes that the
weakness of some post-colonial states grew out of the territoriality displayed by those
traditional elites privileged by the colonial administration. This was not true in the Gold
Coast, where the chiefs, being subject to replacement by their subjects, were weaker
than they may have been elsewhere but where they could, as long as they were
supported by their subjects, withstand pressure from the colonial administration as, for
example, their ability to weaken forestry legislation to allow them to continue to exercise
some measure of control over lands subject to their control. The problematic
relationship between Britain and the traditional authorities is also exemplified by its
confused and anemic land policy. The Colonial authorities were convinced that control
of the use of land not under cultivation should lie with the administration, but they were
not able to carry out such a policy because of strong opposition by a unity of coastal
and traditional elites. They also believed that control of concessions by the chiefs
should be subject to administrative, not judicial, oversight and approval, but they were
unable, despite strong support from a commissioner and a departmental committee, to
achieve such a result. Britain’s attitude toward development of Gold Coast resources is
not necessarily manifest through judicial administration. However, one may note the
repeated failure of the British executive to enact legislation to regulate land tenure or
land use or to create forest reserves over the objections of indigenous authorities that
such legislation trespassed on their rights to own and use their land as they saw fit.
Lastly, the colonial administration was able to enact legislation toward the end of
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the period under consideration in this dissertation that would limit severely, if not
eliminate entirely, the authority of the chiefs to operate indigenous tribunals, albeit such
courts were supposedly strengthened and made less oppressive to encourage the
people to make more use of them. Nevertheless, a special commissioner sent to study
operations of the indigenous tribunals found that such legislation did not eliminate
imposition of excessive costs and fees although the reforms enacted in 1944 did reduce
or eliminate entirely the control of the traditional authorities over those courts and
introduced into them educated members of the urban elite. Indeed, subsequent
commissions recommended further reforms to reduce further the influence of the
hereditary authorities in the hopes of eliminating what was determined to be continuing
corruption.
The British, in their efforts to rule indirectly by supporting traditional authorities,
Mahmood Mamdani argues, transformed a decentralized tribal government that was
subject to control by councils and potential destoolment into a decentralized
despotism.70 The chiefs’ courts were seen by them as an arm of their chiefly power and
permitted them to coerce litigants into paying the fines and fees that, given British
failure to support the chiefs financially, amounted to their main source of revenue. As
we shall see, British oversight, as weak as it often was, may have alleviated but never
eliminated this coercion. Having elected to support the traditional elite as opposed to
the relatively new elite of the educated classes and having limited the jurisdiction of the
British courts leaving oversight of the native authorities to what Mamdani calls “the
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administrative guidance” of overworked District Commissioners, the British can readily
be said to have enabled this form of corruption that continued onto the eve of
independence and afterward.71
Sources and Methodology
As noted above, most of my sources are in archival documents consisting of
communications between the colonial administration and the Colonial Office in London
as well as internal communications between various members of the colonial
administration in London and Accra. I found no inconsistencies in the vast majority of
the documents consulted and thus feel comfortable in relying on their veracity. In these
communications, I looked for the motivations underlying them, particularly when they
revealed some dispute or disagreement between the colonial administration and the
Colonial Office. Often the answers to these questions were revealed in the documents
themselves or in a subsequent interchange.
By the nature of the documents seen in the archives, the voices of the
indigenous people of the Gold Coast are rarely heard. Trevor Getz looks at this
phenomenon in his discussion of the problems of Abina Mansah, noting that historians
are at fault for “tending to see ordinary individuals as less important and so they have
chosen not to write about them.”72 However, he says, historians have begun to look at
sources for the voices of ordinary actors, such as court cases and newspapers. I, too,
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look at these sources as well. Abina’s story was found in the report of her judicial
proceeding, Regina v. Quamina Eddo, in the court of an English Judicial Assessor.73
Moreover, an occasional communication from an important local authority, as, for
example, Nana Ofori Atta, the Paramount Chief of Akyem Abuakwa, may be found in
reports of legislative proceedings or letters to colonial officials or in reports of his
indigenous tribunal, but except as relayed or interpreted by District Commissioners or
as detailed in a judicial report, or newspaper article, we do not generally hear what the
“people” say. In sum, then, this is a history of a bureaucracy, governmental officials at
different levels charged with ruling a subjugated people. It looks at a particular and
somewhat narrow aspect of colonialism, the administration of justice, from the point of
view of the colonial masters rather than from that of the governed. As such, it is a
history written by the victors and many of the points made herein are those of the
colonial authorities and rarely consider the views of the colonized, although I do look at
the effects on the colonial subjects of the decisions and policies of the British overlords.
Acknowledging that I write from the perspective of the British authorities, my narrative
is, as Michel-Rolph Trouillot puts it, necessarily just one of many possible narratives
with an effort to make it more than just a “pretense of truth.”74 I further acknowledge
that the past I am exploring is not again in Trouillot’s words, “a fixed reality” and that I
look at the issues I discuss both as narrator and actor.75
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I strive in this study to demonstrate Britain’s quandary in its efforts to assure the
efficient delivery of justice in both British and indigenous courts while governing through
local authorities whom they did not trust to deal honestly in their courts. I show that
Britain never found a way out of this dilemma until the major, and only partially
successful, reforms of 1944. I also demonstrate that Britain was inconsistent in the
formulation and enforcement of policies dealing with the indigenous courts and land
tenure thus allowing a major space for indigenous agency in a colonial context.
This study also shows that despite lip service to judicial independence, the
administrative authorities made many efforts to bend the judiciary to perceived
administrative requirements, particularly in dealing with issues arising from concessions
to European mining interests. It also sought, more successfully, to limit the jurisdiction
of the British courts in land disputes between and among indigenous litigants as well as
in the creation and administration of forest preserves. I show that the influence of the
administration on judicial activity was most obvious in the actions of District
Commissioners who carried out both administrative and judicial functions.
The evidence I found in the archival materials supports Woodman’s view as to
Britain’s failed efforts to replace customary law with European ideas. It also
demonstrates the failure to impose upon its colonial subjects a legal regime to which
they expressed united opposition. One only has to look at the proceedings of the West
African Lands Committee appointed by the Colonial Office to review land tenure and
concession problems and which concluded that customary tenure rather than European
tenure was more appropriate to the indigenous peoples or the failure in the 1920's to
enact a Statute of Limitations and thus to impose European norms as to land holdings
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to demonstrate such failure. In sum, I build on and confirm Thomas Hodgkin’s view of
the colonial state as a feudal entity, but one allowing some space for the agency of both
the educated class, those trained in British schools, lawyers, ministers and physicians
as well as successful merchants, all of whom I call the colonial elite, as well as the
indigenous traditional authorities.
Chapter Outline
The chapters of this dissertation discuss different aspects of the administration
of justice in the Gold Coast, including the dual system of law and justice, British and
“Native,” criminal and civil. I look at the appointment of British judges, the manner in
which matrimonial law and succession was legislated and carried out and the way in
which the British dealt with customary land tenure and forest preservation policies.
In the next chapter, I outline the history of British contact with the Gold Coast
from the early nineteenth century until and shortly after the creation of the Colony in
1874. I discuss the establishment of what came to be known as a “Judicial
Protectorate” by Captain George Maclean, the apparently voluntary execution by many
of the chiefs of an agreement, known as the Bond, giving the British jurisdiction in
serious criminal matters, the continuous and sometimes reluctant intensification of
British involvement in the affairs of the indigenous population, the creation and brief
existence of a confederation of Fanti states the existence of which enraged the British
Governor. I discuss the expanding role of British judges who sat as assessors in Native
Tribunals and their gradual assumption of decisive roles in determining disputes
between natives. Finally, I describe the creation of the Gold Coast Colony and and the
establishment via a Supreme Court Ordinance of British courts.
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Chapter III discusses the qualifications of the judges who manned the courts
established in 1876, their social origins, how they came to be recruited and appointed,
their training and issues involving judicial independence. I look at transfer and
promotion of the judges and their tenure in general. I also examine the conflicts
inherent in the duties of District Commissioners who served in both administrative and
magisterial capacities. In Chapter IV I briefly describe the lives and work of four
significant Gold Coast Chief Justices who led the Gold Coast Supreme Court for more
than forty five years in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I discuss their impact on
Gold Coast law and their relationships with the executive arm of government. I chose
these judges because of their impact on the hybrid law that developed in the Gold
Coast after 1874 and their relationships with the Executive, both abrasive and
cooperative.
Chapter V deals with the appointment of African judges. Between 1907 when
the first African Supreme Court Puisne Judge retired and 1935 when an African was
appointed to that tribunal, no indigenous judge sat on the Gold Coast Supreme Court,
although from 1919 on several Africans were appointed to police Magistracies. These
appointments seem to have been made only reluctantly, as much for political purposes
as for responding to judicial needs. Although appointed in the same manner as their
European colleagues, they had to overcome higher hurdles to achieve the positions
they came to hold.
Having discussed in detail the personnel of the British courts, I turn, in Chapter
VI, to the jurisdiction of these courts in a dual system of justice divided between British
and Native Courts. I discuss the narrowing of Supreme Court jurisdiction over the years
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from a plenary jurisdiction to one in which the most important cases, those dealing with
land, were confided primarily to traditional tribunals, the requirement of the Supreme
Court Ordinance of 1876 to apply customary law to cases involving indigens and
determination of such law, through the testimony of “experts” whose opinions the
judges were free to accept or reject, thus enabling the British judges to create “custom”
that often was unknown to the indigenous peoples. I describe the pressure for and the
complexities involved in creating a super-colonial appellate court in the 1920's and
disputes over debtors’ rights in the British courts.
Chapters VII, VIII and IX go to the heart of this study, the development of
indigenous courts under the British, the latter’s continued unhappiness with the manner
in which those courts operated and their successive efforts to cause them to deliver
justice while, at the same time, supporting the prestige of the traditional authorities until
1944 when the role of the chiefs as judges was reduced and almost entirely eliminated.
The first of these chapters discusses the efforts to enact and enforce a statutory
scheme, a Native Jurisdiction Ordinance. By means of this scheme, Britain hoped to
regulate indigenous courts, such that those not recognized in accordance with the
terms of the Ordinance would not be recognized as other than arbitration or mediation
panels.. Chapter VII also describes the perceived inadequacies of the initial Native
Jurisdiction Ordinance because of the lack of provisions to enforce their judgments and
what critics saw as oppression of litigants through excessive fees and fines and
rampant corruption and Britain’s efforts from 1894 to 1910 to revise the initial ordinance
to correct such perceived defects, the opposition to such efforts by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court who argued that limiting access to British courts as the proposed
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ordinances provided would contravene what he believed was the desire of a huge
majority of native litigants to seek British justice rather than to submit their disputes to
traditional chiefs. I note the ultimate support for such limitation by African unofficial
members of the Legislative Council who represented the educated elites of the coastal
towns.
Chapter VIII describes the failure of the 1910 Amendment Ordinance to satisfy
the requirements of inexpensive and impartial rendition of justice by the Native
Tribunals because of repeated and lengthy adjournments of hearings and continued
imposition of excessive fees and fines and further efforts to amend it because of
opposition from both elites and chiefs, the latter of which objected to perceived
restriction of their traditional powers to impose such fees and fines as they saw fit.76
Finally the British turned the process of drafting an amendatory ordinance over to a
group of chiefs who consulted widely with their colleagues and the British
Administration resulting in a 1927 Native Administration Ordinance that aroused wide
spread opposition from the coastal elites who charged that the Ordinance gave the
traditional authorities so much authority as to enable the chiefs to tyrannize not only
their direct subjects but the elites as well.
Chapter IX describes repeated amendments, essentially band aids, to correct
numerous shortcomings in the 1927 Ordinance, primarily the continued oppression of
litigants through excessive fees and fines shared among members of the tribunals who
represented only the chiefs and their councillors. It discusses reform proposals by
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British officials on the Gold Coast, Lord Hailey and a Committee of colonial executives
and Africans all of whom agreed on the necessity to reduce the number of tribunals, to
reduce the number of judges who sat on the tribunals and to inject a measure of
professionalism into the administration of traditional justice. The result was a Native
Courts Ordinance that took the rendition of native justice out of the hands of traditional
chiefs and their councillors and put it into those of a broad group of local people,
including educated Africans. It concludes with a brief description of post-1944 studies
of the failures of the traditional courts to satisfy both British requirements to provide
justice and the demands of local peoples.
Chapter X concerns British criminal procedure, an essential element of the
foremost manner in which British colonialism was imposed on the indigenous
population and had been since prior to 1844. Supreme Court judges held regular
Assizes during which all manner of criminal actions were tried in accordance with
English common and penal law pursuant to a Criminal Procedure Ordinance, most with
panels of assessors whose recommendations that court was free to disregard, but the
most serious of which were tried by juries empaneled from lists of educated Africans
and European residents in the same manner as would exist in England. It discusses
one of the most notorious examples of the trial for capital murder of an Englishman, Dr.
Knowles, accused of killing his wife and who was tried by a judge without either jury or
counsel to defend him and his ultimate exoneration after appeal to the Privy Council.
Chapter XI delves into some aspects of matrimonial law and succession to the
property of intestate decedents, again illustrating the relationships and frictions between
British and native law. Marriage among Gold Coasters was generally a matter of
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customary law and the property of married couples would descend upon their deaths
according to customary law.77 This law, for most of the people of the Colony, required
that property of intestate decedents pass not to their spouses or children but to their
matrilineal relatives. I describe the origins of the Matrimonial Ordinance that required
those married pursuant to its terms to forego polygamy and to have their property pass
in intestacy pursuant to English law, a patrilineal system. I go on to discuss pressure
from the African community to amend the Ordinance to permit at least a portion of an
intestate’s property to descend pursuant to customary law and the treatment of children
born to a couple prior to their Ordinance marriage.
Chapters XII and XIII deal with the manner in which land disputes were handled
in both the indigenous and British courts and legislation involving concessions and
forestry. Chapter XII describes how the British courts through rulings in individual cases
altered traditional communal land tenure toward the European concept of individual
tenure so as to make land more readily alienable and subject to development. It
discusses efforts by the colonial administration to control alienation of land by
legislation in order to impose European tenure and the failure of such efforts when the
Secretary of State, Joseph Chamberlain, accepted the protests of the African
community represented by members of the coastal elite and refused consent to
legislation that would have placed all African owned land under British control. It
describes enactment of a Concessions Ordinance designed to prevent the unregulated
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alienation of native lands to European speculators and the continuing efforts of the
executive authorities to wrest control of the concession process from the courts under
whose aegis control of the concession process was placed. It discusses appointment
first of a commissioner and then of a West African Lands Committee to review land
tenure and alienation, the recommendations of these bodies to eliminate the judicial
role in the concession process and the ultimate failure of the British government to
carry out those recommendations or to enact several subsequent proposals for reform
of land regulation all designed to make land more readily alienable, presumably to
British investors.
Chapter XIII discusses efforts that began in the first decade of the twentieth
century to preserve the rain forests from destruction. It looks at Nigerian precedents, a
comprehensive scheme that provoke attack as an effort to deprive the traditional
owners of the land of their rights to use such land as they chose and the unwillingness
of the British government to impose any effective method to protect the forests until the
latter part of the 1920's.
These chapters evidence the inconsistency of British policy and the feebleness
of their efforts to enact policies they strongly believed to be necessary for the
development of the Gold Coast economy as well as preservation of its natural
resources.
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CHAPTER II – BRITAIN IN THE GOLD COAST BEFORE
CREATION OF THE COLONY: 1662-1874
Any discussion of the manner in which the British administered justice in the
intense Gold Coast should begin with a brief description of how the British came to be
there and how they came to be involved with the internal affairs, particularly the judicial
affairs, of the indigenous peoples. British involvement involved a number of frustrated
reforms perhaps deriving from an inconsistent series of efforts at government and
seven wars with the Ashanti state that bordered what became the Gold Coast Colony.
Nevertheless, the arc of more British involvement in local judicial determinations was
continuous. It ran from the initial efforts of Captain George Maclean to promote peace
among indigenous states and their peoples that abutted the British forts the interest of
increasing trade through appointment of permanent judicial officials to hear claims
brought to them by such neighboring peoples. Finally it led to the establishment of a
Colony with a statute based system of courts and justice.
Initially, I describe the region and its people prior to the administration of Captain
Maclean, the manner in which the Akan and Twi peoples came to the Gold Coast, the
relationship between the coast Fanti and the inland Ashanti and Britain’s delegation of
government to merchants. Then I discuss how Captain Maclean came to become the
supreme judicial figure in the Gold Coast Settlements and his relations with the
Metropolitan Government. Finally, I describe British judicial administration of those
settlements and the events that led to the founding of the Gold Coast Colony, including
the Fanti Federation, the decision not to leave the Gold Coast but to create a colony
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and the drafting and passage of the basic ordinances that created the Gold Coast
Supreme Court.
This chapter demonstrates the British Government’s indecision as to whether
and, if so, how it extensively it should be involved in the administration of what
ultimately became the Gold Coast colony, whether by private administration by
merchants engaged in trade on the Gold Coast, somewhat akin to how Britain dealt with
other trading entities that also exercised public authority such as the East Africa
Company, or direct administration by the Government in London. Both methods were
tried before the merchants were permanently removed from the duty and power to
administer what were then coastal settlements. It also demonstrates the reluctance of
the metropolitan government to intervene in the administration of justice by the
indigenous leaders and the increasing intervention in such administration in large
measure because trade disputes between British and local merchants and the
necessity, for purposes of commerce, to maintain peace with and amongst the local
population.
Historians dealing with the nineteenth century Gold Coast and British
involvement there concentrate on the political implications, increasing British
imperialism and nascent nationalism. However, A. P. Newton, while not writing
extensively on the subject, trenchantly argues that an 1844 treaty known as the “Bond,”
was the “principal title deed of the Gold Coast Protectorate.1 The evidence cited herein
supports this argument. Similarly, the evidence supports the argument of W. Ross
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Johnston that the submission of the chiefs in executing the Bond of 1844, resolved the
ambiguities of jurisdiction that existed because of Maclean’s ad hoc actions and,
inferentially, promoted the increasing British involvement in indigenous affairs.2 In this
last respect David Kimble briefly discusses the British “judicial protectorate. He
accurately points out that the roles of the Judicial Assessor, a position essentially
created by Captain George Maclean, which was to assist local chiefs in resolving
disputes and that of Chief Justice, which was to serve as the primary judicial authority in
British courts, were merging and that “the regard paid to local customs became more
and more perfunctory.”3
In these early days, following the abolition of the slave trade, the raison d’être for
the British presence on the Gold Coast was mercantile: trade in commodities and
manufactured goods. Richard Huzzey, a historian of the anti-slavery movement, who
points out that the principal result of a parliamentary inquiry into the manner in which
Captain Maclean governed the British settlements and his creation of a judicial
protectorate, induced by a report made by Richard Madden was an increase in state
control over the Settlements and a reaffirmation of the “civilizing effects of trade.”4 He is
supported by John D. Hargreaves, who describes the primary importance of trade and
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the necessity to use commerce as a means of civilizing the Africans of the Gold Coast.5
This focus on trade and commerce explains in some measure the reluctance of the
British Government to respond to repeated pleas by the colonial governors for
additional judicial personnel or to spend money on other than infrastructure
improvements that would do other than benefit trade.6
The manner in which the British administered justice in the nineteenth century
Gold Coast was not unique. In Nigeria, merchants established a Court of Equity to
settle disputes between British firms and local traders as early as 1850.7 Treaties were
imposed on local chiefs establishing the British court of equity as the supreme judicial
authority in the country.8 Following establishment of a colony in Lagos and
protectorates in Southern Nigeria between 1861 and 18859, the British created native
courts whose authority emanated entirely from British recognition, choosing those who
would sit on them from among men the British perceived to have leadership
capabilities.10 In 1900 a Supreme Court was established for the Southern Nigeria
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Protectorate that enforced English criminal law.11 Unlike the situation in the Gold Coast
however, native courts had no legal status until 1906 when the colonial government
issued a Native Courts Proclamation empowering to enforce customary law not
“repugnant” to English ideas of natural justice.12
The situation in other parts of Africa, however, was different. Thus, in Kenya
where the colonial regime did not begin until 1890 as a result of the Congress of Berlin,
little if any regard was given to indigenous courts until well into the twentieth century
and all usual legal matters, both civil and criminal were handled by British courts,
although the judges often considered and enforced customary law.13 In the segregated
and often virulently racist colonial society in Kenya, the British appointed the chiefs who
were permitted to become, in Swanepoel’s words, “increasingly dictatorial,” too often
indifferent to the needs or demands of the people over whom they ruled.14
The Earliest Days
The Akan peoples came to the Gold Coast in two waves between around 1200
and 1300 A.D. down the Volta Valley and later down the Offin and Pra rivers. Over the
next several centuries, they spread east until they came into contact with the coastal
Fantis. Both the Akans (a linguistic group that includes Ashantis) and Fantis spoke one
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version or another of Twi. The Ga’s, Ewes and Krobos came from Nigeria at the end of
the fifteenth or the early sixteenth century. All these indigens were matrilineal (although
some Ga were patrilineal), territorial and chiefly. The Ga, who mainly occupied the
towns, were patrilineal and the Chief (the Manche) was more beholden to his council
than were the Akan/Fanti chiefs as his was more a spiritual position than a secular one
and was not hereditary.15 By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Akan states
of the coastal region were being well established there and inland.16
The Portuguese navigators Jao de San Toros and Pedro de Escobar discovered
Oro de la Mina in 1471, and in 1482 Diego d’Asambuja built Elmina Castle on rented
land. Dutch, French and English followed to exploit the slave trade. The Dutch
captured Elmina in 1637 effectively ending the Portuguese presence.17
The English built Cape Coast Castle in 1662 as their headquarters. For almost
two hundred years, the British evidenced no interest in a permanent presence on the
Gold Coast, limiting themselves to small forts from which they conducted trade, first in
slaves and later in tropical commodities. Brodie Cruickshank, who served as a judge in
as well as governor of the Gold Coast settlements during the mid nineteenth century
and whose memoir, Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast of Africa, is one of the most
important primary sources for a history of those settlements through that period,
expresses most eloquently the motivation for the British imperial venture as seen at that
time. Climate precluded, he says, armed conquest and settlement by Europeans even
15
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were intermarriage, an impossibility from the European perspective, to take place.
Thus he argued, the only way to raise the Africans to a European standard of civility , “a
conquest far nobler than the warrior’s sword has yet accomplished, a conquest born of
Christian charity,” was to institute strong government, including “an efficient judicial
system suited to the state of social progress,” – implying that it would change as the
Africans became more and more Europeanized – as well as schools and improvements
in infrastructure.
Cruickshank foresaw a permanent role for the British, but in fact they had no
coherent imperial policy but shifted between abandoning the Gold Coast forts to the
merchant community at the behest of the Treasury and retrieving them at the
importuning of missionaries and humanitarians intent on quashing the domestic slave
trade.18 Nevertheless, they did, albeit reluctantly and over a period of years, establish
what came to be referred to as a “judicial protectorate,” the establishment of an informal
jurisdiction to resolve disputes brought to them by the Fanti peoples of the coastal
areas abutting their trading forts. Very shortly after such judicial protectorate was first
asserted, a gap opened between the periphery, the administrators in the settlements,
and the center, Government officials in London, about the propriety of such protectorate
and the extent to which English law should be imposed. Thus, unlike their countrymen
in India, the British were present on the Gold Coast for almost two hundred years
before they created formal courts for the resolution of disputes between Europeans and
Gold Coast Africans, nor did they at any time during the first nine decades of the
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nineteenth century seek to change the rules governing property.19
From 1618, when the Company of Royal Adventurers Trading to Africa (the
“Royal African Company”) was chartered, until 1822, the settlements on the Gold Coast
were owned and operated by private merchants, first through the Royal African
Company and then, from 1750, by the Company of African Merchants, whose directors
sat in England and appointed officials to govern the settlements in West Africa.20 Until
1807, Europeans in general and the British in particular had nothing to do with African
politics. They paid rent to the Fanti states in which their settlements were located in the
form of “Notes” held by the Fanti kings and were subject in their dealings with Africans
to the customary law of such kingdoms. Many British merchants objected strongly to
much of this customary law such as that which held that beached ships escheated to
the king of the territory in which the beach was located and that upon the death of a
European merchant, his goods passed to the king. Nevertheless, they resolved their
disputes through the process of “palaver,” an action in the customary court.21
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This is not to say that British authorities ignored the dispute resolution process
as it related to their own merchants and even to those involving only Africans. As early
as the mid eighteenth century, merchant governors intervened to mediate disputes
between and among their Fanti neighbors. Peace and order being the principal
precondition for trade, the British merchant authorities offered their services in order to
prevent disruption of that trade. In 1792, Archibald Dalzel, Governor of the
Settlements, established a permanent court at Cape Coast Castle and together with the
chiefs and elders as assessors, tried all cases among natives from Cape Coast and
neighboring Fanti states. In 1802, the Governor entered into a “convention” with the
Cape Coast chiefs for the latter to keep the peace on penalty of forfeiture of goods to
the Royal African Company, a penalty which was no longer enforced after Dalzel left
the Settlements. Another Governor of the forts, McCarthy, presided over trials and
gave judgments in cases involving mulattos who resided up to four miles from Cape
Coast Castle. Notwithstanding being told by chiefs that native law permitted the
accused to do so, McCarthy gave judgment against a defendant accused of flogging a
slave because he believed that English law was superior to and trumped native law.
James Swanzy, a former Governor, testified before a Select Committee of the House of
Commons in 1816-17 that even without any authority to do so, Governors accepted
appeals from natives to decide cases between them and Europeans and even between
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them and other natives in accordance with native law and “English sense of justice.”22
At this point the British made no effort to impose English law on Africans,
although early missionaries, far removed from the coastal settlements pronounced
judgment on marriage, inheritance and other legal questions that, they believed, bore
on the morals of the community and did so on the basis of such principles of English
law about which they had any knowledge.23
In 1807, Great Britain outlawed the slave trade that had been the source of its
profits (and those of the Fanti middlemen who bought slaves captured by Ashanti kings)
threatening the well being of British and African merchants alike.24 The Ashanti, who
had grown rich trading captives they had taken in their many wars for weapons and
other British goods were unwilling to accept the demise of their economy quietly. They
began to press their Fanti neighbors in order to gain direct access to the Europeans so
as to benefit from the new legitimate trade without having to see the profits go to
middlemen. Importuned by the Fanti for protection against increasing pressure from
their traditional enemy, the British fought the first of a series of wars against the
Ashanti, beating off an Ashanti invasion. In 1817, the British sent an embassy to the
Asantehene, the King of the Ashanti, to negotiate a settlement of the outstanding
disputes among the Ashanti, the Fanti and the British. The resulting “Bowdich Treaty”
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provided for the transfer of the Notes on the British forts25 to the Asantehene,
authorized the British Governor to mediate between the Ashanti and the coastal
peoples and provided that “The Governor-in-Chief reserves to himself the right of
punishing any subject of the Ashantee (sic) or Dwabin guilty of secondary offenses, but
in the case of any crime of magnitude, he will send the offender to the King, to be dealt
with according to the laws of the country.“26 The treaty did not define the terms
“secondary offenses” or “crimes of magnitude,” thus permitting an interpretation that
would have the British Governor trying any kind of criminal act. Indeed, as we shall see
later, these imprecise terms were the source of much bloodshed.27
In 1821, Parliament, acting under pressure from anti-slavery interests, dissolved
the Company of Merchants and assumed direct control of the Gold Coast forts. On
October 17, 1821, Letters Patent were issued giving effect to 1 & 2 Geo IV c.28 and
creating a colony called the West African Settlements consisting of the Gold Coast
settlements, Sierra Leone and the Gambia with its seat at Freetown. The Governor and
Council sitting in Freetown were established as a court of record to hear appeals from
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courts in the Gold Coast settlements and the other parts of the colony. Appeals to the
Privy Council were authorized, a Police Court and a Court of Requests were set up at
Cape Coast, other “petty” courts were established at other points along the coast and
officers in charge of the many forts were made Justices of the Peace. Soon British
courts were being utilized by natives,141 cases between natives were decided by
various British officers assisted by native chiefs between May 1822 and June 1826.28
British rule could not prevent military disaster though as the Governor and 500 of
his British and African troops were killed by a force of 10,000 Ashanti warriors in
January 1824. As had happened elsewhere and was to happen in the Gold Coast
again after the loss of a battle, the British regrouped. In 1826 a British contingent
inflicted a serious defeat on the Ashanti. The colonial administration now proposed a
treaty of peace that required the Asantehene to turn over to the British the Notes for the
forts and to permit the Governor of Cape Coast Castle, the principal British fort, to act
as arbitrator of disputes. The British Cabinet rejected the treaty because it had decided
that the Gold Coast settlements were too expensive to maintain and determined to
abandon them.29 It went so far as to send an officer in a naval vessel with orders to
evacuate James Fort at Accra and Cape Coast Castle and to destroy both installations,
but at the last moment the Cabinet changed its position responding once again to
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pressure from abolitionists “too strong to ignore and too earnest to deceive.”30 Rather,
yet again, the Government turned the forts over to a committee of London merchants
who appointed seven local agents as justices of the peace and established rules for the
conduct of business and government in the Settlements.31 No mention was made in the
authorizing documents or the rules established by the London committee of exercising
jurisdiction outside the Settlements.32
Indeed, twice in November 1828, the Colonial Office officials charged with
supervising the colonies, informed the officers and merchants of the forts that they were
not to exercise jurisdiction outside the forts even thought it would “promote peace,
happiness and morality among the natives.33” Nevertheless, the merchants construed
the term “forts” to extend to and include “the persons and districts under their
immediate influence and protection,” so that their courts tried crimes, even where chiefs
were accused and settled inter-tribal disputes.34
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The Arrival of Captain Maclean
In 1830, the London Committee appointed a Captain of Engineers, George
Maclean, as President of the Council of Merchants in Cape Coast Castle. It can fairly
be said that the beginnings of “real” British judicial imperialism on the Gold Coast are to
be found in Maclean’s appointment. An extraordinary man, Maclean served at Cape
Coast Castle as President of the Council, in effect Governor, from 1830 to 1844 and as
Judicial Assessor from 1844 until his death in 1847. Although, as we shall see, he had
numerous enemies among the merchant community, the verdict on Maclean is almost
uniformly and universally superlative.35 Mary McCarthy argues that Maclean and most
of his successors were very popular and appreciated by the chiefs and indigenous
people in large measure because most of them had lived on the Gold Coast for lengthy
periods and knew the customs and traditions of the people and because the skill of
British judges attracted people to British courts in coastal towns where they could get
justice that was cheap and convenient compared to what was available in Native
Tribunals.36 One might consider it to be ironic that many of Maclean’s judicial
determinations favored interests contrary to those of the merchants who appointed him.
In fact this demonstrates the fairness and rectitude with which Maclean carried out his
role as a judge, favoring only that which he believed to be right.
35
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Maclean approached his duties with a clear agenda. Finding the country
unsettled and insecure and with trade moribund, he determined to make peace with the
Ashanti and end the internecine quarrels among the Fanti kings. While not vital to his
objective of creating a state of peace and order, Maclean felt that he also had to end
human sacrifice and slave trading and the common practice of panyaring (taking as
hostage the relative of a debtor as security for repayment) and to demonstrate by his
own example the humane and impartial administration of justice.37 All of this for the
purpose of promoting and extending British trade.38 It was, in Fage’s words, “a common
sense policy for an administration founded upon mercantile interest,” and, he might
have added, one whose resources were severely limited.39 Maclean placed magistrates
in the settlements at Dixcove, Anemabu and Accra and went himself on circuit to sit in
trials held by indigenous authorities. Gradually and tactfully, Maclean attacked those
customs that most “affected the rights and liberty of the individual and with those laws
which seemed to err unduly on the side of harshness.”40 However, such attack resulted
in the exercise of jurisdiction without any legal basis, and, as we shall see, exposed him
to attack by some in England who thought less well of him that apparently did the
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indigenous chiefs.
The new Governor quickly disposed of the first item on his agenda by
summoning the Fanti chiefs to a conference at Cape Coast Castle to which he invited
the representative of the Asantehene. He kept them together until they had reached
agreement.41 Their treaty of peace, made in April 1831, provided for open roads and
free markets and the settlement of all disputes by palaver rather than war.42 Perhaps
most importantly from the British point of view, the 1831 Treaty incorporated by
reference the terms of the aborted 1827 treaty, the most important of which provided
that the British Governor, sitting with two or more “adjacent kings or chiefs as are
available”would determine disputes among Britons and Africans.43 Maclean sat with his
council in the capacity of an appellate court, reviewing the penalties imposed by
customary courts to assure humane consideration.44
In theory, Maclean was to be merely an advisor to the customary judges in the
exercise of their traditional jurisdiction. In fact, he came to be the principal if not the
sole decision maker with the indigenous judges acting as his assessors as to customary
law.45 Maclean had no training in the common law and did not purport to rule on the
basis of any English precedent. Rather, he decided on the basis of his imperfect
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understanding of customary law, the common law and equity.46 His decisions outlawed,
among other things, human sacrifice, charges of crime on the basis of what
Cruickshank describes as “the oracular dictate of Fetishism” and the repayment of
dowries and expenses of support in all divorces except where the wife unjustifiably
abandoned her husband.47
Maclean’s popularity among the Fanti as an arbiter arose not only from his own
judiciousness but from the unpopularity of the customary courts where impartial
judgments were rare and, more often than not, were made on the basis of political
expediency. Cruickshank observed that they were corrupt; a party had to bribe one or
more of the judges just to get a hearing.48 The British Governor’s reputation attracted
more and more judicial business, none of which he turned away despite grumbling from
the chiefs who lost the fees and fines of cases now being heard by Maclean and his
associates.49 He devised a judicial system giving most control to local authorities
subject to being “tempered by a British overview.”50 The impact of his judicial work
cannot be overstated. The noted Ghanaian nationalist and legal thinker, J. B.
Danquah, said of him that Maclean “created regularity and law,” that his “main interest
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was in the expansion and perpetuation of justice.”51 And J. Mensa Sarbah, one of the
most influential voices of early Gold Coast nationalism, a barrister and legal scholar and
the compiler and editor of several books on Fanti customary law, wrote of Maclean’s
work in brokering the 1831 Treaty and his subsequent judicial activity that he acted in
strict accordance with the Fanti proverb that a neutral had the duty to try to reconcile
struggling neighbors. Sarbah saw Maclean’s policy of respecting and supporting the
chiefs and involving them in his decisions as a means of consolidating British
interests.52 The draft report of the 1912 West African Lands Committee appointed by
the Colonial Office pointed out that even without specific records, it could be assumed
that the cases that Maclean and his successors dealt with involved land boundary
disputes and “reduced considerably internecine fighting and bloodshed.”53 The
combination of the velvet glove of Maclean’s judicial activities and the iron fist of British
power permitted British influence and jurisdiction to extend far beyond the Settlements
into the interior.54
It must be emphasized that no African litigant was compelled to bring his claim to
a court in which Maclean or his colleagues sat. If they did so, they did so voluntarily.
That being said, the advantages of dealing with the apparently dominant power, even if

51

J. B. Danquah,, “The Historical Significance of the Bond of 1844,” Transactions of the Historical
Society of Ghana, Vol. III, Part I (1957): 1-29, 20. Brodie Cruickshank observed that the courts of the
indigenous authorities with Maclean or one of his deputies present became “a species of lecture room,
from which the principles of justice were disseminated far and wide throughout the country.” Cruickshank,
Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast of Africa, Vol. 2, 24.
52

J. M. Sarbah, Fanti National Constitution, 2nd ed. (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1968) 81.

53

BNA CO 578/117/1046, 10.

54

N. M. Ollennu, “The Influence of English Law on West Africa,” Journal of African Law, Vol. 5, No.
1 (Spring 1961): 21-36, 22, 25, 26. See also Memorandum of Sir W. Brandford Griffith, Jr., 7.4.1912
.GNA ADM 5/3/16.
-62-

that power was rarely and carefully exercised, must have been apparent to even the
dullest litigant. Consequently, despite Maclean’s intentions to the contrary, the power
and influence of the indigenous authorities began to wane and the chiefs began to see
themselves as subordinate officers in a system where they were subject to the
oversight of the superior power.55
Despite his apparent success in pacifying the Fanti lands and increasing British
trade, Maclean and his administration were the subject of a number of complaints from
London abolitionists, principal among them that he took no steps to suppress domestic
slavery although the Settlements constituted British territory and the Abolition Act
applied there. In addition, he was criticized for acting without legal authority in asserting
jurisdiction over African litigants and chiefs. Parliament reacted to these complaints by
sending an agent, Dr. Richard Robert Madden, as Commissioner of Inquiry into the
Affairs of the British Settlements on the West Coast of Africa to investigate. His report
alleged that the local authorities attempted to impede his inquiry and was sharply critical
of Maclean’s extralegal and “informal” jurisdiction.56
A Select Parliamentary Committee to Inquire into the State of the British
Possessions on the West Coast of Africa, etc., heard testimony from a number of
witnesses, including one of Maclean’s magistrates, Francis Swanzy, who testified that
British exercise of jurisdiction was “forced upon us” by the Africans themselves. Asked

55

Cruickshank, Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast of Africa, Vol. 2, 23.

56

BNA CO 267/170; Newton, “British Enterprise in Tropical Africa,” 665. Madden was so hostile to
Maclean that he claims to have placed, at his own expense, a marker on Mrs. Maclean’s grave at Cape
Coast Castle that Maclean had previously left unmarked. Thomas More Madden, ed., The Memoirs
(Chiefly Autobiographical)from 1798 to 1886 of Richard Robert Madden, London: Ward & Downey, 1891,
118.
-63-

if he thought the Africans would be “most unwilling to see us withdraw our influence,”
Swanzy replied, “I am certain they would be most unwilling; it would be a total loss to
them. . . .”57
Contrary to Madden’s assertions, the Committee admitted the merits of
Maclean’s administration and his good influence among natives, maintaining “peace
and security through exercising a useful albeit irregular jurisdiction among the
neighboring tribes and much mitigating and in some cases extinguishing some of the
most atrocious practices which had prevailed among them unchecked heretofore.”58
The Committee acknowledged that Maclean gave judgments in criminal cases without
the proper legal forms, i.e. without a separate judge and jury, but concluded that
Maclean did a great deal of good in resolving civil disputes to the satisfaction of the
indigenous litigants albeit by exercising “a kind of irregular jurisdiction.” However, the
Committee recommended that a “Judicial Officer should be placed at the disposal of
the Governor to assist or supercede partially or entirely his [Maclean’s] judicial
functions”59 and that jurisdiction be “better defined and understood” and exercised by an
official, rather than a private person, provided that the litigants and their chiefs agree
that he should do so and that he decide not on the basis of English common law.60
The Secretary of State, Earl Grey, accepted most of Parliament’s
recommendations, but saw the role of Judicial Assessor as being one to execute
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justice rather than to administer law, indeed to be “quite independent of all positive
law.”61 Nevertheless, neither Parliament nor the Colonial Office specified the extent of
the jurisdiction of the Judicial Assessor or the manner in which he was to decide cases.
Indeed, a memorandum from James Stephen, Permanent Under Secretary of State,
eschewed enforcement of English law entirely. These documents demonstrate the start
of a different approach taken by colonial administrators in Africa and bureaucrats in
London with the former being more aggressive in asserting claims to decision making
authority while the latter seeking, albeit without real effort or success, to rein in their
people on the periphery and permitting the judicial officers.
In the absence of any express limitation on his authority, it is clear that Maclean
saw his powers to be coextensive with those of a metropolitan judge. Responding to
the concerns set forth by the Secretary of State and Parliament, Maclean wrote to the
London Government, expressing his view of Britain as sovereign over the Fanti
Kingdoms by reason of the treaties of 1829 and 1831 that had never been renounced.
He noted that his summonses and warrants were issued with the same authority as if
they had been issued by an English Judge in the United Kingdom and he and the other
magistrates exercised civil and criminal jurisdiction over the population without any
objection from them.62
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On March 12, 1843 Maclean was appointed to the office of Judicial Assessor.63
In April and August 1843, Parliament passed two pieces of legislation crucial to the
exercise of legal jurisdiction outside the limits of the forts on the Gold Coast. The first,
the Government of the Coast of Africa and Falkland Islands Settlement Act (6 Vict. c.
13), authorized the Queen and her Privy Council to ordain laws and create courts to
enforce those laws as was considered to be necessary to promote peace and order for
Britons “and others within the said present or future settlements.” The second statute,
the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1843 (6 & 7 Vict. c. 94) authorized the exercise of
jurisdiction anywhere in the world to the same extent as if jurisdiction had been
obtained by cession or conquest.64
The London authorities were uncomfortable with the manner in which Maclean
accepted cases. Therefore, in December 1843, the Colonial Secretary instructed the
new Lieutenant-Governor of the Gold Coast Settlements, H. W. Hill, as to the powers to
be exercised by Maclean as Judicial Assessor, once again warning of the limitations of
British authority:
As regards any powers to be exercised by Mr. Maclean among tribes not within
British territory, as proposed by the Select Committee of the House of Commons
. . , I need scarcely observe that it must rest with the sovereign power in each
Territory to authorise or permit the exercise of any jurisdiction within that
Territory, whether according to British Laws or the laws there prevalent.65
It is evident that, at least up to this point, British policy was to refrain from
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imposing British judicial authority on the indigens of the Gold Coast, albeit Maclean was
directed to continue his superintendence of the conduct of indigenous judges.66 This
seemingly contradictory directive was typical of Government policy during these years:
the Government could not clearly specify how and to what extent it wished to proceed.
Only the desire to limit British obligations was made clear, albeit only inferentially.
However, the failure of the Gold Coast and Falklands Island legislation to define the
extent of the administrative powers granted or the territorial limits in which those powers
could be exercised allowed local officials, whose policy considerations were not always
coextensive with those of the London Government, to extend control over cooperating
chiefs whose submission to jurisdiction could be said by the Gold Coast colonial
officials to constitute at least tacit recognition of a British protectorate.67 The Order-inCouncil of September 18, 1844 issued under the cited statutes did not clarify the issue
as it merely asserted the existence of British jurisdiction over territories adjacent to the
forts. In principle, the statues and the Order-in-Council applied only to British subjects
and non-subjects who voluntarily submitted to British jurisdiction, but questions and
ambiguities remained and the method decided upon to resolves those questions and
ambiguities was a declaration of submission prepared for execution by many of the
local chiefs.68
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Carrying out his directive from the Colonial Office, on March 6, 1844, Lieutenant
Governor Hill presented to a number of Fanti chiefs a proposed agreement to submit to
British judicial jurisdiction in certain criminal cases. This Declaration of the Fanti Chiefs,
a document that came to be known as The Bond,69 was a brief recitation (only three
paragraphs) of the signatory chiefs’ submission to the jurisdiction of a British judge in
specified criminal cases. The chiefs acknowledged that “the first objects of law are the
protection of individuals and property,” that human sacrifice and panyaring are
“abominations and contrary to law,” and that “[m]urders, robberies and other crimes and
offences will be tried and inquired before the Queen’s judicial officers and the chiefs of
the district, moulding (sic) the customs of the country to the general principles of British
law.”70 The Bond was not a formal treaty and did little beyond documenting the
preexisting situation where cases had been submitted voluntarily to Maclean and his
colleagues.71 On its face, the Bond was limited to criminal jurisdiction although civil
cases still made up most of the work of the Judicial Assessor.72
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The chief significance of the Bond is to be found in the final phrase: “moulding
(sic) the customs of the country to the general principles of British law,” as this phrase
permitted the British judicial officer enormous leeway in applying the common law in
situations where customary law should prevail. Indeed, almost immediately, the
indigenous chiefs began to absent themselves from the joint courts, permitting Maclean
and his assistants to decide cases on their own, the chiefs being satisfied to collect
their fees while allowing Britons to assume responsibility for the imposition of
punishment on Africans.73 Indeed, in October 1845, the Governor reported to London,
that the Judicial Assessor had heard all but two of over one hundred cases alone,
without the chiefs or native councillors.74 And this despite a directive from the Colonial
Office that the Judicial Assessor was not to sit alone or to decide cases independently.75
Thus, notwithstanding any policy to the contrary, the colonial officials on the Gold Coast
were assuming more and more responsibility for the administration of justice among the
indigenous peoples.
The Role of British Judges After Maclean’s Death
After Maclean’s death in 1847, he was succeeded as Judicial Assessor first by
Brodie Cruickshank and then by James Bannerman, neither of whom was a trained
attorney. They followed the path established by Maclean, one that the Secretary of
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State, Lord Stanley said should be “taken as a guide for the exercise of the powers of
the Assessor in the future.”76 However, by 1850, the Judicial Assessors were being
recruited from the English bar and these men were inclined toward the law they knew,
the common law, rather than customary law, and they had to be reminded of the limits
of their jurisdiction. As long as James Stephen held sway in the Colonial Office as the
Permanent Undersecretary, the drift toward the common law would be held in check
insofar as official policy was concerned as he was utterly opposed to the exercise of
any judicial power at all outside of the forts.77 Expansion of English common law on the
Gold Coast was also resisted by a number of indigenous authorities.
Despite such Colonial Office skepticism as to the propriety of Britons exercising
judicial jurisdiction over Africans, Cape Coast Castle remained a long way from London
and bureaucrats were able to exercise little supervision on the manner in which colonial
administrators handled their day-to-day responsibilities. Moreover, by 1849, commerce
on the Gold Coast had increased many fold and both European and African merchants
had factors, or agents, at different places in the interior who kept books and accounted
to their employers on the coast with a concomitant increase in the need for credit and a
more efficient means of resolving disputes over nonpayment.78 Trading enterprises had
relied on the local chiefs to assure payment because such chiefs wanted to attract

76

Watt, 240.

77

BNA CO 96/7, Minute of James Stephen, 1.28.46.

78

In 1852, the British had purchased the Danish forts and had thereby expanded their
responsibilities on the Gold Coast considerably.
-70-

business to their towns and ports.79 Now such reliance, even with the presence of a
Judicial Assessor, no longer seemed justified. Consequently litigation related to
increased commerce also increased.
By virtue of a Supreme Court Ordinance enacted in 1853, the Judicial Assessor
was to “assist” Native Chiefs but was also to fill the office of Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court.80 The Governor-in-Council was to act as a local appellate court. Both
the Order-in-Council and the Supreme Court Ordinance assumed consent and/or
acquiescence of the natives as required by the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1843, 6&7
Vict. c. 13, C. 94.81 As it turned out, in the years after enactment of these measures,
rather than the Assessor assisting the Chiefs, it was the Chiefs who assisted the
Assessor.82 James Bannerman, now acting Governor, and concerned that judicial
jurisdiction had grown beyond reasonable limits complained to the Colonial Secretary
that the post of Judicial Assessor had evolved into “the supreme judicial authority, even
where purely native law is administered” and that he had assumed jurisdiction in civil as
well as criminal cases, albeit with the acquiescence of the native authorities.83
In 1856, an Order-in-Council (4 April 1856), authorized the new Supreme Court
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to hear cases in territories “protected by the Crown” to the same extent that they did in
the forts (i.e. on British territory) without the cooperation of any local authority, although
the consent of both local chiefs and litigants had to be obtained for the case to be
decided pursuant to the common law.84 Griffith, too, noted that from the creation of a
Supreme Court for the forts and settlements in 1853 there was a dual jurisdiction in the
Gold Coast: one dealing with matters inside the forts and settlements and one dealing
with matters outside the forts and settlements. One person filled both positions as
Chief Justice and Judicial Assessor. In the former incarnation, he was bound by
English rules of procedure and evidence while in the latter he could make up the rules
as he thought best. Gradually, according to Griffith, the two jurisdictions began to
merge so that by 1865, Hackett, the Chief Justice and Judicial Advisor said that he sat
in only one court, no chiefs sat with him and he heard appeals from native tribunals.85
The trend toward supremacy of the British judiciary enforcing the common law
was accelerated by the enactment in 1858 of an Insolvency Ordinance that imposed the
provisions of the English Insolvency Act on the Settlements.86 Now, with a new court
open to African creditors seeking redress under English law, the customary courts were
being increasingly undermined as was the prestige and influence of the traditional
authorities.87 Lieutenant-Governor Pine complained to his superior in Freetown, Sierra
Leone, that such interference with the chiefs was harming British influence but he felt
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powerless to rein in the judges.88
Not every chief acceded to the influence of the British judicial authorities. King
John Aggery, King of Cape Coast objected strenuously to the reservation by the
colonial authorities of appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the King’s court and the
maintenance of a suit in the Judicial Assessor’s court against the judge that he had
appointed. He complained to Governor Pine, accusing Captain Maclean of having
“wrested from the hands of our kings, chiefs and headmen, their power to govern their
own subjects.” For his pains, was ordered by Lord Carnarvon, the Secretary of State,
to be exiled to Sierra Leone.89
Contradictory British Policies Leading Up to Creation of the Colony
In the period leading up to 1874, colonial judges in the Gold Coast continued to
exercise jurisdiction over Africans living outside the Settlements despite the rather
feeble efforts by the Government in London to extricate Great Britain from the
complications of governing a territory in which British interests were minimal. Thus,
both the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office opposed any formal territorial
expansion. It was their policy to limit Britain’s involvement to the suppression of the
slave trade and to bring the advantages, as they saw it, of religion, civilization and
commerce to the “miserable inhabitants of Africa,” by supporting merchants and
missionaries in the least intrusive manner possible.90 Such a limited involvement
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seemed to be more and more difficult to maintain and the British Government never did
do so. As will be seen below, the British Government executed a series of contradictory
policies ultimately giving up all efforts to limit its involvement in Gold Coast affairs.
British wavering as to their proper and most desirable role on the Gold Coast
continued into the 1860's. In 1863, reacting to the refusal of the Lt.-Governor to
extradite two fugitives, the Ashanti had invaded the Fanti states under British protection
and inflicted a serious defeat on them and their British ally. Such defeat produced
agitation in Parliament to give up the West African forts entirely. Some MP’s expressed
complete accord with Captain Andrew Clarke of the Royal Engineers, a veteran of the
latest Ashanti War, who urged the War Office to evacuate the forts since trade, he
argued, could not be promoted by imposing “our institutions upon a people to whom
they are neither suited nor applicable.”91 At the urging of these MP’s in 1866 Parliament
convened a Select Committee to examine Britain’s then current role in the West African
Settlements.
The Select Committee heard Sir Benjamin Pine, the Lieutenant-Governor, who
told them that the Judicial Assessor/Chief Justice routinely held court and decided
cases in the Queen’s name rather than the chiefs’ on the basis of British rather than the
customary law that, he admitted, should be the basis for decision unless it was
repugnant to principles of humanity. Moreover, Pine conceded, the manner in which
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justice had been administered undermined native authority.92 Chief Justice William
Haskell acknowledged that when he held court in the Fanti lands, he never sat with any
of the local chiefs as it would be impossible for an English judge to sit collegially with a
native judge to administer justice, and that he applied English law to the extent that he
felt it to be consistent with “natural law.” . Finally he conceded that in matters between
Britons and Africans, he decided on the basis of the common law or the British law
mercantile.93
The Committee’s Report criticized the Judicial Assessor, arguing that he does
not fulfill “the first intention of the office, assisting the chiefs in administering justice, but
supercedes their authority by decisions according to his own sole judgment.” He
introduced “needless technicalities and expense, and the employment of attorneys,
when the natives had better speak for themselves.” The Committee resolved that the
chiefs “should be rather left to exercise their own jurisdiction, with only an appeal, when
necessary to the English magistracy.”94 This desire to limit the role of the Judicial
Assessor was consistent with the Committee’s view that Britain was present primarily, if
not only, to stamp out the slave trade and it looked forward to the day when Britain’s
commitments could be reduced if not eliminated entirely. In the interim, it
recommended a prohibition of all further territorial expansion or the assertion of any
further protectorates in West Africa and that the existing protectorates be maintained
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only until the Fanti kings felt that they do without such protection, but they were not to
be encouraged to rely on British help, even in the administration of justice. Finally, the
Committee recommended that the Judicial Assessor return to the jurisdiction originally
specified and cease to decide cases on any basis other than customary law.95
Gallagher and Robinson have implied that the Committee’s expressed desire to
withdraw from West Africa was a mere sham and didn’t allow for the extension of
existing settlements by colonial officials on the scene.96 The fact that six years later,
Parliament enacted the West Africa Settlements Act (34 & 35 Vict. c. 8) that extended
British jurisdiction to cover crimes committed within twenty miles of a British settlement
or of an adjacent protectorate (emphasis mine) by Britons or persons not subject to any
“civilized power” tends to support Gallagher’s and Robinson’s suggestion about British
good faith.
At the time of the debate on this legislation, the Government advised Parliament
of its unwillingness to withdraw so long as the Dutch remained. However, in 1872,
Britain reached agreement to acquire all the Dutch posts on the Gold Coast. It was now
the sole remaining European power, but before it could formulate a plan to withdraw,
the Ashanti army again invaded the south.97 By the time that a substantial British Army
under General Garnet Wolsey had defeated the Ashanti and occupied their capital of
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Kumasi, all thought of withdrawal had vanished, Parliamentary opinion to the contrary
notwithstanding. Now the rationale for remaining on the Gold Coast was the moral
necessity to eliminate slavery.98
British reluctance to impose European values beyond extermination of slavery
was revealed to be less than honest by the circumstances surrounding the creation of
the Fanti Confederacy, that the Africans created for themselves in 1868. A unique
constitutional structure, the Fanti Confederation, an amalgam of the Fanti states of what
is now southern Ghana, with its own executive, legislature and judiciary, was an act
promoted by the spirit if not the letter of the conclusions of the Parliamentary
Committee, but it evoked an almost violent response from British colonial officials in
Africa as well as a felt need for a national army to protect the Fanti States’ role as
middlemen in trade, a role threatened by Ashanti success in trading directly with the
coastal and British merchants.99 In 1871, the Governor in Freetown, John Kendall, then
responsible for the Gold Coast, characterized the Confederation as “too absurd and
impracticable to be seriously considered,” done only for pecuniary gain by requiring tolls
on goods passing through Mankessa between Kumasi and Cape Coast.100 The
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Governor noted the report of Gold Coast Acting Administrator, C. S. Salmon, claiming
that the people opposed the new Confederation, that he had declared the Fanti actions
to be illegal, that he had arrested all members of the Confederation Ministry except
those who disavowed any connection with the Confederation and that they would be
tried in the Judicial Assessor’s court.101 The Governor justified his actions on the
grounds that “[t]he authority of the protecting power [Great Britain] respecting life and
death, the levying of taxes and the making of treaties with foreign powers and the
supremacy of its courts (emphasis mine) is well established by custom and precedent
and could not be departed from without dire confusion resulting.”102
Much to the surprise of those officials in West Africa, I am sure, the Secretary of
State, Earl Kimberley’s response strongly criticized their conduct. “I cannot but regret
that persons claiming to hold office under the Confederation should have been
arrested” even though released on bail, he said. He continued that even though some
provisions of the Confederation constitution were inconsistent with the Protectorate, the
Administrator overreached. He should have warned the Confederation ministry that
their constitution would not be recognized until approved by the Secretary of State, not
arrested them. Kimberley directed the Administrator to stay any proceedings before the
Judicial Assessor and to free everyone who had been detained. Her Majesty’s
Government, Kimberley went on, does not want to discourage “legitimate efforts by
Fantis to establish for themselves an improved form of government” although the British
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Government must be consulted first.103 Despite protestations from an agent of the
Confederation that “no rebellion against British supremacy, no defiance of British
authority” was intended or shown, as well as Secretary of State Kimberley’s expression
of support for it, nothing more was heard about the creation of an indigenous
Confederation subject to British rule.104
Creation of the Gold Coast Colony
Those officials in the Colonial Office as well as on the Gold Coast desirous of
remaining in power in West Africa prevailed over those eager to withdraw when, in
August 1874, Her Majesty’s Government issued a Royal Proclamation declaring the
existence of a new Gold Coast Colony consisting of all of the coastal region of the Gold
Coast to the Volta River on the east and the Ivory Coast on the west as well as the
settlement of Lagos, Nigeria created by Royal Patent on July 24, 1874.105 The
document declared the Queen’s power and jurisdiction to administer justice, to outlaw
panyaring, to abolish slave trading, human sacrifice, judicial torture and “other immoral,
barbarous, and cruel customs.,” to take measures concerning domestic slavery and
pawning (offering the services of one’s self or of a relative as security for a loan or
repayment of a debt) and to establish courts and enact laws.106 On August 6, 1874 an
Order-in-Council issued implementing the power and jurisdiction proclaimed to exist in
the Queen. It created a Legislative Council, gave the Governor a veto and authorized
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the Colonial Secretary to issue additional directions.107
In his initial dispatch to the new Governor, Colonial Secretary Lord Carnarvon
rehearsed the history of the extension of judicial jurisdiction over the territories of the
Gold Coast from the time of George Maclean, described the Bond but asserted that the
definition of jurisdiction contained therein, “either from being an inadequate
representation of the facts as they then existed, or from change of circumstances,” no
longer represented the extent and scope of British power. He acknowledged that the
Bond afforded no civil jurisdiction but justified, the exercise of such jurisdiction over the
prior thirty years by the”sufferance and tacit assent” of the indigenous population.
Negotiation of a new Bond was considered, he went on to say, but the recent victory
over the Ashanti established British power and resources to the point that only “an act
of sovereign power” was appropriate.108
With the creation of the Gold Coast Colony through the Order-in-Council of July
1874 came the necessity to erect a system of courts to administer justice. One of the
main points of British policy in developing a system of British courts was to do away
with, albeit gradually, the criminal jurisdiction of the native tribunals.109 In order to
promote this policy, Sir Julian Paunceforte, the Legal Advisor to the Colonial Office
recommended that the Supreme Court Ordinance to be enacted in the new Colony
should take into consideration material similar to that found in the English Judicature
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Act, the Fiji Supreme Court Act then being drafted, ordinances concerning
extraterritorial British courts in China and Japan, consular courts in the Middle East, the
Hong Kong codes of civil and criminal procedure, the Hong Kong Summary Jurisdiction
Ordinance (which afforded a model for small claims determinations), the Leeward
Islands Summary Procedure Ordinance (which provided a good model for Magistrates’
jurisdiction), the Hong Kong Evidence Ordinance, the Indian Evidence Act, the Straits
Settlements Penal Code and the English Criminal Procedure Act.110
Paunceforte suggested Indian procedure for criminal cases as it authorized
judges and magistrates to interrogate defendants. He sent copies of all of this
legislation to the current Gold Coast Chief Magistrate, David Chalmers, who had been
tasked with drafting such an Ordinance. There were to be no civil juries, but the judges
were to be authorized to associate with them chiefs as assessors in appropriate
cases.111 Since a Criminal Procedure Ordinance was to be prepared at the same time,
consideration had to be given to whether trial by jury was applicable to the Gold Coast
and if so whether to all or only to some criminal cases: “having particular regard to the
fact that a European jury will not do justice to the case of a coloured man and that a
black jury is quite worthless.” Edward Fairfield, a relatively junior but influential young
officer, recommended jury trials only for capital cases.112
The Court that Paunceforte envisioned would have all the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court of Judicature of England, law, equity, criminal assizes, probate and

110

Ibid.

111

BNA CO 96/112, No. 13, 9.27.1874, Minute from Sir Julian Paunceforte to Lord Herbert.

112

BNA CO/96/112, Confidential, 12.15.1874.
-81-

bankruptcy. The Court should apply principles of equity to tort and contract cases
between “Civilized Persons and Mere Natives,” English law should be applied to cases
involving Europeans and “Christian Natives who have adopted a civilized mode of life”
as to personal rights and the mercantile law of England should govern commercial and
shipping cases. The Ordinance should include a Reception provision as to the laws of
England in force on July 24, 1874, the date the new Colony was proclaimed. It should
provide for the enforcement of customary law in actions between natives, family
relations, devolution of property upon death, marriage and land tenure. That is, in suits
between natives, the governing law was to be the “well established Customs and
usages provided these be proved to the satisfaction of the Court” and that are not
repugnant to morality, the principles of equity or natural justice.113
Paunceforte told Robert Herbert, Permanent Undersecretary of State, that he
thought the Court should have three judges, two Puisne Judges and a Chief Justice,
which position, he told Herbert, he had promised to Chalmers. In addition, he proposed
a staff of Magistrates who would be appointed by the judges, as would the District
Commissioners, as Commissioners of the Supreme Court and would be empowered to
hear motions, examine witnesses, conduct proceedings to enforce judgments and act
as arbitrators. They would also have summary jurisdiction in petty criminal and debt
cases. Paunceforte wanted the procedure to be as simple as possible so that a plaintiff
would tell a clerk of court what his claim was and show up on the specified date with his
witnesses for a hearing. The clerk would prepare a complaint on the basis of what the
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plaintiff had told him and have it served on the defendant with a notice to show up on
the specified trial date with his witnesses, There would be no necessity for a formal
Answer or any other pleadings.
The new Supreme Court’s jurisdiction would be concurrent with that of the
existing customary courts and would, it was anticipated attract considerable business
that would otherwise have gone to such local courts. Lord Carnarvon, the Secretary of
State, expressed his expectations for the new Supreme Court:
When the Supreme Court is established, I should hope that its influence might
be so widely extended as to supercede in most Districts of the Protectorates the
Courts of the Native Kings which are in themselves open to objections, and in
view of the present policy towards the Native Rulers, there is no political reason
to encourage. The Natives do not place a high value on time and those living at
a moderate distance from the Coast would probably report for justice to the
nearest Magisterial post on the Seaboard. . . . wherever the Colonial Courts can
be made to meet the requirements of the people of the District. I should as I
have intimated be prepared for the suppression of the Native Courts of that
District. . . . Where this cannot be effected, the Native Courts should be
regulated . . . .”114
Clearly the intent of the colonial power was to preserve customary law and the
courts that enforced it only so long as it took for British courts and English law to take
root in the society.115 Moving rapidly in accordance with these Colonial Office
114
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instructions, Governor George Strahan asked the Secretary of State for the immediate
appointment of judicial officers who would ”take their places in the new judicial system
upon the courts of justice being established.” It would be desirable for them to come
quickly so as to have as much time as possible to familiarize themselves “in the
peculiarities of unwritten native law” and the “native character” before they assumed
responsibility of judging.116 In September, Strahan sent the draft Supreme Court
Ordinance and Chalmers report on his drafting of the document to the Colonial Office.
Chalmers particularly noted that he proposed to establish a Court not merely for the
Colony but for the “territories near or adjacent thereto.”117 No one in Accra or London
caviled at this assumption of sovereign power in states linked to Great Britain solely by
treaties of protection. Indeed, none of the customary authorities in those territories
expressed any opposition either.
Pending submission to and enactment by the Colonial Legislature, the Gold
Coast Government issued a Proclamation asserting jurisdiction, inter alia, to preserve
public peace, property and protection of individuals, administration of civil and criminal
justice, including creation of a Supreme Court in lieu of the Judicial Assessor’ Court,
magistrates courts, Native Courts [thus from the outset denying inherent jurisdiction of
native courts] and such other courts as shall be deemed expedient; claiming the
authority: to legislate as to crimes, civil wrongs, property rights, contracts and fiduciary
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relations “framed with due regard to native law and customs where they are not
repugnant to justice, equity and good conscience”; to determine appeals from Native
Tribunals to magistrates or to the Supreme Court; to try criminal cases; to regulate
native prisons; to extinguish human sacrifice, panyaring, judicial torture “and other
immoral, barbarous, and cruel customs”; to abolish the slave trade, “Measures with
regard to domestic slavery and pawning”; and settling, through the Governor, intertribal
disputes. Gareth Austin argues that British courts were indifferent to pawning up to the
late nineteenth century and did not enforce criminal prohibitions because they saw
pawns as proper security for debt. In 1907 the attitude of the Colonial Office and
Colonial Government changed and pawns were no longer recognized except as to
women pawns whose existence continued to the 1940's in the guise of marriage
payments.118
The draft ordinance submitted to the Colonial Office included rules common to
civil and criminal cases and a separate schedule of rules for civil cases that Chalmers
said reduced to writing prior practice. Separate rules for criminal cases were embodied
in a Criminal Procedure Code, a draft of which was also sent to the Colonial Office.
Chalmers proposed that the Supreme Court should include a Chief Justice, the Chief
Magistrate of the Gold Coast Settlements and the Chief Magistrate of Lagos as Puisne
Judges and additional Puisne Judges as might be needed. Chalmers recommended a
Ful, that is an appellate, Court of two judges, since if all three judges were required for
appellate work, no other work could be done. With no apparent concern for the conflict
118
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of interest he was embedding in the administrative office of District Commissioner, his
draft created them Commissioners of the Supreme Court to do judicial work subject to
supervision by the Chief Justice with civil jurisdiction by consent of the parties if the
amount in issue did not exceed twice the amount of the maximum civil jurisdiction of
their courts. He limited appeals in civil cases to those where amount in issue was £50
or more, a provision that eliminated the right of appeal in the vast majority of the cases
that the Supreme Court was expected to hear. Moreover there would be no appeal to
the Full Court from an order of the Supreme Court affirming the judgment of a District
Commissioner without leave from the Supreme Court. His draft also contained
provisions regulating admission to practice as well as how practice by barristers was to
be conducted that were adapted from the Fiji Ordinance and were designed to limit fees
charged and to discourage unnecessary litigation. The Criminal Procedure Code
provided for jury trial only in capital cases and in such other cases as the Governor
might prescribe.119
Even before the Supreme Court Ordinance went into effect, Strahan and
Chalmers were petitioning the Colonial Office for more judges, as, they said, the two
existing Puisne Judges were “full up.” Five such judges would be necessary to handle
the work in the Gold Coast as well as Lagos and even that number might be insufficient
as the population was litigious, they preferred the British courts and the climate was so
insalubrious that frequent leaves were required to protect the health of the European
judges requiring more judges to cover for those on leave. Moreover, the salary of
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District Commissioners should be doubled to attract candidates “learned in the law.”120
Lord Carnarvon rejected both requests, the former because “given the small number of
white inhabitants, the existing legal establishment is ample,” and the latter because
such a salary increases were not justified by the estimates as the cost of the judiciary
was already too high.121 Evidently neither Carnarvon nor his advisers saw the Supreme
Court as a forum for litigation between natives, although the Ordinance afforded such a
forum and history taught them that Gold Coast litigants would happily seek their judicial
remedies in British courts.
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CHAPTER III – THE JUDGES – THEIR RECRUITMENT AND INDEPENDENCE
The title of “Judge” was officially conferred in the Gold Coast only on the men
who sat on the Gold Coast Supreme Court, but they were not the sole officials to
engage in adjudication. In addition there were the District Commissioners who
performed judicial functions as part of their duties and, later, Police Magistrates and
Provincial Commissioners, as well.1 In this Chapter, I discuss the recruiting of
candidates for judicial and administrative service on the Gold Coast, how they were
selected and trained and issues concerning their independence from executive
pressure and interference, including their tenure.
Anthony Kirk-Greene, whose work extended to the entirety of the colonial
service, not just Africa, confirms through a statistical study the impression of the
colonial governors that there were never a satisfactory number of colonial officials in the
dependencies.2 Kirk-Greene has done extensive work with respect to the origins,
recruitment and training of District Commissioners, as has Henrika Kuklick. KirkGreene studied what he calls the “generic District Officer,” while Kuklick focused on the
Gold Coast. Both dealt with District Commissioners as members of the Colonial
1
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Administrative Service although both barely mention their magisterial and judicial
functions. In so doing, they lend credence to the oft repeated criticisms of these
officials as lacking judicial independence and exercising their judicial functions to carry
out political policy. Indeed, Kirk-Greene emphasizes the continuing and “central
involvement” with native authorities and administrators as political advisors.3 Judges
were colonial officers subject to the discipline of the Colonial Service but sought the
independence that characterized their metropolitan counterparts. Given the importance
of their position, it is essential, I argue, to know who were the men, and they were all
men, appointed to serve in the judiciary, even those like District Commissioners who
fulfilled both administrative and magisterial roles and how they were appointed.
Kuklick argues that such training as the new appointees received prior to 1926
was superficial and inadequate, a three month smattering of many subjects, of which
law was one. This, she contends was because of an “anti-vocational prejudice” in the
Colonial Office. says, that to the men in the Colonial Office, social polish was more
important than knowledge.4 Because she ignored the judicial functions of the colonial
officials she studied, not even mentioning the creation of the Colonial Legal Service,
Kuklick left an gap in the study of the men who served as judges in the Gold Coast. As
noted above, the judges performed functions that were critical not merely to British
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administration but to the lives of a populace that was considered to be very litigious. To
decide their many disputes in a rational and peaceful fashion served not merely to
avoid violence but to bind that populace to the British notion of the rule of law. Thus, I
contend, it is important to know who there men were and how they were chosen and
trained.
Among other historians, Sir Alan Ward and John J. McLaren, who studied legal
appointments in Canada and Australia and the Empire in general, saw many lawyers
who sought employment in the colonial service as failed barristers looking for
advancement in the colonies.5 Martin J. Wiener observed that the Colonial Office
sought compliant personalities that would not make waves in dealing with the
administration.6 My examination of several dozens of applications for appointments and
the Colonial Office notes on such applications tends to support the conclusion that
many applicants were unsuccessful barristers, but does not show a prejudice for those
who would simply follow the Governors’ orders.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the Supreme Court Ordinance was
subject to expansion or contraction on the order of the Governor-in-Council which,
pursuant to Section 20(a) could declare that such jurisdiction should not extend to any
portion of the Colony specified in the order or could limit in any portion of the Colony
5
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specified in the order the class of causes or matters that might be heard by the Court.7
This provision afforded the Executive a powerful weapon with which to control a Bench
that might decide matters contrary to the wishes of the administration. While it may
have been unusual for judges to be removed, suspended or transferred for political
reasons, as Wiener argues, “the sword of removal always hung over their heads, and
sometimes . . . indeed fell.”8
Origins of the Judges: Education and Training or Lack Thereof
The men who were recruited into the Colonial Service as administrative officers
came principally from Oxford and Cambridge, Trinity College and the University of
Edinburgh, and, unless they were barristers or solicitors, received little legal training for
carrying out these judicial and magisterial duties.9 Indeed, from the earliest days of the
colony, the Governors requested that District Commissioners have legal credentials.
Information for potential recruits specified the necessity of such credentials, but more
and more over the period under study, such requirement was ignored.
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As will be seen below, with one exception, no Supreme Court judge who served
in the Gold Coast entered that service directly from the private sector but, rather, came
from other Colonial Service posts, usually from positions as Judges or Senior Law
Officers.10 District Commissioners, and occasionally Police Magistrates, usually came
directly from Great Britain. Indeed the position of District Commissioner or Assistant
District Commissioner was an entry level one.11
Recruitment of District Commissioners was the same throughout the Colonial
Service: an applicant made his desire for a position known through correspondence or
reference by someone known to the Colonial Office. He then filed a formal application
on forms provided stating his educational and other qualifications, including the sports
in which he participated and the area of the colonial empire in which he sought to serve,
or in which he did not wish to serve. All applicants for all posts prepared the same
formal application and supported it with testimonials and references. Most often a
personal interview followed. At various times, different officials decided upon the
candidate to be chosen and so advised the Secretary of State who made the final
decision.12 Unlike the situation with the Indian Civil Service, no special examinations
were required for admission to the Colonial Service whether in legal or administrative
positions. Rather, until about 1930, a Private Secretary to the Secretary of State would
10
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make the choice from among candidates deemed to be qualified and recommend such
choice to the Secretary of State who invariably accepted the recommendation. It was
difficult to find candidates willing to serve in tropical Africa, particularly in the early days,
because of what was considered to be an unhealthy climate and the plethora of
diseases not treatable easily or at all.
The question of judicial independence is complex. An independent judiciary, that
is one free from control by the administration or the legislature, was and is at the core of
British government. It has been considered to be a shield of the rights of Britons and
an essential part of their legacy of the rule of law. Despite Britain’s oft repeated claim
that it was bringing the benefits of the rule of law to its Gold Coast dependencies, the
independence of the judges of the Gold Coast Supreme Court was threatened, often by
intrusive questioning from the administration as to how and why they made certain
decisions, but I have found no evidence that they were transferred because of their
judicial actions, albeit the threat was always there as they served at the pleasure of the
sovereign. Yet the question of whether or not the colonial judges were independent of
administrative and legislative interference relates to the manner in which the British
colonial state functioned. The question of the independence of the District
Commissioners in their judicial rule was different because their position inherently
involved conflicts of interest; they were administrative officers but served as judges of
minor criminal matters, as magistrates with respect to major criminal matters and as
appellate judges with respect to decisions of Native Tribunals.
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Qualifications and Recruitment
In the last decade of the nineteenth century, the Colonial Office prepared and
published a brochure, Legal Appointments in the Colonies, known as “Memo 117,"
setting forth the conditions for employment in a legal capacity. The brochure was
repeatedly revised in insignificant respects and as revised remained in effect until
creation of the Colonial Legal Service in the 1930's.
Initially, Memo 117 stated that better paid positions in “healthier” climates were
almost invariably filled via promotions of officers who had rendered good service in the
same or in other colonies: “The number of purely legal appointments in the Colonial
Service filled from the Secretary of State’s list (i.e., from outside the service) in any one
year would probably not exceed six at the most and would usually fall below that
number; the majority of in these appointments would be in tropical Africa.” It went on to
specify that nearly all imperial appointments were open only to barristers, but that
solicitors occasionally were appointed to minor registrarships and as District
Commissioners. Candidates were to be under forty years of age and would be given up
to six examinations as to professional qualifications – a paper requirement only, as
such examinations were never given as a condition for entry into employment.
Barristers and solicitors were generally selected for posts in Tropical Africa that were
partly administrative and partly magisterial, that is as District Commissioners. On the
Gold Coast, these officials were both commissioners of the Supreme Court and were
subject to supervision as such by the Chief Justice or the Puisne Judge of the Divisional
-94-

Court in the province or district in which they served as well as executive officers
subject to control by the Gold Coast Colonial Secretary.13
As will be seen, the necessity for legal qualifications more often was a wish
rather than a requirement and as the years passed, fewer candidates selected for
positions as District Commissioners or Assistant District Commissioners had such
qualifications. However, In 1898, the Government’s record in recruiting legally trained
officials was good: all but one had legal credentials.14

But by 1908, the Colonial Office

had given up on restricting appointments to lawyers.15 According to Governor Matthew
Nathan, the District Commissioners who had acted as judges when he arrived in 1900
were very inexperienced – something he could only have learned from his extensive
correspondence with Chief Justice W. B. Griffith, Jr. -- and were “in constant
telegraphic communication with the Secretariat in Accra” as to how to deal with
magisterial issues.16 Nevertheless, the Colonial Office persisted in claiming that legal
knowledge and qualifications were necessary for employment.17 Indeed, so did the
Gold Coast Governor. He reported to London that the Gold Coast needed lawyers as
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District Commissioners in Districts where there was much legal work.18 While the
Colonial Office generally approved the Governor’s recommendations officials there
expressed themselves as not satisfied that legally trained District Commissioners were
necessary in Accra, because the Chief Justice and the Queen’s Advocate could help
out with the judicial work.19
The Gold Coast superior judges had all too frequent occasion to criticize these
Commissioners for their inadequate knowledge of the law. In one judicial opinion, the
court berated the District Commissioner for his lack of legal knowledge and Chief
Justice Marshall expressed his hope that the decision would “promote legality in the
Commissioners’ Courts” and would warn attorneys against “taking advantage of the
ignorance of the law of District Commissioners as well as of “illiterate suitors.”20
However, to the men in the Colonial Office charged with selecting judges and other
magisterial officials for service on the Gold Coast, knowledge of English law and
procedure seemed to be less important than knowledge of local conditions and the
manner in which the courts functioned.21
Knowledge of the local languages was another desirable trait to be sought in
candidates for judicial positions. Indeed, according to H. B. Cox, Legal Assistant
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Undersecretary of State,“22 it was of paramount importance in the case of judicial
officers that a judge should be dependent upon the interpretation [of an indigenous
language] is most undesirable in any court, that he should be so habitually in every
case is dangerous to the administration of justice.”23 Although District Commissioners
were subsequently required to study one or more of the local languages, that
requirement was never extended to members of the Supreme Court Bench or even to
police Magistrates. By contrast, Sir Henry Maine noted that judges training for India
were required to study the local languages as well as Indian law and usage.24
Lord Selbourne, Parliamentary Undersecretary, reported to Colonial Secretary
Joseph Chamberlain that getting good people, administrative, judicial and technical for
West Africa very difficult, but particularly so with respect to those exercising judicial
functions. Indeed, Kubicek points out, given the difficulty in recruiting able people for
serve in the Gold Coast, Chamberlain went so far as to suppress his prejudice against
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divorced and intemperate men as well as his prior rule against married men serving in
West Africa.25
A number of observers expressed less than positive views about the abilities of
legally trained men who would leave the metropolis for life in the colonies. Sir Alan
Ward argued that “[t]he man who joins the Colonial Legal Service after some years at
the Bar in Great Britain or Ireland may have some personal reason for wishing to live in
the colonies, or he may, through bad luck, have failed to make a good enough living at
home; but there is at least a chance that he has failed to make a success of his
profession in his own country through his own fault and that his legal knowledge is no
greater, in fact, than that of the ‘briefless barrister’ who comes from the Administrative
Service.” As one colonial office official put it, men who failed to create or maintain a
successful practice as Barristers in the United Kingdom, who were “journeymen
counsel” and who were uncertain of success at home were the ones who applied to
the Colonial Office, often at the suggestion of a patron.26 Insofar as he and many other
Colonial Office officials were concerned, and notwithstanding the views of the Gold
Coast Governors, administrators with in-country experience were better able to judge
than legal appointees from home or other colonies.27
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But the need for officers was such that despite the strictures of Memorandum
117, the Colonial Office appointed and the Governors were compelled to take
whomever was appointed no matter the paucity of legal qualifications. Reginald
Antrobus minuted at the same time that Secretary of State Chamberlain preferred “any
suitable officer in the service” and said that they should not wait to find barristers. “It
was clear that we could only get unsuccessful lawyers and he did not see how they
were any better than laymen.”28 When the Governor told London that he needed at
least eight more District Commissioners and was willing to take men without legal
credentials because of the difficulty in finding qualified men, he made the suggestion
that he would have newly arrived candidates study law in the Colony and would train
them in Accra as apprentices in the District Commissioner’s court.29 By its failure to
adhere to its own stated requirements for appointment of District Commissioners, the
British demonstrated once again its inability to carry out policy in the context of small
African colony.
The health of candidates was often an important prime consideration. When
Thomas Jackson resigned as a Puisne Judge in 1880, in large measure because of ill
health, three efforts to replace him failed because the candidates were unfit
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medically.30 In 1891, Governor Griffith, Sr. reported the necessity to repatriate a District
Commissioner because of ill health after just a few months in the Colony. The Colonial
Office, per Edward Wingfield, lamented the mistake in appointing a man unsuited for
service in the tropics and admitted the likelihood of more such mistakes with so few
candidates from which to choose.31 Nevertheless, strong emphasis was placed on the
health and physical constitution of candidates for positions in the Gold Coast,
particularly in the nineteenth century. In 1882, Antrobus told the Governor that since
Gold Coast judges had to travel a lot and often had to wade through the surf to land “at
the risk of their lives,” it was necessary to find young, fit, unmarried men who were
active and willing to move around.32
Although judgeships were usually considered to be the sole province of
barristers, on the rare occasion, a non-Barrister was considered to be a good
candidate for the Supreme Court. In August 1899, Governor F. W. Hogdson told the
Colonial Office that he could not recommend any of the District Commissioners for
promotion to Puisne Judge and that he and Chief Justice Griffith agreed to recommend
S. W. Morgan, the Assistant Colonial Secretary, even though he was only a solicitor,
who is “otherwise well qualified, [and] understands native languages. He would be
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useful for concession court work, they thought and there was “no local law against
appointment of a solicitor. The Colonial Office staff was almost unanimous in
supporting the nomination: Herbert J. Read, opined that Morgan, being very hard
working, having served seven years on the Gold Coast and having worked well as a
Registrar, District Commissioner and Clerk of Council, was more useful than someone
from England or another colony; Lord Ampthill, the Parliamentary Undersecretary,
observed that with knowledge of the Gold Coast and its languages, Morgan was
probably better than alternatives from outside the Colony; Antrobus doubted that they
could find someone willing to go to the Gold Coast for £800/year; Wingfield approved
as did Chamberlain.33
How Appointments Were Made
The manner in which appointments to positions in the colonies changed over
time from consideration and recommendation by junior officers to review and
recommendation by Colonial Office committees whose composition varied from time to
time. Applicants were never required to pass an examination for appointment and
were usually asked to come in for a personal interview.
From the creation of the Gold Coast Colony a Junior Assistant Private
Secretary to the Secretary of State, after 1899, Edward Marsh, another Junior
Assistant Private Secretary, Mr. Harris, and an unpaid volunteer about his [Marsh’s]
age, made all appointments subject to the Secretary of State’s assent, which was
33
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seldom withheld. From 1910 to 1930 that position was occupied by Major Ralph
Furse.34
Each applicant completed a form describing not only his education and
professional qualifications but his participation in sports, his team captaincies and
hobbies. Furse, particularly, was more interested in an applicant’s sports history than
in his intellectual attainments.35 Legal appointments were entered into a volume
labeled “Legal” (similarly, others were entered in volumes labeled “Administrative,”
“Medical” and “Treasury – Audit – Customs”). No competitive examinations were held,
but Marsh, Furse and/or their staff interviewed the candidates and noted their
impressions, then passed on a recommendations. Before doing so, however, he
asked the Legal Advisor to vet legal appointments.36 The official making the
recommendation, Marsh, Furse or their staff relied to a substantial degree on
testimonials, particularly from uninvolved referees such as school masters and
professors, i.e. who you knew, as the primary recruitment method, one that Robert
Heussler contends was “intuitive and elitist.”37
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In 1902 a committee of the Colonial Office was appointed to report on
recruitment and promotion of officers in West Africa. It reported in January 1903 and
concluded that “competitive examinations are neither desirable nor practicable.” It
noted that judicial and legal candidates required special or technical knowledge and
were usually sought within the colonial service and rarely from outside, but in so
saying, despite the legal role played by District Commissioners, it acknowledged that
these officials were recruited from outside the service. However, it went on, since
District Commissioners were obligated to carry out magisterial and judicial functions,
they should receive instruction in Evidence, Civil and Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Law for a total of thirty six hours (compared to seventy two hours for Accounting,
twelve hours for Hygiene and sixty hours for Economics) over a period of three
months. They were also asked to state if they could swim, ride, and shoot or had other
athletic qualifications.38
Moreover, applicants for positions in West Africa were warned not to expect
transfers. Colonial Office Brochure No. 96 said that service in West Africa was for a
minimum of five years, that the number of opportunities for transfer were very few and
if granted would result in a reduction in pay. Apparently the thought behind this
37
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document was that if the applicant persisted in the face of such discouragement, he
would be a good officer.39
In 1907, the Colonial Office created a promotions or patronage committee,
reorganized in 1911, to gather and review applications for higher positions in the
colonies. It consisted of the Assistant Permanent Undersecretary, the chief clerk of
the General Department, the Principal Clerk of the West African Section, one of the
Secretary of State’s Private Secretaries and, when dealing with judicial selections, the
Colonial Office Legal Advisor.40 This committee was the medium for consideration of
applicants until the early l930's, but was separate and apart from those that dealt with
applicants for entry level positions. The Chair of the Committee in its early years,
Alexander Fiddian, wrote a memo to the then Secretary of State, Lord Elgin, that the
latter accepted, confirming the policy for considering candidates for promotion to
judicial positions, recommending that prospects should first be sought among the local
bar, then among serving judges and law officers and only then among barristers from
the United Kingdom.41 Promotion from the local bar was not generally considered as
the Colonial Office viewed general professional experience was more important than
local knowledge and there was a great deal of concern about “complete detachment
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from local politics or controversies.”42 Thus, whenever a Governor sought to expand
his Bench or find a replacement for a judge or magistrate, the committee would collect
and review its records for potential appointees. Sometimes these would be shared
with the Governor, but more often, the candidates would be interviewed if possible and
those who agreed to have their names submitted discussed in the committee and one
chosen. No Gold Coast Ordinance specified any particular qualification to hold a
judgeship in the Colony other than that Article XIII of the January13, 1886 statute
describing the contents of Letters Patent stated that the Chief Justice held office during
the pleasure of the Sovereign. Nothing was specified as to Puisne Judges, but since
they, too, were appointed by Letters Patent, it may be inferred that they also held
office during the pleasure of the Sovereign.43 Thus, the committee had relatively free
reign in picking judges.
The Committee solicited appraisals as to all potential candidates. For example,
in 1911, there were two vacancies for Puisne Judges; Gilbert Purcell had been sent to
Sierra Leone and Albert Earnshaw, who had been in the Colony for less than three
years, was being transferred to British Guiana. The Colonial Office Patronage
Committee had six candidates serving in various places around the Empire, including
L. E. Hawtayne, Stipendiary Magistrate in British Guiana (Winchester, Oxford,
Lincoln’s Inn), but four persons recommended before him had declined the position.
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The British Guiana Governor’s Confidential Report which the Committee consulted,
noted that Hawtayne had good general ability, was accurate and self reliant, and
performed his duties with commonsense, care and efficiency.” Thomas C. Rayner, a
former Gold Coast Puisne Judge, reported that Hawtayne was the best Magistrate they
had and was a good lawyer who recently acted as Solicitor General. Given these
testimonials, Hawtayne was appointed.44
At the recommendation of the Fisher Committee, the Appointments Board
would have no role in promotions, the primary method for appointing judges. Rather, a
Promotions Committee consisting of the Assistant Undersecretary, the Legal Advisor
and the appropriate geographical Assistant Secretary, would consider the requests of
the Colonial Governors to fill vacancies, review available candidates and their
confidential reports and make recommendations to the Secretary of State.45 In any
event, the Secretary of State was not bound to utilize the Board and, in fact, made at
least one appointment of a Puisne Judge from outside the Colonial Service on his own
based solely on a Governor’s recommendation.46
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Originally, candidates for legal positions were not to be interviewed and the
Chair might approve professional candidates without a meeting of the Board in order to
expedite appointments. However a Board meeting in March 1931 decided that it was
important to interview legal candidates as personality counted for so much.47 Furse
went on to report that between 1913 and 1931, only one hundred fifty legal
appointments, including Attorneys General, Solicitors General, Crown Counsel and
Judges, but excluding District Commissioners who were administrative appointments
even though they performed judicial functions, were made in all of the colonies in the
Empire. The District Commissioners appointed numbered many times more. In 1931,
all but two came from outside the Colonial Service through the Colonial Service
Appointments Board, and in the three subsequent years about the same percentage of
appointments came from outside the Colonial Service, but none were judges.
Grattan Bushe and his legal associates in the Colonial Office were dissatisfied
with the product of recruitment through the Colonial Service Appointments Board, so in
January 1933 he caused a Circular Dispatch to be sent proposing regulations as to
appointments, promotions, transfers and retirements of legal and judicial officers to be
made and approved by the Secretary of State in a Colonial Legal Service separate
from the Administrative Service. The Service would come into being on April 1, 1933.48
Another Circular Dispatch dated March 1, 1933 noted that in the past, four years
47
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of legal experience had been required for appointment to legal positions and in
choosing candidates the nature and extent of professional experience counted most,
but that some Administrative officers without legal experience were given junior legal
positions. Going forward, however, except in unusual circumstances, candidates for
positions as Magistrates and Crown Counsel had to have necessary professional
training and practice experience. Only judges appointed under Letters Patent would
be exempt from compulsory transfer from one colony to another.49 Finally, no one not
in the Colonial Legal Service could be appointed to a legal or judicial position except in
exceptional circumstances.50
Attempting to generate a greater number of potential recruits for the new Legal
Service, Furse, the Colonial Office official then in charge of recruitment, sent a long
memorandum to each of the Inns of Court describing opportunities for a career in the
Colonial Legal Service. He suggested that each Inn, or the Inns collectively, establish
a committee to present barrister candidates and provide the Colonial Office “with
reliable confidential information about their character and qualifications.” Furse
wanted the Inns to recommend barristers so that the Colonial Office could build a
reserve in anticipation of openings to expedite the filling of vacancies.51 Furse, Bushe
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and Sir Henry John Newbolt, Head of Recruiting at the Colonial Office, met with
representatives of the four Inns of Court and described for them the recruitment
process and, later that year, sent the Inns of Court Committee the Colonial Legal
Service List showing the career track of all Legal Service officers to demonstrate
promotion opportunities as Magistrates and legal officers in the Gold Coast and
elsewhere.52
Bushe took the recruiting effort to the legal press, publishing a memorandum on
the Colonial Legal Service in the Law Journal53 and the Irish Legal Times. He wrote
that it was his purpose to direct the attention of younger barristers to the opportunities
offered by the Colonial Legal Service, comprising two hundred fifty judicial and legal
appointments that were available throughout the Empire and consequently there was a
good deal of movement from colony to colony since “the more important legal offices
as they fall vacant are normally filled by promoting an officer who is already a member
of the Service” and it would be unusual to fill an important post, such as a Chief
Justiceship, from outside the Service as, he said, was sometimes done in India. He
described the work of Crown Counsel, representing the colonial government in criminal
and civil litigation and drafting legislation and that of a Magistrate, very similar to that in
England but usually with a much larger criminal jurisdiction and often also including
51
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civil cases. There was, Bushe said, an average of six appointments to these junior
offices made annually.54 The creation of the Colonial Legal Service offered lawyers a
second track for a career in the colonies. They could, as they always could, choose
employment as a political/administrative officer, serving as a District Commissioner, in
which position they would continue to exercise judicial functions. Or, they could now
opt to serve only as a law officer or judge, totally divorced from political and
administrative functions.55
Those men recruited as District Commissioners, most, as we have seen without
legal credentials, were, at various times over the seventy years discussed in this study,
given training to perform their legal obligations. Between 1900 and 1925, they were
given lectures in legal subjects at the Imperial Institute in London over a period of three
months. Upon arrival in the Gold Coast, they were placed under the preceptorship of
District Commissioners with whom they went to court to observe how cases were
handled. They were encouraged to take on as many simple cases as they felt they
could handle until their preceptors and the Colonial Secretary in Accra determined that
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they were ready to go off on their own.56 In 1926 a Tropical African Service course
was begun at Oxford and Cambridge with a duration of two academic terms or about
four months. This course was less practical than that at the Imperial Institute and was
a theoretical introduction to colonial government with an emphasis on African
languages, anthropology, agriculture and forestry and a smattering of law. The next
year the duration of the course was expanded to one year with the students returning
to the Imperial Institute for studies in surveying and accounting during the Christmas
and Easter university recesses.57 Although indirect rule of the African dependencies
through indigenous rulers as set out in the works of Lord Lugard was the governing
philosophy of the Colonial Office, none of the courses dealt with the organization and
operation of the several Gold Coast states or of those in the rest of Africa.58
Who Were The Judges
With but a few early exceptions, all the judges who ultimately served on the
Gold Coast entered the Colonial Service either in some primarily administrative
capacity, as, for example a District Commissioner or Assistant District Commissioner,
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or as a junior legal officer.59 Of thirty eight Puisne Judges who were appointed to serve
in the Gold Coast between 1883 and 1939, sixteen entered the Colonial Service as
administrative officers while twenty two entered in various primarily legal capacities
such as Crown Counsel, Police Magistrate, conveyancer or departmental legal adviser.
One, William P. Michelin, served initially for a short time as a Crown Counsel before
being named a District Commissioner.60 Similarly, W. Brandford Griffith, Jr., was
initially appointed Acting Queens Advocate before being named a District
Commissioner of Accra.61
Kirk-Greene describes the members of the Colonial Service as an elite who
were carefully selected through “scrupulous choice.” They were, he says, a small, well
defined, homogeneous group made such because of their training and occupation.
The group was not a fixed caste and, indeed, were drawn primarily from the middle
and upper middle class. They became an elite not through family but by the education
they received in the public schools and, to a lesser extent, in the universities.. He
asserts that they learned in the public schools “to rule.”62 Nor were they all English.
Many came from Wales, Ulster and particularly Scotland. Of the English, most came
from the Home Counties. Less than ten per cent were Catholic or Jewish.63 As
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discussed above, up to about 1900, almost all applicants with at least University
degrees, no matter what was thought of their abilities or their legal qualifications, were
offered appointment because, it was often noted, the tropical climate deterred
acceptance of many offers.64 Indeed, some of those who applied expressly stated an
unwillingness to serve on the Gold Coast.
Of seventy one offers to barristers and solicitors of posts as District
Commissioners in the several West African colonies between 1894 and 1918, forty
applicants declined because they were “a little squeamish as to climate,”65 or would
“only accept a healthy climate.”66 Some were rejected for reasons of prejudice, such
as the barrister, A. J. Wallach whom Lord Ampthill, the Parliamentary Undersecretary,
dismissed as “a disreputable looking little Jew,”67 H. S. Williams, disqualified as a black
nationalist although he was told it was because of his age,68 and R. T. Orpen, because
“Governor Nathan doesn’t particularly want an Irishman.”69 At least one, A. Ffoulkes,
who had not attended a university and had no legal qualifications, was appointed an
Assistant District Commissioner on the Gold Coast despite disapproval of his clothing,
64
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“an extraordinary get up, singularly unsuitable for a visit to this office” because of his
good references and an affection for his family.70
Almost all accepted applicants presented degrees from Oxford, Cambridge,
University College, London, Trinity, Dublin or Edinburgh University, albeit eighty per
cent during the period from 1919 through 1937 came from Oxford or Cambridge, with
most of that group from Oxford.71. Three had been privately tutored.72 All barristers
had read law at one of the four Inns of Court or Kings Inn, Dublin or was certified as a
Scottish Advocate. One had attended New York Law School. About half of the
solicitors seeking employment had not attended university. Most, according to John
McLaren, were “‘also rans’” of the metropolitan bar who were not going to the top of
the professional ladder as barristers or advocates in the United Kingdom and who thus
sought colonial posts.73
All candidates except those specifically noted above had practiced as solicitors
or barristers for at least three years prior to applying for Colonial Service employment,
but only a relatively few were offered specifically legal jobs. After 1900, more
applicants without legal training or qualifications were appointed to posts as Assistant
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District Commissioner or District Commissioner because, as some personnel files
noted, of a paucity of qualified candidates.74
Grattan Bushe had research done on the prior tenure of judges of the Gold
Coast in various colonies: Chief Justice Deane served in three colonies, two in the
West Indies and Malaya, Michelin served in four colonies, including the Gold Coast in
1903, Howes served in Uganda, Sawrey Cookson served in North Borneo and the
Gambia, Yates served in the Bahamas and Jamaica, Barton (Circuit Judge in Ashanti)
served in the East African Protectorate and the Gambia.75
Judicial Independence and Tenure
One of the fundamental characteristics of the serving judge in the English
tradition is his independence from direction by the executive or legislative branches of
government. Such independence was insured by a certainty of tenure so that his
actions could not punished by removal from office except upon due process. In this
section, I discuss first the manner in which judges could be removed. Thereafter I look
at efforts by colonial judges to preserve that measure of independence accorded their
English colleagues, principally by preventing compulsory retirement. Finally, I examine
some examples of collusion between judges and executive officers. These latter were
not always interested in an independent judiciary. According to Martin J. Wiener, what
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they wanted were men who would cooperate not contend with the colonial executive,
who would be arms of an “authoritative, if not authoritarian government.”76
The 1701 Act of Settlement gave such legal protection to English judges by
providing that they held office during good behavior, but afforded no such comparable
legal nor legislative protection to colonial judges whose independence and tenure
depended entirely upon constitutional practice, the effect of which was less than
believed since it was not applicable to the colonies and prescribed procedures for
removal of a judge also not applicable in the colonies. As noted above, judges
appointed by Letters Patent, who constituted all colonial judges, held office only during
the Sovereign’s pleasure.77
Colonial judges, as other colonial officers, found a measure of security in the
Colonial Regulations that provided that a colonial judge might not be removed without
cause, but he could be suspended by the Governor pending removal proceedings
which might last a very long time.78 The first legislation applicable to the colonies was
Burke’s Act of 1783 that authorized the suspension of a judge by the Governor and
Executive Council pending removal because of neglect, misbehavior or absence and
that the judge might appeal to the Privy Council.79 In 1836, the Secretary of State,
Lord Glenelg, agreed not to dismiss any colonial judge anywhere in the Empire except
76
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on the advice of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. At that time this rule was
incorporated in the Colonial Regulations applicable to the entire colonial service and
subsequently applied to the Gold Coast colony. Nevertheless, a judge could be
transferred to different colonies freely as there was a “very constant and substantial
flow of promotion from the junior to the senior legal and judicial posts.”80 Procedures
established shortly afterward by the Privy Council provided that a Judge accused of
wrongdoing might be suspended by the Governor pending a hearing by the Privy
Council, and a judge accused of “a cumulative case of judicial perversity” tending to
“set the community in a flame” could be suspended by the Governor with a right of
appeal to the Secretary of State and/or to the Privy Council. In addition to these
procedures, the legislative council still retained the right to initiate removal by a
petition.81
McLaren argues that despite formal removal procedures and regulations,
“[u]doubtedly there existed other less formal methods of putting pressure on colonial
judges to resign or retire that would have appealed to the local government or the
Colonial Office, if not to the jurist himself.” 82 While he cites no cases in West Africa,
McLaren argues that appointed judges often colluded with crown law officers,
particularly in political cases such as those involving sedition. He points out that
80

Jeffries, The Colonial Empire and its Civil Service, 143, 145.

81

“Memorandum of the Lords of the Council on the Removal of Colonial Judges” in Reports of
Cases Heard and Determined by the Judicial Committee and the Lords of Her Majesty’s Most Honourable
Privy Council, New Series, Vol. 6, 1863-1870, Appendix, ix-xiii, edited by Edmund Fitz Moore.
82

McLaren, Dewigged, Bothered and Bewildered: British Colonial Judges on Trial, 1800-1900 3.
-117-

although outside of West Africa judges were removed from legislative councils after
1812, – they remained on the Gold Coast Legislative Council until 1911 -- all over the
world they remained as “close advisers to governors on political, legal and cultural
matters.”83 Finally, he argues that the Colonial Office wanted to ensure that colonial
judges did not challenge or embarrass colonial governments and that they supported
the executive whenever necessary, it not being acceptable to the Colonial Office for
judges to press their own agenda, but to display loyalty not independence.84
Another method of getting rid of unwanted older judges was to retire them.
Governor Slater told Secretary of State Leo Amery that he and a committee of the
Executive Council had reviewed the files of all officers over the age of 55 as to whether
or not they should be compelled to retire. Governor Slater was in doubt, he said, as to
whether the Senior Judges were subject to the provision of the Ordinance permitting
him to retire colonial officers, and he asked Secretary of State Amery to decide, but
opined that he saw no reason that the judges should be treated any differently than
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political officers.85 Amery advised that the Ordinance governing compulsory retirement
“strictly does apply to members of the Bench, but that ordinarily they should not be
called upon to retire under the provisions of [the Ordinance] unless their efficiency has
become impaired by ill-health or old age.”86 However, in September 1928 a Circular
Dispatch required that judges should be retired at age 62 with one extension of their
term of service for three years at the option of the Governor with approval of the
Secretary of State.87 One case of possibly enforced retirement, discussed more fully in
the next chapter, is that of W. Brandford Griffith, Jr., the Gold Coast Chief Justice who
riled the Colonial Office as well as the local Executive with his opposition to the Native
Jurisdiction Amendment Ordinance of 1910 and soon thereafter left the Gold Coast
ostensibly because of ill health and was then retired from the Colonial Service although
he continued to engage in colonial activities as a judge and author.
In addition to the possibility of being forcibly retired, a possibility that became
more probable as the twentieth century wore on, or being transferred to a less
desirable colony, colonial judges, as were all other officials, were subject to annual
Confidential Reports.88 The vast majority of those reports contained little more than
bland but positive phrases such as “satisfactory,” “efficient,” does legal work with “care
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and ability, “specially careful and painstaking.”89 From time to time, the reports got
more specific, but whether positive or negative, there is little evidence that they had
any impact on the career of the judge who was subject to the report.90
For example, the Governor’s report on Chief Justice Smyly for 1913 described
Smyly as “patient, painstaking” but “is so obsessed by the idea of the length of his list
of cases awaiting hearing that he appears to spend much time talking about it that
might be spent in tackling it.” He continued: “as a Chief Justice he is somewhat
weak.”91
The Colonial Office response to these Confidential Reports in 1915 may shed
some light on their effect on the judges’ career. In minutes on a confidential dispatch
from the Gold Coast Governor, a Colonial Office junior official, J. Hood, noted that “the
judges are not improving with time, Mr. Watson being the best spoken of. The Gov.
(sic) thinks Mr. Gough’s health is weak and his ability going. It will be remembered that
there were doubts whether he would be fit to act as Chief Justice when Sir P. Smyly
took leave.” Following up that those comments, Ellis minuted that “Pressure shd (sic) I
think be put upon Mr. Gough to retire when he next comes on leave.” Risley, the Legal
Advisor, said that “Mr. Gough has, I believe, been a fairly good judge in the past but it
seems clear that there is not much more work left in him.” “The Gold Coast bench
89
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wants depth. The C. J. (sic) is really painfully weak and the 2 (sic) best men are
probably Mr. Watson and Mr. King-Farlow. The latter is a very fair lawyer and will bring
plenty of energy and common sense to bear upon his work.”92 As may be seen from
these comments, the Governors were perhaps overly concerned with the perceived
“weakness” of the judges about whom they reported. Such concern may very well
cover questions as to whether that judge would be influenced by local barristers in
cases of importance to the colonial administration.
On occasion, a Confidential Report worked to the advantage of a judge. Thus,
following a highly complimentary Report on Chief Justice Hutchinson by Governor
Griffith, the former’s salary was increased by £300.93 In 1942, Puisne Judge Doorly
reported to Chief Justice Petrides that a particular District Magistrate should be
confirmed because, among other things, “‘He is a strong upholder of the rights and
independence of the Bench and is occasionally a little intransigent, maybe, in his
dealings with Government Officers.’” Within two years, the Magistrate, one Harbord,
was promoted to Northern Rhodesia.94
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The requirement that the Chief Justice report as to the Puisne Judges caused a
considerable row when Judge Arthur B. Howes protested that the Chief Justice was
merely Primus Inter Pares and had no right to comment on other judges and their
work. Moreover, he complained that many of the questions on the form were childish
and irrelevant to his qualifications and duties in a senior position such as his and
“derogatory” to him as one of the few officers appointed by Letters Patent other than
the Governor, the Chief Justice and the other Puisne Judges. Despite the clear
implication that his judicial independence was being infringed, Howes found that
neither Chief Justice Deane nor Governor Slater supported him.95
The view that Confidential Reports compromised judicial independence was
shared by many both inside and outside the Colonial Office. Sidney Abrahams, former
Gold Coast Attorney General and Colonial Office official wrote that the confidential
reports of the Chief Justice on the Puisne Judges, Magistrates and District
Commissioners [in their judicial capacity] that were used “as a means of assessing
individual fitness for promotion or sometimes retention in the [colonial legal] Service”
was an implied threat to judicial independence.96 Another former Gold Coast Attorney
General, Sir Harry Blackall, concurred, writing that although it was necessary to report
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on judges for purposes of promotion, such reports were inconsistent with judicial
independence.97 However, in the context of reporting to the Gold Coast Colonial
Secretary with respect to confirmation of the appointment of magistrates, he took a
more nuanced position, suggesting that the Attorney General, to whom many
complaints about the judges came that would not be known to the Chief Justice, such
as defects of temperament such as anti-police or anti- prosecutor bias, as well as the
Commissioner of Police and the Provincial Commissioners should be permitted to
express an opinion. Indeed, he would caution administrative officials to consider
carefully the view of the Chief Justice who, although he wouldn’t mind being told of a
magistrate’s purported defects, is
very tender about the independence of the judiciary so I do not think he would
be altogether favourable to some of my suggestions. But with all due respect to
his Honour I think he carries the doctrine too far. Everyone agrees that the
Executive should not interfere with the decision or discretion of a Magistrate or
attempt to influence him in the slightest way in any particular case coming
before him. But when it comes to deciding whether or not a District Magistrate
should be confirmed, a member of the Judiciary Department is in exactly the
same position as any other officer. It is the Governor, not the Chief Justice, who
has to decide whether or not a District Magistrate should be recommended for
confirmation and to enable him to do this it seems to me that it is only right that
his excellency should be in possession of the fullest information. He will
naturally attach great weight to the Chief Justice’s views, but he is not bound by
them.98
What Blackall seemed to perceive in his earlier statement but not in his later
one is the negative impact on judicial independence of the confirmation process itself.
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He seems insensitive to the effect on a Magistrate’s, or a Judge’s, mind of having to be
reviewed by executive officials as to his “judicial temperament.”99 Sir Kenneth RobertsWray, a one time legal advisor to the Secretary of State, also took the position that
reporting on judges compromised their independence. but that it couldn’t be helped as
it was necessary to enable the Secretary of State to determine which judges to
promote and/or transfer. Independence of judges ultimately relied on public opinion
that they should be independent.100 They should be free from concern that because of
some decision they made that was not in line with administrative policy that they might
not be confirmed in their position or promoted or transferred. And public opinion did
not clearly support the idea that the judges were independent in the sense set out in
the previous sentence. Robin Luckham quotes E. E. C. Sekyi, head of the Aborigines
Rights Protective Society after the mid 1920's:
The judges are very human and have always an eye to promotion including a
possible knighthood and a fat pension. Although in theory they are appointed
by the Crown, yet since the time at least of Sir Gordon Guggisberg when . . . a
highly flattering report and reference concerning the case [of two lesser chiefs
suing Ofori Atta, the Colonial Secretary, the Secretary of Native Affairs and a
District Commissioner] was found officially to reflect favorably on the learned
Chief Justice who non-suited the plaintiffs, . . . one cannot help feeling that the
judges are, as to some of them at any rate, not above considering the possibility
of deserving more such reports and references or “mentions in despatches.101
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A negative view of judicial independence in the Gold Coast was not limited to
the West African dependency. A leading article in the Manchester Guardian of
September 6,1930, attacked the jurisdiction of District Commissioners who “are so
closely dependent upon the Crown as morally to disqualify them from acting in Crown
cases” and complained that judges were not independent. A minute by Alexander
Fiddian noted that the administration of justice by Administrative Officers without legal
training was undesirable but could not be avoided.102
Most of the Governors lent at least lip service to the ideal of judicial
independence. For example, Governor Guggisberg quoted his predecessor,
Alexander Ransford Slater on the question of judicial salaries, that no Governor should
make any recommendation as to such salaries, “in view of their independent position
and of the fact that transfers between colonies are the rule rather than the
exception.”103 Only the Secretary of State should bear the responsibility of fixing
compensation for the Bench.104
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M. B. Hooker argues that judges on the Gold Coast had no real independence
until a 1954 Order-in-Council105 provided for appointment of the Chief justice by the
Governor after consultation with the Gold Coast Prime Minister and of Puisne Judges
after consultation with (and after 1955 on the recommendation of) a newly formed
Judicial service Committee of the Legislative Assembly. No judge could be removed
except upon a two thirds majority vote of the Legislative Assembly and then only upon
proof of misbehavior or bodily or mental infirmity. Nor could their pay be reduced
during their tenure of office.106 This Order-in-Council, made long after the close of the
period under study here, implicitly recognized that colonial judges were too often
dependent on the Governors of the dependencies in which they served and thus were
potentially inclined to decide cases involving the administration not in accordance with
their studied view of the applicable law but rather to carry out some administrative
policy.
Although colonial judges could not be easily removed from office, they could be
and were often transferred. Comment by local attorneys and newspapers tended to
complain that judges came and went, with the notable exception of Griffith and Smyly,
all too quickly and had no real opportunity to have any but “vague ideas of the Native
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customary law and procedure.107 The Gold Coast press often expressed strenuous
objection to the Colonial Office policy of frequent changes on the Bench . One
newspaper listed the names of judges who had come and gone or who were going to
leave in the seven years since November 1918: King Farlow Nettleton, Porter, Beatty,
Dalton and Logan, the only remaining veterans being Smyly and Hall. It takes time,
the article argued, to learn to deal with the native law and custom that the judges must
administer and that the best judges, whom it named as Griffith, Jr, Redwar, Rayner,
Francis Smith, and Nicoll, all served long terms. It decried the impending transfer of
Logan whom it said was a good judge. It objected to what it saw as the Gold Coast
being used as a training ground for judges being sent to other colonies. It urged the
Government to pay more, if necessary, to keep good judges who should commit to a
ten year stay and complained that it was difficult to lose a judge just when he had
“acquired a firm grip of local usages and customs.”108
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the Supreme Court Ordinance was
subject to expansion or contraction on the order of the Governor-in-Council.109 This
provision afforded the Executive a powerful weapon with which to control a Bench that
might decide matters contrary to the wishes of the administration. Moreover, pursuant
to Section 22 of the Supreme Court Ordinance, the Governor could specify the place
107
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where each judge was assigned or to which he might be transferred either temporarily
or permanently, thus retaining the power to punish each judge for conduct the
Executive found to be distasteful or to reward him for decisions favorable to the
administration by moving him to a more or less propitious location.110 There is no
evidence that the Executive ever exercised its power to limit the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court at all or to transfer a judge for punitive purposes, nevertheless, the
existence of such power was an unspoken infringement upon the independence of the
judiciary, that is their ability to decide the cases before them on their merits without
concern as to potential punishment for a result that might be contrary to administrative
policy.
Pursuant to Section 20(a), the Governor-in-Council could declare that such
jurisdiction should not extend to any portion of the Colony specified in the order or
could limit in any portion of the Colony specified in the order the class of causes or
matters that might be heard by the Court.111 This provision afforded the Executive a
powerful weapon with which to control a Bench that might decide matters contrary to
the wishes of the administration. Moreover, pursuant to Section 22, the Governor
could specify the place where each judge was assigned or to which he might be
transferred either temporarily or permanently, thus retaining the power to punish each
judge for conduct the Executive found to be distasteful or to reward him for decisions
110
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favorable to the administration by moving him to a more or less propitious location.112
Criminal assizes were to be held when and where the Governor ordered.113 There is
no evidence that the Executive ever exercised its power to limit the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court at all or to transfer a judge for punitive purposes, nevertheless, the
existence of such power was an unspoken infringement upon the independence of the
judiciary.
An Independent Bench: the Executive and the District Commissioners and
Judges
Since the District Commissioners were front line officers in constant contact with
the indigenous population, their conduct as magistrates and their relationship with the
colonial administration in Accra gave rise to questions of their independence as
judges.
As noted above, District Commissioners were administrative officers who, while
neither judges nor magistrates, also exercised judicial jurisdiction, both criminal and
civil, as the first level of appeal from Native Tribunals. Among the questions arising
from the dual role played by the Gold Coast District Commissioners was whether they
interfered with operations of Native Tribunals in pursuit of Government political policies
despite the Government’s proclaimed policy that such should not be the case.114 The
evidence to support this argument is equivocal. Indeed there are at least several
112
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instances where a District Commissioner was challenged for failing to execute political
policies. In 1916, Governor Clifford reported that the District Commissioner of
Winneba, having imprisoned a chief for fourteen days after finding him guilty of a
misdemeanor, was excoriated by the Secretary of Native Affairs, Francis Crowther, for
having committed “a political blunder” for having imprisoned the chief without having
considered the political consequences and first discussing the matter with the
Provincial Commissioner.115 The District Commissioner’s action, while legally justified,
had “permanently injured” both the Chief’s and the District Commissioner’s authority.
Governor Clifford sided with his Secretary of Native Affairs and told the Secretary of
State, Andrew Bonar Law, that the District Commissioner’s explanation was
unsatisfactory, that he was “dangerous” and that he should be encouraged to resign.116
In 1903, Governor Nathan, somewhat forcefully, requested that Francis Smith, then
acting as Chief Justice, make an order in the exercise of his discretion with respect to
the conduct of an attorney in a case in the manner that the Governor requested. Smith
declined, saying that he did not “understand in what way the legal practitioners work to
the great detriment of the Government” as Nathan contended.117
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Nathan, perhaps because he was a former army officer, attempted to intervene
in judicial matters more often than other Governors. On one occasion, he wrote to
Chief Justice Griffith telling him that he [Nathan] had been asked to intervene to have
Griffith quash a clearly frivolous legal action. Griffith told the Governor that as the
Chief Justice he would take no steps to stop the lawsuit; the action had to proceed to
judgment even if frivolous as everyone had the right of access to the courts. “In
uncivilized countries like this,” Griffith said, “it must often appear that the powers of the
Court and the acts of the Executive will conflict, but I think the right course is for the
Executive to admit . . . that the power of the Court is above everything except the law.”
The litigant who sought the Governor’s intervention, Griffith advised, should be told
that the Governor cannot interfere with the action or with the operations of the Court.118
The case of Chief Justice Griffith, Jr. seems to be the exception that proves the
rule as he not only voted against the Government’s position on the Native Jurisdiction
Ordinance Amendment Bill of 1910, but petitioned the Secretary of State to disallow
it.119 Perhaps not coincidentally, he soon received a negative medical report along with
a recommendation that he be retired, which, in fact, he was.120
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On occasion, the Secretary of State was obliged to intervene to protect the
independence of the Bench from overreaching governors. In 1914 he reproved the
Acting Governor for giving directions to a judge although no insult was intended. While
a Governor can tell a Judge to hold assizes at a certain time and place, if that judge is
occupied at the time, the Governor cannot direct him to stop what he was doing and go
do something else. “In other words, a Judge ought not to receive a definite order from
the Governor to stop a part-heard case and go elsewhere, but difficulties arising from
the business to be disposed of exceeding anticipations should in practice be left for
arrangement between the Chief Justice and the other Judges.”121 On another
occasion, the executive weighed in against a judge, in this instance a Magistrate,
whom the Attorney General accused of being too lenient in fining hawkers in Cape
Coast who failed to obtain and pay for hawking licenses. Blackall, the Attorney
General, reported that the President of the Cape Coast Town Council complained that
the Magistrate was too difficult to approach and would see it as “‘interfering with his
judicial functions,’” which, in fact, it was. Blackall took the complaint to Chief Justice
Petrides who, apparently, spoke to the Magistrate, for his fines against unlicensed
hawkers increased.122
The issue of administrative officers acting as judges was strongly opposed by
African attorneys. J. E. Casely Hayford, an indigenous barrister, scholar and author,
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wrote to the Governor objecting in the strongest terms to civil and criminal cases being
decided by untrained and unqualified administrators. The Attorney General admitted
that some District and Provincial Commissioners lacked necessary legal credentials
but defended the practice with the explanation that it was more important to know the
people and their customs that to know the law. How that assertion explains why a lay
person is qualified to adjudge guilt or innocence of a charge of crime is inexplicable.
He said that on the whole the results were satisfactory and the right to appeal to
judges was still available.123 That utterly insensitive response to Casely Hayford’s
complaint characterized the British attitude toward the administration of justice on the
Gold Coast. While insisting on the necessity for the rule of law, the colonialists refused
to consider the consequences for the rule of law to their having executives act as
judges, to their indifference to the conflicts of interest inherent in having unqualified
political personnel engaging in judging both civil and criminal cases, the lessons about
justice they were teaching their colonial dependents.
The ARPS attacked the Native Administration Ordinance of 1927 in part
because it gave judicial functions to administrative officers in contravention of what the
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ARPS characterized as British traditions and principles of the separation of powers and
judicial independence.124
Grattan Bushe prepared a report, Part III of which dealt with the questions
concerning Executive Officers acting as Judges, which questions he deemed as being
“of great importance and [going] to the root of the proper administration of justice both
in the Gold Coast and elsewhere in West Africa.”125 Bushe was hostile to political
officers executing judicial functions, reminding his readers of the principal of judicial
independence and noting that for no principle has there been a greater fight through
English history. Asserting the necessity for those acting as judges to be trained
lawyers, he said that there “is no particular reason why a layman should be able
adequately to administer the law any more than he should be able to set a broken leg
or survey a railway. The only difference was in the likelihood of the discovery of his
incapacity.” Merely sending reports of cases decided by administrators to judges for
review was inadequate as no evidence accompanied the reports. Except in cases of
”gross errors of a primitive sort when, for example, a man has been convicted of a nonexistent crime”, such review was “worthless “ In the Gold Coast “it is not uncommon
for the man to have served the whole or a large portion of his sentence before such
action can be taken. . . .” But for Bushe, whether or not the administrator was a
capable judge was not the primary concern. “No man,” he wrote, “can adequately act
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as prosecutor and judge at the same time. Sometimes the attempt to do so is tragic.
Sometimes it merely approaches the ridiculous. . . .” Moreover, the District
Commissioner is not only the Prosecutor and Judge but often “the complainant and the
detective who has “got up” the case.” Finally, as the political officer responsible for
order in his district, it was “inevitable that political considerations must frequently
conflict with his duties as judge.126
As evidence of the truth of his last statement, Bushe pointed out that he had
looked at the Occurrence Book at a Police Station and found a note from a District
Commissioner saying that it was “politically desirable” to prosecute a certain person
who should be charged with a specified crime and “it was most important that a
conviction should be obtained.”127 Of course Bushe noted, the District Commissioner,
who wrote the note would be the one to try the case. But, and one must always
consider the but, Bushe says, that “in a lightly staffed” primitive country, the
combination of executive and judicial functions is unfortunate bu unavoidable.”128 That
simply was not true. Such contravention of the principles of justice could have been
easily avoided merely by the appointment of more Magistrates. But the British refused
to spend the money necessary to avoid continuing hypocrisy.
In determining whether or not those serving in a judicial capacity were, as were
most of the Chiefs and indigenous authorities, mere agents of the colonial
126
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administration, we must distinguish between those who sat on the Gold Coast
Supreme Court and District Commissioners. As we have seen, the latter were all to
often intermediaries between the central administration in Accra and the people of their
districts. The available evidence shows, however, that the instances of Supreme Court
judges carrying out administrative policy were very rare, albeit given the immense
number of decisions of these judges during the seventy years under consideration
here, it is impossible to say with certainty if they decided because of administrative
pressure and, if so, how often.
In their judicial capacities, the District Commissioners as well as the Puisne
Judges and Magistrates were subject to oversight by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court. Between the formation of the Colony in 1874 and 1944, nine men filled that
position. Of those nine, four were exceedingly important to the administration of
justice in the Colony and the Protectorates governed along with the Colony. In the
next chapter, I discuss those four men and their role in the judicial history of the Gold
Coast.
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CHAPTER IV – SOME JUDGES WHOSE CONTRIBUTIONS WERE
SIGNIFICANT TO THE HISTORY OF THE COLONIAL GOLD COAST
Of the many judges who served in the Gold Coast between 1876 and 1944, four
stood out in consideration of their contributions to the creation and operation of a
colonial state as well as development of a Gold Coast judiciary and common law.1 As
such they were critical to the administration of justice in the Colony. William Brandford
Griffith, Jr. and Phillip G. Smyly served as Chief Justice sixteen and seventeen years
respectively, demonstrating an unusual capacity for surviving, indeed thriving, in a
climate so unhealthy for so many Europeans while making many decisions
establishing precedents followed even into the era of Ghanaian independence. These
four provide a continuity of service almost unbroken from 1876 to 1927Their long
service engendered a stability in the courts of the Gold Coast that the shorter tenure of
most judges could not duplicate. No historian whether European, American or African,
has seen fit to examine any of these men or their place in the administration of justice
except with respect to Griffith, and he only briefly.2 I was unable to find any secondary
sources that do more than mention any of the other judges except in passing in noting
one or more of their judicial decisions, or, in the case of David Chalmers, his report on
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emancipation of slaves.3 Indeed, none of the four are even mentioned in the Dictionary
of National Biography.4 As will be seen, they fit into the work of Kuklick and KirkGreene as to their background and education. Because they may have been seen as
little more than agents of the colonial bureaucracy, their lives and role were ignored by
historians, but, I contend, they are of great significance to the history of British colonial
rule in the Gold Coast and the role of judicial administration in such colonial rule. They
were critical to the creation of a number of Gold Coast and West African institutions
and significant in the formulation and implementation of colonial policies as to land
tenure and Native Administration. They exemplify as well both the manner in which
judges were moved from colony to colony as well as the stability in the administration
of the law desired by the colonial authorities and the creation of a hybrid colonial law
that has endured to this day.
All four of these judges were recruited to the colonial service in the nineteenth
century when recruitment criteria were almost entirely subjective. Each had served as
a judge elsewhere in the colonies and were transferred from other posts. D. P.
Chalmers and Joseph T. Hutchinson served as Chief Justices of other colonies
following completion of their Gold Coast service, Chalmers in British Guyana and
Hutchinson in Ceylon, now Sir Lanka. W. B. Griffith, Jr. and Philip G. Smyly were
3
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unusual in the length of their tenure on the Gold Coast, the norm being the four to
seven years served by Chalmers and Hutchinson and almost all of the Puisne Judges
who served under them. Smyly came to the Gold Coast after long service as Chief
Justice of Sierra Leone while Griffith, Jr. had been on the bench in Jamaica. All but
Smyly also served as Official Members of the Legislative Council and often as
extraordinary members of the Executive Council thereby compromising to some extent
the independence that Griffith, Jr. particularly championed.
Griffith, Jr. was a most energetic individual, writing extensively on legal and
political questions. His decisions made law in important areas of Gold Coast law that
were followed throughout the colonial period. Moreover, he is an example of a judge
who took the concept of judicial independence very seriously and was often at
loggerheads with the Governor and other administrators until he left the Gold Coast
under a cloud. Smyly, although not the intellectual equal of his predecessor, Griffith,
Jr., created and maintained superior relationships with both colonial administrators and
the Gold Coast Bar and was the primary moving force in creation of the West African
Court of Appeals, a project he pursued over many years of difficult negotiations with
his opposite numbers in Sierra Leone and Nigeria. Smyly and Griffith, Jr. shared a
passion for the law and the ability to withstand the illnesses rampant on the Gold Coast
and each left his mark on the administration of justice in that dependency.
David Chalmers made his mark as the author of the Gold Coast Supreme Court
Ordinance and as its first Chief Justice. As with other “firsts,” he created precedents
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that his successors felt bound to follow. He closely supervised the work of the District
Commissioners and particularly their relations with the Native Tribunals. Finally,
Joseph T. Hutchinson drafted and pressed for legislation, albeit never enacted,
governing land transfers and native jurisdiction. He was a close adviser to Governor
W. Brandford Griffith, Sr., preparing the first directives to District Commissioners on
the execution of their magisterial and appellate duties. He earned the respect of the
people and the Bar of the Gold Coast.
William Brandford Griffith, Jr.
The towering figure among the judges of the Gold Coast in the period covered
by this study was Sir William Brandford Griffith, Jr., Chief Justice of the Gold Coast
Supreme Court between 1895 and 1911. A man of immense intellect and many
contradictions, close advisor to Governor Nathan, draftsman of some of the most
important legislation of the era and of an ego as immense as his intellect. His
importance derives in large measure from his willingness to oppose the colonial
administration of which he was a part as well as because of the precedents he
established in his numerous decisions and his role as the draftsman of much
significant legislation. Griffith, Jr. was born in 1861 in the West Indies and received his
early education there. He received his university degree from the University of London
and studied law at the Middle Temple being called to the Bar at the relatively early age
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of twenty.5 Almost immediately, he wrote to Robert Herbert, Undersecretary of State
for the Colonies, introducing himself as the son of the Lieutenant Governor of the Gold
Coast and applying any job anywhere, even in West Africa.6 Herbert minuted to Lord
Kimberly, the Secretary of State, to say that Griffith, Jr. called to say that he was going
to Lagos to join his father and practice law: “If he does well there and can stand the
climate he will probably be a useful man for Col [sic] employment afterwards.”7 Herbert
told Griffith, Jr. that there was no immediate prospect of employment, but within a year
Griffith, Jr. came to the Gold Coast having been appointed an Assistant Queens
Advocate in an administration in which his father was serving as Lieutenant Governor.
Despite his Government position, Griffith, Jr. also engaged in private practice
appearing before, among others, Mr. Justice Mcleod in a land case in which he
prevailed.8 Two years later, Governor Young reported that Griffith, Jr. had been
exemplary as an Assistant Queen’s Advocate and had been acting very satisfactorily
for some months as a District Commissioner and Deputy Sheriff in Accra, particularly
with respect to the prisons and prison discipline. The Governor proposed that since
Griffith, Jr. satisfied the Governor’s requirement that District Commissioners be legally
qualified, he should be appointed as a District Commissioner. Young’s
recommendation was accepted despite his being the son of the Gold Coast Lieutenant
5
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Governor and though, the Colonial Office noted, it was not usual to have two men
from the same family serving in the same Colony, there seemed to be no real obstacle
to Griffith, Jr.’s appointment.9
The younger Griffith was ambitious. In 1886, he sought appointment as a
Puisne Judge or Queen’s Advocate, then the equivalent of Attorney General. Despite
his service as an Acting Puisne Judge for two months at Lagos and one month in the
Gold Coast, the Colonial Office said that it had made other arrangements and that he
was too young and not experienced enough.10 Griffith, Jr. pursued appointment as
Queen’ Advocate and secured the Acting Governor’s endorsement as “steady and
temperate” and an “independent character” who was “held in respect by the public and
his brother officers.”11 Despite this testimonial, the Colonial Office expressed concern
about appointing him to such a post in a Colony where his father was the Governor
despite his superior performance while acting as Queen’s Advocate and offered him
the post of Queen’s Advocate at Lagos since he was seen as one of the ablest, most
energetic men in the service.12 He declined that appointment and the Colonial Office’s
Reginald Antrobus argued that he was the best man for the Gold Coast appointment
despite his relationship to the Governor and that sending him elsewhere would be a
great loss to the Gold Coast. Nevertheless, the contrary views of Edward Wingfield
9
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and Robert H. Meade, the Assistant Permanent Undersecretary, prevailed and he was
offered the position of Resident Magistrate in Jamaica, one that he accepted. He left
the Gold Coast in January 1888.13
Four years later, Governor Griffith, Sr. told the Colonial Office that his Colonial
Secretary’s office was severely undermanned and that he needed his son – then in
Jamaica – as he could rely on him. The Colonial Office replied that it did not think it
was right to send Griffith, Jr.14 The Governor persisted in asking for a transfer for his
son as a matter of personal consideration to him. If he could not be permanently
reassigned, Griffith, Sr. asked that the Governor of Jamaica be requested to lend
Griffith, Jr. to him to act as his private secretary for twelve months since only Griffith,
Jr. had the requisite local experience and other qualifications to satisfy the
requirements of the Colonial Secretary’s office and as Griffith, Sr.’s private secretary
the younger man would not be involved with judicial, legal or fiscal issues so that the
relationship would be less important.15 When Griffith, Jr. did return to the Gold Coast,
he came after his father had retired as Governor and in the exalted position of Chief
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Justice of the Supreme Court.16 The Accra to which Griffith returned was of “the
glaring tropical area, ugly with squalid buildings and general air of disheveled undress.”
Unlike the Jamaica from which he recently come, “this was a bare existence, a place to
work and dree out one’s time with a small amount of social amenity then prevailing.”17
For reasons upon which the archival evidence throws no light, Griffith sought to
leave the Gold Coast almost as soon as he assumed the position of Chief Justice. In
January 1896, he asked Governor Maxwell to forward to the Colonial Office his
application to be Attorney General of Jamaica where he had served as Acting Chief
Justice for eight months. The Colonial Office turns him down saying other
arrangements had been made.18 At about the same time, Griffith wrote requesting to
be appointed Governor of Lagos. Antrobus noted that Griffith had been to see him
while on leave to pursue the request and that he held out no hope to Griffith but that
Griffith seemed to stand the climate well and the Colonial Office might need him one
day.19 In 1897, just over two years after he assumed office in Accra, Griffith sought
appointment as Chief Justice at Demaraua (sic), British Guiana or to “any other
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vacancy.” His application was rejected.20 Finally, at the beginning fo 1899, Griffith
asked to be Chief Justice in Trinidad. Again he was rejected.21
It would not seem to be the case that Griffith did not get along with Governor
Maxwell or Hogdson; there are no dispatches complaining about him or their
relationships.22 And when Matthew Nathan took office as Governor in 1900, he and
Griffith developed a close connection. Nathan’s papers disclose almost daily
communications from Griffith to him offering both solicited and unsolicited advice on all
kinds of subjects outside of issues involving the judiciary or the administration of
justice.23 The Chief Justice made recommendations as to ports from which cocoa
should be shipped, volunteered to make inquiries as to rubber production in the Gold
Coast and said that the natives were beginning to harvest latex without killing the trees.
In January 1901, he advised against holding a special meeting of the Legislative
Council as to the Queen’s death but proposed a draft resolution to be telegraphed to
London that should be signed by each Judge, prepared a proclamation as to the
accession of Edward VII and made recommendations as to a religious service to be
held at the time of the Queen’s funeral.24 However most of Griffith’s communications
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dealt with legal issues and pending cases.25 In addition, Griffith offered Nathan his
opinions as to what District Commissioners would give good service as Magistrates
and the prospects for success of newly appointed legal officers and judges.26 Griffith
seems to have had a close relationship with Nathan whom he though to be a good and
strong man, “brilliantly clever, as well as a strong administrator – not always the same
thing.”27 Griffith also retained decent relations with Nathan’s successor, John Roger,
about whom he wrote that although they did “see eye to eye” on many matters, “ they
learned to appreciate each other.”28
During his tenure, Griffith had several disputes with other judges in which he
tried to assert a dominance over the other judges in the Colony of which two required
intervention by the Colonial Office. In this and other disputes, we may see Griffith’s
efforts to maintain a primacy over the Puisne Judges beyond mere primus inter partes.
In 1896, he became annoyed by the habit of Hays Redwar to sit only three hours per
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day. He requested of the Acting Governor, and that official ask a ruling from the
Colonial Office confirming his power as Chief Justice to regulate the hours of judicial
sittings. Governor Hogdson agreed with him, saying that he could not see why a
judge, merely because he was a judge, should be exempt from supervision by his
superior of his hours of work. Redwar contended that no one had the right to interfere
with the manner in which he did judicial business, an element of judicial independence.
Griffith, Hogdson reported, told Redwar that he, Griffith, was responsible to advise the
Governor if the working of the Judicial Department was unsatisfactory, Divisional
Courts, that is Puisne Judges, should sit at least five hours per day, five days per week
and that all previous judges, whom he named, kept those hours. Short days, he went
on, imposed hardships and additional costs on parties and witnesses. Griffith noted
that in 1895, the Chamber of Commerce had remonstrated that courts throughout the
Colony should sit at least six hours per day so that cases could be concluded in one
day as it was done in Accra. Redwar responded to the Chief Justice that he would sit
as long as necessary but not according to a fixed schedule and that the Chief Justice
had no right to regulate his working hours.29 Thus this dispute highlighted the
sometimes contrary concepts of administrative authority (Griffith was acting in an
administrative capacity in seeking to fix hours) and judicial independence, the right to
remain free from administrative interference with the exercise of judicial duties. The
Attorney General, favoring the view that Griffith, Jr., could fix the hours in which a
29
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judge sat although no provision of the Supreme Court Ordinance permitted the
Governor or the Governor-in-Council to fix court sittings. He noted that both one of
Griffith, Jr.’s predecessors, Chief Justice Bailey as well as Griffith, Jr., as Head of
Department and not as a Rule of Court under the Supreme Court Ordinance, had fixed
the hours at eight to eleven and one to four. The Attorney General, however,
recommended legislation authorizing the Governor to fix hours, saying that the
existence of such power itself should fix the problem and would probably not be
required to be exercised and that five hours per day and three on Saturday should be
the standard.30 The Colonial Office questioned whether such power could be effective
since the Executive could not interfere with a Puisne Judge’s discretion to organize his
work and he could if he chose only list cases that would take only five hours to
conclude. The Colonial Office recommended that the Secretary of State, Joseph
Chamberlain, express his opinion that five hours per day was the correct amount of
time to sit for the convenience of the public rather than trying to impose such a rule.
Redwar wrote to the Governor, saying that he was gratified that the Chamberlain
agreed with him that a Court need sit as long as necessary and not fixed hours.31 The
record does not show Griffith’s reaction to this seeming rebuke although the Colonial
Office determination seemed to accord with the Chief Justice’s view that judges should
be independent of administrative interference.
30
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The second dispute shows an aspect of his personality that offended many
colleagues as well as Colonial Office Officials. In March 1908, Gilbert K. T. Purcell , a
Puisne Judge then serving in the Gold Coast Colony, applied to become Chief Justice
of Northern Nigeria. In reviewing that application, Fiddian noted that in 1906 Griffith
had made an unfavorable confidential report on Purcell. Harris minuted to Lucas that
he and his colleagues were not altogether satisfied with “the justice” of Griffith’s reports
and that they were not sure that Griffith “is at all fair to his Puisnes.”32 At the end of
1908, Griffith prepared to go on leave, but he declined to recommend Purcell to act as
Chief Justice while he was away, saying that Purcell didn’t possess the confidence of
the Bar or the respect of the public. He was very short on specifics to back up his
claim, relying only on hearsay and vague hearsay at that.33 Since Griffith wouldn’t
agree to having Purcell act for him, the Colonial Secretary applied to the Colonial
Office to decide the question. In connection with that application, Griffith produced
what he contended were the facts underlying his objections. Although quite detailed,
they established nothing that indicated professional wrongdoing, just personal pique.34
The Secretary of State, Lord Crewe, responded that nothing in Griffith’s indictment
justified depriving Purcell of his right, as Senior Puisne Judge, to act as Chief Justice
during Griffith’s leave.35 Again, the record provides no evidence of Griffith’s reaction.
32
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The third act of the Griffith v. Purcell drama involved a request from the
Governor of Southern Nigeria for a loan of a Puisne Judge for three months. Griffith
wrote to Governor Rodger who had consulted him: “‘Then there is Purcell, who could
be spared, but he is not suitable.’” Griffith contended that Purcell had coerced a guilty
plea with an implied threat of a heavier sentence if the defendant took the case to trial.
“‘But as his judgment was reversed because of this conduct, he will probably not
continue it.’”36 Charles Harris, a clerk in the West African section, suggested that
Griffith might be jealous of his [Purcell’s] independence and that Griffith’s complaints
seemed to be “very minor.” Risley belittled Griffith’s criticisms as to the failure to note
facts, saying that barristers always pushed for more and he rebutted each of Griffith’s
claims. After reading a few of Purcell’s decisions, Risley agreed with A. Willoughby
Osborne, the Gold Coast Attorney General, that Purcell was the best criminal lawyer
on the Bench in the Gold Coast. Moreover, he thought that Osborne was the ablest
law officer in West Africa and that his opinion was of the highest value. Risley opined
that Purcell’s way to promotion was being blocked by Griffith’s “enmities.” and that
there was no need for Purcell to answer Griffith’s charges (Cox agreed).37 These
apparently unimportant disputes are noteworthy primarily for the reluctance of the
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Colonial Office to involve itself in internecine personality disputes among colonial
judges that clearly did not involve issues of colonial governance.
Although Griffith worked well as a member of the Legislative Council with other
members, both official and unofficial, on most matters, he was not shy about executive
policies he opposed. As early as 1899, he had asked the Acting Governor to be
permitted to abstain from voting in the Council as he “had frequently to dissent from
Government propositions.” Despite Governor Hodgson’s refusal to excuse Griffith
from voting, the latter insisted. According to Griffith, Colonial Secretary Chamberlain
supported Griffith’s position.38 Griffith’s opposition to the Government came to a head
in connection with the Native Jurisdiction Amendment Bill of 1910, more about which
below.
Nevertheless Griffith more often than not worked well with his Legislative
Council colleagues on many issues, including the special committee appointed to look
into the amendment of the Marriage Ordinance, and expressed his opinions, mostly
dealing with drafting issues and mostly helpful, on almost all legislation enacted during
his tenure, his position on the Native Jurisdiction Amendment Ordinance that passed
through multiple iterations before being enacted in July 1910, made many enemies in
the colonial administration and can be said to have brought an end to his service on
the Gold Coast. As noted elsewhere, Griffith opposed the Government’s position on
that Ordinance. Governor Rodger reported that the Chief Justice opposed “almost
38
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every clause of the Native Jurisdiction Bill, both on the second reading and in
Committee.” “[Griffith] clearly demonstrated, if any demonstration were needed, the
inadvisability of a member of the Judicial Bench being also a member of the
Legislative Council.” It seemed to him to be significant that Griffith’s opposition was
not supported by the native members.39 Fiddes’ minute reflects his bitterness towards
Griffith’s conduct: “The dignity of the judicial office is un[dermin]ed [?] by Sir W. B.
Griffith’s continuing to hold it.” Lucas concurred: “I agree that it is undesirable to have
a C. J. (sic) on the Council, particularly one with such decided views as Sir W. B.
Griffith. We might ask Sir. J. Redwar if there is any prospect of Sir W. B. G. (sic)
retiring after this year.”40
Although there is no direct evidence that the Colonial Office forced Griffith’s
resignation, the report of the Chief Medical Officer clearly indicated that Griffith’s days
were numbered: “He is lax, senile looking, debilitated and anaemic; he can do one
more tour but should then probably be retired.”41 Undoubtedly having taken the hint,
Griffith submitted his application to retire as of September 13,1911 and received six
months retirement leave.42 But Griffith effectively withdrew from service well before he
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formally retired.43 He took no part in the Legislative Council after October 28,1910. At
meetings subsequent to January 28,1911, Purcell acted as Chief Justice and sat in the
Council until the Constitution was changed to eliminate that official from the Legislative
Council effective after July 12, 1911. The Legislative minutes from November 1910 to
June 1911 show not a single word about the service of W. Brandford Griffith, Jr. as a
member of the Legislative Council or as Chief Justice. He seems just to have
disappeared.44
In his view, Griffith’s departure from the Gold Coast had nothing to do with the
abrasive debate over the Native Jurisdiction Amendment Ordinance. Indeed, his brief
discussion of that matter in his autobiography is focused entirely on the rectitude of his
position.45 He claims that in late January, 1911, he learned that he was suffering from
“haemeomurmurs due to anemia” and had to leave West Africa as soon as possible,
which he did on March 4th. He wrote that he was‘ “‘chagrin[ed]’” when the Colonial
Office told him that he had to retire.46 The circumstantial evidence tends toward the
inference that he was forced to retire for other than health reasons. That Griffith’s
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health was not all that bad is demonstrated by his return to West Africa in 1913 as a
member of a special Sierra Leone court convened to try cannibalism cases.47
Griffith may have been gone, but he remained involved with Gold Coast affairs
whose immediate legacy was further irritation. After he left, he revised a pamphlet of
Instructions to District Commissioners that was amended by the Attorney General and
the new Chief Justice. In January,1912 , Griffith wrote to the Governor strongly
criticizing the changes made to his (emphasis mine) work and demanding that the draft
he had prepared and signed should be issued unchanged.48 The Attorney General
responded, saying that Griffith had drawn the wrong conclusions from the facts. “I will
only add that the late Chief Justice always appeared to me to suffer from some mental
confusion which induced him to believe that he himself had become that which it had
so long been his duty to administer (that is, the law).”49
The criticism of his conduct from men in the Colonial Office did not prevent
them from calling upon him to serve in various capacities at home and in the colonies.
In later years, he served from 1918 until his death in 1939 as Legal Adviser to the
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Ministry of Pensions.50 He testified at length before the West African Lands
Committee. He prepared an Index and Digest of 18 volumes of Gold Coast Decisions
that then Chief Justice Deane, at Griffith’s request, told the Secretary of State, William
Ormsby-Gore was ‘’of considerable assistance.’” In the early 1930's, he wrote A
History of the British Courts On the Gold Coast that the Acting Attorney General
M’Carthy positively reviewed.51 Then in retirement in London, he prepared an edition
of the Gold Coast Ordinances as of 1914 and offered them to the Government. The
Colonial Office ordered five hundred copies and Colonial Secretary Harcourt extended
his thanks.52
Griffith, Jr. never forswore his opposition to the whole system of Native
Tribunals, which he saw as “effete and impractical,” writing that the indigenous people
clearly preferred to have their disputes settled in British Courts.53 In A Note on the
History of the British Courts in the Gold Coast Colony With a Brief Account of the
Changes in the Constitution of the Colony, written in 1935, he attempted to refute the
implication that the British had forced themselves on the indigens rather than the latter
placing themselves voluntarily under British protection. Indeed, he claimed that the
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responsibilities of governing the Gold Coast “were gradually forced (emphasis in the
original) upon” the British.54
David P. Chalmers
The second of the four important judges I discuss here is David P. Chalmers,
the last Chief Magistrate and the first Chief Justice of the Gold Coast. He was
important to the issues of the administration of justice in the new British Colony
because he was the draftsman of the Supreme Court Ordinance, the Criminal
Procedure Ordinance and the first, never implemented, Native Jurisdiction Ordinance
and established precedents that his successors felt obliged to follow. Chalmers was
serving as Queen’s Advocate in Sierra Leone when the then Chief Magistrate, Sir
James Marshall became ill and had to take leave to recover. He advised the Gold
Coast Governor, George C. Strahan that he did not approve of the Accra District
Commissioner acting for him and wanted Chalmers to come to the Gold Coast. The
Secretary of State, Lord Carnarvon, approved Marshall’s request and Chalmers
assumed the duty of Chief Magistrate and Judicial Assessor in July 1874.55 Just a few
months after his arrival and the declaration of the new Colony, Chalmers was relieved
of duty as Judicial Assessor so that he could devote himself to work on preparation of
basic ordinances necessary to administer the Colony. However, Chalmers
recommended that it would be inadvisable to close the Judicial Advisor’s Court as that
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would be misinterpreted as implying “a new mode of dealing with native cases,”
something for which the British were not yet ready.56
Chalmers set to work preparing a Supreme Court Ordinance based in large
measure on ordinances adopted in other colonies adapted to his ideas of local
conditions. The Supreme Court he proposed would consist of a Chief Justice, an
office that he had been promised, and two Puisne Judges and could be enlarged later
as circumstances warranted. It’s jurisdiction would extend to the Colony and those
Protectorates where the British asserted jurisdiction. Chalmers proposed to create the
office of District Commissioner whose occupants would be both magistrates and
political executives, thus bringing into being the problem of dual jurisdiction that
continued throughout the remaining life of the Colony.57
As might be expected in a new institution, the duties of the Chief Justice
involved as much judicial administration as hearing and deciding civil and criminal
litigation. For example, Chalmers prepared and disseminated circular letters to the
District Commissioners on various subjects such as how to deal with Chiefs who were
summoned in actions for debt or were subpoenaed to appear as witnesses.58
Chalmers’ tenure on the Gold Coast was less than one might have liked for one
whose every action amounted to setting a precedent albeit about average for judges,
with the exception of Griffith, Jr. and Smyly. In May 1878, he was appointed to be
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Chief Justice of British Guiana although he would remain on the Gold Coast for some
time to come to finish work on the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1878.59 He
achieved a great deal in the four years he held office although his masterwork, the
Supreme Court Ordinance was severely criticized by at least one newspaper as a
“mishmash that is not understood by suitors, and is so unclear that even judges have
stumbled over [it].”60 This criticism may be accurate as far as lay litigants were
concerned, but it was not echoed by the Gold Coast Bar nor the members of the
judiciary who were called upon to interpret it.
Joseph T. Hutchinson
Joseph T. Hutchinson became Chief Justice of the Gold Coast Supreme Court
a mere ten years after being called to the Bar at the Middle Temple. He served as
Queen’s Advocate and succeeded Hector Bailey as Chief Justice in 1889. He got
along very well with Governor Griffith who sought his advice on issues as diverse as
land tenure reform and native jurisdiction. Hutchinson excelled at legislative drafting
and prepared both the Criminal Code and the Towns Ordinance for the Colony. At
Governor Griffith’s behest, he led commissions to study land tenure and native
jurisdiction and drafted both a Native Jurisdiction Ordinance Amendment Ordinance
and the original Lands Bill.61 Of great importance, In 1893, he prepared the original set
of Directions to District Commissioners that established the guidelines for how those
59
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officers and particularly enabled those not legally qualified to act as Magistrates were
to carry out judicial duties.62
Hutchinson consulted closely with the Governor and the Colonial Office as to
the appointment of new District Commissioners, pressing, as did the Governor, for
legally trained men and ultimately recommending Hays Redwar for promotion to
Puisne Judge.63 Governor Griffith described Hutchinson as “clear-headed, patient,
considerate and painstaking with the result that he has won the confidence of the
people . . . . he has carefully avoided mixing himself up in any way with political affairs
in the Colony or with any local cliques; while I have found him always ready and willing
to give me the benefit of his advice and support when I have considered it desirable to
confer with him upon questions and matters relating to the public interest of the Colony
under my charge.”64 Griffith, Sr. told the Secretary of State, Lord Ripon, in 1892 that
Hutchinson should receive a knighthood as he deserved a reward for his service.
Hutchinson was “all that could be desired” as Chief Justice and he had gained “the
esteem, regard and confidence of all parties,” and a mark of distinction for him would
make the entire colony happy and proud.65 It should be emphasized that although
Griffith, Jr., and Smyly also received knighthoods, neither of them were the
beneficiaries of such fulsome accolades. When, in late November 1894, Hutchinson
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sought appointment as Chief Justice of Jamaica, Governor Griffith, Sr. endorsed his
application, saying that he filled the office of Gold Coast Chief Justice extremely well,
that he could not praise him highly enough and that his work as a judge was
“sterling.”66 In January 1895, Governor Griffith, Sr. announced that Hutchinson was
leaving the Gold Coast to assume the post of Chief Justice of Granada. The Colonial
Secretary minuted that he believed Hutchinson to have been as good or better than
any preceding judge both as a judge and as an officer willing to counsel and assist the
Executive. The Attorney General added that Hutchinson had steadily improved judicial
administration in the Colony from the moment he assumed office.67 Hutchinson was
also much admired by the Christian missionaries in the country who considered him to
be an expert on Christian education.68 The Legislative Council joined in extolling
Hutchinson, congratulating him on his legislative service as a member of the
Legislative Council and his executive service as a member of the Executive Council.
Colonial Secretary Hogdson reiterated that “To the Executive, His Honour has always
been ready to give his counsel and assistance.69 It is interesting to point out that while
Chief Justice Smyly also received many accolades on his departure from the Colony,
W. Brandford Griffith, Jr., left in relative silence with only a single statement from a
member of the Legislative Council to mark his departure.
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Hutchinson’s work on the land tenure and native jurisdiction commissions did
not produce any of the noteworthy results he hoped and expected they would. His
draft Native Jurisdiction Amendment Ordinance was disdained by Griffith, Sr.’s
successor as Governor, William Edward Maxwell, opined that both it and the proposed
land legislation were too favorable to the traditional rulers and did too little to promote
British authority. Although Hutchinson was clearly aware of the problems surrounding
the operations of the Native Tribunals and the charges of corruption, he did not provide
in his draft for the kind of oversight necessary to respond to such problems and
charges.70 Nevertheless, Hutchinson’s initiative in preparing the first set of Instructions
to District Commissioners that sought to overcome the lack of legal training in most of
the men serving as District Commissioners by setting out clear rules for the conduct of
those officials in their magisterial role, marks him as one of the most significant judges
to hold the position of Chief Justice.
Philip C. Smyly
Philip Crampton Smyly was the only Chief Justice of the Gold Coast born and
educated in Ireland. He graduated from Trinity College and was admitted to the Irish
Bar from King’s Inn in 1888. His only posting prior to the Gold Coast was in Sierra
Leone where he was Solicitor General, Attorney General and Chief Justice from 1893
until he was transferred to the Gold Coast, effective September 14, 1911.71 Smyly got
70
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right into the work in the Gold Coast, revising, together with the Attorney General, the
Instructions to District Commissioners authored by Chief Justice Hutchinson and
previously revised by Chief Justice Griffith.72
Governor Clifford found Smyly to be weak, as he did much of the Gold Coast
Bench, by which, I assume, he meant the judges’ willingness to be convinced by local
barristers to decide cases that might conflict with government policies in their favor.
Nevertheless, Clifford was unwilling to have him replaced by Purcell who had
succeeded Smyly as Chief Justice of Sierra Leone. Sir J. Anderson of the Colonial
Office thought that Purcell was “abler” (emphasis in original) than Smyly and was a
“fearless” (emphasis in original) judge, and because of these characteristics, he had
left enemies behind in the Gold Coast when he went to Sierra Leone.73
Despite these perceptions of weakness, Smyly worked hard on his caseload
and administered the Judiciary fairly and effectively, promoting the interests of his
fellow judges as to questions of increased pay and particularly as to the necessity for
more judges. Smyly convinced the Governor to argue for at least one addition to the
bench because the increase in land litigation as cocoa production and land values also
increased led to courtroom battles being fought with “peculiar pertinacity.” Governor
Clifford argued that such court battles were seen as a substitute for personal and tribal
wars of the past and were part of the Akan culture. Moreover, the Governor continued,
72
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once again at Smyly’s behest, it was highly desirable to hold Assizes outside of Accra,
Cape Coast, Sekondi and Axim and that congestion of court dockets was so very
serious that an additional Puisne Judge was needed as soon as possible. Evidently
neither Smyly nor Clifford convinced the Colonial Office since, Ellis minuted, that
before Earnshaw was transferred to British Guiana, he had complained of a lack of
work and Ellis now thought the Governor’s statements as to congestion were
exaggerated and temporary.
The press continually supported the efforts of the Chief Justice Smyly and,
Governors Clifford and Guggisberg to pressure the Colonial Office to appoint more
judges for the Colony. Leaders pointed out the congestion on the dockets in the
principal towns and the frequent inability of the Full Court to dispose of its list, pointing
out that the Bar was often pressing for additional sessions. It supported a Bill pending
in the Legislative Council in the mid-Twenties to eliminate the cap on the number of
Puisne Judges permitted, then four, as a necessary step toward improving “the quality
of the work carried through from day to day in the Divisional Courts.” It commended
Smyly for recommending the regular Bar resolutions for additional judges to the
Government.74
Smyly’s apparent low key personality was often seen as a lack of intellectual
energy. Ellis stated that in his appearance before the WALC, Smyly had impressed
74
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the Committee as “wanting in mental vigour.” Whatever the truth as to Smyly’s “
mental vigour,” he certainly displayed energy in getting his work done and in exerting
efforts to have all the judges, as well as the Bar, work to their capacity. In 1915, he
argued that there was no point to a legal vacation. The judges couldn’t leave the
Colony and could use the time of the former vacation to reduce or eliminate the arrears
in civil cases. While agreeing with Smyly’s point, the Attorney General noted that the
senior members of the Gold Coast Bar, who were also solicitors used the six weeks of
the legal vacation to deal with office work and would oppose abolition, although junior
barristers might agree as they could pick up some business.75
In addition, Smyly vigorously pressed the case of the judges for adequate pay.
Concern for compensation for judges was a continuing one and was linked with the
belief that increased emoluments were necessary to attract better judges. Pressing for
a salary increase in a letter to the Governor, Smyly argued that the judges’ pay had not
been increased since before World War One – the Governor noted that Smyly’s pay
had not increased for twenty years – and were unsuited to post war conditions.
Governor Clifford supported Smyly saying that since the judges have a wider
jurisdiction than in any other West African colony and have the busiest courts and
serve in an increasingly developed economy with an increasing case load, their pay
should be increased. However, he told Smyly, in view of judicial independence,
administrative officers should not make recommendations with respect to judicial
75
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salaries. He told the Colonial Office that it should fix the judges’ pay rates. The
Colonial Office directed the Governor to tell the judges that their pay will be considered
along with that for administrative officers.76
Smyly’s greatest contribution, however, was in negotiating the conditions under
which the WACA came into being. The details of his role in getting the law officers and
judges of the West African dependencies to sit down and work through their
disagreements as to the jurisdiction and procedure of the trans-colonial appellate court
have already been set forth and will not be repeated here.77 His last year as Chief
Justice was almost entirely taken up with the back and forth involved in the effort to
achieve agreement among the judges and law officers, none of them short of ego, of
three colonies. When Smyly, whose last tour of duty had been extended six months to
enable him to do as much as possible to complete the WACA work, gave notice of his
intended retirement in December 1928, the response was very different from that
which met Griffith’s retirement. Governor Slater asked Smyly to remain in the Colony
long enough to lay the cornerstone of the new Courthouse. The Secretary of State,
Leo Amery, expressed his appreciation for Smyly’s work and service and the
appreciation of the Empire. Smyly’s work in both Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast for
twenty eight years, said Amery, was “distinguished and noteworthy,” and “invaluable.”78
Slater expressed what he characterized as “our deep sense of the invaluable and
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devoted service which Your Honour has rendered to the Colony during an
unprecedentedly long and arduous term of office in the office of Chief Justice.” He
wrote that Smyly’s leaving would “long be felt both by the Administration and by all
sections of the community.”79
Nana Sir Ofori Atta, the senior unofficial member of the Legislative Council,
congratulated Smyly on his “valuable work” and particularly on “the institutions and
customs Your Honour had by various decisions and Judgments supported and
upheld.”80
The Gold Coast Independent said that Smyly’s record was unique in the length
of his service in Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast and the paper believed that, were he
to have his way, he would stay on for another ten years. The article characterized
Smyly as suave, long suffering, almost inexhaustibly patient and respected by all who
appeared before him, attorneys, parties and witnesses as he treated them all with
exceptional courtesy. It described his close relationship with the Bar, both African and
European, and his entertaining them at his home. However, it could not let him go
without criticizing him for his taking of extensive notes that delayed hearings and
increased costs of appeal and his failure to extend the jurisdiction of magistrates to
several towns [something which was not within his authority] as well as his failure to
79
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encourage African Magistrates or to make WACA operative with as extensive
jurisdiction as the Independent wanted.81 These remarks echoed in a small way the
observation of Governor Clifford that Smyly was weak, albeit he showed no weakness
in dealing with the Sierra Leone Chief Justice during the preparation of the WACA
legislation. Nevertheless, complimentary comments from the Gold Coast bar and
press about a senior judge must have pleased the officials in the Colonial Office as a
positive reaction British administration of justice at a time when there was much
opposition to the content of the Native Administration Ordinance recently enacted by
the Legislative Council.82
George Deane, Smyly’s successor as Chief Justice, although not of the same
stature as his predecessor, established an excellent relationship with the Bar and
people of the Gold Coast to the extent that when he was involuntarily retired in 1935,
the African Unofficial Members of the Legislative Council petitioned that he be
permitted to remain as Chief Justice. The Petition spoke of Deane’s “wisdom,
courtesy and patience” and expressed the Petitioners’ offer to pay any increased costs
incurred if Deane were permitted to remain in his post. Governor Hodson reported that
Deane was willing to stay and recommended that he be allowed to do so because he
had the confidence of the people.83 Despite such an outstanding testimonial from the
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elected representatives of the Gold Coast people, Deane was retired from office and
replaced by Phillip Petrides.84
Reviewing this brief report of the lives of these four judges, one can see the
intense attachment each had to the prerogatives of his office, the sensitivity, indeed
the touchiness, he felt at what he considered any infringement on those prerogatives.
Griffith, Jr., in particular, felt no qualms about opposing legislation supported by the
administration or seeking to impose his will on fellow judges. At the same time we can
see that none of them were truly independent in the sense that we insist that American
judges be independent, constantly counseling with and advising the Executive, drafting
legislation that they might later be called upon to interpret and judge all while being
subject to removal from the colony and transferred to a possibly more difficult post.85
Nevertheless and despite the restriction of their jurisdiction embodied in the Native
Jurisdiction Amendment Ordinance of 1910, the British courts of the Gold Coast were
as busy as ever and demand for “British justice” increased throughout the period under
study here. Even so, the British courts were limited, as are all courts, in solving the
problems of society. They, unlike the executive and legislative branches, are
84
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responsive institutions that handle matters brought to them. They are incapable of
reaching out to discover and deal with problems.86
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CHAPTER V – AFRICAN JUDGES AND THE GOLD COAST BENCH
Here I discuss the paucity of local judicial appointments and the British rationale
for such paucity: fear that indigenous judges would be more susceptible than
Europeans to local influence. In the late nineteenth century, this rationale does not
seem to have prevented the appointment of Francis Smith to the Supreme Court or the
naming of several Africans as District Commissioners and Assistant District
Commissioners. The British attitude toward the abilities of indigenous attorneys as
judges changed at the beginning of the twentieth century and following Smith’s
retirement in 1907, no African was named to the superior court bench until the
1930's.87 Following a discussion of Smith’s role in the judiciary, I describe the
discussions related to the decisions of Governor Clifford to appoint an African to the
position of Police Magistrate, the problems with finding acceptable African candidates
among the local Bar to fill such positions and problems with some appointments in the
1920's and, ultimately, the decision in 1917 to appoint Woolhouse Bannerman first as
a Police Magistrate, then to Circuit Judge for Ashanti and then to a seat on the
Supreme Court. Clifford and Guggisberg both made efforts to overcome resistance in
the Colonial Office and from Chief Justice Smyly to appointment of Africans to judicial
positions with little success. It was not until Woolhouse Bannerman demonstrated skill
87
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and tact in performing his duties that such resistance disappeared leading to a
subsequent appointment of Leslie M’Carthy to the superior bench shortly before the
close of the period under study.
Appointment of judges from among the colonized populations varied widely in
the Empire. India presented an instance where indigenous barristers were often
appointed to magisterial positions while no West Indian held a superior court judicial
position until after 1944.1 Mitra Sharafi bemoans the lack of historiography that deals
with indigenous lawyers and judges other than as nationalist politicians or as “cultural
translators or ethnographic intermediaries.”2 Nevertheless, that is apparently the
manner in which the British viewed them. Schmitthener points out that as of 1862
native judges were supposed to receive one third of judicial appointments in order to
permit “uniting the 'legal learning and judicial experience of the English Barristers’ with
"the intimate experience of Indian customs, usages, and laws possessed by the civil
servants."3 However, the appointment of indigenous judges in India stirred much racist
opposition. An 1883 paper written by Baron Arthur Hobhouse on behalf of the British
India Committee quoted Lord Lytton in a speech to the House of Lords as to how
members would feel if their “life or honour were exposed to the decision of some
1
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tribunal consisting of a coloured man.”4 Arguing against such racist opposition,
Hobhouse pointed to the effective administration of criminal law by an increasing
number of indigenous Indian magistrates as well as by Indians appointed as judges of
High Courts.5 Nevertheless, while there were numerous Indian magistrates handling
both criminal and civil cases, few such men reached positions on the High Court.6
Indeed, as Bernard Cohn points out, many experienced and well qualified Indian
magistrates had to defer to far less able and junior British officials who, albeit the
newest recruits, were considered to outrank indigenous officials.7
Historians seem to have ignored the story of indigenous judges in colonial
Africa. Swanepoel discusses the colonial judiciary in Kenya without reference to a
single African judge.8 Indeed, John McLaren’s monograph on colonial judges is limited
to those of the white dominions and doesn’t mention native judges at all.9 Only Bonny
Ibhawoh, a Nigerian attorney, discusses the role of non-British judges and then only on
the Privy Council.10 The case of the Gold Coast, discussed in this chapter was almost
4
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unique in West Africa where prior to 1900, a few Africans held the mixed administrative
and judicial position of District Commissioner and one man, Francis Smith, served first
as a Magistrate in the Gambia and later as a Puisne Judge of the Gold Coast.11
Ibhawoh argues, although without specification of the evidence upon which he asserts
his opinion, that the failure of the Colonial Office to appoint African judges stemmed
from British racism, based on the assumption that African were simply inferior to
Europeans.12 It was not until the 1930's that Africans began to be considered as
proper candidates for superior court judgeships.13 In the 1944 Kibi murder case where
relatives of Sir Ofori Atta were charged with ritual murder, no Africans sat on the Privy
Council committee hearing the defendants’ appeal although two Indian judges
participated.14 Historians have been silent as to the reasons for the absence of
indigenous judges in the Gold Coast and we are obliged to rely on the evidence of
communications among officials in the Colonial Office found in archival material, most
of which carefully avoid reference to race except as discussed herein. Governors
Clifford and Guggisberg promoted recruitment of indigenous men into the service in
the Colony and, as discussed below, accepted local barristers as magistrates of
11
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inferior courts. The success of all but one, whose case is discussed below, made it
easier for Gold Coast Governors minded to engage local Africans in colonial
government to convince the London authorities to make such appointments.
Insofar as the appointment of judges is concerned, it appears that the Gold
Coast established precedents in West Africa and in the subsequently created colonies
in East and Central Africa. These latter all came into being after creation of the Gold
Coast Colony, most at a time when racism prevailed in the Colonial Office and fewer
and fewer men of color were appointed to responsible positions in the colonies. Thus,
at the time Francis Smith retired from office, he was the only African serving on a
superior court in all of Africa. Accordingly, the Gold Coast was unlike other British
colonies in Africa.15
African Judges in the Gold Coast Colony
Prior to creation of the Gold Coast Colony and thereafter up to about 1900,
educated Africans served in judicial and quasi-judicial positions. As early as 1823,
British officials sat with men denominated as “gold takers” who received and examined
gold given and taken in trade who were charged with the duty to settle all disputes
between ship captains and natives involving trade. In addition, the Chief’s council
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arbitrated disputes between natives and Europeans.16 In 1880, Governor Ussher
reported to the Secretary of State, Lord Kimberley, as to the excellence of the African
District Commissioners at Winneba and Saltpond who had made their courts attractive
to the indigenous population who had filled them with work. Mr. Bartels, the District
Commissioner at Winneba in particular was “very good at court work.”17 He told the
Colonial Office that the Chief Justice spoke “highly of their administration in judicial
matters” and that insofar as he, the Governor, was concerned, they compared
favorably with Europeans as did four other African Officers who greatly exceeded
European’s generally poor expectations.18
With the exception of Francis Smith, who had been educated in Sierra Leone
and at the Middle Temple and had served as the Chief Magistrate of The Gambia, no
Africans were appointed as a Puisne Judge until the 1930's. Smith came from The
Gambia in 1887 and served honorably, often as Acting Chief Justice, until his
retirement in 1907.19 Kelly argues that many African professionals had equal or
16
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superior educational qualifications than the colonial civil servants in the Gold Coast,
but that the colonial Government had no mechanism for integrating the Africans they
had educated into the colonial system and were extremely reluctant to acknowledge
the claims of the educated class that they had created and viewed them as obstacles
to the colonial Government’s relations with the chiefs whom they valued more highly as
agents of colonial rule.20
Although Francis Smith was seen retrospectively has having served with honor
and distinction, at the outset of his career on the Gold Coast, he was viewed with
suspicion. The Acting Governor reported information he received as to Francis Smith’s
relationships on the Gold Coast. P. A. Renner, a leading member of the Cape Coast
bar, was his brother-in-law. The Acting Governor felt that this connection was
prejudicial and was being commented upon in the community. He moved a criminal
case and caused a Political Detention Ordinance to be passed because he lacked
confidence in Judge Smith’s fairness and because Renner was the accused’s attorney.
Robert Herbert, commented that this showed the problem of employing “natives’ in
high positions in West Africa. Educated Africans were a small number who
intermarried and thus had relationships all over the Colony “and unfortunately they
cannot be trusted to be impartial when dealing with their relatives.” Herbert rued the
19
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fact that they could not send Smith elsewhere because “what Colony will put up with a
black judge?”21 Unfortunately, this casual expression of racism was typical of the
feelings of colonial officials, more so in London than Accra, but common there as well.
Since nothing was done to limit Smith’s activities, it can be concluded that the
prejudicial views expressed by the Acting Governor were never justified by anything
Smith did during his twenty year tenure on the Gold Coast Bench.
However, Smith was treated differently than his European colleagues in a
number of respects. For example, he asked for full pay and paid passage to England
for his forthcoming leave as European Judges received.; Governor Maxwell referred to
the ordinariness of such requests for “Native Officials,” that were invariably resisted by
both local and home governments. On this occasion, Smith’s application was
supported by Chief Justice Griffith who said that native judges should be treated just
as European ones were, if not, it “might have very far-reaching and inconvenient
results in a service where there are two sets of officials subject to separate leave
rules.” Nevertheless, Smith’s application was not be granted.22 Similar treatment was
meted out to Charles E. Woolhouse Bannerman who had requested a £120/Year
personal allowance, a request supported by Governor Guggisberg, because he had
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maxed out his salary and did excellent work as a Magistrate. The Colonial Office felt
that Bannerman’s seniority allowance and salary made him better off than a European
who received a personal allowance but had to support an “Establishment” in the United
Kingdom. Bannerman also complained about being passed over for promotion and
pointed out that two Europeans with less seniority than he had, had been promoted.23
Even into the 1930's, such Africans who had been appointed to magisterial
positions were victims of discrimination. The two African Magistrates, A. Casely
Hayford and S. D. Quashi-Idun, who were third and fourth in seniority, respectively,
were paid less than their European counterparts who had less seniority, e.g.. QuashiIdun, who had four years service, was paid £690 and Archie Casely Hayford who had
three years service, was paid £660, while P. N. Dalton who had been serving for only
two years, was paid £720, W. H. Irwin with three years service, received £810, while R.
M. H. Rodwell, who had arrived only fourteen months previously, was paid £750.24 It is
unclear whether or not Casely Hayford, the poorest paid Magistrate or Quashi-Idun
were aware of this pay disparity, but it is clear that the British did not feel that it was
improper or unjustified.
As noted above, several Africans served as District Commissioners in the
1880's and 1890's. In 1887, barrister Peter Awoonor Renner applied and was
considered for a judicial post. He had been educated at the University of London and
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Lincoln’s Inn and was called to the Bar in 1883. He had more than a little legal
experience, having practiced in England, Sierra Leone and at Cape Coast and had
acted as a Prosecutor in the Western Province. The Colonial Office told the Governor
to inform Renner that the position of Chief Magistrate in the Gambia, for which Renner
had applied, had been merged with that of Queen’s Advocate and Governor was
asked to report on Renner’s qualifications for the position as a law officer. In the
interim, the Governor might consider appointing him as a temporary District
Commissioner until Colonial Office could decide on an appointee for the existing
vacancies. Renner was not appointed, a European was.25 In the first decade of the
twentieth century, the British briefly considered appointing African Magistrates to
enforce newly enacted labor labors. Sir Francis Hopwood, the Permanent
Undersecretary of State, minuted to an Assistant Secretary of State, R. V. Vernon, that
they had not appointed any natives to magisterial positions that enforced labor laws,
but now that a Royal Commission had reported on the issue, he thought that they had
to do so. Vernon replied that there would be a “tremendous row” if an Englishman
were appointed and so they dared not do so, but there is no record of an African
Magistrate being appointed in the Gold Coast at this time.26
In the summer of 1919, Acting Governor Slater sent the Secretary of State, Lord
Milner, an application from C. E. Woolhouse Bannerman to be a Police Magistrate or
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District Commissioner in Accra. Bannerman was 34 and had been called to the Bar in
1913. He was descended from the Bannerman who had been Chief Magistrate and
Governor of the Colony in 1850. His family was very prominent and some of his
relatives rendered useful service to the Government, but the Acting Governor said that
he would not recommend Bannerman for an Accra position because “no matter how
impartial and judicial Mr. Bannerman might prove, the jealousy which exists between
the inhabitants of the various quarters of the town would render his decisions suspect
in the eyes of many whose cases would come before him, and would be calculated to
place both him and the Government in a radically false position.” However, he
continued, Cape Coast needed a Police Magistrate and he would like to see
Bannerman appointed to a twelve month probationary position there. Bannerman was
offered the position on conditions of employment different from those for European
Officers, but his objections were overruled.27 He decided to swallow the discriminatory
terms and to accept the position as offered, but in advising Lord Milner of Bannerman’s
acceptance, Slater, acting as Governor, said that in the future, probation should be
three years, just as it was for European officers and that discrimination in Bannerman’s
case was not justified.28
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Guggisberg’s Efforts to Appoint Africans to the Inferior Courts
Bannerman was the first African to be appointed to a judicial position in the
twentieth century, but opportunity for additional appointments soon presented itself.
The new Governor, Gordon Guggisberg told the Colonial Office that court work in the
three principal towns had increased so much that additional assistance was urgent.
The District Commissioners were obliged to spend so much time in court that they
couldn’t tour their districts or conduct their political work. He told Milner that the Chief
Justice, the Provincial Commissioners, the Attorney General and the Solicitor General
had conferred and unanimously recommended the appointment of more District
Commissioners in preference to an additional Police Magistrate, provided that these
additions to the “minor judiciary” had legal training and were to be independent of the
executive. It would be important to have such post or posts made available to local,
that is, African, barristers forthwith (it would be a “wise policy”). Lest one get the idea
that racism was disappearing on the Gold Coast, attention should be paid to
Guggisberg’s recommendation that Europeans should also be appointed so that they
could train for higher judicial positions, a clear statement of intention not to permit
Africans to be appointed to the Supreme Court Bench. However, he continued, the
recently appointed native Police Magistrate (Woolhouse Bannerman) was doing well
so he wanted to appoint one native Magistrate in addition to two European District
Commissioners and six Assistant District Commissioners [presumably also European
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although he was silent on this point). While acknowledging the request for a native
Magistrate, the Colonial Office made no commitment to accommodate it.29
Over the course of the next year, the Accra administration found candidates for
most of the nine positions approved by the Colonial Office, including for those as
Police Magistrates. Three applications were from natives, but the Chief Justice turned
down two allegedly because of lack of experience as a barrister. I say “allegedly,”
because a white candidate eventually approved was not even admitted to the Bar
although he promised to seek to be called to the Bar on his next leave. The third
candidate was the son of Peter A. Renner, a well known barrister, who had
unsuccessfully sought appointment as a Magistrate of District Commissioner twenty
years previously. As to this young man, the Chief Justice expressed a “high opinion of
his ability and attainments,” but who, so the Government said, apparently wanted too
much money to fit into the Governor’s estimates.30
Shaloff notes that appointment of Africans to judicial and other senior positions
was an important grievance among the intelligentsia in the inter-war period.
Guggisberg proposed some Africans for judicial positions because he said it was
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consistent with “the spirit of justice.”31 The first of these was Leslie E. V. M’Carthy, a
graduate of Oxford and Gray’s Inn, whom he proposed to appoint Crown Council or
Police Magistrate. The Governor said that M’Carthy had declined the post of Crown
Prosecutor in Sierra Leone and would probably decline appointment as Police
Magistrate in favor of becoming a Crown Counsel in the Gold Coast Colony because
the pay was better. Guggisberg reported that the Sierra Leone judges knew him and
his work and thought highly of him and that the Attorney General recommended him.
Guggisberg said that M’Carthy had taken honors at Oxford and that “it is very desirable
to give more posts to natives when candidates appear who are notable in character
and qualifications.”32 M’Carthy soon accepted the appointment as Crown Counsel.
In 1924, T. Hutton Mills, son of a former Legislative Council member applied for
a position as Crown Counsel or Magistrate and Guggisberg advised the Colonial Office
that he wanted to give Hutton Mills an opportunity “to prove his worth.” Since,
according to the Governor, Hutton Mills was not yet sufficiently experienced for a
permanent appointment, Guggisberg asked Colonial Office approval for a temporary
appointment to a post normally held by a European. The Colonial Office’s Ellis thought
it a good idea and approved, although as one junior official noted, the response should
be confined to Mills and nothing should be said about any principle involved.33 Thus, in
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this somewhat grudging fashion, the Gold Coast obtained its second indigenous Police
Magistrate.
The third African Magistrate to be appointed did not fare as well as either
Bannerman or Hutton Mills. Peter A. Renner, the younger, previously passed over for
appointment was named a Police Magistrate in 1924, shortly after Hutton Mills. Not
long thereafter, complaints as to his work habits began to be heard. A District
Commissioner reported to the Governor that he rarely appeared in court before nine
o’clock or remained after twelve o’clock and was sometimes absent entirely.
Guggisberg wrote to the Chief Justice complaining of unnecessary adjournments in an
important case and then, because of “partiality” or “fear” denied the Government’s
application that, Guggisberg maintained, the evidence showed should have been
granted.34 One year later, the new Governor, A. Ransford Slater, wrote to Chief Justice
Smyly saying that it was time to decide whether or not to extend Renner’s probation or
terminate him. He asked the Chief Justice to collect and report the Judges’ views to
him. Judge R. E. Hall reported that Renner had been signing blank arrest warrants
and summonses and had unjustifiable arrears in his case load. Judge Gardiner-Smith
said that he was careless and not serious so that there was no reason for “public
confidence and satisfaction.”35 Guggisberg called in P. A. Renner, Sr., and told him
that his son was not doing his job and under normal circumstances would not be
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confirmed but would be terminated. However, as he had already told the Chief Justice,
he would allow young Renner to resign rather than suffer the stigma of termination but
that he had to do so forthwith. Renner, Sr. told the Governor that his son would
resign.36 Despite Governor Slater’s expressed desire to appoint an African to succeed
Renner, and Chief Justice Smyly’s statement that he would recommend one of the
three nominees, when it came time to forward a recommendation to the Colonial
Office, Thomas, then Acting Governor, decided, albeit with regrets, to appoint a
European, R. T. Egg, formerly Stipendiary Magistrate in British Guiana, described only
as a “good routine magistrate,” because the Chief Justice had changed his mind and
now thought none of the three African barristers was suitable.37
The sincerity of that statement may be tested by considering the dispatch the
Gold Coast Colonial Secretary, J. Maxwell, then acting as Governor, sent to Amery the
previous year with respect to a vacancy produced by the transfer of a Police Magistrate
to Nigeria. He told Amery that the qualifications for a Police Magistrate are a
European (Emphasis mine) of five years experience at the Bar. These qualifications,
he went on, were inserted by Chief Justice Smyly who wanted to assure himself of a
reserve of minor court judges who could act as a Puisne Judge when need arose.
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Maxwell said that he agreed such qualifications were desirable but that it would be
difficult to find a qualified candidate among local lawyers.38
Indeed, there was antipathy, if not real hostility to local lawyers as judges.
When Bannerman applied to become a Puisne Judge, the Governor expressed his
concern that a local judge would be subject to family influence, “no matter how great
the integrity of the individual judge,” the same argument put forward against appointing
Bannerman as a Magistrate.39 Smyly commented that he liked Bannerman and
respected his work and that he’d done very well as a Police Magistrate and would not
oppose him acting as a Puisne Judge temporarily on the condition that Bannerman
knew it would not be a permanent position. Questions of local influence aside, Smyly
argued that others had more seniority at the Bar, including Hutton Mills, Coussey and
even Solicitor General M’Carthy. Puisne Judge Roger E. Hall, expressed a “high
opinion” of Bannerman’s work and said that there was “little doubt he would be an able
and efficient judge if he were appointed.”40 Governor Guggisberg endorsed both these
views of Bannerman’s credentials, saying that he was a man “of such moral courage
as to lead to him ignoring family influences in the discharge of his work” and would
resist all influence, particularly if he were appointed to a post outside the area where
his family resided. He told Amery that Smyly had reported confidentially that he was
38
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sure Bannerman would have “acquitted himself well” had he been given the chance to
preside at assizes.” Nevertheless, Smyly declined to support him for a permanent
appointment, so the Governor, although eager to give Bannerman the opportunity to
act as a Puisne Judge was unwilling to recommend that he be appointed on a
permanent basis.41 Three years later, Guggisberg’s successor, Ransford Slater told
Bannerman that it was unlikely that he would be promoted in the Colony because
Colonial Regulation No. 55 usually barred anyone “connected to the Colony by birth,
family or otherwise,” in order to prevent aspersions on a blameless judge and
Governor.42 This rationalization must be seen as just that, a rationalization for refusing
to recognize the abilities of an indigenous judge simply because he was an African.
He had been serving with admitted skill and honor for nine years, yet the same
ridiculous explanation was offered for refusal to promote him. Moreover, the
Regulation cited in support of such refusal arguably applied only to Chief Justices and
was never used to prevent Francis Smith from serving as a Puisne Judge or
Bannerman himself or Hutton Mills from appointment as Magistrates. Indeed, when
Bannerman was ultimately named an Acting Puisne Judge, the Governor reported the
appointment in terms of his being “forced” to do so because there was no “practical
alternative” as the Attorney General declined to spare the Acting Solicitor General,
M’Carthy – another African – no one else was available and Bannerman was the
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Senior Police Magistrate.43 No wonder that in 1929, J. B. Danquah expressed both
disappointment at the paucity of African Magistrates and despair as to the likelihood
that Africans would be promoted to the Supreme Court as other than Acting Puisne
Judges without hope of a permanent appointment.44
Fiddian reported that in 1930, the Promotions Committee had received twelve
applications to fill the position of a Police Magistrate transferred to Granada and
another resulting from death of the incumbent. None were recommended to Major
Furse, the Private Secretary for Appointments, so it was decided to ask Governor
Slater to recommend a candidate for one position. He suggested T. Hutton Mills, the
son of a former Magistrate and Legislative Council member, but Chief Justice Deane
opined that such an appointment would be “a calamity.”45 Rather, the Governor put
forward the name of Alexander Mills, another son of T. Hutton, Sr. and the brother of
T. Hutton, Jr., who was appointed.46
A breakthrough occurred insofar as Bannerman was concerned when R. E.
Hall, then acting as Chief Justice, recommended that he be appointed an Acting
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Puisne Judge for a period of a year during the leave of Puisne Judge Ernest GardinerSmith and the return from leave of Chief Justice Deane.47 Then, in 1933, a vacancy
occurred in the position of Circuit Judge for Ashanti. Bannerman, Governor Thomas
reported, was the most senior Police Magistrate and was very well qualified. Deane
was still unwilling to consider Bannerman on the basis of his abilities, telling Thomas
that fourteen years of service without complaint of his submitting to outside influence,
Bannerman, would be subject to family influence and that was why he had kept
Bannerman assigned outside of Accra. However, the Chief Justice went on, more than
a little grudgingly, if it was politically necessary to appoint an African to the position,
he’d recommend Bannerman for a Circuit Judgeship and even as a Puisne Judge.
Thomas said that he regretted that the Chief Justice limited his recommendation to
political need, as he considered that apart from the “incident of his birth, Bannerman
performed “admirably” as an acting Puisne Judge, was “thoroughly fit for promotion”
and should be considered on the same basis as a European. He knew Bannerman
and his family well and was convinced that the former would not be influenced and the
latter would not try to influence.48 Bannerman was appointed to the position of Circuit
Judge of Ashanti in March 1934. Moreover, the Secretary of State, Sir Philip CunliffeLister, advised the Governor that when Supreme Court jurisdiction was extended to
Ashanti – as it was in 1935 – Bannerman would become a Puisne Judge. The
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Governor, and Deane as well, decided that Bannerman should receive the same salary
as his European predecessor rather than the reduced amount usually paid to
Africans.49
When Bannerman became Circuit Judge for Ashanti, a vacancy occurred for a
Magistrate, for which the Governor tried to appoint an African. However, his telegram
requesting the Colonial Office to hold up an appointment until he could send a
recommendation arrived to late and an appointment of a European was made and
accepted.50 Fiddian expressed great displeasure that the Governor and the Chief
Justice delayed giving the Colonial Office the information about the two African
candidates and thus made the Colonial Office look bad. Fiddian says that Deane
knew eighteen months previously that he wanted Awere but said nothing when the
vacancy occurred, giving “justifiable cause for complaint and resentment to African
agitators and Africans generally.” It appeared to him that Deane was “unconsciously”
against African judges.51 Ultimately, the position was offered to and accepted by
Quashi-Idun, a Cyprot. Bushe expressed skepticism because whites in the mining
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district complained about being dealt with by an African Magistrate there. He
recommended that the Colonial Office not appoint more Africans, “for the moment we
have gone far enough.” However, the Colonial Office decided not to tell Governor
Hodson not to push Africanization so fast.52
However, the decision not to decelerate Hodson’s program of Africanization did
not last long. Demonstrating a typical inability to make and stick to a decision, the
Colonial Office first telegraphed the Governor asking him to reconsider his
recommendation to appoint an African Magistrate as it felt that Africanization has gone
far enough for the moment. The Governor replied defending his recommendations,
saying that they were based “on policy and the successes of recent African
appointments,” but then backing off by saying that he wouldn’t object to the
appointment of two Europeans. Now the Secretary of State, William Ormsby-Gore,
reversed course, telling Hodson that he had reconsidered and that he would entertain
the Governor’s recommendation for appointment of an African.53 The Governor had
two candidates, A. Casely Hayford, son of the eminent barrister and scholar, J. E.
Casely Hayford, and C. F. Hayfrom-Benjamin. Hodson reported that Chief Justice
Petrides and the Attorney General both thought that Archie Casely Hayford was the
best qualified and most experienced, with which view the Governor agreed, as did
52
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Ormsby-Gore who appointed Archie Casely Hayford a Magistrate. In a minute on the
dispatch, Bushe disclosed the disagreement among the senior staff of the Colonial
Office, dissenting from the decision to appoint Casely Hayford because three Africans,
two Magistrates and a Puisne Judge (Bannerman) are “as much as we can safely have
for the moment.” Objecting to Bushe’s position, A. J. Dawes minuted that if they were
qualified, Africans should be appointed as Africanization was the approved policy.
Ormsby-Gore who had assumed office only four months previously, declared that it
was desirable to appoint worthy Africans as examples to African barristers as to where
they can go “if they show credit in their profession.”54 Shaloff argues that Ormsby-Gore
hoped to convince the coastal elite to forego politics by holding out the possibility of
judicial appointments for barristers.55
Guggisberg had initiated a debate on inclusion of Africans in superior positions
in the Gold Coast civil service in his 1926 speech to the Legislative Council advocating
promotion of worthy African candidates in part to save money. Opposition from
European officials arose immediately based, according to Shaloff on “racism and self
interest” by European officials unwilling to be subordinate to Africans whom they
believed to be morally and politically unqualified and unreliable.56 Nevertheless,
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despite a lack of enthusiasm expressed by Guggisberg’s successors, Ransford Slater
and Shelton Thomas, some effort was made to follow Ormsby-Gore’s suggestion and
to promote Africans. Given the difficulty discussed below experienced by the two most
obvious candidates for judicial promotion, Woolhouse Bannerman and Leslie
M’Carthy, on the basis of the flimsiest reasons, Shaloff’s argument appears to be
correct.
However, when Arthur Hutton Mills died suddenly while on leave in the United
Kingdom, no African candidate acceptable to the Chief Justice and the Attorney
General came readily to mind. Both the deceased’s brother, Thomas Hutton Mills, and
A. C. Acolatse, were rejected for lack of sufficient experience. Despite the Governor’s
fear of criticism if a European were appointed to replace an African, two Europeans, L.
C. Langley and P. M. Dalton, were appointed.57
In 1939, Attorney General Blackall wrote to the Governor reminding him that
both Puisne Judges Yates and Savary had transferred from the Colony and that
Puisne Judge Barton would soon go. He asked the Governor for assurance that
M’Carthy would be considered for one of the vacancies. He reminded the Governor
that M’Carthy was appointed Crown Counsel in 1931 and Solicitor General in 1933, in
which capacity he had been serving ever since. M’Carthy revised the Gold Coast
statutes and had exceptional knowledge of the law and local conditions, was
painstaking and sound and would add strength to the Bench and would be very
57
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popular with the Bar and the people of the Colony and “would be regarded as an
earnest of the Government’s endeavour to promote Africans to higher appointments
where they possess the requisite experience and qualifications.” Petrides supported
Blackall’s recommendation and expressed the hope that M’Carthy would be
appointed.58
Hodson supported the views of his Chief Justice and Attorney General,
reminding the Colonial Office that M’Carthy had acted as Puisne Judge on several
occasions “with credit.” Although accepting Hodson’s recommendation, the Colonial
Office specified that M’Carthy be appointed last of the three judges to be named so
that the two Europeans to be raised to the Bench would be his seniors. Hodson balked
at that proposal and demanded that M’Carthy be named first followed by Mustapha
Fuad Bey who was being transferred from Cyprus. London reluctantly agreed, but not
to grant M’Carthy the same salary as a European judge despite local opinion
supporting equal pay. Rather, it would discuss with the Governor how to phrase the
appointment so as not to offend either man and to justify a disproportionate salary for
M’Carthy.59 Thus for the first time, the Supreme Court of the Gold Coast had two
indigenous judges.
In concluding this survey of the judges of the Gold Coast, one must point out
that during the seventy years covered by this study, the judges for the most part lived
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apart from the peoples of the Colony, socialized primarily with the European members
of the Colonial Administration, neither spoke nor understood more than a smattering of
any of the local languages and, except for the rare occasions when they dined with
members of the Bar, were isolated from the people they judged. In addition, they left
the Colony for several months of home leave after each year of service and thus had
limited opportunities to study the customary law and mores of the people. Almost all of
what they knew they learned only through the evidence of “expert” witnesses in court.60
Albeit this was the standard manner in which British judges administered justice in the
Empire, particularly in the Tropical Empire, it cannot be said to have been conducive to
bringing colonizers and colonized together except to support British economic policies
and to keep the peace.
British official often expressed fear that judges appointed from the local
population would be susceptible to corrupt influence from family and friends, by which
was meant rendering decisions based on family connections rather than the evidence
presented. Yet the archival evidence discloses not a single case of where any
Africans considered for appointment to magisterial or superior court positions could be
found to have been susceptible to such improper influence. Unlike the case of
indigenous chiefs who were continually being criticized for their corrupt exploitation of
litigants, by imposition of excessive costs and fees and deciding cases other than on
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L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, The Rulers of British Africa, 1870-1914, Palo Alto: Stanford
University Press, 1978, 236.
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the merits, the judges of the British courts in the Gold Coast, African and European
alike were deemed to be men of honor and integrity.
This brief study also demonstrates once again the vacillation of Colonial Office
authorities in creating and carrying out a policy. Thus efforts to bring indigenous
people into the administration, including the judiciary, was encouraged, then
discouraged and then encouraged again, evidencing the ad hoc nature of British
colonialism.
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CHAPTER VI – BRITISH JURISDICTION: BUILDING A
DUAL SYSTEM OF JUSTICE
It was the essence of British imperial rule that justice according to British ideas
of jurisprudence be brought to the colonies.1 Indeed, British law required that the
common law be introduced into its many colonies for the benefit not only of British
settlers but of the indigenous community as well.2 To do so required the establishment
of courts in which causes might be heard, the appointment of judges to hear those
causes and the adaptation of rules of law to an environment completely different from
that in which those rules of law were created. In Chapter II, I described how the British
on the Gold Coast first came to decide disputes among British merchants. In Chapters
III through V, I discussed the identity and appointment of those who would decide the
causes brought before them. In this chapter, I shall set forth the nature and extent of
the jurisdiction exercised by British judges and how those judges created and
administered a common law based on the statutes and common law of England but
peculiar to the West Africa and particularly to the Gold Coast. This hybrid common law
resulted from the statutory injunction to apply customary law unless the parties
expressly or implicitly agreed that English law should prevail. I describe who was
entitled to proceed under customary law and how the British courts determined what
that customary law was.

1

Indeed, as Allan Mcphee has noted, in the second half of the nineteenth century, viewed from
their position as imperial masters of almost one quarter of the planet, the British believed that English law
was the best law for any country at any stage of development. Allan McPhee, The Economic Revolution in
British West Africa, 2d ed., London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1971, 138.

2

L. C. Green, “The Common Law and Native Systems of Law, “ in International and Comparative
Law of the Commonwealth, edited by Robert R. Wilson, Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1968, 81107, 86.
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In this chapter, I discuss how British, as distinguished from native, jurisdiction
was defined and asserted. I describe how the British judges created a hybrid common
law for their Gold Coast Colony and Protectorates, defining the customary law they
were charged to enforce. I go on to show how the colonial judges treated customary
law as a matter of fact to be proved by evidence, evidence most often supplied by
indigenous experts whose testimony the judges were not bound to accept. I describe
and discuss the repugnancy doctrine, which enabled the British courts to reject
customary law they deemed to be repugnant to their own moral standards. I discuss
the role of the District Commissioners as judges as that of other judges of the inferior
courts and how they also shaped the hybrid Gold Coast jurisprudence. I look at the
appellate process including the long struggle to create a trans-colonial West African
Court of Appeal. I describe the judicial reforms of the 1930's and, finally, I describe the
manner win which the British dealt with debt and debtors and the amelioration of the
harsh treatment prescribed by the common law that came about particularly under the
aegis of Chief Justice George C. Deane.
Roger Gocking wrote of the British courts as a medium of cultural interchange
exercising both direct and supervisory interventionist jurisdiction, the former over
disputes between Europeans and a limited number of Africans and the latter over the
Native Tribunals. He concludes that the cultural interchange brought about by this
exercise of British jurisdiction profoundly changed both customary law, but was not
imposed on the people of the Gold Coast.3 The evidence adduced in this dissertation
tends to refute Gocking’s conclusion, particularly in the area of supervisory jurisdiction
3

Roger Gocking, “British Justice and the Native Tribunals of the Southern Gold Coast Colony,” The
Journal of African History, Vol. 34(1993), 93-113, 94, 112-113.
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and supports Julius Lewin’s argument that the British courts in reviewing cases arising
under customary law imposed the concept of precedent and through invocation of the
repugnancy doctrine, imposed its own jurisprudence on the people of the Gold Coast.4
Similarly, Modibo Ocran points out that the necessity for the British to “retain their
posture as an imperial power” by introducing Africans to civilization almost compelled
creation of a repugnancy doctrine.5 The repugnancy doctrine endured throughout the
colonial period. Indeed even after independence, Ghanaian courts were determining
matters on the basis that some act was repugnant.6
In French West Africa, too, morality as seen from the perspective of the
colonizing power played a role in developing law. Alice Conklin notes that the
Governor-General of French West Africa issued a set of instructions to French judges
in which he required that customary law be applied “in accordance with the dictates of
French civilization.” Custom was to be clarified as a first step in modifying it “according
‘to the fundamental principles of natural law, the original source of all legislation.’”7
Unlike the common law tradition of reliance on decided cases as a source of law,
French law was almost entirely based on statute. Statutes enacted in France were
applicable in the colonies along with decrees of administrative authorities and special
4

Julius Lewin, “The Recognition of Native Law and Customs in British Africa,” Journal of
Comparative Legislation and International Law, Third Series, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1938), 16-23. Repugnancy
was defined in the Supreme Court Ordinance in terms of inconsistency with morals and natural law, these
latter terms deriving from a British rather than an African sense of morality or the laws governing the
universal conduct of people toward one another.

5

Modibo Ocran, “The Clash of Legal Cultures: The Treatment of Indigenous Law in Colonial and
Post-Colonial Africa,” Akron Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 2 (2006): 465-481, 475. Ocran, at the time of
publication a Justice of the Supreme Court of Ghana, notes that a repugnancy doctrine is still being
applied by African judges to certain customary rules. Ibid., 480.

6

S. K. B. Asante, “Over a Hundred Years of a National Legal System in Ghana:
A Review and Critique,” Journal of African Law, Vol. 31, No. Ω, (Spring, 1987): 70-92, 86
7

Conklin, 92.
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acts applicable only in Africa.8 However, in French West Africa, French courts were
open in civil matters only to French citizens except in cases involving commercial
transactions.9 As in the Gold Coast, criminal jurisdiction lay only in French courts.10
Application of Customary Law
The Supreme Court Ordinance, No. 4 of 1876, enacted on March 31, 1876
provided for enforcement of customary law by that Court. Section 19 provided
authority for the Court to enforce customary law in cases where the parties were
“natives” of the Colony, provided that such law was deemed not to be “repugnant to
natural justice, equity, and good conscience, nor incompatible either directly or by
necessary implication with any enactment of the Colonial Legislature.” Customary law
was to apply particularly in cases relating to marriage and to the tenure and transfer of
real and personal property, and to inheritance and testamentary dispositions. The
Ordinance provided that in cases between natives and Europeans customary law
would apply where the Court determined that “substantial injustice would be done to
either party by a strict adherence to the rules of English law.” However, an indigenous
party could waive resort to customary law he agreed by express contract to do so or if
the nature of the transactions underlying the claim were such that it could be said that
the indigen agreed that his obligations in connection with such transactions should be
regulated exclusively by English law. The Ordinance gave the Court complete
discretion in cases where no express rule was applicable to formulate rules based on

8

Jeswald W. Salacuse, An Introduction to Law in French-speaking Africa, 2 Vols., Vol. 1, Africa
South of the Sahara, Charlottesville, VA: The Michie Company, 1969, 7.
9

Ibid. 122

10

Ibid., 123.
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“the principles of justice, equity and good conscience.” In other words, the British
would engage in the pretense that Africans could live by their own custom and tradition
provided that they would determine who were Africans, what that custom and tradition
was and whether or not it applied in any given circumstances.11 So, too, in French
West Africa, the courts were directed to apply customary law in civil disputes between
indigenous people, mainly a hybrid of classic Islamic law and pre-Islamic customary
law.12
In implementing Section 19 of the Supreme Court Ordinance, the courts initial
question was whether the party seeking the benefit of customary law was a native.
This question would not appear to be difficult as people of color in the Gold Coast
would necessarily appear to be natives of Africa. However the courts held otherwise.
Thus, in Brown v Miller, [1921] F. Ct. ‘20-‘21, 48 the appellate court held that
repatriated blacks from Brazil and the West Indies were not natives within the meaning
of Section 19 entitled to claim the benefit of customary law despite long residence in
Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast.13
Next it was necessary to find whether or not the party claiming benefit of
customary law was in fact entitled to such benefit, the Court then had to decide what

11

Julius Lewin, “Native Courts and British Justice in Africa,” Africa: Journal of the International
African Institute, Vol.14, No. 8 (October, 1944): 446-453, 449. Lewin argued that British willingness to
accept and permit its courts to administer customary law was based on the unarticulated assumption that
it would be all right to apply traditional law “in its own limited sphere” but the extent and method of
application were “matters to be determined by the rules and doctrines of English law.”

12

Salacuse, 47, 54. However, population of four Senegalese towns, Dakar, Gorée, St. Louis and
Rufisque, were deemed to be citizens of France to whom French law applied. Ibid., 49-50.

13

Accord Nassu v Basel Mission, [1915] D. and F. Cts. ‘11-‘16, 86; Millers v Van Helm [1912] D.
and F. Cts. ‘11-‘16, 155. On the other hand, natives did not stop being natives because they had married
under the Marriage Ordinance and, except for matrimonial and succession issues specifically dealt with in
that Ordinance, were still subject to customary law. Thompson v Thompson, [1925] D. Ct. ‘21'-25, 155.
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the applicable law was.14 Relatively early in the history of the Colony, the British courts
decided that in order to qualify as a custom, the particular practice had to have been
recognized as having existed since ancient days, which meant at least since 1189.15
To be recognized as a custom, the practice had to be notorious, that is widely known
and used, but, according to the Privy Council, this requirement was satisfied if it was
described in a textbook, e.g. Sarbah’ Fanti Customary Laws or Fanti National
Constitution, or had been discussed in several judicial decisions.16
Having determined whether or not a litigant was a native entitled to the benefit
of customary law and that the custom sought to be applied was in fact a custom, the
courts then had to decide if the matter in issue was one suitable to the application of
customary law and/or the parties intended customary law to apply as indicated by their
conduct.17 Some cases were relatively clear. Thus, for example, the courts held that
corporations were unknown to customary law so that corporate parties would never
14

Ayim v Mensah [1911] Div. and F. Cts. 1911-1916, 4, aff’d Div. and F. Cts. 1911-1916, 6, held
that it was for the Court to determine the existence of a custom as to the right of an occupant to continue
cultivating land sold by a Chief to a third party.
15

Wellbeck v Brown, [1884] F.C. L. 185, where the Full Court, per Hector Bailey, the Chief Justice,
said that in order to be seen as valid, a custom had to have been of long standing and not recent. It is not
a custom if one knew the date when it first is said to have become a custom. Smalman Smith, P. J. said,
in his judgment in the same case, that in accordance with English law (emphasis mine) a custom “must
have existed in the colony since time immemorial” so that a custom only sixty years old is no custom.
Sarbah, argued that Wellbeck was wrongly decided. Custom, he contended is not limited to ancient
usage even under English law. Even new usage, if “universal or a fair and reasonable result of
development of a progressing community is a ‘custom.’” Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws, , 29. By 1925,
the Courts had eased that strict rule by holding that if a practice was in use at the date of enactment of the
Supreme Court Ordinance, that is, 1876, it would be recognized as a valid custom. Mensah v. Wiabo,
[1925] D. Ct. ‘21-‘25, 170. By contrast, this seemingly absurd rule was never applied in many other parts
of the Empire. L. C. Green, 88.
16
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“Some Realism About Customary Law: The West African Experience,” Wisconsin Law Review, Vol. 1996,
No. 1 (1996): 128-152, 133.
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International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April 1964), 574-616, 593.
-202-

intend other than English law to apply. In doing so, however, they ignored the
corporate qualities of customary institutions such as stools and families and the ability
of customary law to adapt.18
Intention to have English law apply need not have been express, but could have
been implied by words or deeds.19 Moreover, where the transaction at the heart of the
case was unknown to customary law – and the English courts stretched the term
“unknown to customary law” to all transactions usual in western economies, e.g. where
English forms were used as with leases, bills of sale and financing documents –
English law was deemed to have been intended to apply.20 But not all documented
transactions required application of English law. Thus, merely because documents
evidenced a transfer the Native Tribunal did not lose jurisdiction.21 To the contrary, the
Privy Council determined that native law did not always apply even when all parties
were natives, but only when the matter in issue was so connected to native life as to
require it. One court whose decision was accepted as precedent in Gold Coast courts
held that where, “the matter before the court contains elements foreign to native life,
18

Thus they held that the corporate personality was unknown to customary law and thus
corporations and matters integral to it could not be subject to customary law since they were not “native.”
A. K. Fiadjoe, “A Century of Company Law - An Overview,” in Essays in Ghanaian Law, Supreme Court
Centenary Publication, 1876-1976, edited by W. C. Ekow Daniels and Gordon R. Woodman, Accra:
Ghana Publishing Corp., 1976, 224.
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intent that the parties be bound by English law so that the Statute of Limitations applied to bar the action.
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habit and custom, the Court is not bound to observe native law and custom.”22 Some
examples of “elements foreign to native life, habit and custom” were found in written
executory contracts,23 written mortgages containing a power of sale,24 and a written
note made by an African to a European firm.25 In such cases, the burden of proving
that customary law rather than English law applied fell on the educated African
claimant. The test was whether or not substantial injustice and undue hardship would
result to the African if English law was applied.26 Notwithstanding such exceptions, it
may thus be seen that British courts could and did exert enormous influence on the
content of customary law, shaping it based on their own ideas and legal concepts.
Since the Supreme Court Ordinance required the Court to apply customary law
in those cases before it involving one or more indigenous parties, it was incumbent on
the Court to determine what customary law rules applied to each case. Normally, the
22

Cole v Cole [1898] 2 Nigeria Law Reports 15, a Nigerian precedent followed in Gold Coast courts
as it discussed common issues of traditional law found in both countries.

23

Zo Nwabueze, “English Law and Customary Law of Contract,” in Antony N. Allott, compiler,
Conference on the Integration of Customary and Modern Legal Systems in Africa, New York: African
Publishing Corp., 1971, 138.

24
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form, it was neither an English mortgage nor an equitable mortgage and customary law applied, Bosson v
Attonie [1897] Redwar’s Comments 199. Macan v Addaquay [1892] Redwar’s Comments 139 holds that
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Akoa [1893] Redwar’s Comments 138 (express contract), Adoo v Bannerman [1898] Redwar’s Comments
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exclusively to be applied; but see Longdon v Sagoe [1898] Fanti Law Reports 97, a mere book entry kept
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determination of what the law is, is a function of judicial knowledge and experience
with, in the Anglo-American tradition, a resort to precedent.27 However, foreign law is
not considered to be such as is within the cognizance of a judge. Thus, the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, the highest judicial authority for cases arising from the
Empire, held that customary law was foreign law and its content was a matter of fact to
be proved by evidence as would foreign law of any nature. Accordingly, as is the case
with appellate review of any determination of fact by a court from which the appeal is
taken, the finding of the court as to what the customary law was should not be
disturbed on appeal except in cases of clear error.28
Chief Justice Griffith had said that determination of the existence, nature and
applicability of customary law in any particular case was a very serious task requiring
more than a mere preponderance of the evidence.29 This holding required the judge to
consider what amounted to “expert” evidence from traditional authorities such as chiefs
and linguists and to accept only that which he believed to be clear and convincing.30
However and most importantly, a court was not obliged to accept any opinion proffered
to him but could determine for himself what the custom was, thus creating a custom on
27

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 37 (1803) (Marshall, C. J.)

28

Ometa v Numa, [1928], 11 Nigerian Law Reports 18 (Privy Council). Crabbe argues that the
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argument that requirement for such proof violated Section 92 of the Supreme Court Ordinance that
provided for reference to local referees to determine the applicable customary law. Crabbe, 59, 60.
Francis Crowther, Secretary of Native Affairs, told the West African Lands Committee in 1912 that oral
evidence of native custom was unreliable, that there was very little collected knowledge of native custom,
that the testimony of some so-called experts was biased and that custom was often created post facto.
BNA CO 879/117/1047.
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his own.31 Given this high level of discretion in determining the content of customary
law and frequently conflicting opinions as to what the custom was in any particular
situation, it is not surprising that the British courts frequently made mistakes and just
as frequently created customs that, after multiple repetitions were judicially noticed,
that is became something no longer necessary to prove.
In this manner, British judges created “traditional” law not only for a particular
ethnic group but for the entire country and that did not really exist or existed in forms
different from those the court found to be established. Courts frequently
misunderstood the oral testimony of a particular custom and misapplied it. Too,
because there were so few texts upon which the Courts relied, principally Sarbah’s,
courts extended the customary law of one group, e.g. the Fantis, to all groups
notwithstanding the likelihood of differing customs, and an incorrect decision as to
custom was perpetuated by the doctrine of stare decicis . Gocking argues that the
success of Sarbah’s Fanti National Constitution influenced British judges to view all
customary law as Fanti customary law not only in Fanti coastal towns but in the Akan
towns of the interior where, in fact, custom differed from place to place. This was so
because most of the cases collected by Sarbah, Redwar, Renner and Casely Hayford
involved Fanti custom.32

31

Godwin Jones v Ward [1895] Fanti Customary Law 143, held that the court was not bound by the
opinions of expert witnesses as to customary law but may choose the rule to be applied based on its
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Repugnancy
The manner in which the Supreme Court Ordinance was drawn clearly
demonstrated that English law would be the supreme law of the land viz à vis
customary law. Such supremacy was maintained not only by the requirement of proof
but also by the repugnancy rules so that customary law was enforced only when it had
been approved by British courts enforcing British norms of fairness, equity and natural
justice. As we have noted, the repugnancy doctrine held that customary rules that
contravened equity, fairness and natural law, as the British understood those terms,
were unenforceable. The British, Asante contends, saw the allowance of the
enforcement of native law as a “sort of dispensation within the larger framework of
English law, and often official contempt for ‘native’ law was hardly veiled.33
The repugnancy doctrine permitted British courts to shape customary law by
applying European concepts of public policy, morality and probity to indigenous ideas
and thus bend them to British norms.34 Perhaps because the practice was so
widespread and fundamental to the lives of the indigenous peoples of the Gold Coast,
polygamy was never deemed to be repugnant to British ideas of fairness, equity and
morality.35 Thus, the colonial power reserved to itself the right to determine which local
practices would be considered to be repugnant.36 T. O. Elias, an African legal scholar
33

S. K. B. Asante, “Over a Hundred Years of a National Legal System in Ghana: A Review and
Critique,” 86.

34

See T. O. Elias, “Customary Law: The Limits of Its Validity in Colonial Law,” African Studies, Vol.
13, Nos. 3-4 (1954): 97-107.
35
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The French also imposed a repugnancy doctrine. By Article 75 of a Decree of 11.10.03,
customary law was made applicable in disputes between indigens of French West Africa provided that
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of the post-colonial era, argues that through the repugnancy doctrine, the British
pushed customary law toward “an ordered and rational pattern of social control, shorn
of their superstitions, and harsh elements.”37 While one can agree that the repugnancy
doctrine was essential to social control, that control was British rather than indigenous
and gave the colonial power a tool to reformulate customary law along lines
considered by the British to be useful for economic development.
Thus, British judges had wide discretion to decide which parts of customary law
to incorporate into a colonial common law and found practices to be repugnant if they
were contrary to what the judges determined to be “principles elementary to English
justice,” principles deemed to be so self-evident that no explanation was needed.38
The standard was said to be objective not subjective, i.e. the Judge’s conscience was
not be determinative, but the decision had to be related to an external yardstick of
morality. In some cases the rules were so basic to fairness, e.g. the disinterestedness
of the judge and giving all parties a fair hearing, that every court, no matter the
36
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formative culture, had to observe them.39 But, not all determinations of repugnancy
depended on equity, justice and morality. Ocran points out that often the British based
their determination of repugnancy on their consideration of what was “most appalling,
ridiculous or simply unhelpful to the inculcation of Christian ideals.” Some examples,
Ocran gives, would be suicide where the deceased’s body was exhumed, tried and
decapitated. 40
Some British courts incorporated concepts found in English law but not in
customary law by considering customary conduct contrary to such concepts in terms of
repugnancy.41 Thus the English doctrine of prescription was not to be found in
customary law (see Chapter XII, infra.). Nevertheless, the British courts ruled that
permitting the ouster of one in long possession of land openly asserting rights known
to the owner to be adverse to the owner’s title and spending to improve the land or to
defend rights to it would be repugnant to equity.42 Other customs deemed to be
repugnant included: rendering a judgment by a Native Tribunal when a member of the
Tribunal had not heard all of the evidence, customs based on slavery, e.g. the chief’s
succeeding to a retainer’s property on the latter’s death,43 imprisonment by native
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Law School, 1978, 42.

40
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custom, e.g. being held in log,44 making a child of a slave a part of his or her father’s
family for purposes of succession is repugnant and unenforceable because it would
perpetuate prohibited slavery. Finally, Chief Justice Deane, sitting as a Divisional
Judge held that customary law requiring that the successor by heirship to a deceased
relative be personally responsible for all of the decedent’s debts was repugnant to the
extent that the heir was sought to be held liable for debts in excess of the assets left to
him.45
District Commissioners
The role played by the District and Provincial Commissioners in the
administration of justice on the Gold Coast was complex and one of the most
controversial, for they were both executive and judicial officers and were subject to
control by both executive superiors as well as the Chief Justice. Until 1894, neither
District nor Provincial Commissioners had any legislative authority to exercise judicial
functions save for that section of the Supreme Court Ordinance giving the Chief
Justice power to appoint commissioners for “taking affidavits and declarations and
receiving production of documents, or for taking the examination of witnesses on
interrogatories or otherwise which may be necessary to be taken in respect of any
proceedings in the Court”46 Despite this lack of statutory authority, the various District
Commissioners sat as judges in small civil and criminal matters in their Districts and
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were supervised therein by the Chief Justice who sought approval of the Colonial
Office for his request for specified law books for use by the District Commissioners.47
In this section, I discuss the legal authority of the District Commissioners as
magistrates from the 1882 Ordinance and their civil and criminal jurisdiction. We have
seen that at least until 1900 not all or even most of the District Commissioners had
legal qualifications and I discuss some of the problems arising from that lack and the
attempts by the Chief Justices to provide direction to the District Commissioners
through issuance of instructions for their guidance.48 It directed each Commissioner to
form a Court, makes him a commissioner of the Supreme Court, subjects him to the
Rules of the Supreme Court and the orders of the Divisional Court of the Province
where his District is located. The statute directed appeals from his court to the
Divisional Court. He was required to report to the Chief Justice as to each case he
decided at such intervals as the Chief Justice might direct. The revised statute
conferred upon him authority to issue writs of Habeas Corpus and to appoint
guardians and decide custody cases as well as to enter injunctions in order to protect
property in suit or to prevent breaches of contract or tort. He now had jurisdiction to
decide disputes as to land arising from property upon which execution had been
47
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levied. His criminal jurisdiction extended to all misdemeanors and he was authorized
to accept criminal informations and bind defendants for trial at an Assize. From that
point on, District Commissioners were raised in stature as members of the Judiciary.49
In 1916, after several drafts reviewed and revised by the Chief Justice, the Ordinance
was amended to provide that the monthly returns of cases heard by the District
Commissioners would be made to the Divisional Judge with authority over his district
rather than to the Chief Justice. These judges would have full revisory powers that
they could exercise on their own initiative without waiting for a monthly report “as the
deem fit,” unless the defendant has applied to the District Commissioner to state a
case or an appeal is pending.50
Soon after enactment of the 1883 Ordinance, the Governor also began to
receive complaints about what he decried as the many instances of illegal proceedings
and illegal decisions being made in the District Commissioners’ Courts in criminal
matters and said that something had to be done to counteract them. Thus he asked
the Chief Justice to draft an Ordinance requiring monthly returns of cases to be made
to the Chief Justice that would act as an automatic appeal of all criminal convictions
from those Courts and authorized the Chief Justice summarily to reverse or amend any
judgment he determined to be contrary to law and to authorize him to grant bail
pending his review. The Colonial Office approved and asked for lists of all convictions
reversed or amended by the Chief Justice.51
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Almost from the moment that he assumed office as Chief Justice, Griffith began
writing letters to District Commissioners in response to their monthly reports on
criminal cases. He would tell them in the form of a Socratic dialog what he thought
about the way they handled their cases52 He also minuted the Colonial Secretary
suggesting that increasing the District Commissioners’ criminal jurisdiction would save
Divisional Courts at least a week’s work annually and would not impose additional work
on the District Commissioners as most new cases could be dealt with summarily.
However, he said, no time savings for the Divisional Courts would result from
increasing civil jurisdiction as there would likely be many more appeals from the District
Commissioners civil judgments and they would soon be overburdened.53
Because of the lack of legal preparation by so many of the District
Commissioners, in 1893, Chief Justice Hutchinson convinced the Governor that the
District Commissioners should be given detailed instructions as to how they should
conduct their magisterial duties.54 The document, Instructions To District
Commissioners, defined the District Commissioner as a Commissioner of the Supreme
Court who was to facilitate the administration of justice with limited civil and criminal
jurisdiction. He was subject to the direction of the Chief Justice and/or the Puisne
Judge in his Province insofar as his Magisterial duties are concerned and to the
direction of the Governor as to his other duties. The Instructions addressed the
problem of the District Commissioner’s dual capacity and the necessity to “constantly
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to be on his guard to put aside all preconceptions derived from mere rumour or
suspicion. This was especially important in cases where had in his capacity as an
executive officer received instructions from the Executive at headquarters.” In such
circumstances, he should consider transferring the case to another Court.
The District Commissioner was firmly instructed that he had to, as would a
Puisne Judge, keep a faithful record of all admissible and relevant oral evidence he
received. He was warned not to issue criminal summonses except when he believed
that there was evidence that a crime had been committed and that the person
summoned had committed it and that the grounds for arrest had to be clearly stated
and had to give real notice of the acts charged. The accused had to be promptly
brought before him and the summons or warrant and the charge had to be read and
clearly explained to the accused. He was not to hold any hearing outside the presence
of the accused.55
In civil cases the District Commissioner was required to determine if the request
for a summons had some basis or was merely vexatious. He was directed not to grant
a judgment on default without taking evidence on the claim. He was advised that
judgments might be enforced by attachment and sale of property, arrest and
imprisonment or both as of right but that the District Commissioner might release a
judgment debtor if the debtor showed that he had disclosed all his property and had no
ability to pay and such inability was not due to his own misconduct.56
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The Instructions required the District Commissioners, in accordance with the
1884 Supreme Court Amendment Ordinance, to make monthly returns to the Chief
Justice as to all cases he heard, both civil and criminal, with a verbatim statement of
the charge or claim and the decision he’d made. The Instructions pointed out that no
judgment of a Native Tribunal not subject to the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance on the
same claims was binding on him (i.e., such judgment had no res judicata effect and
the case should be retried de novo), but that he was obliged to apply native customary
law to all claims before him involving natives provided such law was not repugnant to
natural justice. Despite some Supreme Court cases that could be read to the contrary,
the District Commissioners were told that there were no prescriptive rights in land nor
any statute of limitations on claims under customary law. Finally, the Instructions said
that there was no Statute of Frauds (requirement of a writing) on claims involving
illiterate natives.57
A second edition of the Instructions edited by former Chief Justice Hutchinson
and the then Chief Justice Griffith was issued in 1899 that made a number of changes.
While the Introduction to the 1893 version defined a District Commissioner as a
“Commissioner of the Supreme Court”, the 1899 version specified that he had two
“distinct official characters” as a magistrate and an executive official.” The 1899
version reinforces the injunction to note evidence carefully by pointing out that many
reversals were occasioned by a failure to specify evidence supporting the decision.58
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Paragraph 18 of the 1899 version enjoins the District Commissioner to make
sure administrative officials who allege violations of ordinances do not hand in charges
prepared “in a slovenly and insufficient manner.” In this and subsequent paragraphs,
he was told not merely to note evidence passively received but to question and follow
up “clues and hints,” as David Chalmers had earlier directed, to be able to sift the
evidence proffered by uneducated witnesses for the relevant material, eliminating
hearsay and the witness’ inferences from matters not in evidence and drawing out
evidence from the witness’ own observations that he may have omitted to state.59
In the 1899 revision, there is a more extensive discussion of the procedures
involved with imprisonment for debt. Since most of the District Commissioners’ civil
jurisdiction related to appeals from Native Tribunals, the later version of the
Instructions deals with the status of native courts not subject to the Native Jurisdiction
Ordinance (see Chapter VII, infra.) and the manner in which their judgments could be
enforced with particular attention to customary forms of punishment and detention and
the inability of native courts to order sale of a defendant’s property so that the native
court was reduced to enforcement primarily by “the force of public opinion.” Griffith’s
revision encouraged the District Commissioners to read and study Sarbah’s book on
Fanti law and custom as it “will well repay any Commissioner.”60
Griffith took greater note of the problems of proving native custom where it is
not admitted as, he wrote, it was often very indefinite: “In such cases the indefiniteness
of native law affords so-called experts large scope for generalizing from single
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instances and for laying down as native law doctrines which are sometimes absurd,
often in themselves inconsistent and always narrow.”61 This statement demonstrates
Griffith’s hostility to native custom and law.
In early 1911, Herbert Bryan, then Acting Governor, sent Secretary of State
Harcourt a dispatch concerning a new edition of the Instructions To District
Commissioners that had been started in 1909 by Chief Justice Griffith but never
completed. Bryan told his superiors in London that he had asked Griffith to revise
them in light of the recently enacted Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1910. Griffith had
promised to complete the revision and send it to the Governor before he left the Gold
Coast for the last time, having retired as Chief Justice, on March third.62
Completed that month but not finally approved until October, the latest revision
was more than twice as long as the 1899 edition, was much more detailed and
included several appendices and pages of forms. The title page indicated that it had
been prepared by Griffith but had “since been issued subject to certain modifications
with the approval of Chief Justice Sir P. Crampton Smyly.”63 Some of the changed and
additional material discussed the common native practice of someone appearing as
the party, giving the party’s name and testifying on the basis of what the party told him
61
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to say, so that the District Commissioner had to determine at the outset if the witness
was acting on behalf of a party per customary law, which was “not accordance with our
law” and had to be told that he could only testify as to that which he knew first hand.
Another new paragraph directed the District Commissioner to determine whether or not
to permit attorneys to appear for parties in civil cases (they could appear in criminal
cases as of right) and referred him to Schedule I of the Supreme Court Ordinance
which said that ordinarily no attorneys should be permitted where the parties are
illiterate unless a special reason compelled otherwise. In this revision, the Instructions
reminded the District Commissioners that no sentence of flogging could be carried out
without the prior approval of the Chief Justice and no juvenile should be imprisoned as
well as whipped. They were reminded not to hear cases of threats, insults or abuses
directed at themselves: “This direction may seem elementary but a long experience
has proved that it is necessary.”64
As to appeals from summary convictions, the District Commissioner was to note
the grounds asserted for as the basis for leave to appeal carefully. Unless asserted
questions of law were apparently frivolous, he should agree to state a case, that is to
set out the legal question presented, and to state all relevant facts, his reasons for his
decision on the legal question and any special circumstances the Court should
consider.65
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Paragraph 67 specified that linguists, the spokesmen for the chiefs, generally
were allowed to testify as to past events connected to the stool.66 “Tradition and history
get mixed up in evidence of this sort and there is much room for the imagination and
for invention, but nevertheless this evidence fills in lacunae which could not otherwise
be filled and in a certain class of land cases it often furnishes a clue to the truth.”67
Paragraphs 77-88 discussed Native Tribunals and customary law. They pointed out
that the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1910 radically changed prior law and divested
British Courts of many cases with which they had previously dealt, recognized the
jurisdiction of all native courts not merely those proclaimed to be under the earlier
Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1883, made it mandatory to stop hearing cases
cognizable by native tribunals and refer them to those tribunals unless special
circumstances were shown and required the District Commissioners to ask themselves
if a case was one “cognizable” by a native court. Paragraphs 89-91 urged the District
Commissioners to be sympathetic and understanding of the differences between the
native and European mind sets. Natives would not blame Commissioners for their
decisions if they were convinced that they genuinely tried to get at the truth and were
absolutely impartial: “Whenever a new Commissioner comes to any district natives are
all prepared to give him a welcome. They recognize his superiority and expect from
him a strong sense of justice, great patience in listening to them, strict impartiality,
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dignity and self control.”68 On this note of self congratulation and smugness, the
Instructions closed.
The following paragraphs describe in greater detail the jurisdiction of the District
Commissioners as it changed from time to time as well as the relations between the
District Commissioners and the judges who supervised their magisterial work. I
describe the appointment of Police Magistrates and the continued perceived need for
more District Commissioners to deal with increasing minor litigation that fell outside the
jurisdiction of the native tribunals.
This extended discussion of the Instructions demonstrates, I contend, the
importance of the District Commissioners to the administration of justice in the Gold
Coast at the end of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century and the
efforts of the professional judiciary to enable the District Commissioners to act like
lawyers and proper judges even when they lacked professional training and
credentials.
At various times, the jurisdiction of some or all District Commissioners was
changed in some or all cases. Thus that of the District Commissioner of Akwapim was
increased without limit in undefended debt cases where the amount was liquidated.
Moreover the Governor requested the opinion of the Acting Chief Justice on raising the
jurisdictional limit on all debt cases where the District Commissioner was a Barrister or
Solicitor.69 The point of all this was that the Supreme Court judges liked very much
having the assistance of District Commissioners in discharging their judicial duties,
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provided that the judges could rely on them to perform in a lawyerly manner. For
example, from time to time Chief Justice Griffith had occasion to write with approval of
the work of many of the District Commissioners whom he supervised, calling them
“hard working and steady.”70
,

One effort to deal with the need for more judges of summary courts involved the

passage of a Police Magistrates Ordinance. At the end of 1915, the Governor referred
a draft such ordinance to Chief Justice Smyly for review and comment. The draft
proposed to give the Governor power to appoint and define the geographical
jurisdiction of Police Magistrates who would constitute a Court that would be part of the
Supreme Court of which the Magistrate would also be a Commissioner. He would, of
course have criminal jurisdiction to deal with lesser offenses punishable by
imprisonment for up to one year and/or a fine of up to £100, what we in the United
States would call misdemeanors, as well as civil jurisdiction of personal actions, i.e.
contract, tort landlord-tenant rent and eviction cases, but would specifically deny him
jurisdiction to deal with appeals from Native Tribunals such as were within the
jurisdiction of District Commissioners.71
Adding Police Magistrates would not be enough. The performance of judicial
duties by District Commissioners was still absolutely vital to the well being of the
Colony. Indeed, in early 1919, toward the end of his term as Governor, Sir Hugh
Clifford wrote to Chief Justice Smyly asking his opinion as to the necessity to keep the
District Commissioners independent of the Executive. He said that the development of
70
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the Colony generated such an amount of litigation that the District Commissioners
could not keep up with their judicial work as well as their executive work. He could
appoint Police Magistrates in the towns to reduce some of the District Commissioners’
burdens and who would be independent of the Executive, but, he told Smyly, the
Commissioner of the Western Province had earlier objected on the ostensible grounds
that the District Commissioners’ lack of independence was a good thing as they knew
the people and the Districts and that sometimes political knowledge was necessary to
them making good judgments.72 Clifford pointed out that in Ceylon, the Executive and the Judiciary
were interchangeable without any problems and the Provincial Commissioner insisted that the natives
had no trouble with an Executive as a judge and neither man knew of any complaints that any judgment
was politically motivated. Moreover, if there were more District Commissioners they could do political
work in their down time whereas Police Magistrates could not.73

Indeed, many matters dealt with

by District Commissioners as judges involved politics. Thus, a District Commissioner,
one Ramsey, reported that he had to consider the political effect of any decision he
made as to a “patently illegal” destoolment of an Ohene in his district where the Ohene
[a second tier chief] was suing in his Court for assault: “My sympathy is very much
with the Ohene who has been badly insulted and knocked about,” and since the
parties rejected his proposal for a settlement “there is no other course, if the Ohene’s
prestige is to be kept up, but to have the culprits dealt with in the District
72
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Commissioner’s Court,” and the Ohene’s prestige was an important concern for the
colonial government who relied on him to carry out Government orders and policies.74
The Governor wrote to the Secretary of State, Lord Milner, later in 1919 telling
him that court work in the three principal towns of the Colony had increased so much
that additional assistance was urgent. The District Commissioners, he said were
obliged to spend so much time in court that they couldn’t tour their districts. He
reported that the Chief Justice, the Provincial Commissioners, the Attorney General
and the Solicitor General had conferred and recommended more District
Commissioners in preference to an additional Police Magistrate. These proposed
additions to the “minor judiciary” should have legal training and should be independent
of the executive – how that could be he did not say. He believed that such post or
posts should be made available to local barristers forthwith -- it would be a “wise
policy.” His estimates provided for more District Commissioners as well as for an
additional Police Magistrate, he said.
While recommending the appointment of an African, he also suggested that
Europeans should also be appointed in order to train them for higher judicial positions.
He noted that the recently appointed native Police Magistrate, Woolhouse
Bannerman, was doing well and that he wanted to appoint one other native Magistrate,
two European District Commissioners and six Assistant District Commissioners -presumably also European although he is silent on this point. The Colonial Office
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noted Clifford’s request for a native Magistrate but was otherwise silent. However
none were appointed at that time and for a number of years later.75
The personal testimony of some District Commissioners indicates that almost all
of their time was allocated to their judicial duties, although that would not seem to tell
the whole story, as we know that they were required to deal with numerous political
and administrative issues. Nevertheless, District Commissioner W. H. Beeton noted in
his diary, in an entry that was typical of many others, that he had spent almost the
entire week in court hearing cases such as one involving the “ownership of a wife,” and
a large number of cases, “half sanitary and half police.”76 Similarly, A. J. Loveridge told
an interviewer that most of his work as an Assistant District Commissioner during his
first tour of duty was judicial and that he spent at least three days each week in court.
Both Beeton and Loveridge said that it was vital to get control over the Native
Tribunals and that among their most important duties was to review decisions of the
Native Tribunals and to quash unjust convictions.77
This comment on the duty to review decisions leads us naturally to a discussion
of judicial review of lower court decisions generally. All judicial systems in Europe and
North America provided for courts to review the decisions of lower tribunals as a
corrective of factual and legal error. The judicial system of Great Britain and its Empire
was no different. An appellate court of last resort for litigants from the courts of the
entire Empire was the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Established by the
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Judicial Committee Act, 3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 41 1833, it had jurisdiction over all appeals to
the prerogative exercised by the Sovereign in Council. Its jurisdiction was extended by
7 & 8 Vict. c. 69 1844 to appeals from any court, but the Judicial Committee by long
practice only heard appeals from the highest court of a colony. The 1844 statute
conferred upon the report of the Judicial Committee the status of a judgment.78 Its
purpose was not to supplant the courts below as to their findings of fact in the cases
before it but to consider only the most important questions of law, the answers to which
might be applied to cases in all of the imperial dependencies and, most importantly, to
induce “the inhabitants to resort to the Courts for the settlement of their disputes rather
than to the possibly more familiar means of personal violence. For this purpose it is
essential that the people should be brought to feel the greatest respect not only for the
impartiality and independence of the tribunals, but for the honesty and fairness of
those who practice before them.”79 Thus its members saw themselves as educating all
imperial subjects as to the benefits of British justice.
Appeals In the Gold Coast and West Africa Generally: A West African Court of
Appeal
In the course of this section, I discuss the manner in which appeals were
handled in the Gold Coast and the extended debate over eight years as to the
formation and the jurisdiction of a multi-colony court of appeal. This debate, which
sometimes became testy as the Chief Justice of Sierra Leone, who had served as a
Puisne Judge in the Gold Coast, pursued his own agenda for the jurisdiction of such a
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court and the rules that would govern its operation. I note that at times it required the
intervention of the Secretary of State for the Colonies to move the creation of the court
to fruition.
During the early days of British colonialism, in 1856, the British established a
Court of Appeal for all cases arising from its settlements in West Africa. However that
Court was suppressed in 1874 at the time of the creation of the Gold Coast Colony.80
In 1902, an East African Court of Appeal was created for the protectorates of Kenya,
Uganda and Malawi, the jurisdiction of which was later extended to Tanganyika,
Zanzibar and Somaliland.81 But no comparable trans-colonial court existed in West
Africa until 1930.
From 1876 until 1930, the Full Court of the Supreme Court constituted the
highest appellate court in the Colony and the Protectorates. Pursuant to Section 7 of
the Supreme Court Ordinance, it consisted of at two or more of the Judges of the
Supreme Court, but one of which had to be the Chief Justice who had a casting vote in
the event of an even division. It was required to sit at least four times annually so long
as appeals were pending.82 It had jurisdiction over all final judgments of a Divisional
Court and over interlocutory judgments and orders where the judge making the
judgment or order gave his leave to appeal in matters worth £50 or more.83 One may
readily see that questions of conflict arose on appeals from judgments of the Chief
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Justice sitting as a Divisional Judge since he was required to sit as a member of the
Full Court, but these questions do not seemed to have been raised until 1920.
In November of that year, Gilbert K. T. Purcell, formerly a Gold Coast Puisne
Judge and at that time Chief Justice of Sierra Leone, wrote to the Colonial Office
recommending the establishment of a supercolonial court of appeal for all the West
African dependencies.84 Purcell alleged that the public had lost confidence in the
existing appellate courts where the Chief Justice sat in review of his own decisions, as
was the case in all of Sierra Leone, Nigeria and the Gold Coast, and suggested a West
African Court of Appeals sitting twice each year in Freetown, Accra and Lagos. All
British West African Judges would be members. Purcell readily admitted that such a
court would dislocate the work of the local courts and probably would be impracticable
but given the resolutions of the National Congress of British West Africa with respect to
its dissatisfaction with the Appellate Courts where judges sit on their own cases, it
would be better to have a court with outside judges.85 Purcell argued in favor of
criminal appeals in accordance with the 1909 English Criminal Appeals Act that, if his
suggestion was accepted, would produce more than enough appeals to keep such a
Court busy. He pointed out the fact that in several places, criminal trials were without
defense counsel so that a court for criminal appeals would be even more necessary.
84
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Indeed, Purcell went on, as important as doing justice was the necessity for people to
see and feel that justice was being done.86 Lord Milner responded that if there was a
general desire for such a court, there should be a conference among the Chief
Justices and the Attorneys General to prepare a scheme for his approval.87
In early 1921, Purcell sent the Colonial Office and the Governors of the West
African colonies a draft Order-in-Council establishing a West African Court of Appeals
(“WACA”) and rules governing it operation. He said that he preferred a court with full
time outside judges doing only appellate work but acknowledged that the expense of
such a court made this impracticable. His draft permitted criminal appeals only on
questions of law which allowed for no additional appeals beyond those then allowed by
the various colonial ordinances.88 Winston Churchill, Milner’s successor, rejected the
idea of a WACA at that time because of the “considerable expense” that would be
imposed on the colonies, an expense that they could not then afford. As to the
problem of the Chief Justices sitting in review of their own decisions, Churchill
suggested that the Supreme Court Ordinances of the four colonies be amended to
eliminate the requirement that the Chief Justices sit on the Full Courts at all times and
to add the Circuit Judges of Ashanti and the Northern Territories as Puisne Judges for
appeal purposes.89
Pressure from Africans for creation of a WACA continued as T. Hutton Mills
argued at the 1923 meeting of the National Congress of British West Africa that the
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alleged lack of money should not prevent enactment of WACA legislation as four
colonies could and should pool their resources to come up with the necessary funds to
fund this vital reform.90 The press took up the call with the Gold Coast Independent
joining the National Congress of British West Africa in calling for a WACA with
independent judges from England whose sole duty would be to hear appeals.91
However, beyond expressing a need for a WACA, the voice of the African in the
debates concerning the form and jurisdiction of such a court was not heard.
In May1924, representatives of Nigeria, the Gambia, Sierra Leone and the Gold
Coast conferred in the Colonial Office to discuss formation of a WACA, but, according
to Colonial Office officials, the conference did not bring such a court “appreciably
nearer” to fruition because neither Nigeria nor the Gold Coast wished to support it
financially, preferring that any money available for the judiciary be spent on additional
Puisne Judges for their colonies. However, Chief Justice Smyly told Governor
Guggisberg that he “wholeheartedly” supported a WACA for civil matters, in response
to which the Secretary of State, James Henry Thomas directed Smyly and his
counterparts in Sierra Leone and the Gambia, along with the Attorneys General of
those dependencies to confer and propose a scheme for a WACA and a manner of
sharing the costs. He told them to proceed without Nigeria which demonstrated no
desire to participate. Each colony would have to decide for itself if the WACA was to
have criminal jurisdiction over cases from that colony.92
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The conference met in Accra for six days during the last week of October and
the first week of November, 1924 and produced a majority and a minority report. The
former, consisting of all the participants from the three colonies save Puisne Judges
Dalton and Michelin from the Gold Coast, said that it was not financially feasible to
constitute a court of three independent appellate judges, recommend a court
consisting of all the judges of the four colonies, even those of Nigeria, with an
independent President who would do only appellate and administrative work and which
would replace the Full Courts of the participating colonies. No judge would sit on an
appeal from his own decision below. The WACA would sit twice yearly in each of
Accra and Freetown. The two dissenters accepted the entirety of the majority report
except, they asserted, that there should not be a separate independent President, but
that the presiding officer should be the Chief Justice of the Gold Coast until such time
as Nigeria joined the Court because such officers had the knowledge of local
customary law that an independent judge would not have. They went on to
recommend appointment of a sixth Puisne Judge for the Gold Coast to ease the
burden on the Chief Justice enabling him to devote more time to the WACA. Governor
Guggisberg advised London that he supported the minority report because it would
result in less expense – “a matter of some importance” – and because it would enable
the formation of a WACA sooner.93
Nothing happened to forward the project of a WACA for almost two years.
Reporting to the Parliamentary Undersecretary of State, William Ormsby-Gore, in
November 1926, Governor Guggisberg said that correspondence as to a WACA began
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as early as 1914. He described the recommendation of the majority of the attendees
at the conference among judges, attorneys-general and solicitors-general from the
Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and the Gambia at Accra in October 1924 that a WACA
similar to that in the East African Protectorates, consisting of all judges and acting
judges, be created with an independent President with only appellate duties with
headquarters at Accra, and that would replace the Full Courts of the colonies. Each
colony would be responsible for a specified portion of the cost according to size. He
described Michelin’s and Dalton’s dissent from the majority report as to a separate
WACA President since the Gold Coast Chief Justice could do it and that Sierra Leone
was holding out for an independent President. Guggisberg noted that the Colonial
Office had yet to comment on this issue but that it had told the Governors that each
colony could decide for itself what cases would be appealable to the WACA. Finally,
Guggisberg told Ormsby-Gore that in 1921 the Gold Coast Attorney General had said
that criminal appellate jurisdiction of any WACA should be no greater than that of the
Gold Coast Full Court, i.e. criminal appeals on questions of law only.94
Shortly thereafter, the Governor of Sierra Leone complained to Secretary of
State Leo Amery about the lack of progress toward formation of a WACA and the
rejection by the Gold Coast Government of his Chief Justice’s recommendations.
Flood noted on the dispatch his disdain for Sierra Leone’s appeal that the Secretary of
State should force the Gold Coast and Gambia and also Nigeria to bail out the
“relatively unimportant Colony of Sierra Leone.” Flood thought that the Sierra Leone
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Chief Justice was responsible for the agitation, was weak and was being manipulated
by the local Bar. Risley, the Colonial Office legal advisor, disagreed saying that, on the
contrary, Purcell was often accused of being too strong and that Sierra Leone needed
immediate relief in the form of judges from the other colonies to enable it to form an
appellate court for pending cases. Nigeria had six Puisne Judges and could afford to
lend one to Sierra Leone even if the Gold Coast couldn’t, so that a WACA would be
unnecessary. Sir Samuel Wilson, the Permanent Undersecretary, minuted that the
Secretary of State was reluctant to coerce other colonies at the behest of Sierra
Leone, but he’d ask Nigeria if it would accept either of the 1924 proposals and if it said
yes, he’d approach the Gold Coast and the Gambia which likely would go along.95
Nigeria’s Governor advised his colleagues that he had adopted his Chief
Justice’s view that a WACA would offer no benefit to Nigeria since appeals couldn’t be
heard speedily by outside judges coming to Lagos given the schedule of the judges of
the four colonies.96 Nevertheless, the Colonial Office decided to move the scheme
forward without Nigeria and directed the Governors of the three remaining colonies to
get together and resolve their differences.97 Now, however, John Aitken, the Gambia
judge, expressed his opposition to a WACA without Nigeria, saying that it was
unnecessary since Sierra Leone and Gambia appeals could be heard in Freetown if
Nigeria lent the necessary judges as it had agreed to do and the Gold Coast could
handle its own appeals.98
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Ignoring Aitken’s opposition, the Colonial Office proposed a scheme along the
lines of the 1924 majority report with a permanent President based in Accra to arrange
sittings and to preside over all sittings of the WACA and to consult with the Chief
Justices as to rules.99 The seemingly endless colloquy continued when Gold Coast
Governor Alexander Ransford Slater, said that Chief Justice Smyly now opposed a
WACA because Nigeria would not come in, the Gold Coast would have most of the
burden and the Gold Coast would not be able to share the prestige of an appellate
court that encompassed all of West Africa.100 Risley noted in the margin, “Rubbish.”
Slater preferred an additional Puisne Judge who could do both Divisional and appellate
work as to which he was being pressed by the unofficial members of his Legislative
Council, in which case the Gold Coast could help out Sierra Leone as Nigeria would.
He said that his Attorney General was also backing away from the idea of a WACA in
favor of an additional Puisne Judge who could go to Sierra Leone from time to time if
needed. Moreover, the Attorney General reported to Slater, Smyly had inquired of the
leaders of the Bar as to what they wanted and was told that they wanted an additional
Puisne Judge in preference to a WACA without Nigeria. The Governor enclosed
extracts from the minutes of the Legislative Council recording a speech by Casely
Hayford, then an Unofficial Member, complaining about the Gold Coast being a
training ground for judges seeking promotion. Casely Hayford argued that Judges
needed to stay for longer periods in the Colony because the law and customs were not
easy to learn quickly. Slater, somewhat reluctantly said that he had to endorse the
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views of his Attorney General and Chief Justice and pressed for another Puisne Judge,
one who was vitally needed in view of leaves coming up for three judges.101 A Colonial
Office official, D. C. J. McSweeny, characterized the Gold Coast’s reasoning as
“selfish” and said that lending judges to Sierra Leone ad hoc would not cure its
problems in the long run.102 A. J. D. Dawes expressed the hope that Slater would
“convert” his advisors to a WACA scheme but acknowledged that Slater and Smyly
seem to have “retired” from the idea of a WACA. J. A. Calder, an Assistant
Undersecretary of State, opined that since nobody but Sierra Leone seemed to want it,
the ideal of a WACA should be dropped, while Risley argued that if the Gold Coast
were to be coerced to take part, Nigeria should be as well. Moreover, arguing with
some passion in favor of the multi-colony court, he said that if a Court of Appeal for all
of British West Africa were to be created, “it would inspire the natives of all those
territories with an even added confidence in the administration of ‘British Justice’ which
they all recognize as being the bedrock of peace, order and good government in West
Africa.” While Ormsby-Gore said that he wanted to revisit the question of coercing the
recalcitrant colonies, as he personally believed that the Gold Coast and Nigeria should
be in.103 McSweeny was skeptical about the need for a sixth Puisne Judge and
discounted the endorsement of the local Bar as self serving in that they believed it
would lead to more litigation and work opportunities. Calder agreed that the case for a
sixth judge was “hardly made out,” but recommended that the Secretary of State
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approve putting a sixth judge in the estimates. Risley agreed, although Gilbert Grindle,
another Assistant Undersecretary, thought it unnecessary as Magistrates could act as
Puisne Judges, he wouldn’t oppose Risley.
The Gold Coast Independent responded to complaints that if outside judges
were brought in to deal with local appeals they would not know local law and custom
by saying that neither did the Privy Council when dealing with appeals from the Gold
Coast. The paper encouraged the Government to pursue creation of a West African
Court of Appeal as soon as possible, citing the support for such a court from many
(albeit unnamed) local judges.104
At last, in February 1928, Ormsby-Gore decided that a WACA of the three
colonies should be created with Sierra Leone to pay for the appellate judge, Nigerian
judges would sit on the court even if it heard no Nigerian appeals and there would be
no independent President. The three Governors were to consult and decide where the
new appellate judge should be based, what if any other work he should do and what
local legislation was necessary to get things going. They should prepare a proposed
Order in Council to carry out the scheme.105 Through the summer of 1928, the
Governors of the three colonies, the Attorneys General and the judges went back and
forth, drafting and redrafting the Order-in-Council establishing the WACA and debating
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whether it should have jurisdiction over criminal appeals.106 Having at last lost
patience, in November, the Secretary of State took charge and told the three
Governors that the Order-in-Council would be revised in the Colonial Office, passed
through the Privy Council and sent to them.107 Because Sierra Leone insisted on the
WACA having jurisdiction over criminal appeals and the Gold Coast did not, he had
decided that the Order-in-Council would provide for jurisdiction over such appeals
where local law so provided. Rules were to be made by the President of the Court,
that is the Chief Justice of the Gold Coast, and one other judge in consultation with the
Chief Justice of Sierra Leone and the Judge of the Gambia.108 In April 1929, the
Secretary of State directed the Governors to pass all necessary legislation and agree
on the Rules of Operation so that the Court could commence operation on June 1,
1929.109 Through the spring and summer of 1929, Governor Slater having told the
Secretary of State that the June 1 deadline could not be met, fourteen substantive
communications respecting proposed rules passed among Smyly, Purcell and Aitken,
with the latter two judges usually carping about Smyly’s drafts.110 In order to resolve
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the outstanding issues, the new Gold Coast Chief Justice G. C. Deane, would meet his
Sierra Leone opposite number in Freetown en route to taking up his post. Puisne
Judge R. E. Hall and the Attorney General, Sidney Abrahams, were sent to assist him.
By mid-November, the Rules had finally been agreed to and an effective date for
operations of the Court of January 1, 1930 was set. But, as was usual with West
African legislation, technical glitches were discovered and a revised date of March 1,
1930 was set.111
The issue of the jurisdiction to be given the WACA over criminal appeals from
the Gold Coast engendered numerous and varied opinions from the judges and law
officers. Some favored free appeals and some appeals only on questions of law.
Judge Sawrey Cookson insisted that free appeals be granted to defendants not only in
the Colony but in Ashanti and the Northern Territories as well in order to “Let us
remove this blot on our escutcheon as typified by the recent Knowles case” [where a
defendant in Ashanti had been condemned to death for murder without trial by jury,
without a right to counsel and only a limited appeal]. Attorney General Abrahams
argued that a free appeal, that is one on the facts, the law and the sentence should be
allowed.112 The Governor advised the Secretary of State that after much thought and
consideration of the views of his Attorney General and the judges, he agreed that the
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WACA should have jurisdiction of criminal appeals from the Gold Coast pursuant to
the English Criminal Appeal Act.113
In late May 1932, the Secretary of State advised the Governor of Nigeria that
the WACA was working very well and was giving a great deal of satisfaction and that it
was now time for Nigeria to adhere to the Court. He informed the Governor that until
Chief Justice Deane left that he would remain the President of the Court after which
the Nigerian Chief Justice would assume that position and until then, Rules would be
made by the two Chief Justices together.114 The Gold Coast wanted the WACA
quorum to remain at two judges with the consent of the parties because of a financially
induced reduction in personnel. The Attorney General had his doubts as to the value
of a two judge bench but deferred to Chief Justice Deane’s desires in the matter.115
The Governor wished to wait until the reforms recommended by Bushe (see below)
were implemented, but since the necessary legislation to implement those reforms
would not be ready for a year or more, he urged that the Order-in-Council to bring
Nigeria into the WACA go forward immediately. This was done and Nigeria adhered to
the Court as of April 1, 1934.116
The press continued to lobby for free appeals in criminal cases and
independent judges for the WACA, repeating its concern that judges will not reverse
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the decisions of their colleagues, although experience showed that concern to be
without basis.117 Despite pubic opinion, Britain continued to resist the idea of both
independent judges and free appeals in criminal cases, although WACA’s jurisdiction
was extended in 1935 to include interlocutory appeals by leave of the court below in
civil cases and appeals on questions of fact and punishment by leave of the court
below in criminal cases.118 Then, in 1938 a crack appeared in the wall of opposition
when Donald Kingdon, the Chief Justice of Nigeria, said that the time had come for
appointment of a full time WACA President and probably full time WACA judges as
well.119 The new Gold Coast Chief Justice, Philip Petrides, expressed his agreement,
at least in part, but, asserting that most criminal appeals were frivolous, argued that
they should be heard speedily by judges in the colony from which they came and
should not await appointment of a President. The Colonial Office seemed receptive to
Kingdon’s suggestion, asking the two Chief Justices to report exactly what their
proposal would cost, what savings, if any, would result and what fees it would
generate.120 In response, Kingdon told the Secretary of State that he believed that an
Independent President should be the highest paid judge in the Colonial Legal Service
so as to attract the most able candidates but conceded that even that estimated sum
he submitted to the Colonial Office would likely not convince the best English barristers
to offer themselves as potential appellate judges. The Gold Coast Governor, Arnold
W. Hodson, doubted that the appointment of an independent WACA President would
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save much of the time of the Gold Coast and Nigerian Chief Justices as to appellate
work.121 By the time the Secretary of State responded, the war had commenced and
he was able to use that fact as an excuse to put off further consideration of proposals
for independent WACA judges for the time being.122
Wartime conditions notwithstanding, Gold Coast officials, such as Attorney
General, Henry W. B. Blackall, continued to consider the value of having independent
appellate judges. The time was coming when they would be appointed by the
Sovereign through the Colonial Office without consultation with the colonial
Governors.123 In March 1943, Gold Coast Governor Alan Burns told H. H. Duncan,
Assistant Legal Adviser at the Colonial Office, that since the Gold Coast Chief Justice,
Philip Petrides, would retire toward the end of 1943, it was time to consider the role of
the Chief Justice in WACA. The performance of the Chief Justice’s role in the Gold
Coast (the “efficient administration of the Supreme Curt and the Magistrates’ staff”)
was negatively affected by his frequent absence at WACA sessions. Burns urged that
consideration should be given to appointment of three independent appellate judges
the cost of which could be partially offset by the reduction in the Gold Coast and
Nigeria of one Puisne Judge each although he couldn’t really say if the Gold Coast
could afford to lose a Puisne Judge. He knew, he wrote, that the judges would oppose
such a reduction, but he believed it could be afforded since some of the Puisne Judges
didn’t do a full days work.124 The Colonial Office replied that all four Chief Judges
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would have to make such a request before the Secretary of State could consider it and
asked if there would be sufficient work to occupy three independent judges full time. In
any event, consideration would have to await the end of the war.125
Unwilling to give up their efforts to obtain an independent court, the Governor of
Nigeria proposed a court of an independent President and one other judge who would
do only appellate work and sit together with the Chief Justice of the colony in which the
court sat. Burns joined in saying that he and other Governors agreed that two
independent judges should be appointed and that the Chief Justice of the colony
where the WACA was sitting would make the third judge for the panel. The two judges
would be based in Accra and go on leave only in the summer when the Court would
not be in session. Current judges would handle emergency applications while the
Appellate Judges were on leave and would remain members of WACA.126 Still
reluctant to commit itself, the Colonial Office asked each Governor to provide the
opinions of their Chief Justices and information on the work of WACA since 1935, i.e.
the number of cases, the time spent hearing, traveling and deciding the cases and the
opinion of the Chief Justices of the Gold Coast and Nigeria as to whether or not they
could afford to lose a Puisne Judge.127
Ironically, after all the lobbying for an independent court by Gold Coast
Governors and Judges, it was the Gold Coast Chief Justice, Philip Harrigan, who
raised the latest obstacle to achieving that objective. The Colonial Office’s O. G. R.
Williams reported on January 22,1944 that he’d spoken to Harrigan the prior day and
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that Harrigan said he opposed an independent appellate bench, because such judges
would be “out of touch with the peculiar conditions of the various West African
Colonies.” Harrigan said that the Governors rather than the judges were promoting the
idea so they could keep their Chief Justices home. His proposal to deal with the Chief
Justices’ workload was to appoint more Puisne Judges.128 Burns rebutted Harrigan’s
assertions with a memorandum from the Gambia’s Judge Johnson saying that two
judges were good but three would be better, and a letter from one of his own Puisne
Judges, Alfred Doorly, saying that the decisions of the WACA would have added
weight if it were composed of independent judges and suggesting that the WACA
judges should live and work in England and only come to West Africa two or three
times a year to hear arguments. Burns pointedly added that Harrigan was so
occupied with WACA and administrative work that he had little time to sit as a
Divisional judge.129 Former Attorney General Abrahams advised the Colonial Office
that Doorly’s suggestion was utterly impractical and the cost of employing eminent
barristers was beyond anyone’s means However he rejected Harrigan criticism that
knowledge of local conditions was necessary as demonstrated by the decisions of the
Privy Council judges who had no knowledge of local conditions.130 Harrigan responded
to Duncan saying that the absence of the Chief Justice from the colony from time to
time was not such an inconvenience as to “justify this far reaching innovation.” Nor
would Independent judges expedite the work of the WACA particularly. Moreover, the
WACA as proposed would be “an academic body of lawyers removed entirely from the
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conditions existing in the colonies concerned” and would be too technical.131 In May
1944, Burns and Harrigan sat down with Colonial Office officials, during which meeting
it was decided to postpone decision on independent judges until Harrigan had some
more experience in West Africa and the war was over.132 Thus after years of debate,
as with so many other initiatives for changes and reform in the administration of justice,
nothing was done and the WACA continued to be a court consisting of the judges of its
member colonies.
Judicial Reform in the 1930's
At the start of the 1930's, it appeared to many in the Colonial Office as well as in
the Gold Coast administration that the colonial judiciary was neither as efficient nor
effective as was desired. While concern focused on the operation of the traditional
courts, the Colonial Office deemed that the manner in which the British courts
administered justice, particularly criminal justice justified a close inspection of the
courts. Thus it was decided to send the Colonial Office legal advisor, Grattan Bushe,
to visit each of the West African dependencies and to report on the manner in which
the British courts administered justice. As to the Gold Coast, Bushe’s extensive report
led to a Courts Ordinance in 1935 that replaced the Supreme Court Ordinance of 1876
and, among other things, extended the jurisdiction of the Gold Coast Supreme Court to
Ashanti and the Northern Territories and created the position of District Magistrates as
judges of summary jurisdiction who would be subject to the supervision of the Chief
Justice alone. It extended the right to counsel in criminal cases to Ashanti and the
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Northern Territories. The 1935 Ordinance worked well and remained in force until the
creation of an independent Ghanaian state.
The quality of justice in West Africa in 1930 was being questioned by those
members of the public that read the Gold Coast press. A leading article in the August
4th issue of West Africa complained of certain judicial decisions and asked if men of
the right caliber were being attracted to legal posts in the Gold Coast. It asserted that
the salaries were too low for a Chief Justice in the Gold Coast. The article went on to
say that jury trial should be a right in all cases and asked if WACA excluded judges
from sitting on appeals from cases in which they were involved below -- a question that
need not have been asked if the journalist responsible for the article had read the
WACA Order-in-Council which was readily available to him. Upon reading the article,
E. W. Flood, a Colonial Office Assistant Secretary, minuted that the Colonial Office got
the best men for what it could afford to pay and whose judgments were seldom
reversed.133 In late September 1930, Alexander Fiddian minuted that he had been told
by E. W. Flood, another Assistant Secretary, that “he had been thinking for some time
that everything was not right with the administration of the law in West Africa.” Fiddian
discussed the matter with Grattan Bushe, the departmental Legal Advisor who
suggested that he, Bushe, go to the four West African colonies to become acquainted
at first hand with legal conditions and problems; it would also be good for legal and
judicial morale for him to visit. The Deputy Undersecretary of State, Charles Jeffries,
agreed with the proposal and suggested that Bushe go to Africa in 1931.134

133

BNA CO 544/84/4, Flood minute, 8.24.1930.

134

BNA CO 544/85/4, Fiddian minute, 9.27.1930, Bushe minute, 10.28.1930.
-244-

In anticipation of Bushe’s visit, a leading article in the Gold Coast
Independent135 argued that there was a need for radical reform in the administration of
justice: “The administration of justice by the State is an essential and permanent
element of civilization and a device which admits of no makeshifts or temporary
substitutes.” The Government had to assure the legal system against “fatal
conservatism,” the leader continued. The judiciary had to be severed from the
Executive, that is, Provincial and District Commissioners should not exercise judicial
functions, a “cause of much perversion of justice.” It was necessary to free judicial
administration “from every conceivable suspicion.” More Magistrates, especially
African Magistrates, should be appointed, WACA should have independent judges as
it was wrong for appellate judges to sit on appeals from their own decisions and their
colleagues were unlikely to reverse or even to criticize the decision of one of their own.
As noted above, this last contention was demonstrably false. Nevertheless, the leader
laid out serious proposals for a thoroughgoing reform of the legal system.136
Bushe spent four weeks in the Gold Coast during the period December 1931 to
March 1932, meeting and talking with the Governor, judges, District and Provincial
Commissioners, the Administration’s law officers and local barristers, among others.
His report attacked the exclusion of attorneys from courts in Ashanti based on
unsupported beliefs that they fomented litigation, a belief that certainly did not apply to
criminal cases, and found that charges of misconduct by members of the Bar were
substantially exaggerated. He said that he believed that his recommendations
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concerning the allowance of counsel in criminal cases in Ashanti and the Northern
Territories would be supported by the Gold Coast Government, but he agreed that
attorneys might be excluded from Native Tribunals until appeals from such Tribunals
reached the Supreme Court and/or WACA.137
Bushe reported that judges and barristers told him that appeals to Provincial
Commissioners in land cases were “unnecessary and undesirable,” that Provincial
Commissioners made too many mistakes, some elementary, were apt to decide cases
on the basis of knowledge obtained outside the record, and, as was the case with
District Commissioners, were often interested in their political capacity in the outcome
of cases. Provincial Commissioners defended their conduct by saying that only they
could decipher often unintelligible records sent up from Native Tribunals. Bushe
acknowledged that most decisions of the Provincial Commissioners were not appealed
and most of those appealed were affirmed by the Supreme Court. Thus, despite his
recommendation to deprive District Commissioners of judicial jurisdiction and the
complaints of the Bench and Bar, he recommended that no change be made in the
jurisdiction of the Provincial Commissioners.138
Bushe said that he believed the monetary jurisdiction of the Magistrates Courts
was too high and deprived the Supreme Court of cases it should have had. Appeals to
the Supreme Court, he went on, should be on all grounds not just on questions of law,
because that stating a case for review by the Supreme Court was too difficult for most
District Commissioners. More effort, Bushe urged, should be made to create WACA
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panels with judges from colonies other than the one from which the appeal comes so
that the parties might be given more of a sense of a disinterested tribunal.139
With respect to jury trials, Bushe concluded that expansion of the right to jury
trial would be of doubtful value because there were too few literate natives and most of
them were Fantis and would not be suitable for trying cases involving other ethnicities.
Accordingly, he recommended against extension of jury trials to Ashanti.140
Finally, Bushe discussed the desirability of extending the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to Ashanti and the Northern Territories and of consolidating it with the
Circuit Courts of those dependencies. Ashanti and the Northern Territories were then
being administered, viz á vis the Gold Coast, as foreign territories. Criminal
defendants found in those places who were sought by the Gold Coast had to be
extradited under the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance; the writs of the Supreme Court did
not run there and the Gold Coast Attorney General had no control over prosecutions
there. He deemed these conditions to be unacceptable. Thus, he recommended that
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court be extended to Ashanti and the Northern
Territories and that the Chief Commissioners’ courts should be abolished since they
were run by administrators who had an interest in too many cases as political officers,
who were too often without legal training, who committed too many elementary
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mistakes and too many of whose decisions were based on knowledge acquired
outside the record.141
Writing to the Colonial Secretary about Bushe’s recommendations as to
Magistrates’ monetary jurisdiction some months after reviewing Bushe’s Report, the
Secretary for Native Affairs said that Bushe recommended appointment of a small
committee to “evolve a practicable scheme.”142 The Committee in turn recommended
that each Police Magistrate should dispose of 4,000 criminal cases per year together
with a small number of civil cases, some of the Police Districts should be enlarged with
Police Magistrates to sit from time to time in all the large towns of the District, but that
they would have to make do with the current number of Magistrates because there was
no money for more people.143
Responding to a question as to whether District Commissioners should have
concurrent jurisdiction with Police Magistrates in places where the latter sat, the
Secretary of Native Affairs quoted Bushe’s Report, that “‘ It is slightly ridiculous and
quite unnecessary” for Police Magistrates and District Commissioners to be part of the
Supreme Court. Bushe had recommended that a new Courts Ordinance should have
two parts, one dealing with the Supreme Court and one dealing with courts of
summary jurisdiction for Magistrates. District Commissioners, Bushe recommended,
141
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should not have any jurisdiction ex officio but If necessary, a District Commissioner
could be appointed an Acting Magistrate. Chief Justice Deane said that until a Courts
Bill passed, the District Commissioner’s jurisdiction should not change, but when a Bill
was drafted, the Governor should be authorized to create Justices of the Peace and to
appoint District Commissioners as Justices of the Peace so that they could issue
search and arrest warrants, set bail and try petty cases. Police Magistrates could look
to such District Commissioners for assistance if necessary. The Chief Justice argued
that his scheme would facilitate administration of justice and not allow the prestige of
the District Commissioners to suffer as it might if they were stripped of all jurisdiction.144
Attorney General Abrahams said that he was not willing to see the District
Commissioners deprived of all jurisdiction or endanger their authority or influence but
would like to see their judicial role as secondary to that of the Police Magistrates and
would suspend their jurisdiction in places where Police Magistrates sat.145
The Governor told the Colonial Office that he was not happy with Bushe’s
recommendation as to reducing the Magistrates’ civil jurisdiction. He argued that the
monetary amount was raised to its then limit in 1930 in order to reduce the workload of
the Divisional Court because, before his retirement, Smyly had been concerned that
WACA would produce so many criminal appeals as to keep Puisne Judges from
dealing with civil work, but, the Governor said, the feared explosion of criminal appeals
never occurred. Now, Slater said, the Chief Justice and the Attorney General agreed
with Bushe’s recommended reduction. He, however, could not concur because, he
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contended, the present level of monetary jurisdiction yielded faster, cheaper and more
convenient results. Moreover, since the monetary jurisdiction of the Magistrates’
courts was raised only a few years ago, it should not now be reduced. If Puisne
Judges were not fully occupied, perhaps their number could be reduced. The
consensus of Colonial Office opinion was, with one exception, that the Governor’s
arguments were “conclusive.” Bushe noted his disagreement but said that he wouldn’t
push the matter against the Governor’s wishes.146
In October 1933, the Attorney General delivered to the Governor a draft of a
Courts Bill that would essentially replace the Supreme Court Ordinance. Among other
things, it would consolidate the courts of Ashanti and the Northern Territory into the
Supreme Court, extend the jurisdiction of that Court throughout the Gold Coast and
make the Circuit Judges of Ashanti and the Northern Territories Puisne Judges. At the
behest of the Chief Justice, it would make the Puisne Judges of the three other British
West African dependencies Puisne Judges of the Supreme Court. It created a
separate inferior court to be called the Magistrate’s Court for judges of limited,
summary jurisdiction whose judges would be known as Magistrates, rather than Police
Magistrates, and who would have both limited civil and criminal jurisdiction. The
District Commissioners would have the authority of Magistrates as well and have
jurisdiction in addition to that of the Magistrates to try interpleader cases arising from
attachments issued by Native Tribunals in land cases. It amended the Legal
Practitioners Ordinance to provide attorneys accused of disciplinary violations a
hearing by the Gold Coast judges. Lastly, it would create a Rules Committee of
146
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Judges and private attorneys to made civil rules that would become effective unless
the Legislative Council vetoes them.147 As may be seen, all recommendations that
District Commissioners be relieved of their judicial authority and duties were rejected.
After multiple revisions, the Courts Bill was read for the first time in the
Legislative Council in March 1935, the first proposed legislative enactment for the
entire Gold Coast after an Order-in-Council of January 1, 1935 consolidated the three
entities occupying the territory of the Gold Coast into one Colony and requiring only
one ordinance for the entirety of the expanded Colony. The Attorney General, who
presented the Bill to the Legislative Council, stated its objectives and purposes: to
expand the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to Ashanti and the Northern Territories.148
As before, the Court would have no jurisdiction over cases within the jurisdiction of the
Native Tribunals under the Native Administration Ordinance except as might be
specified in that statute. There would continue to be no jurisdiction over land cases
heard in the Native Tribunals and appealable to the Provincial Commissioners.
Magistrates’ Courts were no longer part of the Supreme Court but were separately
constituted. He pronounced it to be Government policy that the administration of
justice was to be confided, as far as the financial condition of the Colony would allow,
to credentialed attorneys. He admitted that the Administration had not always carried
out that policy completely however, but promised to do so to the fullest extent possible:
“It is hoped that the judicial work of the country will as far as is possible be performed
by the District Magistrates thereby giving effect to the policy of divesting the judiciary
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from the Executive.” But the statement went on to say that would not happen
immediately because there was little money to hire professional magistrates. He said
that when District Commissioners had to sit as judges they would do so only upon a
special order of the Governor.149
The Supreme Court would be the forum for appeals from the Magistrates’
Courts in civil actions as of right where the amount in issue was more than £5 and of
interlocutory orders upon leave of the Magistrate. The jurisdiction of the Magistrates’
Courts in civil matters would be up to £300 and included personal cases, rent cases,
guardianships of minors, injunctions and interpleader with respect to property upon
which execution had been levied of a value up to £300. Where District
Commissioners sat as magistrates, their jurisdiction was limited to £100 and their
interpleader jurisdiction was similarly limited. Magistrates would have criminal
jurisdiction where the fine was up to £100 or one year in prison and/or flogging under
the criminal code. Similarly, where a District Commissioner sat as a magistrate, his
criminal jurisdiction was limited to a fine of up to £50 or prison for six months. In most
other respects the Bill reenacted the provisions of the Supreme Court Ordinance
except that there would be no jurisdiction as to election or destoolment disputes of
chiefs, claims as to stool property or political or constitutional relations among chiefs.
The Court might refer questions of native law and custom to a Native Tribunal or rely
on expert testimony. It could accept or reject the judgment of the Native Tribunal as to
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which there would be no appeal or otherwise treat it as justice might require as if it
were the report of a referee.150
After the second reading, the Unofficial Member from Cape Coast, Mr. Korsah,
moved in the Committee of the Whole to amend the Bill to reduce the monetary limit
on the Magistrates’ civil jurisdiction from £300 to £200 because the magistrates were
overworked and the judges were not busy. After some discussion an amount of £150
was agreed and the amendment passed. The Bill was passed in essentially this form
on April 27, 1935 as The Courts Ordinance No. 7 of 1935.151 The British Courts were
thereafter governed according to the strictures of this Ordinance until 1944 when it was
amended to reflect the changes then being made to the native tribunals under the
Native Courts Ordinance of that year.152
The Courts Ordinance added prestige to the Magistrates, now known as District
Magistrates, and a Circular Notice from Chief Justice Deane reinforced their prestige in
the eyes of the public by reminding them and all the other judges of a statement he
had made in Judicial Circular No. 1 of 1931 that Magistrates had power to fine instead
of imprisoning those they convicted and urging them to exercise that power freely
when the “offense is not of an aggravated nature and the offender is a young person or
a first offender.” Further, Deane said, in the proper case extensive use should be
made of the power to grant the offender time to pay the fine or to pay it in installments
if necessary. However, one of the African Magistrates, Archie G. Hutton-Mills
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cautioned his colleagues that such power should only be used cautiously as it
encouraged defendants to disappear and gave them incentives to commit crime (!).153
The 1935 reforms established the jurisdiction and personnel of the Supreme
Court up to the date of independence. The number of judges varied according to
financial and national security considerations during World War II, but from 1935 on,
the focus of the British administration of justice was on the indigenous courts.
Imprisonment for Debt
Another aspect of the judicial reforms of the 1930's involved imprisonment for
debt. The issue of the propriety of imprisonment to compel payment of a debt and the
terms under which that remedy (or penalty as others would call it) had roiled the courts
of the Gold Coast for many years. As early as 1874 the Colonial Office was seeking a
report on the law of imprisonment for debt applicable in the settlements if the Gold
Coast from Chief Magistrate Marshall and the Queen’s Advocate, David Chalmers.
The former reported that the law operated in a cruel way, the debtor can’t pay the debt
while he is imprisoned, interest accumulates and the amount paid by the creditor for
his maintenance is added to the debt, so that the debtor would be unlikely ever to be
able to pay and could only look forward to an indeterminate time in prison. Marshall
said that since there were no ordinances governing imprisonment for debt in the Gold
Coast, English common law applied, but English statutes had abolished imprisonment
for debt – a marginal note on the dispatch at this point made in the Colonial Office
says: “Not so . . . the statute only applies to the U.K.” – Marshall suggested enactment
of an Ordinance. Chalmers said that the Debtors Act of 1869 did not apply to the Gold
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Coast but that a local ordinance abolishing imprisonment for debt would only
encourage fraud and the debtor’s property that might be available to pay the debt was
not always known or ascertainable, so that imprisonment was the only form of
enforcement that worked. Chalmers added that the Judicial Assessor, like a native
chief, could make any order he felt appropriate to enforce payment and could thus
ameliorate the harshest aspects of imprisonment for debt.154 Almost one year later, the
Secretary of State, Lord Carnarvon, in the course of a dispatch setting out his design
for a Supreme Court Ordinance, opined that the law related to imprisonment for debt
should be modified because “The supposed interests of traders must yield to the
requirements of humanity.”155 Nothing was done at that time either to codify the law nor
to ameliorate its negative effects.
In 1918 the Governor asked the Attorney General to look into the necessity for
and the conditions of imprisonment for debt. The Attorney General reported that it was
indeed necessary and that the conditions under which it was imposed and was carried
out were fair. Shortly after assuming office as Chief Justice, George Deane proposed
elimination of this form of enforcement of judgments. The Governor sent him Session
Paper VII of 1918-19 that contained the Attorney General’s discussion of
imprisonment for debt and the opinions of various people showing “an overwhelming
majority in favor of maintaining the existing law.” Governor Slater asked Deane
whether, in light of this material, he still thought imprisonment for debt should be
abolished. He reminded Deane that India, Hong Kong, Zanzibar, Kenya and Uganda

154

BNA CO 96/116, 5.26.1874.

155

GNA 1/1/39, No. 15, 4.16.1875.
-255-

still permitted it.156 Deane’s reply, if any, is not in the record, but we do have a
memorandum of a conversation between Attorney General Abrahams and the Colonial
Secretary concerning the former’s discussion with Deane in which, Abrahams says, he
convinced Deane that the remedy of body execution, or imprisonment for debt, was
permitted by the Supreme Court Ordinance, albeit, Abrahams says he admitted, such
a remedy was considered in England to be “a relic of barbarism.” However, under the
very different conditions prevailing in the Gold Coast it might be necessary. Indeed, he
went on, he told Deane that he believed that conditions had not changed much from
1918-1921 when the overwhelming weight of opinion was in favor of retaining the
remedy. He noted that he had recommended to the Chief Justice that the latter
prepare an up to date Civil Procedure Ordinance that would give the judges some
discretion in ordering arrest of debtors and that Deane had seemed to agree to such a
proposal.157 Abrahams recommended against abolition of imprisonment for debt or
enactment of bankruptcy legislation the effect of which would have been to harm
creditors, primarily European creditors, by annulling all or most of their claims, a
recommendation that he knew Deane strongly opposed. He advised the Governor to
seek the Judges’ opinions as to giving them discretion not to order imprisonment when
specified conditions existed. Since they had the power to make rules under the
Supreme Court Ordinance, they should take the initiative to make the desired changes.
However, he continued, whatever the Judges decided would have to be imposed on
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the customary tribunals as well.158 In July 1930, Deane reported to Slater that as he
had been asked to do, he had discussed with each of the Puisne Judges the issue of
relaxing the current rules on imprisonment for debt and that only Judge Michelin had
recommended giving the Judges discretion not to order arrest in a case where
reasonable cause had been shown. Accordingly, Deane reluctantly acknowledged that
his position lacked support and he recommended retention of the status quo.159
There matters rested until April 1933 when the Colonial Secretary asked the
Attorney General to comment on the existing legislation relating to imprisonment for
debt and a proposal to appoint a committee to investigate and make
recommendations.160 The Attorney General responded that he “very strongly” opposed
such a committee as a waste of time; it was done in 1918-19 and things had not
changed so much since then. He also opposed bankruptcy legislation for reasons he
had previously expressed. However, he said, Nigeria was enacting bankruptcy
legislation and the Gold Coast Government should watch and note how it operated.
Abrahams explained that the Judges were split on their views as to whether or not the
issuance of the writ was a ministerial act or whether they had the authority to exercise
their discretion. He said that former Chief Justice McLeod, writing in Eiloart v Brew,
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FCL 261, as well as Puisne Judge Porter, said that the Judges had discretion, while
Deane and former Puisne Judge King Farlow Nettleton, Michelin and Cookson said
that issuance of the writ was simply an obligatory ministerial act. Deane wanted to
eliminate imprisonment for debt entirely, Abrahams went on, while he favored a rule
permitting a judge to exercise discretion not to order arrest of honest debtors who
showed an inability to pay and no misconduct.161
In August 1933, the Chief Commissioner of Ashanti agreed to the Chief
Justice’s proposal to permit the judges discretion when an application for an arrest
warrant was made and allowing District Commissioners to deny a warrant to a
Judgment Creditor in a case in a customary court if the judgment debtor satisfactorily
showed that he could not pay.162 Governor Shenton Thomas agreed as long as the
native authorities understood the purpose of the change in policy.

Abrahams

concurred, particularly, he said, in view of the recent dispatch from Cunliffe-Lister
noting how many people were being imprisoned for debt in the Gold Coast. The
necessary rule change could be quickly accomplished by the Chief Justice and one
Puisne Judge with the approval of the Legislative Council. Then, at some point, not
necessarily right away, the Native Administration Ordinance would have to be
amended to apply the changed policy to the Native Tribunals.163
The Supreme Court Rules were amended in April 1934. They eliminated the
unrestricted right of a Judgment Creditor to have his Debtor imprisoned on execution
161
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and to “Ensure that no man is subjected to imprisonment by reason of poverty or
misfortune.” If however, the Judgment Creditor proved that the debtor had sufficient
means and was deliberately evading payment or attempting to defraud his creditor by
a transfer of property, or that he has contracted the debt by fraud or recklessly without
a reasonable expectation of being able to discharge it, imprisonment could be
ordered.164 Cunliffe-Lister suggested amending the Rule to require the consent of a
detained Judgment Debtor to sale of his goods to satisfy the debt, except those goods
that were perishable, as to which consent would not be required. Sale would take
place only after one month’s confinement on fifteen days notice.165
Press response to the Rule change was positive, but confused. The Times of
West Africa said that the Government had abolished imprisonment for debt, an
obviously incorrect observation, but only in the British courts. It claimed that the
Native Tribunals “continue to harass” debtors, and that British action creates a wedge
between the chiefs and the people. The Attorney General, it went on, should
recommend extension of the Supreme Court Rule to the Native Tribunals: “The
Government is gradually destroying public confidence by such invidious discrimination
between white and black in this matter of justice.” One cannot help but conclude that
this attack on the Government at a time when it was doing or was about to do exactly
what The Times of West Africa sought to have done was motivated by ignorance or
anti-Government malice.166
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It is somewhat artificial to divide judicial jurisdiction as exercised on the Gold
Coast between British and Native (as that term has been almost universally used to
described the indigenous courts), for in the end all jurisdiction was British. Indeed, the
customary authorities only exercised such jurisdiction as the colonial power allowed
them to do. Similarly, as we shall see, all courts were British courts and the extent that
each exercised more or less different subject matter jurisdiction, that is the types of
cases which the courts heard, reflected policy decisions of the colonial power. British
jurisdiction would supercede that of Native Tribunals because, in the words of a Senior
Colonial Office official, Assistant Undersecretary Edward Wingfield, “the Kings’ [I. e.,
the Chiefs’] courts are so dilatory and corrupt and they enforce their judgments by
detention in such horrible dungeons and sometimes even by torture that their abolition
is clearly desirable in itself. Besides, they cannot be trusted to carry out the
Emancipation Ordinance.”167 Former Chief Justice Griffith argued that natives with bad
cases took them to the Native Tribunals, but those seeking “justice” came to the British
courts. For Griffith, maintenance of “effete and impractical” Native Tribunals was a
“careless resuscitation” of ancient problems.168 We now turn to a discussion of those
Tribunals and their relationship to the colonial administration and the British courts.
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CHAPTER VII – NATIVE JURISDICTION – 1878 TO 1910: FIRST
EFFORTS TO REGULATE NATIVE TRIBUNALS
Perhaps the most significant aspect of British administration of justice on the
Gold Coast, as well as in many others of the British African dependencies, was the
relationship between the colonial administration and the customary authorities as to
the operation of the indigenous courts, known during this period as Native Tribunals.
Martin Chanock has written that this aspect of colonialism was one of interaction in
which Africans played an important role, participating “within the forms of colonial
institutions” and expressing themselves in the language of the colonizers.1 He argues
that the indigenous authorities took advantage of Britain’s desire to rule through them
to control access to land and assert their control over women while seeking to stave off
loss of authority.2 Cotran and Rubin point out that the British created dual court
systems in each of their African colonies. In some they merely continued existing
traditional courts while in others they created them. The contend that there were no or
only tenuous links between the two systems and that customary courts and the law
they applied were almost completely isolated, but, as we shall see, that was not the
case in the Gold Coast.3 Roger Gocking has characterized the British recognition of
the role of Native Tribunals as grudging but necessary as the British courts had
insufficient manpower to handle all litigation and were unwilling to deal with indigenous
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offenses such as witchcraft and fetishes.4 And although, he argues, they never came
up to what British judges and administrators considered the highest standard of British
justice, they did accustom people to utilize the courts to resolve disputes in a manner
more and more akin to British legal usage.5 In this respect, Gocking has the right side
of the argument as the evidence shows a steady increase in the number of cases
brought in all the courts, British as well as traditional. Indeed, concerns for the
litigiousness of the Gold Coasters were frequently heard from Colonial Office as well
as local British officials.
Mahmood Mamdani notes that justice was “bipolar” in all African colonies with
native courts for native disputes and European courts to resolve non-native disputes, a
situation that did not exactly fit the case of the Gold Coast however.6 He argues that
the British, in particular, privileged traditional law and custom but more often that
tradition or custom that was the one with the “least historical depth so that “monarchial,
authoritarian and patriarchal notion of the customary . . . most accurately mirrored
colonial practices.” It was, he says, an ideological construct.7 We shall hear echos of
this argument in the criticisms of traditional courts both by Gold Coast colonial
authorities as well as the educated elite in that colony.
Consistent with the concepts of indirect rule, the British in India promoted a local
customary court, the panchayat, that would enforce customary law without reference to
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Hindu law.8 Originally seen as an arbitral forum, the panchayat was available only to
those litigants who came to it voluntarily and it had no enforcement powers.9 As a
result, litigants overwhelmingly chose to ignore the panchayats in favor of other
tribunals so that it metamorphosed into an administrative body.10 In French West
Africa, efforts were also made to have disputes among the indigenous population be
adjudicated pursuant to customary law, often that law being Muslim law, albeit in
courts in which a French official presided.11 Indeed, as Salacuse points out, the
French were compelled to respect indigenous law and institutions as their concepts in
most areas “conflicted fundamentally” with those of the people they governed and
imposition of French civil law “would have had disastrous results.”12 As in the Gold
Coast, customary courts applied customary or Islamic law to disputes between
indigenous peoples.13
I discuss here several themes that characterized the relationship between
colonial officials and indigenous courts that continued to do so during the entire course
of the period under study. First among these is the desire of the British to use the
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traditional authorities as agents of their rule, supporting their prestige while, often
contradictorily, seeking to control them. As late as1949, a Committee appointed to
study constitutional reform noted that the administration of justice by such traditional
authorities had been one of the “causes of friction” between and distrust by members
of the community.14 From 1865 to 1880, the British in the Gold Coast, with the full
accord of Colonial Office officials, tended to allow native chiefs to exercise jurisdiction
without control except for that resulting from appeals.15
A second theme, related to the first, deals with the widespread perception that
the indigenous court officials exploited the population by means of excessive fees and
fines and made decisions based on political considerations unrelated to the merits of
the dispute. In the years just before formation of the Gold Coast Colony in 1874, the
officials of what would become the new dependency had increasingly expressed
concern about the unregulated conduct of the customary authorities in the Colony and
particular in the Protectorates of the interior. Writing some years later, the long serving
Chief Justice of the Gold Coast, W. Brandford Griffith, Jr., said of the customary
courts: “There is ample contemporary testimony to show the condition of the native
courts; the fees were enormous; bribery was rampant, and judgment went to the highs
bidder; costs and damages fell so heavily on unsuccessful parties that whole families
were pawned in payments; panyarring was the recognized mode of enforcing
judgment, and this led not only to many persons being sold into slavery, but to tribal

14

Coussey, J. H., Chair, Report to His Excellency the Governor by the Committee on Constitutional
Reform, London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1949, 32, ¶220.
15

R. Addo-Fening, “The Native Jurisdiction Ordinance, Indirect Rule and The Subject's WellBeing: The Abuakwa Experience, 1899 -1912," Research Review, N. S. Vol. 6, No. 2 (1990): 29-44. 29.
-264-

dissension.”16 Continuing, he said that people deserted the native tribunals for the
British magistrates because the latter were so “measurably superior.”17 At the time,
maintenance of an indigenous system of courts was a matter of necessity because, as
Antony Allott argues, the British were unable or unwilling to provide a sufficient number
of judges to handle all the cases sought to be litigated and permitting a continuation of
the existing system, no matter how corrupt it seemed to be was consistent with their
expressed desire to “promote tranquility” and was more likely to promote acceptance
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of British rule.18 In this chapter, I described the dissatisfaction of the colonial
authorities with the Native Tribunals, the manner in which the colonial power began to
exert more control over Native Tribunals and the problems arising from British desire to
insure that justice was done in these indigenous courts while maintaining the stature of
the chiefs who were considered to be agents of the colonial administration. I show
how very often these two objectives conflicted and discuss the mostly failed efforts of
the British to reconcile them through legislation. I discuss the first effort to regulate
native jurisdiction in 1878, the 1883 Native Jurisdiction Ordinance and the repeated
failed attempts to amend that statute until passage of the 1910 Native Jurisdiction
Amendment Ordinance that greatly increased the jurisdiction of the Native Tribunals at
the expense of that of the Supreme Court, but which did little to eliminate corruption or
to reconcile the people to the chiefs’ administration of justice.19 The colonial power
seemed unable to find the fine line between assuring fair judicial treatment to the
people and sustaining the authority of its chosen agents.
Owusu has pointed out that the relationship of the Chief, or Ohene, to his
subjects was that of the head of the family. He ruled them as a father then ruled his
wife and children.20 One of his most important functions was to see to administration of
justice through his Tribunal. The Native Tribunals generally consisted of a Chief or
King presiding over a number of traditional councillors who collectively decided the
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cases brought before them. In some societies, such as the Borotse of modern
Zambia, Namibia and Angola, the chief neither presided not participated in making a
decision but whatever verdict resulted was presented to him for confirmation.21 In
many societies, such as the Tswana of modern Botswana, as well as the Akan of the
Gold Coast, the tribunals had varying jurisdiction, ranging from only the most minor
matters in village courts to plenary in the chief’s court. Appeals could be had to higher
chiefs’ tribunals where cases were heard de novo.22 Conciliation was the primary
objective of the customary courts and, indeed, before a case could be brought in a
Tswana court, the plaintiff had to certify that the parties had attempted to settle their
dispute.23 In the Akan courts of the Gold Coast as well, the chiefs and councillors
made every effort to reconcile the parties before rendering a decision.24 Since custom,
affiliated with religion, played a critical role in administering justice in the Native
Tribunals, oaths were central.25 In pre-colonial Africa continuing until almost the end of
the colonial period, cases were usually commenced by the swearing of an oath, more
about which is discussed below.26
While repeatedly according the traditional courts the role of intermediary
between the British rulers and the peoples of the Gold Coast, the colonial
administration attempted to control the operation of those traditional tribunals as
21
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closely as it could through the oversight of the District Commissioners who were
authorized to review and, later, revise the decisions of the traditional authorities. As
the first level appellate authority from decisions of the Tribunals in most ceases, the
District Commissioners played a key role in the administration of justice, but were not
as intrusive as their colleagues in other colonies. In Northern Rhodesia, for example,
the District Commissioner played a much more involved role in the dispensation of
indigenous justice. One such District Commissioner, Kenneth Bradley, notes that he
sat with the chiefs during their deliberations and often suggested an appropriate
verdict. Moreover, he frequently heard appeals from the decision of local courts
informally in his office with only the appellant and the chief rendering the decision
appealed from being present.27 That the District Commissioners, more often than not,
failed to overcome the failings of the native system of justice bedeviled the colonial
authorities throughout the period under study.
Regulating Native Jurisdiction By Legislation
It will be seen that from the outset, the British viewed the chiefs, even of those
of the nominally sovereign states of the Protectorates, with disdain and as little more
than their agents who would follow orders as to the conduct of their courts as well as in
all other respects or suffer for their failure to do as they were told. David P. Chalmers,
who prior to creation of the Colony and during its first days was then acting as Chief
Magistrate and Judicial Assessor and who subsequently became the Colony’s first
Chief Justice, laid out a plan that, with a number of alterations, remained the program
for the role of indigenous courts in administering justice throughout the period under
27
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study: permit customary courts to exist with whatever jurisdiction the British would
allow them to have to be under close supervision of the colonial Government and that
would carry out the colonial plan for administering the Colony. What Lord Lugard later
called “indirect rule” was, at least as far as the Gold Coast was concerned, little more
than a recognition that the imperial government would not pay for the number of
officials that would be required to rule the colonized peoples directly, something of
which Chalmers quickly recognized.
Chalmers criticized the existing system of Native Tribunals saying that the
problems of corruption and excessive fees were soluble only by “utilizing, regulating
and controlling” chiefs’ power by allowing the chiefs plenary civil jurisdiction subject to
appeals to British courts and specifically limiting fees, setting out rules of conduct,
having the Government pay native judges a stipend and appointing Court Clerks for
the Tribunals.28
Chalmers said that if there were a sufficient number of British magistrates
working with the local chiefs, that would be the best means “for bringing the population
under the influence of the Government as a civilizing power, so far as the department
of justice is concerned.”29 Since that would not be really possible because of cost and
the unavailability of trained personnel, the best way of administering justice would be
“by utilizing, regulating, and controlling the power of the hereditary chiefs of the
country,” for, if left to themselves, Native Tribunals would not improve. Government
could and should recognize and support the power of those chiefs who were
28
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“intelligent, humane and well affected towards the Government,” who would be
responsible for his lesser chiefs and would carry out Government decrees and
directives and those of the British courts . His court would be recognized as a tribunal
of first instance with civil and minor criminal jurisdiction subject to appeal to the British
courts; “he would be required to abstain from all excessive exactions and charges, and
to conform his conduct generally to the instructions which should be given to him from
time to time.” He would be, in effect, an English magistrate and should receive a
government stipend conditioned on his good behavior and compliance with the
instructions he receives. The Government should appoint educated clerks and
registrars where the chief was illiterate. As to those chiefs who did not meet these
conditions, Chalmers could only recommend that for the time being they be left to their
own devices, allowing them to continue but not formally recognizing their authority and
providing redress for injustices through the British courts.30
Chalmers recommended against confining British jurisdiction to that of a court of
appeal and requiring all cases in the first instance to be heard by Native Tribunals,
except in the coastal towns where Native Tribunals were under the direct observation
of the English authorities. British courts, he urged, should be open to anyone who
sought their intervention and should handle all cases except those of such a nature as
would be better decided in a native court: “if natives both want a native court so be it
but if either party wants a British Court it should then be held to be exclusively in our
cognizance, and dealt with as such without exception unless it should appeal that it is
of such a nature as may properly be decided in one of the recognized native courts
30
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. . . .” Otherwise the prestige of the British Courts, and also of the Government, would
“seriously suffer” and their influence in reducing crime and “the darker forms of cruel
native customs” would abate.31 Only courts that had been approved by the
Government should be allowed to hear cases since appellate jurisdiction was
insufficient where bad chiefs might use physical force to prevent an appeal from being
taken.32
While proposing to increase control over them, Acting Governor Freeling told
the Colonial Office that the chiefs were complaining that because of British control,
people wouldn’t obey them and that they could not carry out Government orders
without help from the constabulary. In a tone almost of desperation, Freeling went on
to say that Government had to work through the chiefs as it was “impossible except at
enormous cost in money and probably lives to have a sufficient number of resident
commissioners in the interior districts of the protectorate to carry our laws; besides this
would tend still more to teach the people to lean only upon Government.”33
Nevertheless, he sent the Chalmers’ proposals to be set forth in an ordinance to Lord
Carnarvon, the Secretary of State, with which the latter expressed his agreement with
the caveat that they had to be very simply stated and approved by him before being
issued.34
Herbert, the Permanent Undersecretary, and Robert H. Meade, Assistant
Undersecretary of State, agreed that Chalmers’ suggestion of an ordinance was a
31
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good one and better than a mere notice as to the limits of native authority as it would
carry much more weight. Moreover, as Charles Lees, then acting as Governor said, an
Ordinance would make native jurisdiction rest on British authority rather than innate
right and would make native chiefs less formidable opponents to British government.35
An Ordinance embodying Chalmers’ proposals was introduced into the
Legislative Council and passed through all three stages on one day by a Council
consisting only of the Acting Governor, Lees, the Acting Colonial Secretary and the
Chief Justice, Chalmers. The Ordinance which recognized the authority of only those
chiefs proclaimed by the Governor to be subject to its provisions and authorized the
holding of Native Tribunals only by such chiefs was sent to the Secretary of State, Lord
Carnarvon, for the Sovereign’s approval with the Acting Governor’s caveat that it would
apply only where and when he proclaimed it to be in force and that he would await
Sovereign approval before doing so.36
Eighteen months after passage of the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1878, it
had yet to be placed into effect. Governor Ussher explained to Michael Hicks-Beach,
the Secretary of State, that the Ordinance was motivated in part by need to replace the
power the chiefs had lost when slavery was abolished and in part in order to educate
35
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them and to raise their status while relieving the British courts of the cost of a
considerable burden of work. However, he said, he did not believe that the Native
Jurisdiction Ordinance could be put into effect at that time because the interior chiefs
were unable to understand it.37 As simple as were the workings of the Ordinance, they
“would be utterly beyond the power of the Native Chiefs if left to interpret it” with only a
brief visit from a Commissioner or with the help of a semi-literate bush magistrate.38
Ussher was quite pessimistic about the Native Tribunals that were operating
without the authority that the Ordinance would have conferred, because the chiefs
rendered corrupt decisions that British Courts had to reverse on appeal and oppressed
their subjects: “Their courts are as venal, their decisions as unjust and they themselves
as superstitious and ignorant as they were twenty, or for that matter, one hundred
years ago.” He should be required to exercise his jurisdiction under the constant or
frequent care and direction of competent officers, and such officers must be
appointed.” “It cannot fail to be remarked that next to nothing has been done to ensure
to the poor and helpless inhabitants of the interior, the comparatively just and upright
rule and the effective protection of the law, which is accorded to the natives of the
coast.”39 Until the situation in the interior improved by sending in officers to teach
“ordinary principles of law and justice” and to educate the chiefs as to the same, no
system of native jurisdiction could succeed and direct taxation (in which the Secretary
37
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of State was primarily interested and which, Ussher agreed, was the only source from
which to pay stipends to the chiefs) could be possible. Here then was the essential
contradiction in British policy: indigenous authorities could not be trusted to administer
justice according to British ideas without close supervision from British officials but
there were an insufficient number of such officials. At the same time, the British
needed to work through these same corrupt chiefs to rule the country. Historians such
as Sara Berry have noted these essential contradictions in British colonialism as
exemplified here in the administration of justice.40 My study reinforces Berry’s
argument and supports her conclusions that property and other rights were continually
contested and changed over the course of the seventy year period considered here.
Indeed the shortage of manpower to oversee the operations of the traditional
courts was recognized by the Colonial Office from the earliest days of the Gold Coast
Colony, but despite such recognition, the British were unable, or unwilling to spend the
money, to resolve them. As we shall see, when chiefs complained that close
supervision of their operations were undermining their prestige and their ability to
control the population, the inclination of the colonial government was to ease such
control all the while complaining that the chiefs did not render justice to their people
fairly and efficiently.
Some days later, Ussher again wrote to the Colonial Office, suggesting that no
Native Tribunal should be permitted within a reasonable distance of the seat of a
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British court. Until he heard from the Secretary of State as to this suggestion, he
would limit Native Tribunals to one per town requiring as many chiefs as wished to
participate to sit together. He would require each Tribunal to make weekly returns of
the number of cases heard, the amount and disposition of all fees and fines collected
and the nature of all other punishments imposed. He told London that he intended
these measures to be temporary only, “since eventually native courts can be
suppressed, in my opinion, where District Commissioners and higher British Courts
exist.” In these circumstances, he thought that the Ordinance should not be enforced
as the chiefs could not be trusted.41 The Secretary of State replied said that without a
direct tax it was unlikely that the Government would be able to afford implementation
of the Governor’s suggestions. He recommended implementing the Ordinance in a
few districts where the effects could be monitored by District Commissioners. The
Secretary of State agreed that eventually the Native Tribunals would have to be
abolished where British courts sat, but “such change must, however, be carefully and
gradually made, and the worst cases should be disposed of first.”42
Ussher took the Secretary of State’s suggestion and eliminated the Native
Tribunals in Accra and Cape Coast and told his superior that he intended to move
speedily against those in Elmina and Lagos (for which latter he was still responsible).
The Governor complained that there were still too many instances of human sacrifice,
slavery and lawlessness, and that the local chiefs were unable to stamp out slavery, an
example of the “unfitness for the present of natives to cope with a judicial system
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requiring the example of honesty and judgment.” The native courts performed better,
he went on, when they knew that the parties had the option to appeal to British courts
or to resort to British courts in the first instance.43 Ussher said that judges coming to
the Gold Coast “hold sinister opinions as to the general fair dealing of the Native
Chiefs, and they were correct to hold such opinions.44 He disagreed, he said, with
Chalmers that the chiefs were reasonable and cited several examples of chiefly
atrocities. Implementation of the Ordinance, he concluded, would negate efficient and
civilized rule and he could not do it then with the means at his disposal.45
Herbert thought that Ussher went too far in interfering with native jurisdiction
and, probably much to Ussher’s surprise, the Colonial Office said that it disapproved
his proposals to oversee and regulate native authority. The Government was “not
prepared to assume the responsibility of so great an interference in the habits and
customs of the natives as would be involved in placing them under the direct
Government of the Crown.” The policy of the Government, the Colonial Office
dispatch continued, was to govern the interior through the chiefs and exercise only “a
general control and supervision over their acts.” Thus it was necessary to support
native jurisdiction except in coastal towns with only such supervision as was necessary
to check abuses such as “cruel and barbarous punishments.” Where a “sufficient
English court is established,” native jurisdiction could be curtailed. Then came the real
reason for the Government’s position: deference to local mores was a justification for
43
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British unwillingness to bear the expense of direct rule. The Colonial Office was not
prepared to appoint the number of District Commissioners and judges necessary to
implement the policy Governor Ussher proposed, but would assure that the District
Commissioners who were appointed would have legal training so as to enable the
Governor to relieve Constabulary Officers of judicial functions.46 Thus the
administration of justice according to the professed principles of English law gave way
to financial considerations and the need to support indigenous agents.
The 1883 Native Jurisdiction Ordinance
By August 1882, after four years of backing and filling about whether and how
native jurisdiction should be dealt with, the then Governor, Samuel Rowe, told the
Colonial Office that he thought “it is quite time that some close arrangement should be
made for the support of the authority of the native chiefs in any action which they may
rightly take.”47 The Secretary of State agreed and a new Native Jurisdiction Ordinance
Bill was prepared. The necessity for doing something to legitimize the Native Tribunals
resulted from a Full Court decision, Amocoo v Ducker,48 that held that judgments of
such indigenous courts were akin to arbitration awards and were neither final nor
binding unless both parties accepted the judgment and agreed to be bound.
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The Bill that became law as the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance No. 5 of 1883
applied only to those states that were the subject of a proclamation by the Governor-inCouncil to be under its terms. In those states, the chiefs and councillors authorized to
do so by customary law could hold Native Tribunals with a small civil jurisdiction over
personal actions, over land cases of any value and succession cases where the value
of the property in the matter was no more than £25. The Native Tribunal could hear
criminal cases involving customary offenses and common law crimes as specified in
the Schedule attached to the Ordinance such as petty assaults, slander, seduction,
wilfully disobeying a chief or violating a chief’s oath or insulting a chief. The Tribunal
could impose punishment as provided in the Criminal Code or by customary law so
long as they were not repugnant nor oppressive and the fines were not excessive.
Even this jurisdiction could be restricted by order of the Governor-in-Council.
Attorneys were expressly prohibited from appearing before any Native Tribunal and in
any British Court to which a case might be transferred except with the consent of the
Court, a provision that raised loud opposition then and for many years going forward.
British control was thought to be strengthened by a provision that the Governor, the
Queen’s Advocate or a District Commissioner, on his own initiative or at the request of
a defendant, could intervene in any case in a Native Tribunal and direct that it be
heard in a higher Native Tribunal or a British Court. Further, appeals from Native
Tribunals to British Courts were subject to administrative control in that applications for
leave to appeal were to be decided by the Secretary for Native Affairs. In land cases
applications for leave to appeal went to the District Commissioner and, with his leave
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that could not be denied without the approval of the Queen’s Advocate, from him to the
Divisional Judge.49
When he sent the newly enacted Ordinance to the Colonial Office for Royal
Consent, Governor Rowe explained to Lord Derby, the Secretary of State, that he
would proclaim coverage of only those Native Tribunals where there was no Divisional
Judge or District Commissioner at or near where the Tribunal sat and that it was not
now nor for some time to come intended to bring tribunals under the Ordinance where
there were District Commissioners or a Divisional judge sitting.50 Thus, he implied that
he would tolerate Native Tribunals only so long as it would take to enable a British
judge or District Commissioner to assert British jurisdiction over the indigenous state.
Even before passage of the Ordinance, the Governor and the Colonial
Secretary began seeking information as to which states should be placed under the
Ordinance.51 The District Commissioners were sent into the bush in their districts to
collect such information as to when the local Tribunals were established, the names
and positions of the members of the court, “from whence does the Court derive its
native jurisdiction and to what extent does it exercise it in civil and criminal matters
irrespective of the Ordinance of 1883,” do the people accept court decisions as final or
can they and do they appeal to another or higher Tribunal, are there any written
records made, by what process are parties brought before the Tribunal, must the
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parties be present and be heard or does the Tribunal decide in their absence, on what
basis are costs calculated and who decides how they are distributed among the
members of the court, how are judgments enforced and how many actions, on
average, are brought each week, by Europeans, and by natives.52 Whenever a state
was proclaimed to be under the Ordinance, the Chief was told that the Governor
expected him to enforce criminal law and keep the peace. No concern for fair
administration of civil law was expressed.”53
An emerging African elite of ministers, prosperous merchants and lawyers, of
both mixed race and purely African, living primarily in the larger coast communities,
educated in English schools and adopting, at least in part, a life style akin to that of the
colonial rules, seeing themselves as a class separate from the people of the interior.
They often felt as negatively about the chiefs as did many British officials. At the end
of 1883, responding to a petition from one J. R. Maxwell, apparently an educated
coastal African,54 for the Secretary of State to disallow the Native Jurisdiction
Ordinance, because, as he said, the chiefs are “‘illiterate and uncivilized’” with no will
of their own. In his response, Governor Rowe indicated his indifference to the
corruption of the chiefs when he said that he was concerned not with chiefs’
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knowledge of law but “their general habit of ruling, their appreciation of the
responsibilities attached to their position as chiefs, their recognition by their people in
this position and the general consensus of opinion among the tribe or district which
they rule that they are persons who are fittest to rule.”55 He wanted agents who would
be accepted by the people. The purpose of the Ordinance, he reminded his readers,
was to sanction by law the exercise of traditional powers. The people would be
protected by their right to seek leave to appeal to a British court and by the authority of
the Governor-in-Council to suspend a chief and/or his court in any District for a good
reason. It bears repeating that the Government had to administer through the chiefs
because it was unwilling to pay for a staff necessary to do otherwise: “It is most
desirable to make use of and regulate their influence and authority until such time as it
may perhaps be possible to replace it by something better adapted to meet the needs
of the community as civilization progresses.”56
In the years after enactment of the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1883, the
question arose as to the status of Native Tribunal judgments issued after the
effectiveness of the Ordinance. Previously, the Court had ruled, as noted above, that
such judgments were not binding on a British Court having only the effect of an
arbitration award. Now, in Oppen v. Ackinie,57 Macleod, C. J., Smalman Smith and
Francis Smith, PJ’s, the Court overruled prior decisions as to §§11-12 of the Supreme
Court Ordinance and held that jurisdiction of Native Tribunals based on native
customary law continued and was “coextensive” and “concurrent” in cases between
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native parties with that of the Supreme Court. But despite this decision, Griffith, Jr.
opined that Native Tribunal judgments were binding on British courts only to the extent
that such Tribunals were subject to the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1883 and that
Tribunals not under the Ordinance had no legal standing and held court and
imprisoned defendants “at their peril.”58 He “strongly” recommended that the
Government adopt a course that “would gradually lead to the extinction of native
prisons in consequence and of the Native Courts.”59 This recommendation reflected
Griffith, Jr.’s lack of respect for the traditional authorities and his conviction that their
decisions were based “as much on fetish as on facts,” and that as civilization, as he
saw it, advanced in the Gold Coast, the chiefs would lose power and the British would
rule through District Commissioners.60
In January 1892, Chief Justice Hutchinson, reporting on his recent tour of the
Colony, said that the chiefs complained to him that Government was taking their power
away and that they had no means to enforce their judgments and orders because of
restrictions on the length of sentences in prison. They claimed to be losing the respect
and obedience of their people and fewer cases were being brought to their courts
resulting in a loss of prestige and revenue. They particularly resented not being able
to put defendants and recalcitrants in log without the written consent of the
Government and the cost of keeping an expensive clerk to comply with Government
paperwork requirements.61 They treated petty crime as a tort against a person rather
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than against public order and required the perpetrator to pay damages to the victim
rather than by imprisoning the wrongdoer.62 Hutchinson explained that land cases, of
which there were a great many, generally were not between individuals but between or
among families or stools of villages or subdivisions.63 He cautioned against
undermining the prestige and power of the chiefs because the distance between where
most litigants and witnessed lived made it “impossible for many years to come” for
British courts to dispense Justice in every part of the Colony. Thus, “a very large
proportion of grievances must remain without any legal remedy unless at the hands of
a Native Court.” This was particularly true in disputes in land which were very
numerous and which, because they generally involved questions of boundaries, a
British judge could not decide satisfactorily without going to the spot and seeing the
land.64 Hutchinson was not convinced that the chiefs and Tribunal councillors were
corrupt despite the widespread general belief that they were, but acknowledged that
the Tribunals were often influenced by personal relations and were more expensive
than British courts.65
Amending the 1883 Native Jurisdiction Ordinance
Despite Chief Justice Hutchinson’s conclusion that not all of the chiefs were
corrupt, many British officials expressed intense dissatisfaction with the Native
Tribunals. One District Commissioner complained that the Native Tribunals in his
District were engaged in “gross perversions of justice” by extorting “almost incredible
sums of money from litigants.” The Governor explained to the Secretary of State that
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the exactions of the Native Tribunals had led to pawning, a “system which is the growth
of centuries brought about by the doctrine of vicarious punishment” in which the pawn
was effective enslaved to a creditor pending payment of the debt incurred.66 Pawns,
most often females, he continued, were often abandoned by their debtor-relatives who
moved on to create new ties. He urged that only the extension of the Native
Jurisdiction Ordinance to the entire Colony, careful supervision by the “Judicial
Department” and publication of a fixed schedule of fees and fines could “cure the evil”
of pawning and even then it would take time.67 Although panyaring, a form of slavery
by which a creditor could seize the debtor or anyone associated with the debtor and
sell that person to satisfy the debt,68 was outlawed by Ordinance, pawning, a less
extreme form of slavery by which the pawn turned him- or herself over to the creditor
voluntarily continued, as the colonial government acknowledged, until well into the
twentieth century, the courts often seeing the pawning of women as just another form
of marriage.69 Indeed, despite a mandate from the Colonial Office to prosecute
pawning under the Criminal Code, the colonial government turned its eyes from its
obligation, arguing that it should be allowed to “wither as economic and legal changes
made alternate forms of borrowing available.” In 1907 the Colonial Office directed the
Gold Coast Government to inform District Commissioners that they were not to assist
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in the recovery of escaped pawns and the courts of Ashanti not to recognize pawns as
security for debts.70
Based on his findings as set forth above during his tour of the Colony, Chief
Justice Hutchinson wanted to amend or replace the 1883 Ordinance, an Act with which
he decided he was dissatisfied and for the improvement of which he needed more
information about the operations of the Tribunals. A Traveling Commissioner, Hull,
suggested the appointment of a Commission to explore the issue, a suggestion that
Hutchinson adopted and promoted.71
Thus it was the initiative of the government, rather than any outcry from the
populace, that led to the Hutchinson Commission that was appointed on August 1,
1894. Its Report, transmitted to the Colonial Office on January 12, 1895,72 summarized
the evidence taken about the structure and jurisdiction of various courts, mainly those
of Head Chiefs and Kings, describing the composition of Native Tribunals, the plenary
jurisdiction of those tribunals, although fear of British displeasure lead most of the
tribunals to send all criminal cases, not merely murder or other major felony cases, to
the British courts. Jurisdiction of subordinate courts was only defined by custom and
was impossible to define accurately. The Report described the manner in which
decisions were rendered by the councillors who were members of the Court, some with
and some without the participation of the presiding Chief and the requirements for the
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parties to produce sureties for costs.73 The Commission reported that the fees and
fines collected were divided among the Chief and the other members of the Tribunal
and that fees were charged at every stage of the case.74
The Commission discussed the absence of any applicable statute of limitations
and the manner of enforcement of judgments, most often by arrest of the debtor and/or
his surety until the debt was paid, but, more recently, more and more by execution
against and sale of a judgment debtor’s property.75 The Report confirmed the
statement Hutchinson made earlier about the absence of specific allegations of
wrongdoing or corruption by Tribunal members and that the Commission had received
no evidence of extortion or corruption, although J. M. Sarbah testified that people were
afraid to complain lest they “be boycotted and ruined, but that there was a widespread
belief that exorbitant fees were charged and people were wrongfully imprisoned.76
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The Commission recommended that a new Ordinance be enacted that would
apply to all Tribunals without exception and without distinction between those in the
interior and those in towns where British judges might sit. All judgments should be
rendered only unanimously by the members of the Tribunal and the Chief or King
should not be permitted to refuse to accept the decision or to overrule it. A scale of
fees should be fixed at the average amount given in evidence before the Commission.
No family property should be permitted to be sold to satisfy an individual debt and vice
versa. Finally in order to keep their costs down, the Tribunals should not be required
to keep written records,77 although this last recommendation may just as well been
made because then the British Courts would be required to hear the case de novo on
appeal, something many, if not most, natives would prefer.
On June 1, 1895, Hutchinson introduced a Native Jurisdiction Bill into the
Legislative Council based on the Commission’s recommendations.78 This Bill was
withdrawn on April 10, 1896 with the promise that a new bill was to be introduced and
published for general information, but such legislation never surfaced.79
Governor Maxwell, who succeeded Griffith, Sr. in mid-1895 told the Colonial
Office that Hutchinson’s draft appeared to him to be insufficient. In his view, the Bill
dealt too much with the Tribunals and insufficiently with the “powers, duties and
responsibilities of Native Chiefs.” Thus, he decided to withdraw the Bill, which was
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done in August.80 Now he was sending the Secretary of State a new Bill, the aim of
which was to improve the position of the chiefs while making them more responsible to
Government “for the proper performance of the functions assigned to them.”81
The new proposed Bill classified all chiefs as Omanhene (Principal Chief),
Ohene (Divisional Chief) and Safu or Odikro (Village Chief), of which there were twenty
six Omanhene. The Attorney General urged that all native courts should be within the
Ordinance and, thus, subject to the Government’s approval. He would have those not
receiving such approval be penalized if they tried to exercise jurisdiction. His draft
provided, among many other things unrelated to the Native Tribunals, that the
Governor-in-Council could determine the fees to be charged by the Native Tribunals
and who was to get them. A Native Tribunal’s criminal judgment would not be binding
on the Supreme Court which might retry the case. It would require that all decisions by
Native Tribunals had to be unanimous among all persons customarily empowered to
be part of the Tribunal; that perjury before a Native Tribunal was to be punished in the
Supreme Court not the Tribunal; that enforcement of Tribunal judgments could be by
seizure of property as well as by imprisonment, that the Governor could suspend any
Tribunal for good cause; that appeals from Divisional Chief to Head Chief and from
any court would lie to the District Commissioner if the case were in the latter’s
jurisdiction and otherwise to the Divisional Court; and that the Supreme Court could
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transfer cases to and from a Native Tribunal on the application of any party or on its
own motion.82
The time to enact new legislation to regulate the Native Tribunals was simply
not propitious. The Land Bills of 1895 and 1897 engendered such opposition that, as
Mensah Brown argues, the Government feared pressing any legislative initiatives that
would intensify anti-Government feeling.83 The combination of these two proposed
Ordinances was seen as a broad attack on the customary authorities by
“systematically subverting the judicial authority of the chiefs, interfering with ability to
enforce obedience to their judgments by limiting the forms and extent of punishments.
As Addo-Fening has said, it “ultimately marked the beginning of the collapse of central
authority” of the chiefs in the traditional state.84
Following the end of the last Ashanti War, Britain annexed Ashanti and, at the
same time, issued an Order-in-Council annexing the Gold Coast Protectorates and
incorporating them into the Gold Coast Colony that now included all of the country
south of the Pra River, the border of Ashanti. The issue rose almost immediately as to
the impact of the Order-in-Council on the status of those Native Tribunals in the
Protectorates that had been proclaimed to be under the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance
of 1883. In 1903 the case of Dantsi v Appiah85 raised the issue before the Full Court
as to whether Native Tribunals continued to exercise jurisdiction following annexation
or was their jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court by the Order-in-Council. Chief
82

BNA CO 96/272, No. 131, 4 .15.96., Enclosures: Attorney General’s Memoranda dated 2.27.1896
and 4.2.1896. It also would repeal the 1883 Ordinance as well as the 1887 Native Prisons Ordinance.
GNA ADM 6/21, 262.
83

Mensah Brown, 403.

84

Addo-Fening, “The Native Jurisdiction Ordinance, Indirect Rule and The Subject's Well-Being:
The Abuakwa Experience ,1899 -1912," 117.
85

Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation, N. S. Vol. IX (1908): 167-179.
-289-

Justice Griffith and Francis Smith, P. J., concurring, held that jurisdiction of colony and
protectorates was bound together by the Supreme Court Ordinance of 1876. The
Legislative Council, they held, was empowered to legislate for the Protectorates as well
as the Colony. The1895 Law Revision Ordinance defined the Colony to include the
Protectorates, so that whenever an ordinance specified the Colony, it was deemed to
be effective in the Protectorates as well. This would apply to the Native Jurisdiction
Ordinance of 1883 as well as all the other Ordinances. Native Tribunals continued to
be dealt with by Government and the Supreme Court in the same manner as they
always had been both before and after the 1901 Order-in-Council. Indeed, seven
Native Tribunals were proclaimed by the Governor to be subject to the Native
Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1883 after the effective date of the 1901 Order-in-Council.86
Thus, Griffith concluded, the Native Tribunals continued to exercise the same
jurisdiction as they had since 1883.87 Unfortunately Griffith could not convince two of
his colleagues, Stanley Morgan and G. K. T. Purcell, who dissented and said that the
Native Tribunals had been ousted of jurisdiction and their judgments were merely
arbitration awards and the Tribunals were without any inherent means to enforce them
in the same manner as were those of Tribunals held by Arthur B. Pennington, P. J. In
Gambra v Num, to have no legal existence. Since the Court was divided, no definitive
rule could be laid down at that time.88 In an effort to provide some kind of ruling for the
guidance of the Colonial Administration, the Law Officers expressed their opinion that
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the Order-in-Council annexing the Protectorates extinguished the jurisdiction of the
Native Tribunals and that the 1883 Native Jurisdiction Ordinance was only of “doubtful”
applicability in the former protectorates.89
Two years later, Chief Justice Griffith, sitting alone as a Divisional Judge ruled
that Native Tribunals were not abolished by the 1901 Order-in-Council.90 He did not
refer to the Colonial Office Law Officers opinion to the contrary as he did not consider
the courts to be bound by such opinion. He held that the decision of a Native Tribunal
in an action between parties who voluntarily appeared before the Tribunal was binding
on a Divisional Court. Thus the judgment of such a tribunal was not merely an
arbitration award but the judgment of a court.91 Griffith then asked whether tribunals
not under the 1883 Native Jurisdiction Ordinance survived the 1901 Order-in-Council
that annexed the Protectorates to the Colony. He concluded that native tribunals only
existed because the Crown, the source of all justice, expressly or implicitly recognized
and permitted them to exist. The Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1883 was an
expression of such recognition and the Order-in-Council of 1901 was an example of
implicit recognition. The terms of the 1901 Order-in-Council retrospectively validated
and legalized prior legislation that had included the Protected Territories and thus
acknowledged the Native Tribunals in such territories, even those not under the 1883
Native Jurisdiction Ordinance. Accordingly, he determined, the decisions of the Native
Tribunals were res judicata and binding on the Divisional Courts.92
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Griffith continued to argue inconsistently as to the existence of Native Tribunals
following the 1901 Order-in-Council annexing the Protectorates and forming the Gold
Coast Colony. The Order-in-Council established the Crown as the sole source of
justice and thereby eliminated any pre-existing jurisdiction. Griffith expanded on the
argument that the Order-in-Council did away with jurisdiction of Native Tribunals,
leaving them only as fora for voluntary arbitration with no power to compel attendance
or to enforce their decisions. These de facto Tribunals could only be made de jure by
an Ordinance conferring and limiting jurisdiction and specifying that all native
jurisdiction derived from the Crown. He argued that the view of Justice Pennington in
Dantsi that only Parliament could create courts in the Gold Coast was wrong in that the
Legislative Council, acting under the authority of the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865
could and properly did create both native and British courts. The Supreme Court
Ordinance took care of the British Courts and, he confusingly asserts, a Native
Jurisdiction Ordinance was necessary to deal with the Native Tribunals.93 But if the
Supreme Court Ordinance remained valid after the Order-in-Council why did the Native
Jurisdiction Ordinance not also remain valid and was that not exactly what he argued
in Dantsi and again in Mutchi?
The confusing and inconsistent judgments of the Supreme Court as to the
continued viability of Native Tribunals clearly required legislative resolution. The
Secretary of State, Alfred Lyttelton, agreed. He said that he was tired of what he
considered to be lawyers picking the wings off flies and directed that the matter be
resolved by an Ordinance. He said that when the Protectorates became British by
92
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annexation, Native Tribunals had “either to become a British Court deriving its authority
from the Sovereign or else to disappear as a court of justice.” The Sovereign
delegated authority to the Legislative Council that by the Supreme Court and Native
Jurisdiction Ordinances set up courts so that, in his opinion, every Native Tribunal
under the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance prior to the 1901 Order-in-Council existed as a
British Court and every Court not under that Ordinance prior to 1901 was no court but
at best a private and voluntary arbitration tribunal without power to compel
appearances or to enforce its awards. A Native Tribunal could be made a proper court
only by bringing it under the Ordinance and, thus, he disagreed with Justice
Pennington that only an Act of Parliament could create a court. 94
The continued existence of viable Native Tribunals was only a tepid attraction
for those members of the indigenous community educated at Fourah Bay College in
Sierra Leone or in England or in missionary schools in the coastal towns. One
correspondent to a newspaper commenting on an Open Letter to Kings and Chiefs
said that if they would administer justice with “rigid impartiality,” Africans would flock to
such Tribunals and not to the British courts, but that he despaired of such a result,
citing a case where a party was fined £10.17.6 before he was even allowed to state his
case.95 It was a measure of the desperate need of the colonizers for assistance in
rendering justice that the Governor, Matthew Nathan, said that he needed the chiefs to
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preside over the Native Tribunals “‘no matter how unsatisfactory the District
Commissioners and the Chief Justice found them in those roles.’”96
As had former Chief Justice Hutchinson and former Governor Griffith, Sr.,
Governor Rodger believed that the powers and duties of the chiefs should be more
clearly defined and the jurisdiction of their courts, their fees and fines should be more
precisely specified. However, he and his Attorney General disagreed with Griffith Jr.’s
view that no Native Tribunal should exist where there was a District Commissioner’s
court and said that Native Tribunals could coexist with District Commissioner’s courts
quite easily and be supervised under the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance but,
nevertheless, that such Ordinance should be repealed and replaced.
The Chief Justice sent the new Governor, John Rodger, a memorandum, dated
March 23, 1904,97 arguing that Native Tribunals generally were only covered by the
Native Jurisdiction Ordinance where there were no District Commissioner’s courts, i.e.
in the interior, or where the Governor had thought that a Chief was “worthy to be
granted special powers,” but that such powers had frequently been extended to places
even where a District Commissioner sat. Griffith contended that the continued
existence of Native Tribunals betrayed the native who wanted to make use of British
Courts because they had decided that indigenous courts “were unfit to administer
justice.” If native courts had been “reduced . . . to impotence,” it was the result of
indigenous action, he claimed. He strongly objected to “restoring and placing
alongside our Supreme Court” courts that had “been tried and found wanting, which
the natives themselves have condemned, and which are not shown to have materially
96
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improved,” and to which we are practically forcing the natives to return.”98 Native
Tribunals served a useful purpose, he went on, where they were at a distance from
British Courts or where the chiefs were more than “ordinarily enlightened” since the
British could not always provide justice in the first instance and should be glad to make
use of the native courts to “supplement our own courts.” But, he went on, in those
courts “partiality was common, where injustice was rampant,” fees are excessive and
damages awarded are disproportionate to injuries suffered. Chiefs didn’t want cheap
justice for their people, Griffith argued, but revenue from fees and appellate jurisdiction
was but “a small corrective” against abuses in the face of social pressure against using
“‘white men’s courts.’” If they could be trusted, native courts would be the best
tribunals to deal with land cases because the chief and his councillors would know the
history of the land and probably the boundaries, but they couldn’t be trusted and native
judgments in such cases were so vague and uncertain that it took days for the
Supreme Court to determine what the judgment decided and whether the land was
the same.99 If native jurisdiction were expanded, Griffith continued, judgments which
were likely to be corrupt and the extent of which would be difficult to determine, would
be res judicata, a very bad result. Native tribunals should not be abolished, he
concluded, but appeals to British courts should be easier, fees regulated and all
judgments in land cases should be required to be particularized and recorded and filed
with the Secretary for Native Affairs as a condition to their validity. All execution sales
should be recorded stating the price paid.100
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In a second memorandum dated May 21, 1904, Griffith, speaking of Odikro and
other minor chiefs’ courts, said that it “seems hardly wise to permit the existence
throughout the Colony of practically irresponsible petty Courts with power to enforce
decrees untrammeled by the many restrictions which hedge round the enforcement of
judgments of British Courts.” In practice, he said, it was only “the Omanhene’s Court
which is deemed to have the full powers conferred by the Ordinance” and that can
properly be regulated, although minor courts fulfilled a function as arbitration panels
whose decisions “will possess only a moral and social sanction.”101 He repeated his
objection that native courts existed primarily to provide revenue to the chief and not to
give speedy justice, and that they were “often partial and corrupt.” Nevertheless, they
could be of great good: “They are in fact our future petty sessions Courts and County
Councils” and should not be abolished.102 The British could not make the Tribunals
just, but by making appeals easier than at present Government could “mitigate
hardship and expose partiality and injustice,” by regulating fees it could “put some
check on extortion” and by requiring recording of land judgments within a specified
time in order that they be valid, it could reduce the danger of unrecorded tribunal
decisions103. But so long as the “Court to a native chief connotes revenue, . . . so long
will there exist in the native Courts an inherent defect which no legislation can cure.”104
Griffith sent Rodger yet another memorandum that year arguing that viz à vis
British Courts, Native Tribunals were foreign and their judgments were to be
recognized only if they could be said to be civilized; since they were not, the Supreme

101

Ibid., Enclosure No. 3, 5.21.1904, ¶¶1, 3.

102

Ibid., ¶7.

103

Ibid., ¶8.

104

Ibid., ¶11.
-296-

Court had no duty to acknowledge their force.105 The Governor, writing to the Colonial
Office, said that it should give the utmost consideration to W. Brandford Griffith’s views
as to the policy to be adopted as to native jurisdiction, “but at the same time, allowance
must be made for the ‘unconscious cerebration’ of the President of the Gold Coast
Supreme Court, naturally jealous of the prerogatives of that Court, and intolerant of the
existence of tribunals such as Native Customary Courts, independent of the Supreme
Court and not even subject to its appellate jurisdiction.”106 Clearly, Rodger saw the
dilemma of trying to make indigenous tribunals responsive to the needs of the people
without destroying the prestige of the chiefs upon whom the British relied, but like most
colonial officials, he had no effective proposals to resolve the dilemma.107
A few days later, Sarbah and E. J. P. Brown, African unofficial members of the
Legislative Council, advised the Governor that a new ordinance should be passed as
defects could not be cured by regulations or rules under the existing ordinance. The
new law should be “comprehensive, explicit and complete in itself,” declaring the
powers and jurisdiction of the native authorities and regulating the exercise thereof,
specifying the fees and fines chargeable. It should “facilitate appeals from inferior
local courts to that of an Omanhene and from there to a District Court. These council
members urged that the Ordinance should apply to the whole country and should
permit lawyers to practice in the Omanhin courts so long as they spoke the language
of the court and the people and conducted the cases in that language. Finally, each
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court should have a registrar who would keep detailed records of the cases that would
be admissible in the Supreme Court.108 These proposals, if adopted would go some
way to reducing the corruption found in the Native Tribunals, but would gird the chiefs
about with rules that would limit their power and prestige.
The Attorney General laid out for the Governor his views on the content of a
new Native Jurisdiction Ordinance and his reasons for his proposals, a memorandum
that was sent on to the Colonial Office. All Native Tribunals should be explicitly made
subject to the Supreme Court with a general right of appeal to the Supreme Court, he
suggested. There is no indication in his memorandum that he considered that this
suggestion would have the effect of creating one court system with no independence
for the native courts. Jurisdiction and fees should be specified and the courts of the
lesser chiefs would have civil jurisdiction only. Omanhenes’ courts should be provided
with registrars and the means to enforce their judgments. In a very creative suggestion
that did not arise again until 1927, he proposed that principles of customary law be
recorded so that they could readily be known outside the small circle of councillors and
linguists. He believed that as a consequence, business and revenues would increase.
He further recommended that those courts that would have criminal jurisdiction would
have it defined by Hutchinson’s 1894 draft Bill that limited criminal jurisdiction to crimes
punishable by up to three months imprisonment and/or a fine of up to £25, allowed
appeals to the District Commissioner’s Court if within the jurisdiction of that court or to
108
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the Divisional Court, and specified fees to be charged. Civil jurisdiction as the
Attorney General foresaw it would seem to be unlimited, even though the committee
reporting on the 1894 Bill had rejected unlimited civil jurisdiction and the then
Governor, Maxwell, had also been opposed. However, unlike Sarbah and Brown, the
Attorney General opined, strictly limiting the chiefs’ powers in civil matters would be
“impolitic:” “The aim of the Government should be to uphold his [the Chief’s] dignity
and make him an effective instrument for maintaining law and order in his own district,
not to lower him in the eyes of his people.” Unlike Griffith, the Attorney General
believed that native courts and District Commissioners’ courts could exist side by side
“in perfect harmony” with distinct duties and jurisdiction, native courts would deal with
native cases, District Commissioners with Europeans, native courts with customary
law, District Commissioners with English law. The District Commissioners, the
Attorney General noted seemingly without a single concern for the problems inherent
in their dual role, were not mere judges but also administrative officers. He viewed
some of Sarbah’s proposals as being “excellent” but he disagreed with probably his
most important one, to permit attorneys to appear in Native Tribunals. In yet another
proposal that would not resurface until the Native Courts Bill of 1944, the Attorney
General recommended that native magistrates for each superior chief should be
appointed who, presumably, would have legal training. Moreover, registrars should be
appointed to keep complete records of proceedings, to summarize in English the
linguists explanation of the reasons for a judgment and record it in a judgment book,
issue writs of execution, account for fees and fines and report all this regularly to the
Government 109 Despite a common theme in the proposals of almost everyone who
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expressed a view, the Colonial Government seemed unable to reach the consensus
necessary to produce detailed legislation for another six years.
Early Versions of the 1910 Native Jurisdiction Amendment Ordinance
The Native Jurisdiction Amendment Ordinance Bill of 1906 was published and
read for the first time on November 6, 1906. After twenty three years during which the
Native Tribunals and the Supreme Court exercised concurrent jurisdiction over
disputes between natives, the proposed Bill now provided for the exercise of exclusive
jurisdiction specified in the Bill by Native Tribunals of Head Chiefs and Chiefs and
prohibited exercise of jurisdiction except as specified in the Ordinance, thereby
asserting the British view that the chiefs had no inherent rights to hold courts. As in
previous bills, the Governor in Council was authorized to extend, curtail or remove any
and all jurisdiction otherwise conferred by the proposed bill from any and all the native
tribunals in the Colony. It provided for enforcement of judgments by sale of property,
arrest, writs of possession, etc., and for appeals first to the court of the head chief and
then to the Divisional Court whether judgment was as to personalty or land.110
In January 1907, the Governor sent the 1906 Bill drafted by the Attorney
General and the Chief Justice to the Colonial Office. He said that he had deferred the
second reading of the Bill until August at the request of an association of educated
coastal Africans, the Aboriginal Rights Protective Society (ARPS)111 and the Provincial
Commissioners so that the Bill could be thoroughly explained to the chiefs. The Bill,
he said, was based on the principle of derived, not inherent, jurisdiction. Only those
chiefs listed on the schedule to the Bill would be permitted to conduct Tribunals for
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which the Governor would appoint Tribunal registrars. To reduce the possibility of
corruption, all fines and fees would be paid to state treasuries, not to the chiefs and
councillors who would, instead, receive fixed salaries. Thus far, he reported, the only
serious opposition to the Bill that he saw was to those provisions amplifying those
sections of the 1883 Ordinance making the chiefs’ jurisdiction derivative and not
inherent.112 Colonial Office minutes from Alexander Fiddian and Charles Strachey
noted the provisions of the Bill with approval but said that if Bill were enacted, it would
be the de facto end of Native Tribunals.113
Contrary to Rodger’s expectation, the immediate public reaction to the 1906 Bill
was unfavorable. The ARPS attacked it as violative of customary law. It argued that
the Chiefs’ jurisdiction was inherent in his position as chief and not derived from British
rule despite British claims for the Sovereign being the font of all justice. Moreover, it
contended that judicial functions should be entrusted not just to chiefs but to chiefs
and councillors otherwise people would be deprived of democratic rights and the chiefs
would be established as tyrants in contravention of customary law.114 However, press
comment was more restrained. In reporting the first reading of the 1906 Bill and the
appointment of the Legislative Committee to study it before the second reading, the
Gold Coast Leader, praised the Attorney General for the “great pains” he took in
drafting the Bill that it saw as a step toward cooperation with Native authorities in the
fair and efficient administration of justice.115
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The members of the Legislative Committee appointed to consider the Bill
received criticisms from many sources. Principally, they concerned limits on civil
jurisdiction,116 the level of fees permissibly to be charged,117 that the Bill stripped the
chiefs of their inherent rights and should not be passed without their consent, the
manner in which fees were to be distributed118
Justice Pennington claimed that many terms in the Bill were too vague to be
applied easily.119 The Commissioner of the Western Province, Arthur J. Philbrick, also
criticized the Bill as being too complicated and that many provisions were
impracticable.120 Similarly, District Commissioner Arthur Ffoulkes thought the Bill was
too elaborate. He suggested that a conference be held with all the chiefs to see if a
uniform procedure could be agreed upon that would limit court membership to the
Chief and three councillors as assessors in an effort to reduce the costs litigants would
have to pay.121
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Contrary to the views of the chiefs, the Commissioner of the Central Province
expressed the view that the Head Chiefs’ courts were unpopular because the fees and
costs were too high, particularly where there was a District Commissioner’s Court in
the same town and because of the “frequent oppression and injustice of [the Tribunal]
administration.” He thought that because the Head Chiefs’ Courts couldn’t exist on the
fees set out in the schedule to the Bill since they had too many retainers to support, it
would be likely that they would create new fees or take bribes with the connivance of
the Registrars so that District Commissioners should be authorized to sit in the
Tribunals to prevent corruption until the time came when the Head Chiefs could be put
on a salary. From his point of view, the Chiefs were, in any event, already too
independent of the District Commissioners, who were the “CEO’s” of the District.122
The Acting Provincial Commissioner of the Central Province, Herbert C. W. Grimshaw,
reminded his readers that the Native Tribunals were generally seen as excessively
expensive and partial. Government was providing no adequate compensation for the
Chiefs’ loss of income due to the lower scheduled fees. It would be better, he wrote, if
all fees and fines were paid to the Registrar and the Head Chief were paid a stipend.
Grimshaw failed to note that this suggestion left the Councillors who made up the court
without any income at all.123
The District Commissioner of Accra commented that the proposed Ordinance
should not be applied in Accra where educated people and merchants abounded and
had been living away from custom, tradition and the authority of the chiefs for years,
and particularly not to the large Muslin population that should not be subject to Native
Tribunal jurisdiction because Sharia law was completely different from Ga traditional
122

Ibid., 59-65.

123

Ibid., 78., 11.25.1907.
-303-

law.124 Finally E. J. P. Brown sent an extensive Memorial to the Legislative Council
urging a requirement of written records to enable appellate courts properly to review
Tribunal proceedings as well as reform of appellate procedures to take from the
Secretary for Native Affairs, an administrative officer, the authority to pass on whether
or not to permit an appeal, a cumbersome and unsatisfactory system that deterred
proper appeals by natives who lacked understanding of the procedures.125
Some criticisms reflected a realistic appraisal of the Bill, e.g., that it was too
complex in its provisions to enable illiterate and semi-literate chiefs to understand and
enforce. Others could easily be accommodated, such as permitting the Tribunals to
enforce the terms of written notes, previously considered to be solely within British
jurisdiction. However, the evidence, albeit primarily anecdotal, demonstrated that most
of these criticisms were well grounded, but those issuing them should have known that
it would be impossible to draft a bill that would respond to the most important of them.
For example, the Colonial Office had several times in the past denied that there was
sufficient funding to pay for as many District Commissioners as would be necessary to
provide the supervision of the Tribunals required to prevent corruption. In any event, if
District Commissioners were to sit in the Tribunals to oversee them, how could the
chiefs save their face as traditional leaders, in which event the whole purpose of
preserving traditional courts would be defeated. Moreover, fees could not be raised
sufficiently to provide a secure income for the chiefs while paying for the Registrars
and other staff, for which the Government would not pay, without driving the people
away from the Tribunals which would consequently become too expensive for the vast
majority of would be litigants.
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The Committee considered the 1906 Bill for more than a year but was unable
to produce a unanimous report. Ultimately, the Governor sent the Colonial Office both
a majority and a minority report together with a copy of the 1906 Bill marked to show
the latest changes and proposals.126 He said that everyone on the Committee but the
Chief Justice agreed on the universal application of the Ordinance so that the powers
of the Tribunals “if abused can always be either restricted or withdrawn.” The majority
gave no reasons for their recommendations, so he asked the Official Members (W. C.
F. Robertson, Acting Colonial Secretary, Frederic H. Gough Acting Attorney General,
and John Maxwell, Acting Secretary of Native Affairs) to state them. The most
important opinion, in his view, was that of then Attorney General, A. Willoughby
Osborne, who was then in Nigeria.
The Majority Report of three official members and Giles Hunt, a European
unofficial member, Brown and Sarbah: stated that while not all members agreed on all
the provisions of the Bill, all agreed to sign the report and offer additional amendments
on the second reading. Griffith produced a 32 page minority report in which he said
he could not agree to universal application of the Ordinance or to Europeans being
tried for violating by-laws and that he ”profoundly” disagreed with depriving the
Supreme Court of jurisdiction of matters within the civil and criminal jurisdiction of
Native Tribunals. Griffith argued that if Native Tribunal jurisdiction were to be exclusive,
even in small civil and criminal matters, the District Commissioners would lose the bulk
of the business they do. Even though most small civil cases involved debt on shop
accounts evidenced by shop books, illiterate native judges could not understand them.
So, too, promissory notes with guaranties were documents beyond their ken. Under
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the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1883, Griffith contended, natives had the option of
bringing their land cases in the Supreme Court or Native Tribunals and almost always
chose the Supreme Court. To oust the Supreme Court of jurisdiction in land cases
would result in a substantial increase in appeals from Native Tribunals to the District
Commissioner then to the Provincial Commissioner and then to the Full Court, thus
only increasing cost and delay. Griffith acknowledged that where jurisdiction was
concurrent and Native Tribunals sat in proximity to the courts of the District
Commissioners, jurisdiction would clash, “But which court should suffer, the native
court which has fallen to its present low estate owing to the fact that the natives
deserted it to come to our court or the Supreme Court which must in any case
remain?”
Griffith moved on to argue in favor of attorneys appearing in all courts, native as
well as British. He noted that attorneys might appear in the District Commissioner’s
Court and should do so because the District Commissioner is equivalent to a
prosecutor, an executive officer, and attorneys provided an important safeguard for
defendants summoned before him. They were vital in saving judicial time and
organizing facts and evidence. The natives knew the value of counsel and used them
in all important land cases. Additionally, attorneys encouraged settlement. Griffith
referred to a Provincial Commissioner as having said that the failure of a Head Chief to
hear counsel deprived him of “‘an assistance often of great value.’” “Our role,” Griffith
said, “in this country has been based upon the justice dispensed by the late Queen’s
courts.” Natives coming into British courts contacted Europeans and civilization,
Griffith asserted, while Europeans learned about the customs of the natives and their
law, resulting in mutual trust. Courts had more educational effect than schools and the
-306-

proposed amendment would diminish the “most wholesome communication between
natives and Europeans.”127 Griffith’s arguments reflect his long held view that British
courts administering British law in all but a few cases was critical to the development of
the people of the Gold Coast and their integration into the modern world. His
contentions differed from those of the administration only in his statements that British
judges would become familiar with indigenous custom and find therein a basis for
understanding the colonial subjects. One may argue that these views originated in
considerations of racial supremacy, but, I argue, they derive equally if not entirely from
Griffith’s training in the common law as advocate and judge.
Governor Rodger reported that some of Griffith’s arguments were “very cogent”
and perhaps some area around the District Commissioner’s seats should be excluded
from the jurisdiction of the appropriate Tribunal, but he had yet to form an opinion.128
The Governor urged that Tribunal jurisdiction should be limited to natives and
exclusive as to subjects of the Chief, and as to all other persons, jurisdiction should be
concurrent with that of the British courts. Commenting on Griffith’s opposition to
exclusive jurisdiction in land and other cases, Rodger said that without it Tribunal
jurisdiction would be a “nullity” and would encourage lawyers to promote litigation in
British courts where they could appear.
Griffith, Jr argued that to grant Native Tribunals exclusive jurisdiction was a
reversal of the historical spread of British jurisdiction and was contrary to the desires of
the native population that would benefit only the chiefs and would lead to a marked
deterioration of the quality of justice. He said that one reason the Native Tribunals
made poor decisions in land cases was because they did not require surveys or plans,
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made no definitions of boundaries and created no adequate record for Supreme Court
review. Native Tribunals were, he concluded, are and would continue to be
instruments of extortion.129 Governor Rodger, to the contrary, wanted jurisdiction in
cases between natives to be exclusive to the Native Tribunals, because the
“persistently hostile attitude of the Supreme Court during the last twenty years . . . has
rendered the nominally ‘concurrent’ jurisdiction of all Native Tribunals quite illusory.”130
From the point of view of the chiefs, the Supreme Court “has gradually usurped and
monopolized all jurisdiction of every description, original as well as appellate and over
tribal as well as non-tribal natives; and that for the last twenty years, it has persistently
endeavoured to abrogate or minimize, in every direction, the civil and criminal
jurisdiction specifically conferred on certain Native Tribunals by the Native Jurisdiction
Ordinance of 1883."131
The Governor quoted his Attorney General as saying: “‘. . . it is one of the main
objects of this Bill to spare Natives the necessity of squandering money in Supreme
Court litigation . . . .”’ Rodger wanted Supreme Court jurisdiction to be appellate only
where the parties to the action were natives, but cases involving Head Chiefs should
be heard by a District Commissioner or Divisional Judge and those involving lesser
chiefs should be transferable to a British Court.132
Ellis, of the Colonial Office, clearly expressed the policy choices available when
he minuted that the issue was whether “we are ‘to rule through the chiefs’ and give
them exclusive jurisdiction so they can be the instruments of our rule” or as had been
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going on for years, “particularly since the present Chief Justice was appointed,”
gradually to eliminate the chiefs’ power and make government European in “personnel
and method.” He reminded the readers of his minute that successive Secretaries of
State chose the first alternative, but because of delay in amending the Native
Jurisdiction Ordinance and “the animosity of the Chief Justice towards the Native
Courts,” the tendency has been toward the second alternative. Apparently having
heard from the now departed former Attorney General, Alexander W. Osborne, Ellis
reported that Osborne thought that native jurisdiction should be concurrent with that of
the District Commissioners and that the Supreme Court should be required to transfer
cases to Native Tribunals unless there were allegations of bias or partiality. Other
minutes noted that W. C. F. Robertson, the Acting Colonial Secretary, said that he
signed onto the majority report because the chiefs were losing influence through
Government’s failure to help them enforce their judgments. He believed that the
Native Tribunals were clearly being used and were popular notwithstanding the Chief
Justice’s statements to the contrary. Robertson was convinced that the power of
appellate courts was a check on abuses. John Maxwell, the Acting Secretary of Native
Affairs, was reported as thinking that the Native Tribunals should be strengthened as a
sign of British trust in them but should not have exclusive jurisdiction in land cases. He
believed that the chiefs were becoming educated and abuses were diminishing. Once
again, opinions varied and fell almost equally on both sides of the issue. It was
apparent that they could not readily be reconciled and that no new Native Jurisdiction
Ordinance was soon to be enacted.133
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The Governor blamed the attitude of the Supreme Court and the Chief Justice
for, the “decay” in Native Tribunals. It was clear that Griffith had enormous influence
as to courts legislation, both native and British, for Colonial Office minutes reflect
Rodger’s thinking that in view of the Chief Justice’s opposition it might be better to
withdraw the 1906 Bill and make necessary changes through issuing regulations, thus
getting around Griffith”s opposition. J. S. Risley, a Colonial Office Legal Adviser,
opined that this would be all right legally, but it would be better to pass a new Bill albeit
one much less elaborate than the then current draft, which could be done if agreement
could be reached on basic principles. Risley reported on his interview with Griffith,
who was then home on leave. The Chief Justice was uncompromising on the issue of
concurrent rather than exclusive jurisdiction for the Native Tribunals, Risley noted.
Since the possibility of compromise seemed to be out of the question, Risley said that
they had a choice to make. He chose to go with the majority report that, he said,
seemed to represent a better way to go forward allowing transfers where bias was
likely. He would confine jurisdiction to local Africans giving other West Africans the
option either to go to the Supreme Court or a Native Tribunal and that there would be
no native tribunal jurisdiction over Europeans.134
Ellis minuted to Cox that he did not see how chiefs could maintain their
authority without exclusive jurisdiction. Cox agreed but he also agreed with Risley that
the “power of removal is very necessary in the case of native courts.” Ellis sought
guidance from Cox as to whether the Bill should go forward or the Governor should
issue regulations. Although the Legislative Council would still have to approve
Regulations, the debate would be far more limited than if a Bill were before it, so he
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recommended going forward with regulations and the Colonial Office directed the
Governor to do so unless he has strong reasons to proceed otherwise. The
Regulations the Governor was directed to issue would afford the Native Tribunals
some “small” exclusive jurisdiction, less than that in the draft 1906 Bill, provide for
removal of cases to the District Commissioners’ courts and the Supreme Court “in a
proper case” as where, e.g., bias is likely, confining such jurisdiction to “tribal natives”
while other West Africans were to be given the choice of proceeding in a Native
Tribunal or the Supreme Court and the Tribunals would have no jurisdiction over
Europeans. London directed that such regulations should provide for a gradual
extension of applicability rather than encompass the entire Colony at the same time.
Finally, the Tribunals should be given the “proper means” to record their judgments,
especially in land cases, and to enforce them.135 In order to clear the way for a
completely redrafted Bill, the 1906 Bill as redrafted to reflect the Majority Report
recommendations was withdrawn.136
In discussing with the Colonial Office the principles that would underlie a new
proposed Native Jurisdiction Ordinance Amendment Bill, Governor Rodger observed
that native jurisdiction, once entirely personal, had become both personal and
territorial. He quoted the report of the1895 Committee on Native Jurisdiction to the
effect that any Native Jurisdiction ordinance should be universally applied and notes
that Chief Justice Hutchinson was not as fearful of the consequences of universality as
his successor Sir W. Brandford Griffith, Jr., seemed to be. Rodger suggested a newly
drafted Ordinance prepared by the current Attorney General, Arthur Hudson, with
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some modifications of his own, that was “a more modest, but possibly more practical
Bill.”137
Commenting on this dispatch, Ellis minuted that after extensive analysis, he thought
that the Hudson draft as modified in accordance with the Governor’s proposals should do
the job. Cox approved, agreeing with the Governor, contrary to the Chief Justice’s view in
his minority report, that Native Tribunals should be supported and chiefs trained so as to
raise the level of their courts. Sir Charles Lucas, an Assistant Undersecretary, and Lord
Crewe, the Secretary of State, expressed their agreement and authorized the Governor to
proceed with a Bill that defined “native” as the Governor had proposed but they asked the
Governor to advise as to what extent the definition would include educated Africans, native
officials and others and to advise if he thought it possible to include provisions for recording
land cases.138 Crewe told the Governor that “some small (emphasis mine) exclusive
jurisdiction should be assigned to the Native Courts” that would be less extensive than
under the 1883 Ordinance. The powers of the Native Tribunals should be “safeguarded”
by authority to remove cases to the District Commissioner’s court or the Supreme Court in
cases where, e. g., bias was probable. The Ordinance should not be immediately applied
throughout the Colony but gradually introduced.139 The “aim of the Government,” Crewe
said, “should be to train them [the chiefs] and to raise the level of their courts.” Both good
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policy and necessity require active Native Tribunals so as to avoid “swamping the Supreme
Court with petty cases.”140 Shortly thereafter, the Governor reported on a meeting with
Sarbah, Hunt and Mills, unofficial members of the Legislative Council, and his impression
that they favorably received the new proposals.141 The content of a bill to give greater
jurisdiction to traditional tribunals was critical to the colonial administration as it would, it
was hoped, enable to traditional authorities, whose prestige had been diminished by
increasing resort by litigants to British courts, to regain some of that lost prestige by
requiring their subjects to use their courts. At the same time, some of the proposed
content would enable the administration to exercise control over those tribunals to protect
the people from feared exploitation by rapacious chiefs and their councillors.
The Native Jurisdiction Amendment Ordinance Bill of 1910 was read for the first
time in the Legislative Council on May 28, 1910 and published in the Gazette.142 In his
address to the Legislative Council, the Attorney General recapped the effort to regulate
Native jurisdiction from 1878 through 1883 and the three bills submitted and withdrawn in
the 1890's. He reminded the members of the Council of Chief Justice Hutchinson’s
recommendation, repeated subsequently by a number of officials, that a Native Jurisdiction
Ordinance should apply throughout the Colony with no distinction between interior and
coastal Tribunals and tells the Council that this Bill makes that provision. He also
reminded them of Chief Justice Griffith’s 1901 statement that the key to native jurisdiction
was the enforceability of judgments and pointed out the provision enacting that principle.
He recalled to the Legislature the Government’s 1904 policy statement that “all petty civil
and criminal cases between natives should in the first instance be heard and decided by
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the Native Courts and that the jurisdiction of these Courts should be supported and their
legal orders enforced to the fullest extent,” and noted that such policy was carried into
effect by the Bill. He bemoaned the failure of the 1907 Select Committee to achieve
unanimity leading to the withdrawal of the 1906 Bill.
Sarbah expressed his hope that prior to submission of the Bill to the Committee of
the Whole after its Second Reading, it would be widely circulated and publicly considered.
As to specific provisions, Sarbah criticized specific sections, saying that appeals should not
lie to District Commissioners who change so frequently and that they should not sit in
Tribunals with the Chiefs who should be assisted by educated natives.143
In a scene that most Americans would find extremely bizarre in light of our tradition
of separation of powers, Chief Justice Griffith rose, as an Official Member of the Council, to
criticize his own Government’s proposal. Saying that he had often been called, “the
Member for the Natives,” he promoted a Bill that would be simple in form and attacked the
one on the table as being too complicated, among other things. He criticized the provisions
dealing with appeals in land cases, saying that they should not go to Provincial
Commissioners who were too preoccupied with administrative tasks to deal with them and
ninety per cent of whose decisions would be appealed to the Divisional or Full Court in any
event. Such appeals should lie from the Head Chief’s Court directly to the Divisional
Court.144 At this point the Governor interjected his opinion that the success of the
Ordinance in providing inexpensive justice depended in large measure on the Registrars
about whom he had “grave doubts,” so the Bill provided that illiterate chiefs should send
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the Linguists to give complete oral reports of all proceedings with respect to land cases to
the appropriate District Commissioner.145
On July 4th, over Griffith’s objection that there had been insufficient time for the
public to consider the Amendment and that in and of itself it made no sense and should
have been published with the entirety of the 1883 Ordinance which it amended, the Bill
passed its second reading and proceeded to the Committee of the Whole. In Committee,
Griffith objected to most of the Bill’s provisions and voted against them. He argued that the
definition of the term “Native Authorities” was incomprehensible, against mandatory
transfer of cases between natives to Native Tribunals because transfers worked a hardship
on those who chose British courts and enabled District Commissioners to lighten their
workload by dumping otherwise valid cases into Tribunals. To rebut Griffith’s opposition to
universal application, Governor Rodger pointed out that Griffith had concurred in the
recommendation of the Select Committee for universal application.146
Sarbah proposed a number of amendments, particularly to defeat exclusive
jurisdiction. He suggested that educated natives compelled to litigate in the Tribunals,
might unduly influence the illiterate chiefs and councillors through inadvertent intimidation
and so distort justice. His proposed amendment was rejected, supported only by the Chief
Justice and T. Hutton Mills, the second African Unofficial Member. He pushed for the right
to counsel in cases transferred from the Tribunals to British courts. The Governor
countered by warning that a richer party could take advantage of a poorer party and
impose economic hardship on him by forcing him to hire counsel. Sarbah responded that
attorneys would be very useful to new and inexperienced District Commissioners who were
unfamiliar with customary law to have counsel on both sides, particularly in land cases,
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which, in any event should be appealable directly to the Supreme Court.147 The Governor
rebutted by saying that the District Commissioners were more familiar with the land in their
districts and could decide on the spot while a judge had to take evidence. Moreover,
Rodger said, he had doubts that a mere plan without a personal inspection could enable a
court to make a correct judgment.148 On July 5th, a number of outstanding issues were
resolved by agreement, among which were the appellate route for land cases, to the
Provincial Commissioner and then to the Full Court. At Griffith’s behest, the Rules made
part of the Schedule to the Bill was amended to require the Tribunals to keep written
records. Sarbah prepared a list of fees to be put into the Schedule. Finally, on July 27,
after Griffith had said, with “regrets, that he had to oppose passage of the Bill because it
was too complicated for illiterate chiefs and councillors to deal with and was detrimental to
the rights of the colony primarily because it forced unwilling litigants into an undesired
forum, the Native Jurisdiction Amendment Ordinance it was enacted as No. 7 of 1910.149
The provisions of this extremely important legislation require more particular
attention. Section 2 (ii) redefined “Native” as someone living under customary law; Section
3 applied the Ordinance to every state and division in the Colony and subjected all their
“powers and jurisdiction to the provisions of the Ordinance and not otherwise”; Section 13
gave Provincial Commissioners power to intervene in Tribunal proceedings (theretofore
such power resided only in the Governor and the Attorney General); Section 15 added a
new appeal track: appeals from an indigenous Divisional Tribunal lay to the Head Chief’s
Tribunal, then to the District Commissioner’s Court if the amount in issue or criminal fine
exceeded specified sums or the criminal sentence exceed seven days in jail; Land appeals
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would lie to the Provincial Commissioners and then to the Full Court; Section 17 precluded
any appeal from the District Commissioner’s Court in a non land case except upon leave
from the District Commissioner or the Divisional Court; Section 24 added a new Section 34
requiring Tribunals and Appellate courts to apply customary law not repugnant; a new
Section 25 criminalized imposition of fines and fees in excess of those specified on the
Schedules to the Ordinance; and a new Section 36 authorized Tribunals to punish perjury.
Rule 18 required literate chiefs to record all proceedings and to preserve the record for the
District Commissioner; Rule 19 required illiterate chiefs to send the Linguist along with the
parties to the District Commissioner to make a verbal report of the proceedings within
seven days; Rule 20 required monthly reports to the District Commissioner either in writing
or via the Linguist to be passed on to the Secretary of Native Affairs of all criminal cases
where the fine exceeded 10/ or imprisonment was imposed. Schedule A specified the
fines for violating a Chief’s Oath and fees for summonses, hearings, Land Viewing,
Linguists and Execution.150
The 1910 Ordinance enacted the principle of exclusive Native Tribunal jurisdiction
over all actions between indigenous litigants with administrative officials, District and
Provincial Commissioners having the primary responsibility for dealing with appeals. In so
doing, it achieved the objective of supporting the stature of the customary authorities, but
failed to provide for simple and inexpensive justice for indigenous litigants. Indeed, merely
laying out the most pertinent terms of the Ordinance gives support to Griffith’s criticism that
it was too complicated. If the intent was to simplify the procedures and make litigation in
the traditional courts cheaper and easier for the indigenous population, it clearly failed. For
instance, an appeal from a lower British Court to a higher British Court was on the record
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made below and written and/or oral arguments. Under the 1910 Ordinance, an appeal
from the lower Tribunal was to a hearing de novo in the Head Chief’s Tribunal and thence
to a hearing before the District Commissioner on a record, if the Head Chief were literate, a
matter of coincidence, or another hearing de novo upon the report of the Linguist. The
District Commissioner’s judgment was appealable to the Provincial Commissioner in land
cases and finally to the Full Court or, in personal cases, with the leave of the District
Commissioner or the Divisional Court to the Divisional Court and, at last, to the Full Court.
It is not at all surprising, even without the burden of attorneys’ fees, that few litigants could
afford this tortuous and expensive process. Moreover, the provision outlawing fees in
excess of those specified was without teeth and required for enforcement the close
supervision of an insufficient number of overworked District Commissioners. The colonial
authorities chose to support their indigenous agents in preference to assuring that they
would render justice.
Griffith’s opposition to the 1910 Ordinance made him few friends, even among those
who agreed with all or some of the positions he took. The Governor was furious. He sent
the Colonial Office the minutes of the Council meetings, complaining that ”Every stage,
almost every clause of the Native Jurisdiction Bill both on the Second Reading and in
Committee was opposed by the Chief Justice who clearly demonstrated, if any
demonstration was needed, the inadvisability of a member of the Judicial Branch being
also a member of the Legislative Council.” “Fortunately” neither of the native members
ever supported him together and often neither of them did, particularly on the final
division.151 When he sent the Colonial Office the newly enacted Ordinance for Sovereign
approval, Governor Rodger bitterly complained that “when the division was taken, the
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Chief Justice after again expressing his disapproval, withdrew from the Council” without
voting.152
Now Griffith did something absolutely unheard of for the chief judicial officer of a
British Colony. He petitioned the Secretary of State to disallow approval of an Ordinance
passed with the sponsorship of his own colonial government.153 In multiple closely typed
pages, he took apart the Ordinance clause by clause and submitted his own proposed bill
that he said was simple and easy to understand. Griffith characterized the 1883 Ordinance
as “ill drawn. In a short written peroration, he said that he was “making a stand for the
inarticulate masses who are in the majority and whose interests are not always identical
with those of the chiefs” for whom he says the Government displays “solicitude.154 Fiddian
minuted to Ellis most disdainfully, “It is quite time Sir Brandford Griffith came home for
good.”155 It is difficult to determine from the evidence available just what Griffith’s motives
were beyond an egotism that refused to accept others opposing his detailed analysis of the
Amendment Ordinance. It is however clear from his prior writings that he believed the
people of the Gold Coast to be far better served by access to British courts for resolution of
their legal disputes than by being required to bring them to traditional tribunals about which
so many had complained so much.
However, Griffith was not entirely without support. Bryan, then Acting Governor,
characterized the Ordinance as “reactionary.” He agreed with Griffith that Government
had shown solicitude for the Chiefs but “none for the people.” He continued that he felt
“very strongly that the rights and liberties of the people are about to be seriously curtailed.”
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He objected to universal application of the ordinance in part because “the number of
educated natives in the Colony is rapidly increasing and . . . they form a section of the
community whose aspirations and sense of justice are far removed, and tend to be still
further removed from the atmosphere of native courts.” Compelling them to appear before
Native Tribunals, he concluded, “cannot but be prejudicial to, as it is in opposition to, the
Government’s liberal educational policy.”156 Fiddian scorned Bryan’s appeal and criticized
his opposition to the Government.157
Attorney General Hudson, responding to Griffith’s Petition demeaned it as an
unnecessarily wordy and repetitious tome “on the principle that if only enough words are
thrown some of them may hit the mark and overweighted with adverse epithets in the
apparent hope that if only they are iterated and reiterated sufficiently often some of them
will stick.”158 He denied that the Ordinance laid any disability on the natives and that it
negatively affects their rights. The Attorney General defended giving Provincial
Commissioners jurisdiction to hear land appeals by pointing to conflicting Supreme Court
decisions that left the law up in the air, implying that the Provincial Commissioners would
do no worse. Responding to Griffith’s assertions of solicitude for the chiefs, he argued that
people could not be saved from subjection to poor traditional authorities except by making
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“good chiefs and councillors through whom alone these large native communities can be
governed.”159
E. R. Darnley, an Assistant Undersecretary, minuted that Griffith should be told that
his petition attacked a principle (to shore up the chiefs’ authority) already agreed to by the
Secretary of State who had approved the Ordinance, with the exception of the
amendments made in Committee, which had no great importance, and that he should give
it a chance and see what imperfections show up.160 Sir Charles Lucas noted that the
Attorney General’s response to Griffith’s petition was “intemperate” but that was the
obvious result of friction and Griffith’s provocation. As to Griffith, Lucas wrote, “It is certain
that he will do his best to make the law unworkable and the sooner he leaves the Colony –
where he has been a great deal too long – the better for everyone.161 Lord Crewe’s
response to Griffith’s petition said that he had seen and considered it and the Attorney
General’s response and after considering Griffith’s arguments, he would not advise the
King to disallow the Ordinance. Indeed, he had decided even before passage of the
Ordinance that the Native Tribunals should have exclusive jurisdiction. Griffith’s carping
about “form and detail” could be dealt with in time, he wrote. Lastly, he asked for a report
in one year on how the Ordinance was working.162
The dilemma that Griffith’s opposition to the Native Jurisdiction Amendment
Ordinance demonstrated was that of the colonial government throughout the period under
study here: how to carry out a mandate to “civilize” the indigenous population through the
benefits of English law and British justice while supporting traditional authorities through
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whom they wished to rule but who too often they found represented the antithesis of British
justice. As will be seen below, it was not until the end of the 1930's and particularly with
the enactment of the Native Courts Ordinance of 1944 that the position of the traditional
authorities in dispensing indigenous justice was almost entirely reduced to a ceremonial
role and better educated men assumed a position of responsibility on the Native Courts.
Popular response to the Ordinance was generally positive, unexpectedly so given
that the newspapers were in the hands of educated Africans opposed to exclusion from
access to the Supreme Court and the readership of which was similarly made up of
educated coastal Africans who could read and write in English, an attribute rarely found in
the interior of the country. Perusal of these papers shows that they were not shy about
criticizing government policies and actions while expressing loyalty to the British Crown and
Government.
A leading article from the Gold Coast Leader saw the passage of the NJO as a
happy sign of a new order: “The principles underlying the ‘Native Jurisdiction (Amendment)
Ordinance are such as may largely contribute to a rehabilitation of our Head Chiefs and
Chiefs in the exercise of their immemorial rights as the natural Rulers of the country.”163 In
a subsequent leader, it encouraged Governor Rodger to see to the approval of the
Ordinance before leaving the Colony: “Nothing that Sir John has done would be more
appreciated by Native Thinkers than His Excellency’s honest and sympathetic efforts to
163
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recover the lost position of our Chiefs in the economy of Colonial Administration.”164 And
again, in September, the leader said that the Chiefs would be forever thankful to Rodger
for his “unparalleled and successful efforts” in passing the Native Jurisdiction Amendment
Ordinance, “a law which, in principle, is destined to be the Charter of their liberty and
indefeasible rights.”165
As might have been expected, the Gold Coast Bar was unhappy with an Ordinance
keeping its members from access to Native Tribunals. Taking the brief for the chiefs, it
also petitioned for disallowance of the Ordinance. Its Petition was based in large part on
perceived infringement of the principle of inherent jurisdiction, because it was seen as
“unworkable” and because it imposed additional duties on overworked District
Commissioners, a “hardly desirable” result. Finally the Bar objected to pushing educated
persons into Native Tribunals and limiting their appellate rights.166 In transmitting the
Attorney General’s response to the Bar’s petition, Acting Governor Bryan characterized the
latter as a ”crude and inconsequential document.”167 Ellis’ minute on this second petition
derides the Bar as being “not of much use” and encouraging litigation. The lawyers were
unhappy, he said, solely because they wouldn’t be able to practice in the Tribunals. He
suggested telling petitioners that the petition had been considered but there was found in it
no reason to advise against approval.
The Colonial Office response to the Bar petition demonstrated British class and
racial hostility to the educated elite that the Colonial authorities saw as potential nationalist
adversaries. Simenssen argues that the British motivation for the Ordinance was to relieve
164
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the District Commissioners of work for which they were too few in number.168 This
argument seems to founder on the numerous burdens on District Commissioners added by
the Ordinance, such as dealing with most appeals from the Tribunals, as well as the
expressed intention of the Accra Administration to require the District Commissioners to
supervise the Tribunals ever more closely. What is clear is that the Ordinance could not,
by its terms, effectively achieve either or both of the objectives the Administration sought
for it.
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CHAPTER VIII – NATIVE JURISDICTION – 1910 - 1927:
CHIEFS VERSUS COASTAL ELITES
In this continuation of the discussion of Native Jurisdiction, I deal with the repeated
efforts to correct the perceived deficiencies on the 1883 Ordinance and the failure of the
colonial authorities to find a solution to the divergent objectives of fair justice and support of
their native agents. The judicial landscape changed completely after enactment of the
1910 Native Jurisdiction Ordinance as the Native Tribunals became the exclusive forum for
resolution of claims between and among indigenous people of the Gold Coast to the
exclusion of the Supreme Court in almost all cases, particularly land cases. This provoked
criticism and unhappiness among the educated elite of the coastal communities who
objected to having their disputes decided by men they considered to be ignorant. In
addition, complaints as to extortionate fees and fines, after initially diminishing again
climbed. Complaints also claimed that the Native Tribunals were too slow in making
decisions and granted unnecessary and dilatory adjournments of cases.
I describe the two failed efforts, in 1919 and 1922, to amend the 1910 Ordinance to
deal with these complaints and the opposition of the chiefs to limitation of fees and fines
that they deemed necessary to fund local government and to maintain their status among
their subjects. I go on to detail the British decision to allow the traditional authorities to
draft an ordinance that, with substantial British revisory input became the Native
Administration Ordinance that for the first time limited the monetary jurisdiction of the
Native Tribunals, established a hierarchy of such tribunals with that of the Paramount chief
having appellate jurisdiction over those of the divisional and village chiefs and the highest
monetary jurisdiction. It changed the basis of jurisdiction from personal to territorial and,
again for the first time, expressly prohibited corruption by chiefs and imposed severe
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sanctions on those found to have accepted bribes. I note the opposition of many chiefs, an
opposition promoted by certain coastal lawyers, to the new ordinance that, it was claimed,
unfairly infringed on their sovereignty. Finally, I describe the immediate recognition that
the new Native Administration Ordinance, too, required numerous amendments and that it
did not achieve the objective of delivery of fair and efficient justice to the people of the Gold
Coast.
The drafting and enactment of the Native Administration Ordinance highlighted the
increased prominence of traditional authorities in the making of policy through their new
state councils and the newly created Provincial Council of Chiefs. Another voice now
heard more frequently was that of the local press that represented the frustrated desires of
the educated elite. The active involvement in the drafting process of the Secretary of
Native Affairs, first J. T. Furley then John Maxwell, emphasized the importance of this
department of the administrative secretariat created in 1902 to represent more directly to
the chiefs the administration’s policy and to help settle succession disputes as well as
those between different chiefs.1
Life Under the 1910 Ordinance and Efforts to Amend It
The inconsistency of British policy between supporting the chiefs in their judicial
jurisdiction and controlling them to prevent or at least diminish the corruption and
exploitation of litigants in their courts, the themes discussed in the prior chapter, continued
after enactment of the Native Jurisdiction Amendment Ordinance of 1910 despite the
hopes of the colonial authorities that they had found the fine line they sought. Indeed,
when Hugh Clifford assumed the role of Governor in 1912, he found that British policy was

1

Kwaku Nti, “Action and Reaction: An Overview of the Ding Dong Relationship Between the
Colonial Government and the People of Cape Coast,” Nordic Journal of African Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1
(2002): 1-37, 14; Gold Coast Annual Report 1902..
-326-

“seemingly aimless and shifting.” Moreover he found much opposition by the coastal elites
to the “venality” of the chiefs and disgust “with the ignorance, corruption, or general
slowness of the chiefs to act.”2
Over the next decade the Governors, first John Thorburn then Hugh Clifford as well
as the two chiefs sitting on the Legislative Council, Matte Kole and Ofori Atta engaged in a
debate over the perceived inadequacies of the 1910 Amendment.3 The chiefs opposed
having village headmen, Odikros, hold courts and wanted to limit the jurisdiction of chiefs
of lesser divisions and villages and to require Africans from other colonies to submit to the
jurisdiction of the Native Tribunals. The debate over an attempt to revise the Native
Jurisdiction Ordinance embodied in a 1919 Bill and that to come over one introduced
in1922 highlighted and exacerbated divisions between the traditional authorities of the
interior and the coastal educated elites, a division that the elites, represented by such as T.
Hutton Mills and J. E. Casely Hayford and the press that gave voice to their views saw as
an effort by the British to divide and rule. Thus, we find in the Gold Coast Independent a
leading article accusing the British of making a “grotesque” error in considering that the
educated Africans “have little regard or respect for his (sic) chiefs.” The educated Africans,
the article went on, just did not want their chiefs to “oppress and suppress his progress in
the march of civilization.”4
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The Amended 1910 Ordinance would become effective on January 1, 1911 and in
preparation for that date, the colonial Administration discussed a number of potential and
actual issues, such as how a debtor could be imprisoned for debt by a Native Tribunal and
who would pay for it,5 what form Writs of Execution should take,6 whether or not Native
Tribunals had jurisdiction to issue search warrants at the request of a European7 and, most
importantly, whether or not the Ordinance authorized Odikros to hold Court and, if so,
whether they had the same jurisdiction as Division and Head Chiefs, because, if so, he
believed that the Ordinance should be amended.8 As to this last, the Attorney General
opined that the Odikros did have jurisdiction, but suggested an amendment to the 1910
Ordinance to define “chief” more precisely and directed the District and Provincial
Commissioners to advise the chiefs that the earlier opinion of the Acting Attorney General
to the contrary was no longer valid.9
As noted above, within a year of passage, a number of shortcomings were seen in
the 1910 Amendment Ordinance and not only by members of the Administration. The
principal problem was the failure of the Government to provide a method of financing the
Native Tribunals other than from fees and fines, thus permitting the chiefs to use them, in
5
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the words of the Korsah Commission Report, as “a lucrative and valued privilege.”10

Yet

no one proposed steps to remedy the problem.
Rather, attention focused on the distinction between and among chiefs. One of the
more prominent chiefs, Nana Mate Kole, Kronor of Kobo, recommended amendments
limiting divorce, paternity and custody cases to the courts of the Head Chiefs; more
specifically defining the jurisdiction of Head and Division chiefs as the Ordinance seems to
give them equal jurisdiction in contravention of customary law; limiting the right to keep and
maintain prisons to Head Chiefs; and authorizing the Head Chief to define and set both the
civil and criminal jurisdiction of subordinate chiefs. As he said, “What strikes me as the
most objectionable of the Amended Ordinance No. 7 of 1910 is the equality of power given
to Head-Chiefs and their subordinates. . . . This equality of power is sure to result in the
disorganization of our society and political institutions.”11 He went on to request
amendments to require natives of Sierra Leone and Nigeria to submit to the jurisdiction of
the Tribunals in land cases where the land was within the Chief’s jurisdiction even if the
transaction was based on English conveyancing documents since use of such documents
was spreading rapidly and threatened, if his proposed amendment were not accepted, to
deprive the chiefs of jurisdiction over most land cases; to add specific crimes, such as
fighting in a public place, endangering life via a fetish charm, assembly for an unlawful
purpose and aiding and abetting a crime to the Tribunals’ jurisdiction; adding some
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additional fees to the schedules; and establishing a difference in the amounts of fines and
fines between the Tribunals of the Head Chiefs and subordinate chiefs.12
In September 1912, Governor Thorburn, who was replaced in December 1912 by
Hugh Clifford, reported to Secretary of State Harcourt, as he had been requested to do, as
to the workings of the 1910 Amendment Ordinance. Thorburn said that things were
working well except in the coastal towns. While the people of the interior were satisfied to
look to their chiefs for justice and the chiefs seemed to appreciate recognition of their
judicial powers, the coastal elite continued to be opposed to traditional courts.13 However,
he proposed an early amendment – as Mate Kole had recommended – that he said was
necessary to clarify the status and jurisdiction of the various levels of Native Tribunals
before minor village courts usurped the jurisdiction of the Division and Head Chiefs.
Attorney General Hudson advised against a premature amendment and suggested waiting
two or three more years to see better how things were working out.14
A somewhat less positive view appeared in the 1912 Native Affairs Department
Report that said that the working of the Native Tribunals was “fairly satisfactorily.” It said
that the Ordinance was difficult for many of the chiefs to understand – belatedly
acknowledging the criticism of Griffith and others -- and required amendment. The
Secretary for Native Affairs, Francis Crowther, admitted that the Tribunals kept few
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records, and the Commissioner of the Eastern Province noted that the Chiefs there sought
a higher fee schedule and differing jurisdiction for Head Chiefs and lesser chiefs.15
Governor Hugh C. Clifford acknowledged that the practice of dividing fees and fines
among chief and councillors of his Tribunal encouraged excessive fees and fines and that
the Ordinance should be amended to prevent such practice, an amendment that was never
enacted.16 In 1915, the Government appointed a Committee to examine the workings of
the 1910 Amendment Ordinance and to recommend necessary amendments. The most
important issues to be examined were whether or not an Odikro had the right to form and
hold a court and whether or not a chief’s jurisdiction was personal or territorial.17 In his
1915 Annual Report on Native Affairs, the Secretary for Native Affairs, Crowther, reported
that a new Bill would try to deal with issues of land acquired by immigrants from other
states of the Gold Coast who still owed loyalty to the chiefs of the states from which they
came and would provide for grading Tribunals and assigning jurisdiction accordingly – a
reform not implemented until 1944. He expressed his concern that the Tribunals “show a
tendency to abandon their own traditions and to follow the forms and methods of the
English courts.”18
Issues, probably of long standing, as to inherent right showed, in Clifford’s words,
“no sign of abatement.” As a practical matter, these issues meant little at that moment and
the Secretary for Native Affairs felt that with close supervision, they could be reconciled
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“with a system of wise regulation.”19 Of greater concern were reports, many of them said to
be justified, that the Tribunals had a tendency to continue to charge fees in excess of the
amounts allowed under the Schedule to the 1910 Ordinance, a fault attributable to illiterate
chiefs who were “more or less in the hands of their Registrars.” In addition, it was reported
that many of the Tribunals wrongly exercised their jurisdiction “through the ignorance or
arrogance of the Tribunal Police or Clerks who are rather prone to an abuse of their
powers.” The only remedy proposed was closer supervision by the already overworked
District Commissions to see to it that Tribunal Registrars were knowledgeable as to the
provisions of the Ordinance, a remedy that had not worked in the past.20
Tribunal personnel, most of whom were illiterate, much less legally trained, were
required to know and interpret an extensive and complicated statute and then the British
carped because they failed to do so properly. One District Commissioner criticized the
members and Registrar of a Tribunal for not understanding the elements of the crime of
assault on the facts presented to it when assault was not defined except in the Criminal
Code and then for imposing an excessive penalty. Since most defendants, as well as most
civil litigants before a Tribunal, were also illiterate and poor, appeal to a superior tribunal or
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to the District Commissioner rarely was a practical remedy, particularly since lawyers were
not permitted to represent or advise such parties.21
Since 1915, work on a revised Ordinance Bill continued with apparently little
progress toward completion. Governor Clifford had become convinced after study of the
various proposals for amendments and consultation with the chiefs that amendment would
be “useless” and that a new bill would be necessary.22 In early 1918, Clifford told the
Colonial Office that the draft Bill, despite the fact that “preparation of which had occupied
much time and thought,” was not yet ready although he hoped to be able to send it to the
Colonial Office in a few months.23 In October 1918 it appeared that the draft Bill was still
unready. The new Secretary for Native Affairs, T. J. Furley, reported that it “was again
considered by a committee who redrafted the Bill prepared by a former committee.” He
said that the principal changes related to “a procedure by which some finality can be
secured to their [the Tribunals’] judgments especially in disputes relating to the ownership
of land held under [native] tenure . . . .”24
Most appeals from Native Tribunals came initially to the District Commissioner of
the division in which the tribunal sat. It was the task of the District Commissioners to
assure justice was done. In general however, Governor Clifford found that the District
Commissioners were an unsatisfactory means by which to supervise Native Tribunals. He
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complained to the Secretary of State, Andrew Bonar Law, that they were rarely in their
districts for more than twelve months before going on leave and even more rarely returned
to the same district. Indeed, they “moved from post to post with so bewildering a frequency
that they were precluded from acquiring a deep and intimate knowledge of any one district
or of any of its chiefs or peoples,” so that “efficient” British oversight of Chiefs was “an
impossibility.”25
In the interim, complaints about the Native Tribunals continued unabated, relating,
as they had continuously since the creation of the Colony, to excessive fees and penalties.
Despite these complaints, the British asserted, that the comparatively low number of
appeals to the District Commissioners demonstrated that “the system is one which is
suitable to the ideas of the people and with the working of which they are as a whole
content.”26 This assertion ignored the illiteracy of most of the population and assumed the
failure to appeal was deliberate rather then the consequence of ignorance of the law and/or
intimidation by the chiefs, a fact that Furley, the Secretary for Native Affairs, seemed to
confirm when he wrote of the necessity, “to eliminate from the mind of the average chief
the idea that his Tribunal is primarily a revenue producing institution and that an appeal
from his judgment does not in itself constitute an act of disrespect or insubordination to his
authority.”27
In late 1918,the Governor reported that he was ready to introduce a new Bill into the
Legislative Council. It declared that British sovereignty was unrestricted and that native
jurisdiction was dependent upon the Colonial Government. Had this provision been
enacted into law, much future debate would have been avoided. The draft bill provided
25
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that only Head Chiefs would have jurisdiction in land cases and their jurisdiction in personal
cases would be higher than that of Divisional Chiefs. District Commissioners would have
the power to transfer cases and to sit with the Chiefs in their tribunals. Appeals in land
cases would be to the Provincial Commissioners as a court of last resort, so that the
Supreme Court would be deprived of all jurisdiction, original or appellate, in land cases as
well as in stool disputes. A Colonial Office minute noted the obvious intent of the Governor
to minimize the influence of attorneys and opined that the Governor had gone too far.28
At last, the proposed revised Bill was introduced into the Legislative Council in
February 1919. It permitted the Governor in Council to extend, remove or restrict specified
jurisdiction, thus restoring a provision of the 1883 Ordinance that had been removed from
the 1910 Amendment.29 Since Governor Clifford was about to turn over his office to
Governor Gordon Guggisberg, he adjourned the second reading of the Bill for six months.30
The provisions of the Bill requiring confirmation of a Chief by the Governor-in-Council and
enabling suspension of the jurisdiction of a Tribunal by the same institution produced much
opposition from both customary chiefs and the urban elite. Clifford reported to the Colonial
Office that the Accra sub-chiefs, two doctors, ten merchants and three lawyers had
petitioned against the Bill and that the petition was said to have been approved by a mass
meeting.31 The petitioners argued that the Bill an attack on traditional Akan democracy,
converting chiefs into “quasi official” “Government creature[s]” and traditional democracy
into a colonial bureaucracy.32 In addition, there was a petition from the ARPS challenging
the Bill’s elimination of village chiefs’ jurisdiction and divisional chiefs’ jurisdiction in land
28
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cases and arguing that people would be subjected to the mercy of corrupt chiefs without
access to redress in the Supreme Court. Moreover, the elites accused the Government of
attempting to “prop up the power of ignorant chiefs so they could resist the just demands of
the educated but also of making them ore clearly the tools of the Europeans.”33 Faced with
this opposition, the Bill was never read a second time but was withdrawn. Indeed,
Governor Clifford’s biographer argues that Clifford could have imposed his Native
Jurisdiction Bill on the people because he had an official majority in the Legislative Council
and the support of the Colonial Office, but that unlike Lord Lugard in Nigeria, he refused to
use coercion to force acceptance of his policies.34 While, as we shall see, the coming
debate on the 1922 Native Jurisdiction Bill showed a solidarity between traditional chiefs
and educated elite not seen since the 1895 and 1897 Land Bills, it also showed how
closely the elite identified with the culture of their colonial masters.
In September 1922, Furley, the Secretary for Native Affairs introduced the latest
iteration of a Native Jurisdiction Bill. He said that it contained provisions responsive to the
criticisms of and suggestions for the 1919 Bill particularly with respect to confirmations of
chiefs, appeals in land cases and the Schedule of fines and fees and Rules of Practice.35
The Attorney General’s Statement of Objects and Reasons noted that a 1915 Bill had been
referred by a committee to Head Chiefs, judges, Provincial Commissioners and others for
comment and their suggestions incorporated.36
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J. E. Casely Hayford presented petitions from the ARPS and two Bar Associations
to be heard by counsel as to suggested amendments.37 He asked to be heard before the
committee stage because at that point only detail could be discussed and he argued that
several key principles were at stake. With the support of Nana Ofori Atta , Mate Kole and
the third chief on the council his request was granted.38 T. Hutton Mills presented the
ARPS’ position objecting to the provision limiting chiefs’ jurisdiction because it made him “a
Government creature” who “ceases to be the leader, the champion and the protector of his
people that the Native Constitution expects him to be.” He argued for recognition of the
inherent rights of the chiefs and for recognition of three levels of chiefs. Native customary
law should not be defined but should be left to develop naturally as it always had. Lawyers
should not be excluded from Tribunals, Mills argued, if their fees were deemed to be too
high, they could be scheduled as in England. Boundaries should be settled if disputed by
the Supreme Court and the Governor-in-Council should not be involved. Since land
disputes were the most important ones, they should be dealt with by trained judges who
had experience, not executive officers, and in courts that would properly hear counsel. Nor
should Provincial or District Commissioners be allowed to sit with the chiefs in their
Tribunals as that would “restrict the freedom of action” of the chiefs and their councillors. If
a Tribunal were so incompetent, jurisdiction should be given to the Supreme Court.
Appeals should not be limited monetarily and motions to transfer should be heard by the
Supreme Court with the participation of counsel and no Executive Officer should be
involved in determining leave to appeal, nor should Provincial Commissioners hear cases
37
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whether in the first instance or on appeal as he is a political officer. The Supreme Court
should be allowed to determine customary law as it deemed fit; assessors were
unnecessary. Finally, judges should hear land cases as there was “No good ground
shown” for them not to.39 Mills thus repeated several times the theme of ARPS and Bar
Association arguments from the 1870's to the 1940's: The Executive should be separated
from the Judiciary and he received the same response as his predecessors and his
successors did, although as time went on even Government officials became more ready
to accept his argument.40
In moving the second reading of the Bill, Secretary for Native Affairs, Furley, averred
that the reason for giving the Governor-in-Council power to add or restrict jurisdiction was
to reward efficient Tribunals and punish inefficient ones. He asked a series of rhetorical
questions that, he said, should be discussed in Committee, among which were was the
Supreme Court a good venue for consideration of customary law? How, and to what
extent, should Tribunal jurisdiction be limited, if at all? He then went on to argue that the
current law by which appeals in land cases lay from Head Chiefs to Provincial
Commissioners and then to the Full Court was good law and that there is no reason to
change it, noting that since 1912 only nine of the fifty appeals to the Full Court from
decisions of the Provincial Commissioners were allowed and an additional seven were
remanded, a very good record.41
Casely Hayford argued in rebuttal that Provincial Commissioners were less
competent to decide land cases than the Chief Justice and the Puisne Judges who were
39

GNA ADM 14/2/8, 445-474.

40

The next day, Peter A. Renner argued on behalf of the Bar Associations and essentially repeated
Mills’ arguments: appeals and other legal matters were to often left in the hands of laymen “as a rule
whose attention is most engrossed with executive and political matters.” Renner vociferously objects that
the provisions excluding attorneys from helping litigants was, to say the least, vicious.” Ibid., 476-486.
41

Ibid., 491-503.
-338-

there as representatives of “the King’s justice,” and that administration of justice should not
be diminished by being placed in the hands of administrative officers. He also opposed the
transfer provisions and quoted at length from former Chief Justice Griffith to show the
waste of time, effort and money in requiring transfers from the Supreme Court to a
Tribunal. It was obvious, Casely Hayford asserted, that Tribunal jurisdiction should be
coordinated and concurrent with that of the Supreme Court and that exclusive Tribunal
jurisdiction was neither right nor fair. Responding to Furley’s statistics, he contended that
dismissals of land appeals by the Full Court were as much a function of improper or bad
records made in the Tribunals as the lack of merit of the case, so that those statistics were
meaningless. Again quoting Griffith, this time from his Petition against the 1910
Ordinance, Casely Hayford cited the long delays in resolution of land cases by Provincial
Commissioners who did not have time to view the land and who never got a proper plan
from a licensed surveyor as did the Supreme Court. He concluded: “I say that British
justice is appreciated in these parts more than anything else, and I am here today pleading
for the integrity of the Judicial Bench of the Gold Coast, its pristine position as under the
Bill of 1883.”42 Sadly, the irony of an African lawyer arguing passionately for British law and
justice against a pastiche of customary, English and administrative principles was lost on
the colonial authorities.
Nana Ofori Atta joined in the opposition, expressing his displeasure with the
provision excluding alien Africans from customary jurisdiction. Atta also argued that
monetary jurisdiction should be uniform throughout the Colony so that one state did not try
to undermine another. He strongly opposed the power granted by the Bill to the Governorin-Council to vary jurisdiction as that would destabilize Native government and cause
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unrest by making people suspicious of their chiefs. Finally, he proposed that appeals in
land cases should go from the Head Chief to the traditional state council, rather than the
Provincial Commissioner, and from its judgment to the Full Court.43 The Gold Coast
Leader expressed wonder if such legislation originated with the Colonial Office or “are the
offspring of limitless zeal on the part of the local Administration.” It asked if it was British
policy “to strike at the roots of our institutions and our land system by an insidious process
of legislation, the effect of which is to undermine the chiefs. Similar press criticism
continued over the next several years, often focusing on popular unhappiness with political
officers performing judicial functions. The paper’s leader then objected strenuously to
appeals from Native Tribunals to District and Provincial Commissioners, executive officers
who “nine times out of ten know no law.” Such appeals cause confusion and expense “to
the ordinary litigant who formerly had the ordinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to rely
upon with much satisfaction and less expense.”44
In concluding the debate, the Governor defended his political officers, saying that he
“strongly deprecates any disparagement” of the way that political officers administered
justice. He iterated Government’s right to regulate Native Jurisdiction, but that it was clear
from the debate that the Bill was not yet ready and required further study (“very close
enquiry”) and, thus the Bill had to be withdrawn, which, on motion of the Secretary of
Native Affairs, it was.45 Governor Guggisberg considered the debate in the Legislative
Council over the proposed Native Jurisdiction Ordinance to have been the of the highest
quality in which he had ever participated. Ultimately, however, the bill failed over the issue
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as to whether the Administration or the indigens held ultimate judicial and ministerial
authority.46
While this futile debate was going on, complaints about the conduct of the Native
Tribunals continued to be received by the Colonial authorities. The Commissioner of the
Central Province reported many complaints from all districts about excessive fees,
assertion of jurisdiction outside and beyond that permitted and unjust decisions and heavy
fines, complaints that the District Commissioners seemed unable to adjust and behavior
that they seemed unable to prevent. The Provincial Commissioner laid responsibility at the
feet of some “semi-literate and unscrupulous” Tribunal Registrars. He noted that some
were being trained by District Commissioners, but that a better policy would be to pay them
a regular salary so that they would no longer be dependent on a share of the revenues.
He also recommended a reduction in the number of petty Tribunals so that the more
important ones would be easier to control.47
In 1924, operations of the Tribunals under the 1910 Ordinance were thrown for a
loop when the Supreme Court ruled, that a Native Tribunal had no authority to order arrest
for debt.48 Puisne Judge Hall held that the Schedule to the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance
provided for execution against property or any other method allowed by customary law that
was not repugnant. Hall heard expert witnesses on what customary law allowed and based
on such evidence as well as Sarbah’s Fanti Customary Law, he determined that it allowed
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imprisonment for debt but without limit as to time. He decided that such unlimited
imprisonment was repugnant to justice and natural law and thus could not be permitted.49
The Native Administration Ordinance of 1927
The purpose of the 1927 Native Administration Ordinance was to remedy the blatant
defects that practice had shown existed in the 1910 Native Jurisdiction Amendment
Ordinance, particularly to make litigation in the Native Tribunals cheaper and free of
corruption. Albeit, from the chiefs’ perspective, the main purpose was to bolster their
position as the traditional rulers of the country. As shall be seen, despite vigorous efforts
by the chiefs led by Ofori Atta from 1922 and continuing even after enactment of the Native
Administration Ordinance in 1927, neither goal was completely achieved since litigation in
the Tribunals continued to be burdensome and subject to extortionate fees while the chiefs
complained that British regulation was undermining their position with their people.
Almost as soon as the 1922 Bill had been withdrawn, officers of the colonial
Government led by Governor Guggisberg and Secretary of Native Affairs Maxwell began
consultations as to how to proceed to regulate native jurisdiction in the face of united
opposition from both coastal elite and traditional authorities. Frustrated as to how to
achieve enactment of such a bill, Governor Guggisberg said that Government would not
move again unless and until the chiefs and State Councils moved first. He decided to
49
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discuss the matter with Nana Ofori Atta, Head Chief of Akyem Abuakwa, and a member of
the Legislative Council. The Provincial Councils of Chiefs of the Central and Eastern
Provinces jointly prepared a draft that was substantially revised by Attorney General
Wilkinson. The Government decided that it would permit an unofficial Bill after it had
considered and approved the provisions. The chiefs, aided by Cape Coast Municipal
Member, R. J. P. Brown, met and agreed on certain principles, then informed all chiefs and
invited their views. The chiefs conferred for fourteen days, received letters from those not
attending, sent a memorandum of the results of the conference to all chiefs, and received
their comments. They agreed on many principles contained in the Bill then before the
Legislative Council, but did nothing more until May 1926 so that the chiefs could consult
their respective State Councils. In May 1926, the Head Chiefs of the Eastern Province met
along with many Divisional chiefs who took part in the discussions, after which they named
one Head Chief to put everything together. His draft was approved in July 1926 and sent
to the Central and Western Province Councils which expressed their views. The Bill was
redrafted and sent to the Government that appointed a committee to meet with
representatives of the chiefs to discuss the Bill and redraft it. The Bill on the floor was the
result which, according to Atta, all but two chiefs “warmly acclaimed.”50
Ofori Atta introduced the Bill, the first time a private member had done so. He told
the Legislative Council that everyone felt the need for revision of the Native Jurisdiction
Ordinance in order to support the chiefs. He quoted the Governor as saying that “‘
Government will have to do something to strengthen the power of the chiefs to prevent
their rule becoming a farce.’” Atta listed the main features of the Bill as: 1) recognition of
customary rights and powers of the State [Oman] Council; 2) giving Government the final
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say on political disputes affecting States; 3) regulating and “placing on a sound basis the
powers and jurisdiction of the Tribunals in their order of precedence and within their
territorial limits with necessary powers for enforcing their judgments and verdicts;” 4)
facilitating means of “preventing and checking abuse in the Tribunals by the Government
through its Commissioners; 5) utilization of the provincial councils for administrative and
judicial purposes subject to the Executive Government and the Judiciary; and 6) to provide
the means to codify customary law.51
In an effort to broaden the discussion of the Bill, which he adjourned until April 1927,
Guggisberg named three extraordinary members to the Council, Casely Hayford, the Chief
of Dixcove in the Western Province and Mr. Adda Glover. Casely Hayford declined to sit
but attended the April meeting to argue in support of a Petition against the Bill on behalf of
the ARPS. The Council rejected the Petition and denied Casely Hayford’s application to
argue before the Council, the Governor expressing his regret that Casely Hayford declined
the opportunity to present the ARPS views from inside the Council.52
In moving the second reading of the Bill, Ofori Atta went into some detail as to
certain of the Bill’s provisions. Most dealt with political relationships among the chiefs and
between the chiefs and the Government, but some focused on the operations of the
judicial fora. He said that he was eager to codify customary law because he saw how in
the Supreme Court it was “twisted and distorted” by lawyers to promote their case, so
provision was made for discussion of custom and traditional law in the State Councils and
formulation by them of a definitive statement for approval by the Government as not
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repugnant.53 Courts, neither Native nor British would have any jurisdiction in political
matters involving stool disputes that should be decided by State Councils with help if
necessary from Provincial Councils.54 Persons accused of undermining the chief might be
tried by the State Council, not the chief who was the object of the alleged offense, with an
appeal to the District Commissioner. Chiefs, Atta argued, were entitled to respect and
while opposition was lawful and necessary, subversion was not.55
He then turned to questions of jurisdiction of Native Tribunals. Traditionally, the
Paramount Chiefs’ jurisdiction was unlimited but under this Bill it would be £100. Atta said
that he tried for more but that £100 was the best to which he could get the Government to
agree. He regretted that Divisional Chiefs’ jurisdiction was only £25 and not £50, but
again, that was the best that the Government would accept. He hoped to be able to get it
increased later when the chiefs showed how well they could operated their Tribunals. He
rebutted criticism that Divisional and Paramount (formerly called Head) Chiefs should have
equal criminal jurisdiction. It never was so and even Casely Hayford admitted that.
Appeals under the Bill would lie to the District Commissioners because it was necessary to
have someone close to “correct and guide the Native Tribunal.” For the same reasons
applications for leave to appeal would be made to the District Commissioners because
they were close and the Provincial Commissioners were difficult to reach.56
Atta explained that the Bill sought to limit the number of Tribunals because too many
could cause “confusion and trouble.” Only two levels, Paramount and Divisional were
necessary. Clearly he intended to say that Odikros would not be authorized to hold courts.
53

Ibid., 465. This provision continued the colonial power’s control of law and justice by giving it the
last word as to the propriety of any formulation of customary law.

54

Ibid., 471.

55

Ibid., 472.

56

Ibid., 475-476, 478-479.
-345-

However, he went on, chiefs not entitled to hold Tribunals under the Ordinance could still
act as arbitrators as they had always done.57 Opponents of the Bill, led by Casely Hayford,
said Atta, charged that the chiefs had more power under the proposed Ordinance than
traditional law allowed, a charge Atta denied because traditionally chiefs had the power of
life and death and they were now restrained by Government acting with an English sense
of justice and fair play. He went on to defend against claims that Divisional Chiefs were
reduced from being equal to Paramount Chiefs contrary to customary law, by citing Casely
Hayford’s treatise to the contrary.58
Kojo Thompson, an African municipal member, charged that not enough time had
passed since leave to introduce the Bill was given to enable the public to understand and
critique the Bill. He introduced what purported to be a resolution of some Akwapam chiefs
against the Bill and against the restrictions on the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court that
would work hardship and increase litigation by increasing Tribunal jurisdiction, a claim that
is difficult to comprehend. Thompson said that the Bill would introduce conflict between
people and chiefs and more time was needed to work things out. He claimed that the Bill
was no different that the 1922 version that the Government had withdrawn. He attacked
the provisions criminalizing opposition to the chiefs, saying that they struck at the roots of
the traditional constitution. If such powers existed before, why was it necessary to put
them in a statute now, he asked. Chiefs would use such powers against opponents who
tried to destool them. All chiefs were equal, he contended, citing Sarbah’s Fanti National
Constitution that a King was only first among equals. He proposed that a commission
should be appointed to study Tribunals as was done in 1894. He also objected to the £100
jurisdictional limit of Paramount Chiefs’ Tribunals, but not because it was too low, but
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because it was too high; most chiefs were illiterate and incapable of rendering intelligible
judgments, so that people should be able to take their mid sized claims to the Supreme
Court.59
The debate exposed the fault lines between the people of the interior and the coast
and between traditional, mainly illiterate people of the interior and educated merchants and
professionals of the coast towns. Atta summed up the position on his side of the fault line:
“In matters affecting Native Constitutions and Native Customary Law, the chiefs coming
from the interior do not expect to be guided by people in Accra and the coast towns, much
less from one [referring to Thompson] who, from infancy because of the kind of education
he had received, has apparently lost touch with the Constitution and Customary Laws of
his country.”60 One can just imagine how pleased Governor Guggisberg and his immediate
subordinates were to hear such sentiments about the men whom the Government
disdained and maybe even feared.
In Committee, the Government accepted amendments to increase the jurisdiction of
Divisional Chiefs from £25 to £50, to require consent of all parties to permitting counsel to
appear in transfer cases and to provide that when the Provincial Council was not
functioning, its powers and duties would be exercised by the Provincial Commissioner. As
so amended, the Bill was read a third time and passed as No. 18 of 1927. The Governor
then stated his regret that Brown, Casely Hayford and Addo Glover were not present to
participate in the debate because they represented an important constituency and should
have made their views heard. More importantly, he cautioned that the chiefs should note
that the municipal members attacked the integrity of the Tribunals and that they should
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keep on “the very highest peaks of honesty and integrity, and that it is up to the chiefs and
the State Councils to insure that the Tribunals meet this standard.61
The Colonial Office having advised that the King would not disallow the newly
enacted Native Administration Ordinance, the Legislative Council met in October 1927 to
consider and approve the Rules of Practice. These were accepted without much dispute
and it was announced that the Ordinance would come into effect on January 1, 1928.62
Among the major provisions of the Ordinance dealing with the Tribunals were:
making jurisdiction territorial rather than personal, i.e., jurisdiction would extend to anyone
present in the State or Division when the claim arose; there would be jurisdiction over all
civil actions except those arising from agreements to apply English law or where, because
of the nature of the transaction, English law should apply; jurisdiction of the Paramount
Chiefs’ Courts would be limited to £100 in personal actions and would cover divorce,
paternity, custody, succession, and actions relating to land located in the State; the
jurisdiction of the Divisional Chiefs’ Courts would be the same except the limit for personal
actions would be £50 and in succession cases to property with a value of less than £200;
all courts would be entitled to issue writs of execution against real and personal property;
specifying the crimes subject to criminal jurisdiction and the maximum penalties for each;
authorizing searches and seizure, except as to the property of Europeans, for stolen
property; permitting arrest plus any customary method to insure the appearance of a
defendant; permitting diversion of all or part of a fine to an injured party in lieu of damages
and restitution; criminalizing holding an unauthorized Tribunal; proscribing presents, bribes
and corruption and punishing these offenses with severe penalties; banning barristers and
solicitors in Tribunals and cases transferred to a District or Provincial Commissioner’s
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Court from a Tribunal except that where all parties consented and would be represented,
the court to which the case has been transferred might permit counsel to appear; requiring
all cases pending in the Supreme Court within Tribunal jurisdiction to be transferred to a
Tribunal unless it had been previously transferred from a Tribunal or unless a claim in
interpleader of a cross-claim had been asserted in a case otherwise properly before the
Supreme Court; permitting, but not requiring, issues of customary law to be referred to a
Tribunal for its opinion, but authorizing the referring court to accept or reject the Tribunal
opinion as it wished in its sole discretion63; making provision for nationwide service of
process and for subpoenae to out-of-state witnesses; providing that European witnesses
might be deposed before a District Commissioner; authorizing a Paramount Chief to
remove a case from, or transfer it to, a lesser Tribunal when he deemed it expedient or
doubted the lesser Tribunal’s jurisdiction; permitting a Provincial Commissioner to transfer
a case from a Tribunal to a District Commissioner or to another Tribunal with jurisdiction or
to a Divisional Court of the Supreme Court except in land cases; providing that appeals lay
from lesser Tribunals to Paramount Chiefs’ Tribunals and then to a District Commissioner
except in land cases and very petty civil or criminal cases; providing that land cases would
be appealable from the Paramount Chiefs’ Tribunals to the Provincial Commissioner and
from his judgment to the Full Court; authorizing appeals from a District or Provincial
Commissioner, except in land cases to a Divisional Court of the Supreme Court; and
granting discretion to any tribunal or court to which an appeal was taken to hear a case de
novo all or in part on appeal or to remand for taking of new evidence.64
This resume of the principal provisions of the Native Administration Ordinance
relating to the Chiefs’ judicial functions clearly demonstrates a glaring weakness in the
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statute as the Government had not reserved the power to vary the schedule of chiefs who
could hold tribunals, of which it has been said, there were too many.65 Another weakness
was the failure to provide expressly for supervision of native tribunals by granting the
District Commissioners revisory powers, a failure not remedied until 1935. Theoretically,
the District Commissioners would closely supervise the Tribunals by meeting with the
chiefs, but in fact they were too overburdened with their own judicial and administrative
responsibilities and too few in number to carry out supervisory functions except as a forum
for appeals. Moreover it was so intricate that many of the Africans required to enforce it
misunderstood its provisions.66 Extortionate fees continued to be charged and unjust
decisions continued to be rendered and the Government was obliged repeatedly to amend
the Ordinance in ultimately futile efforts to strengthen it so that justice would be rendered.
Meanwhile, the Government faced a storm of opposition to the Ordinance from the
coastal press. Even before it was passed, attacks began. Thus, in March 1927, the Gold
Coast Independent assailed Ofori Atta and the Bill as being only in the interests of the
Chiefs and reflecting the “partisanship” of that interest group without consideration for the
many people of the coastal communities. It encouraged the Government to go slow in
pushing the bill as it did not deal with the interests or problems of all the people.67 The
Government took such opposition seriously, opposition that continued throughout 1928 and
into 1929 and manifested itself in part by the refusal of certain Chiefs to participate in the
Provincial Councils of Chiefs, sometimes depriving them of a quorum and the ability to
function.68 Acknowledging strong opposition being “carried on by a small minority,” the
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Administration sought to convince London and the public that most of the chiefs began to
accept that the colonial government was attempting to restore autonomy to them. At the
outset of the year only nine of twenty eight states were participating in the Provincial
Council of chiefs, but by the end of the year, the Provincial Commissioner of the Central
Province reported, all but three were participating. By refusing to recognize the Tribunals
of the hold out chiefs, the Provincial Commissioner said, the Government would soon force
them to participate in order to regain the revenue arising from their Tribunals. Things went
better for the Government in the Eastern and Western Provinces where, although
opposition had not yet ceased, it had lessened as people began to see that their rights and
interests were not being restricted as the opponents of the Ordinance had told them they
would and there were no attempts to hinder appeals from the Tribunals to the
Government’s administrator-judges. Things would go much more smoothly, a colonial
official opined, if better Registrars could be obtained, but the stools were too poor at the
moment to pay enough to attract the “right class of man.”69
In the following year, the Eastern Province reported more appeals from Tribunals, a
fact that the Provincial Commissioner attributed to a greater use of the Tribunals rather
than to their inefficiency. Moreover, better Registrars who had gone through a training
program were making the Tribunals work better: “Comparatively few complaints” show that
Native Tribunals were being run fairly and efficiently, albeit better in strong states such as
Atta’s Akyem Abuakwa and Kole’s Manya Krobo and worse in states with weak leadership
and government.70
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Press criticism continued unabated. The newspapers attacked the Ordinance
indirectly by attacking the tribunals, comparing the fees they charged with those the
Supreme Court charged and accusing the tribunals of selling justice.71 People went to the
British courts whenever possible, the Gold Coast Independent said, because, “It is an open
secret that they [Native Tribunals] very often allow prejudice, engendered by factional strife
to influence their decisions.”72 Such factional strife was illustrated by the dispute among
three chiefs, as a result of which two of whom would not enforce the summonses of the
third and instead insulted him. The District Commissioner wrote to each chief telling them
how badly their acts reflected on each of them and undermined their jurisdiction, but we
have no evidence of what effect his letter had.73 The inability of the District Commissioners
to oversee the Native Tribunals effectively was shown in the report of another District
Commissioner who wrote that Tribunal monthly returns were invariably late and
haphazardly prepared, so that he could not tell what had occurred in any particular case.
The Tribunals frequently failed to respond to his inquiries as to excessive fees and fines
unless he made such inquiries in person and he often had to order Chiefs to refund
overcharges to litigants.74 District Commissioner W. H. Beeton noted in his diary that the
complaints against the Ayokohene’s Tribunal concerning excessive fees and fines had
been increasing, that he had repeatedly told the Ayokohene to stick to the amounts
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specified in the schedule and that if he continued to violate the rules, he would have the
Ayokohene prosecuted.75
Complaints about the Native Administration Ordinance were not limited to the
coastal elite or extorted litigants. Thus, in 1928, Ofori Atta complained about prospective
litigants entering into arbitration agreements in order to avoid his Tribunal (and the fees he
would charge) and sought an amendment to stop this practice. The Attorney General
objected, telling the Secretary for Native Affairs that such agreements are part of the
ordinary law of contract and that nothing was wrong with them: “To take away the rights of
the people to have their disputes settled (should they so elect) by consent out of court,
would in my opinion, amount to an unprecedented and wholly unjustified interference with
the liberty of the subject and would savor of oppression.” In any event, the proposed
amendment might not entirely suppress arbitration but would make it much harder and
would make the Ordinance even more unpopular that it was then, it that were possible.76
The Government did not accept Attorney General John Maxwell’s advice and an
Amendment Bill was introduced to make arbitration more difficult by restricting the power to
act as an arbitrator to “responsible native authorities.”77 Perhaps cooler minds prevailed,
for the final version of the Bill passed in November 1928 eliminated Atta’s proposed
amendments and all other suggested changes except one clarifying the transfer provision.78
As his term in office wound down, Governor Guggisberg expressed concern as to
the probability of continued corruption in the Native Tribunals even after the Native
Administration Ordinance had been passed. He asked his Secretary of Native Affairs, W.
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J. A. Jones, to brief the new Governor, Alexander Ransford Slater, on this issue. Jones, in
turn, asked the District Commissioners for their suggestions.79 Shortly after assuming
office, Slater minuted on District Commissioner of Akwamu’s Quarterly Report that new
legislation was necessary to remedy “this scandal.”80 Yet the amendment that was
enacted, as were all the subsequent amendments, contained nothing directed toward
eliminating corruption in the Tribunals nor effectively controlling imposition of excessive
fines and fees. It was not as if proposals were lacking. The new Attorney General, Sidney
Abrahams, wanted District Commissioners to be able to interpose themselves in Tribunal
cases and to make any order they deemed fit to do justice. Even some of the chiefs,
particularly Ofori Atta, sought a provision requiring Tribunals to account for income and
disbursements but the Government decided that such a provision should be the subject of
separate legislation.81 And such legislation didn’t come about until 1939.
In 1929 another amendment Bill was introduced seeking further to strengthen the
powers of the chiefs. It would criminalize “usurping” or counseling, encouraging or
assisting usurping the position of a Paramount or Divisional Chief, defying their authority or
doing any act “amounting to a claim of independence” from the Paramount of Divisional
Chief under penalty of imprisonment or, on the Governor’s order, deportation.82 The Bill
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also contained proposed amendments to provide for extra-territorial service of process and
writs of arrest and to allow plaintiffs as well as defendants to move to transfer to another
Tribunal or to a court.83 A Native Administration Further Amendment Ordinance No. 22 of
1929 limited pre-trial detention in Native Tribunals to the same extent as in the Supreme
Court.84
In early 1930, Secretary for Native Affairs Jones presided over a meeting of the
Joint Provincial Councils of Chiefs that discussed possible additional amendments to the
Native Administration Ordinance, among which were: requiring that Writs of Execution
served outside the State were to be upon notice to the Paramount Chief of the place where
the property was located, and eliminating the monetary limits on a District Commissioner’s
appellate jurisdiction.85 Ofori Atta and Mate Kole pushed for a new inferior Tribunal with a
monetary limit of £10, but Jones declined to consider the proposal.86 Attorney General
Abrahams, pointed out that a Tribunal had no authority to order execution on property
outside the State and if it was doing so, it was doing so illegally, so that an amendment to
authorize that practice was necessary on the same basis as extra-territorial service of
process. He opposed eliminating the limits on the District Commissioners’ appellate
jurisdiction.87
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In April 1930,the Acting Secretary for Native Affairs, C. E. Skene, asked the
Attorney General to prepare an amendment to allow for extra-territorial execution. He went
on to say that in certain civil and criminal cases in Tribunals, costs and fees continued to
be disproportionately high and that an avenue for review was needed. Abrahams was
against lumping costs in with the judgment amount to reach a monetary threshold for
appeal, but since a separate Bill of Costs rarely included the value of non-monetary costs
such as a sacrificial animal or alcohol, costs were often understated. There was no way at
that time, Abrahams went on, for a District Commissioner to remedy costs exceeding the
Scheduled limits, so he recommended that costs in excess of £5 be appealable.
Abrahams also recommended amendments to specify that “Execution” included
attachment and sale of property and to allow execution outside the State on the same
basis as service of process. In addition to being made separately appealable, he
recommended that District Commissioners be authorized to review and revise costs on
their own motion. Indeed, he preferred the latter option because it provided not only for
correction of error but also protected against “incompetence and perversity.”88 The extraterritorial execution and appealability of costs provisions were included in subsequent
amendments.
Yet another amendment, Native Administration Ordinance Further Amendment
Ordinance No. 13 of 1930, authorized persons serving arrest warrants to break and enter
and use limited force to effect an arrest of persons who had notice of the warrant and
imposed a three months statute of limitations on claims against the process server for
alleged violation of the Ordinance.89
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By 1931, it seemed that amending the Native Administration Ordinance was
becoming an annual event with little consideration being given to the impact of such
repeated amendments on the stability of native administration of justice. Nevertheless, the
amendments kept coming. The 1931 Native Administration Amendment Ordinance No. 23
of 1931 eliminated witchcraft as an offense to be tried in Native Tribunals, authorized
execution against property anywhere in the Colony, put a floor under appeals from a
Divisional Tribunal to a Paramount Tribunals and, in the words of the Attorney General, to
“put a stop to the practice of some tribunals of mulcting litigants in unjustifiably large costs
in civil cases,” made costs greater than £2 appealable to the Paramount Tribunal and
those greater than £5 in a civil case and £2 in a criminal case appealable from a
Paramount Tribunal to the District Commissioner.90
The next year’s amendment, Native Administration Ordinance Amendment
Ordinance No. 12 of 1932, dropped the floors for appeal of fines to 10/ in Divisional
Tribunals and £1 in Paramount Chiefs’ Tribunals and authorized all Tribunals to imprison a
defendant in default of paying his fine until the fine were paid or a maximum of ten days to
three months depending on the amount of the fine.91 It also restored the right to appeal
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sentences of imprisonment “inadvertently” taken away by a drafting error in the 1931
Amendment.92
Acting Governor Geoffrey Northcote proposed to amend the Native Administration
Ordinance further to suspend any state not participating in the Provincial Council of Chiefs
from exercising any judicial jurisdiction. He felt that deprivation of fees would effectively
pressure recalcitrant chiefs to participate.93 Bushe minuted that the proposal was a good
way of dealing with the problem, but Attorney General J. de Haart feared that such a
suspension would permit the suspended Tribunal to operate outside the regulation of the
native jurisdiction ordinances.94 The Colonial Office decided to let it slide for the moment.
But, the next amendment authorized the Governor-in-Council to suspend chiefs and their
State Councils from the exercise of judicial functions if the Chief did not attend meetings of
the Provincial Council of Chiefs and imposed criminal sanctions if he or they continued to
exercise judicial jurisdiction after suspension.95 These actions demonstrated once again
the contradictory approach of the colonial Government to dealing with the traditional
authorities: forcing them to bow to colonial demands even when the demand was to permit
them to exercise some autonomy.
As we shall see, as the Native Administration Ordinance continued to be amended
throughout the 1930's, it soon came to be seen as ineffective in protecting against
corruption and that an entirely new scheme of regulation would be necessary.
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CHAPTER IX – NATIVE JURISDICTION 1927 -1944:
REFORMING TRADITIONAL COURTS
At the end of the Twenties, despite the continued opposition of the coastal elites, it
became more and more apparent that the traditional authorities were becoming comfortable
with the powers and limited autonomy granted them by the Native Administration
Ordinance. This comfort was demonstrated, among other ways, by increased participation
of the chiefs in the Provincial Councils of Chiefs. However both the dispute over the nature
of indigenous jurisdiction and continued complaints as to extortionate fees, politically
motivated decisions and cronyism both on native courts and in native litigation, all of which
constituted corruption in the mind of the British, led, at the end of the Thirties, to a
consensus among colonial authorities as well as the public that substantial, indeed radical,
change was necessary. Responding to behind the scenes advocacy of an number of
groups, the Colonial Office asked Malcolm Lord Hailey to visit the African colonies and to
report on indigenous government with an emphasis on traditional courts. His report, a multivolume tome, included a long section on and made numerous recommendations for reform
of the native tribunals. At about the same time as Lord Hailey was preparing his report, a
conferences of Gold Coast colonial officials considered proposals for restructuring the
traditional courts made their own recommendations to the colonial government. Nothing
however was done until the arrival of a new Governor, Alan Burns, who appointed a
committee chaired by the Gold Coast Attorney General, Harry Blackall, that heard many
witnesses, received memoranda and documents from throughout the colony and rendered a
report that led to ordinances that radically altered the nature and operations of the
traditional courts, yet failed to solve the problems completely.
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Sally Falk Moore correctly observes that the object of the British administration to
insure that the local courts rendered fair and impartial justice and to preserve the prestige of
the traditional authorities was as contradictory in the 1920's as it was in the 1950's.
Moreover, she writes, repeated injunctions to the traditional authorities by the British
colonial government to conduct their courts in an “idealized court-as-it-should be” manner
were little more than “self-serving discourses on power, as justificatory representations of
the ideology control.”1 As noted previously, the reservation of control over the native courts
through appeals to British tribunals as well as the power to determine custom strongly
supports the conclusion that there was little desire on Britain’s part to afford more than the
most limited space to the traditional courts.
In this chapter I describe dissatisfaction with the operations of the Native Tribunals
found by the Colonial Office Legal Advisor, Grattan Bushe, during his tour of West Africa.
Bushe strongly criticized these tribunals as delivering illusory justice: appellate rights to
redress grievances against those tribunals were without meaning because the costs
imposed and security required of appellants deterred all but a very few litigants from
pursuing appeals in higher tribunals. I look at continuing efforts to make the native tribunals
fairer and more efficient by making available to supporting personnel, particularly court
registrars, courses sponsored by the colonial administration in legal subjects and the
administration of tribunals. Governor Shelton Thomas encouraged such training but failed
to enact legislation that would have made it mandatory. Once again the administration
specified the fees and costs to be charged to litigants and by means of a 1935 Ordinance
empowered District Commissioners to look at the records of Native Tribunals on a regular
basis to assure themselves that the limitations on charges were being honored. An
1
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ordinance requiring the establishment of state treasures and requiring tribunal fines, fees
and costs to be paid into such treasuries was enacted in the late Thirties under the aegis of
Governor Sir Arnold Hodson. Finally, Native Courts Ordinance was passed in 1944 that
limited the number of and classified Native Courts, removed the chiefs and their councillors
from more than a perfunctory role as decision makers therein and replaced them with men
chosen from panels established by the colonial administration. But first, I discuss the longstanding dispute as the nature and source of native jurisdiction, whether it be inherent in the
office of the stool or derivative from the King of England’s justice.
I conclude this examination of native jurisdiction with a brief discussion of three
commissions or committees appointed by the Colonial Office in the post 1944 period. The
first of these, that of G. R. Havers, as a single commissioner examined the cost of litigation
and found it to be excessive because of legal fees and excessive costs incurred in the
native courts. The second, a committee chaired by Puisne Judge J. H. Coussey was to
recommend constitutional changes. It suggested appointment of unpaid lay magistrates to
sit in the native courts and be subject to control by the Chief Justice. It also suggested the
appointment of a formal commission to look at native justice. This suggestion was adopted
with the appointment of a commission head by another Puisne Judge, K. A. Korsah, that
found that corruption in the native courts, by which is meant not merely exploitation of
litigants through imposition of extortionate fees and costs but rendering of decisions
influenced by political or social considerations removed from the merits of the cases before
the court, continued little abated and recommended complete separation of chiefs from the
traditional courts that should then be headed by full time stipendiary magistrates.
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Inherent or Derivative Jurisdiction
The nature of native jurisdiction created a dispute between the colonial authorities
and the colonized almost from the first British intervention in Gold Coast affairs in the early
nineteenth century. Albeit primarily a matter of theory, the ongoing ideological dispute
between the British and the traditional authorities as to the source of the latter’s jurisdiction
caused the colonial power considerable anxiety and demonstrated British concern for their
claim to possess absolute power over those upon whom they claimed to need to govern the
country. Thus, the Gold Coast Government showed more and more concern about
assertion by native authorities of their “inherent right” to rule, run their courts and even
legislate for themselves. If native jurisdiction was, as many Gold Coast natives argued,
inherent in the position of the chiefs as traditional rulers of the country, the steps that the
colonial authorities could take to regulate and control how the chiefs could deliver justice to
their people.
The issue definitively came up during a debate in the Legislative Council about a
cocoa “holdup,” a boycott of European cocoa buyers by native producers seeking to force
an increase in the price paid for their commodity. Many of the chiefs sought to enforce
compliance with the boycott by requiring their subjects to swear a Chief’s Oath, the breach
of which would subject those taking it to severe penalties imposed by the Chief’s Tribunal.
Governor Slater reported to Lord Passfield, the Secretary of State, his concern with a
assertion during the debate by Nana Ofori Atta in which the Omanhene claimed that the
Chiefs acted legitimately pursuant to their inherent rights. Rather than confront him at that
time, the Governor preferred to repeat a prior governmental statement as to using oaths to
enforce the boycott, “that whatever might be the source of the powers which the chiefs
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claimed, Government could not tolerate their exercise for coercion of His Majesty’s subjects
in matters of trade. . . .”2
In October 1931, Governor Ransford Slater sent to the Secretary of State, J. H.
Thomas, an extensive Memorandum prepared by W. J. A. Jones, his Secretary for Native
Affairs, detailing the history of Native Jurisdiction legislation and arguing strongly against the
doctrine of inherent right and proposing amendments to the Native Administration
Ordinance that would, once and for all, lay that doctrine to rest. The Governor and Jones
asserted that the creation of the Provincial Council of Chiefs by the Native Administration
Ordinance promoted a tendency among the chiefs to consider themselves “as
administrative entities separate from Government and free to exercise their judicial
functions without Government’s control.” Jones urged that it was necessary in order to end
the debate once and for all to provide for confirmation by the Governor as a condition
2
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precedent to the chiefs’ exercise of judicial jurisdiction. He made three proposals: declare
in the statute that jurisdiction was derivative, not inherent; provide for adequate control over
the Tribunals, a proposal first made in the 1880's, repeated continuously through the years
and never carried out; and transfer to the District Commissioners jurisdiction now exercised
by the State Councils to punish those who were alleged to conspire to undermine the chiefs.
Despite the then Attorney General Wilkinson’s demolition of the claim of inherent jurisdiction
in the debate over the 1922 Native Jurisdiction Bill, in his demonstration that annexation of
the Protectorates established sovereignty in the Crown from which all justice derived and
that no judicial jurisdiction could be exercised except as permitted by the Crown, belief in
inherent jurisdiction and that the chiefs had rights that “it is not within Government’s power
to control persisted.”3
In a Minute dated December 31, 1932, both Slater and Jones noted that it would be
a bad time to try to introduce the Bill that Jones had drafted in order to lay the matter to rest
and that had been sent to the Secretary of State in October because, Jones feared, the
chiefs would question the Government’s good faith (and rightly so, I contend) in saying that
it proposed to delegate more responsibility to the chiefs if at the same time it were pushing
a Bill to declare that the chiefs exercised only rights derivative from British sovereignty as
were really only British agents. Such a Bill should not be introduced, Jones opined, until it
could be accompanied by a Bill to provide revenue to the chiefs that they would accept.4
Fiddian attributed the claim of inherent rights to “a certain type of native lawyer” and
“a certain type of half-educated Chief [who] is the kind of person who would furnish an
excellent soil for such good seed. But quite clearly, the theory has got to be uprooted.” He
suggested that the Bill not be introduced at that time because of agitation about income tax
3
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legislation and proposed that the Secretary of State telegraph his appreciation of the
importance of taking “early steps to dispose of the claim of inherent jurisdiction on the part
of certain chiefs, and approves entirely the principles and substance of the Bill.” In another
minute, dated December 18,1931, Fiddian suggested a confirming dispatch quoting
Secretary of State Lyttelton’s dispatch of July 27, 1905, denying any inherent rights of
jurisdiction and suggesting that it be made public.5 Although Governor Slater proposed to
introduce this Bill and a Revenue Bill at the December 1932 Legislative Council session, he
never did, because Cunliffe-Lister, adopting Fiddian’s suggestion, told the Governor that,
quoting Fiddian’s language, it would not be politic to move the Bill then because of
disturbances over proposed direct tax legislation. As an alternative, the Governor might
consider publishing a statement on the subject as “a definitive pronouncement issued with
the Secretary of State’s approval.”6 Needless to say, nothing was done at all at that time.
Since the creation of a stool treasury system co-joined with a source of stool revenue as
envisioned in Governor Slater’s Native Authority Revenue Bill was deemed to be essential
to the concept of indirect rule, such rule was, as Shaloff has noted, “seriously diminished.”7
Continued Dissatisfaction With the Workings of the Native Tribunals
British colonial policies with respect to the administration of traditional justice were
not distinctive during the late Twenties and early Thirties. Indeed until passage of the 1944
Native Courts Ordinance, changes in policy were incremental. Thus, passage of the Native
5
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Administration Ordinance did little to alleviate complaints from the educated elite as well as
colonial officials as to improprieties in the Native Tribunals. Citizens complained that chiefs
routinely rendered political decisions to bolster their positions or to punish their opponents.
Grattan Bushe, after a tour of the Gold Coast wrote that by reason of the imposition of
excessive fees, appellate rights of litigants in traditional courts were illusory. The educated
Africans continually complained of having their disputes adjudicated by illiterate chiefs
whose decisions seemed to be influenced by who had paid the most for the judgment.
Finally, much dissatisfaction derived from the manner in which the funds received by the
traditional courts were spent. An effort at reform was made via an ordinance authorizing
chiefs to establish stool treasuries into which court income could be deposited and court
expenses, as, e. g., the salaries of registrars could be paid.8 However only two of the chiefs
acted to establish such treasuries.9 Finally, in 1939 the Legislative Council enacted a Native
Administration Treasuries Ordinance requiring the establishment of stool treasures for the
receipt of stool income, primarily that from the Native Tribunals, and requiring the chiefs to
account for their income and expenses.10 This Ordinance also had the effect, as we shall
see below, of reducing the Chiefs’ incentive to sit on traditional tribunals.
A further effort was made to reform the Native Tribunals by amending the Native
Administration Ordinance in 1935 to authorize District Commissioners to examine and
revise judgments of the traditional tribunals without the necessity of a formal appeal.
However, as we shall see, in order to overcome arguments that this provision completely
undermined the native authorities, the District Commissioner was obliged to hear the
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arguments of the chiefs and consult with the Provincial Commissioner before exercising his
revisory powers thus vitiating the authority granted to him.
It was hoped that the provisions of the Native Administration Ordinance permitting
State Councils to define customary law would help make the decisions of the Native
Tribunals less subject to outside influence. In the first usage of such provisions, the
Commissioner of the Eastern Province submitted a statement of the Akyem Abuakwa State
Council purporting to declare the customary law with respect to pledging and mortgaging.
The Commissioner said that he had never seen a custom such as that declared and that
both Danquah, in Akan Law and Customs and Sarbah, in Fanti Constitution and Law, wrote
that the customs was to the contrary to that declared by the State Council.11 Nevertheless,
the Commissioner went on, since the State Council declaration was equitable and favorable
to the debtor, it should be accepted.12 Jones, the Secretary of Native Affairs explained that
the custom was not mentioned by Danquah because it was newer than his book – Attorney
General Abraham’s marginal note asked “Then how is it proper customary law?”
Responding to Jones’ assertion that it was good law,13 Abrahams said that no matter how
good the law is, it could not be declared if it were not customary; the State Council had to
declare what was not what should be, and the Governor-in-Council had to be satisfied that
the State Council “truly and accurately records such alleged to be customary law. Section
123 of the Ordinance did not give the State Council ‘a blank cheque’ to make new law.”14
The Government flexed its muscles once again, rejecting the purported purpose of
supporting the traditional authorities, and asserted its control over both customary law and
11
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claims of inherent jurisdiction by rejecting the declaration of the Akyem Abuakwa State
Council.
During his tour of West Africa to observe the workings of the British and Native
courts, Grattan Bushe, the Colonial Office Legal Adviser, noted that most chiefs
were illiterate and were supported by the Government despite obvious shortcomings
because policy required that chiefs “be bolstered up at all costs.” He opined that appellate
rights of litigants in Native Tribunals were illusory because fines and fees had to be paid as
a condition of appeals and were often too high. Generally, “corruption and oppression are
rife.” He reported that the number of educated people in the Colony was increasing rapidly
and that they resented being subjected to the jurisdiction of illiterate chiefs as required by
the ordinance governing native jurisdiction. The Gold Coast native, he continued, did not
get equitable and fair treatment: “I say without fear of contradiction, that the greatest wish of
the native is to be given the benefit of the ‘white man’s’ justice.” No native, he said,
preferred a Native Tribunal to a British Court. Indeed, Native Tribunals did not exist in the
interest of the natives, that was a “pretense,” but existed only because “we cannot afford
any other system.”15
Consistent with Government’s efforts to improve the functioning of Native Tribunals
to reduce corruption by educating Tribunal Registrars, the Commissioner of the Central
Province sponsored a training course which exposed attendees to lectures on the Native
15
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Administration Ordinance, court procedures, court accounting, process and execution under
the Native Administration Ordinance, office routine, Native history, law and custom,
bookkeeping, simple rules of evidence and English. Among the lecturers were the Principal
Instructor of the Tribunal Registrars Association, Woolhouse Bannerman, then Circuit
Judge of Ashanti, District Commissioners, barristers, the Commissioner of Police and the
Commissioner of the Central Province. Those successfully completing the course, after an
examination, were awarded a Certificate of Completion, something that they apparently
deemed valuable to have.16
In early 1933, Governor Thomas visited Cape Coast and spoke about his
unhappiness with Native Administration. He reported the complaints he had received from
throughout the Colony about Native Tribunals exceeding their powers “unjustly.” Thomas
said that the Ordinance had to be amended so as not to “bolster up inefficient chiefs and to
put money in their pockets and those of their friends.” He said that in the amendment he
would propose, the Governor would “take power to exercise proper supervision over the
workings of the Tribunals and to close those which are corrupt or inefficient.”17 Like so
many others over the years by prior Governors, this promise went unfulfilled during the
balance of Thomas’ term.
Just before he left the Colony, the Colonial Secretary, T. S. W. Thornton, minuted
that political unrest was due to widespread dissatisfaction with the way stool funds were
spent and the workings of the Tribunals. Part of the problem, he argued, stemmed from
reliance of the chiefs on Tribunal funds that incentivized them to milk the litigants. The
chiefs had little if any income other than that they derived from the fees and fines they
charged those who sought to resolve their disputes in the traditional courts. Moreover, that
16
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income had to be shared with those of the tribal elders who sat with the chiefs in deciding
cases. Often, Thornton noted, one or both of the parties offered bribes to the chief and/or
his councillors to decide in his favor. Nor did the judges try very hard to conceal this
conduct. As we shall see, the colonial government sought to end these practices by
requiring that the fees and fines imposed on parties be paid into a stool treasury and, later,
by increasing the universe of judges beyond the chiefs’ councillors and having them paid a
small stipend from the stool treasury.
Thornton went on to write that the current law did not permit revision of judgments.
Of course appeals were allowed, but there was no automatic review of judgments by District
Commissioners as was the case with the judgments of Magistrates and District
Commissioners by judges of the Supreme Court on review of monthly returns and no
appeals at all with respect to small cases, yet it is just these small cases that caused the
most dissatisfaction. Automatic review was in the interests of justice as well as of the
Tribunals, as it would help them to become more efficient and gain in prestige and public
confidence. At the same time, although Thornton did not say so, it would emphasize that
the native institutions remained firmly under the thumb of the colonial power. Accordingly,
he proposed that District Commissioners have the authority to inspect the records of the
Tribunals on their own initiative and to revise judgments and sentences in criminal cases as
well as to reduce costs. The Tribunals would be required to make monthly returns to them
just as the District Commissioners were required to make monthly returns to the Puisne
Judges. Thornton said that the chiefs had agreed to this proposal, but wanted the right to
have the Provincial Commissioner review any revision of their judgments that the District
Commissioner might make. He disagreed as, he said, nowhere in the world does a court
have the right to appeal a superior court’s judgment concerning their decisions. In so
-370-

saying, Thornton iterated the implied British position that despite lip service to indigenous
autonomy, the British were the superior court and the Native Tribunals the inferior ones.
Thornton would also require all fines and fees paid to the Tribunal to be held and not shared
among the Tribunal members until the revision process had been completed and only then
divided, one third to the chief, one third to the other members of the Tribunal and one third
to be used as a fund to pay back to litigants fines and fees found to be unjustified or
excessive. Of course, this would have required institution of state treasuries. He asked all
of the members of the Executive Council and the judges for opinions on this proposal and
one to limit the number of councillors who could sit on a Tribunal. He noted that in that part
of Togo administered by the British, they were already limited to from three to seven.
Finally, he proposed that only Registrars certified by the Government after having
successfully passed a course be permitted to be employed by a Tribunal and that the
Government should fix their salary at a level high enough so as not to encourage them to
charge excessive fees. However, Thornton concluded, the Government had to take into
account the impact of a reduction in Tribunal income that such reforms would entail.18 This
caveat would, it was clear, prevent any effective action as the Government was unwilling to
make up any shortfall in Tribunal revenue from Government funds.
Whether or not Thornton’s proposals were made public or not is unclear, but in early
1935, the press urged the creation of a college to train Registrars for the Tribunals at which
District Commissioners and barristers could teach various aspects of the functions of Native
Tribunals. Registrars would be required to read and understand a manual for practice in
Native Tribunals to be written by E. Norton Jones, a District Commissioner who trained
other District Commissioners in the Central Province, as well as a Tribunal Registrars’
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Handbook written by A. C. Duncan-Johnson. The newspaper would also require regular
visits to the Tribunals to be made by the Principal of this training college or his deputy to
check on the Registrar’s work, and would require Registrars to visit other Native Tribunals
and to confer with other Registrars.19 It appears that the Gold Coast Independent was
ignorant of just such a course that had been in existence for a number of years, but its other
proposals apparently were not being seriously considered by the Government, because the
1935 Amendment included nothing to require Registrars to be certified.20
The 1935 Amendment Ordinance did, in fact, make some substantive reforms. It
carried out Thornton’s proposals to enable District Commissioners to revise Tribunal
criminal judgments and Bills of Costs in civil cases on their own initiative, because, as the
new Governor, Arnold W. Hodson, said, up to then “Tribunals have been able to perpetrate
the most grave injustices and to use the machinery placed at their disposal for mulcting
litigants of large sums of money.” However, he was able to convince the African members
of the Legislative Council, who acknowledged that the chiefs were often corrupt in their
dealings with those bringing cases to their courts but still sought to maintain some
semblance of chiefly autonomy, to agree to the Amendment Ordinance only by promising
that the District Commissioners would be required to consult the Provincial Commissioners
before revising any Tribunal decision.21
Here, once again, we may see how the British policy of trying to rule through
indigenous chiefs hamstrung them in their efforts to afford the inhabitants of the Colony fair
19
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and efficient justice. They professed to be aware of the continuing and almost universal
complaints about the corruption of the Native Tribunals, but they utterly failed to provide any
effective remedy. Merely burdening already overburdened District Commissioners with the
task of reviewing every Tribunal decision, a task they must have known could not be carried
out, would not make the native courts fairer or more efficient. Indeed, the British, despite
their protestations to the contrary, saw the Tribunals as “prerogative” courts attaching to the
chiefs ex officio and independent of considerations of need or efficiency.22 Quite simply,
they were stuck with the native courts but they did not trust them.23 By the end of the
Thirties, however, the administration had evidently determined that assuring that indigenous
litigants would not be oppressed by chiefly judges because things now began to change.
The Blackall Committee
From the late 30's until 1944, and despite an understandable focus on World War II,
the colonial government did not completely ignore efforts to reform native justice. From a
visit to the Gold Coast by Malcolm Lord Hailey, through meetings of colonial administrators,
the appointment and report of committee of Gold Coast officials and members of the public,
recommendations, many of them overlapping, were considered and a Native Courts bill
drafted and enacted as the Native Courts Ordinance of 1944. Although Bushe, the Colonial
Office Legal Advisor found little in Lord Hailey’s initial criticisms of native justice to be new,
Secretary of State Malcolm Macdonald endorsed Lord Hailey’s ideas and sent him to Africa
to report on his observations of the local courts. Despite Governor Hodson’s apparently
22
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lukewarm endorsement of his report, many of Hailey’s recommendations, such as limiting
the number of native courts as well as the number of councillor-judges participating in
judicial business, paying judges a fixed amount and separating chiefs from the judicial
function found their way into a report of a committee appointed by Governor Burns and into
the Native Courts Ordinance.
In the autumn of 1938, Macdonald, and senior Colonial Office officials, including
Bushe, had met with William Malcolm Lord Hailey, a veteran administrator in India,
Government Minister and recognized expert on African, and particularly West African,
affairs, who bemoaned the variety of Native Tribunal procedures and administrative
supervision of Native Tribunals. Hailey suggested that Native Tribunals were run by the
most conservative elements unwilling to adapt customary law and both their conservatism
and the rigidity of customary law would be a bar to progress. He opined that British and
native courts should be better integrated as development could never happen if, for
example, the law of debt and limitations continued to be different in British and native
courts, as the objective of native courts was to maintain the status quo and “native law was
insufficiently fluid and adaptive.” Hailey thought that “readjustment of the machinery of the
courts should be considered, as “procedure of judicial administration is a more important
factor in gaining respect for the law than the substance of the law itself.”24
Bushe said that he did not see anything new in Lord Hailey’s observations and that
sooner or later native courts would die out from inertia, but that unless native tribunals were
improved, the whole system might collapse. The British, he explained, had to find a place
for educated Africans in an improved system of native courts. He expressed worry about a
tendency of administrative officers “to bolster up the courts of the chiefs instead of

24

BNA CO 847/13/2, 10.30.1938.
-374-

concentrating on seeing that justice was done,” a view he and others had often stated over
the years. Bushe averred that the administration of justice in the Gold Coast by native
courts was “particularly bad” and that the idea of indirect rule, that is rule through the
traditional authorities who were in charge of their subjects, was no longer a means to an
end but had become an end in itself resulting in neglect of reforms and insufficiently
checked abuses and that indirect rule was regarded with “extreme distaste” by a growing
number of educated Africans as being corrupt.25 As I have argued herein, the British
administration of justice in the Gold Coast dependency required a stricter supervision of the
indigenous courts than it had been able or willing to exercise up to this point. Bushe’s
critique challenged the prevailing view that the Gold Coast Colony could be governed
through the agency of the chiefs, at least insofar as the latter’s operation of their tribunals.
Evidently impressed more by Hailey’s exposition of the problem than by Bushe’s,
Macdonald advised the Governors of the West African colonies that he intended to send
Lord Hailey to West Africa for about nine months to study native administration.26 Hailey
made his visit and produced an extensive report that was delivered in September 1941. He
criticized the Native Tribunals for expense of litigation, “reduplication of actions,” confusion
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of function of civil and criminal law, difficulties in “strangers” (i.e., Africans originating
outside the Gold Coast) obtaining justice, particularly where chiefs were involved in the case
and the fact that court members divided fees and fines. He recommended establishment of
Magistrate’s Courts in all towns, requiring that all fines and fees be paid into native
treasuries and accounted for, and limiting the number of members of the traditional courts
who should be paid fixed salaries. Judicial jurisdiction of State and Provincial councils
should be abolished and the political disputes within their former jurisdiction should be
settled administratively. Hailey criticized native courts as continuing to be corrupt and
inefficient despite supposedly being subject to close supervision by the District
Commissioners, because that supervision was not systematically carried out.27 The native
tribunals were badly equipped and poorly run and the number of cases they handled
“suggests that they are far from popular” (123 courts handled about 5500 cases a year).
Akan courts imposed Akan customary law on native “strangers” (i.e., non Akans) whose
customs were different, e.g., imposing Akan matrilineal succession on those such as the Ga
whose custom was patrilineal -- something that the Supreme Court through repeated
reference to the works of J. M. Sarbah, had been doing by then for forty years. The courts
did not do justice when a chief was involved for fear of retribution. They fomented litigation
to increase the fees and fines to divide among court members and encouraged swearing an
oath because it increased the costs of litigation since, in addition to dealing with the
substance of the case, the court had to decide if the oath was properly sworn.
Hailey argued that past efforts at reform, such as a proposed amendment to the
Native Administration Ordinance that would have stated that all judicial power derived from
the Crown and would have permitted Government to establish or eliminate native courts,
27
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would have prescribed a minimum and maximum number of court members who would
have been nominated by the Governor in Council and who would not have been limited to
chiefs and councillors allowing educated men to sit and would have required fines and fees
to be paid into accounts controlled by the District Commissioners was not pressed by the
Government and had been abandoned. Magistrate’s Courts could and should be created in
most larger towns and staffed with African Magistrates.28
Hailey recommended restricting the number of Tribunal members as a necessary
reform in the Gold Coast and suggested a roster system for Tribunal members and payment
of those that served from treasuries established under the Native Treasury Ordinance of
1939.29 Students should be trained in customary law to become advocates in the native
courts, concomitantly, such a reform might also discourage the training of Gold Coasters in
English law with its consequent animus toward customary law and Native Tribunals. Hailey
went on to recommend appointment of a Judicial Advisor knowledgeable in customary law
to suggest to chiefs ways to improve functioning of their to Tribunals through, for example,
issuance of procedural rules, and with full revisory powers to enable the close control of the
Tribunals and their adaptation to modern needs.30 Hailey would eliminate the hereditary role
of Chiefs as heads of Native Tribunals – he said that many people he interviewed told him
that the chiefs were ready and would be glad to go. The number of District and Assistant
District Commissioners should be increased so that they could systematically review
Tribunal criminal decisions and the Bills of Costs in civil cases.31 In effect, Hailey was
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proposing to resolve the dilemma as to supporting the chiefs or insuring fair administration
of law in the traditional courts by promoting the latter . As shall be seen, almost all of the
reforms Lord Hailey proposed were echoed by a conference of Provincial and District
Commissioners that had met in Accra and the subsequent Report of the Blackall Committee
and were adopted and made part of the Native Courts Ordinance of 1944.32 Improvement
of administration of justice in Native Tribunals, the conferees resolved, “could be brought
about only by such a reconstitution as would permit their control being removed from the
hands of those whom illiteracy, ignorance and venality led to acts of injustice and given to a
trained body of men to whom security of tenure and possibility of advancement would unfold
an honourable profession.”33 Accordingly, the conferees proposed a new native jurisdiction
bill to allow State Councils to appoint educated persons to preside over Native Tribunals,
reducing the number of Tribunals and proposing that their judges be paid. Courses in
elementary principles of law and customary law should be made available to train Tribunal
judges. This would be consistent with a proposed policy “of entrusting judicial powers only
to those whom specialized training and judicial independence qualify to administer the
law.”34
If Africans such as Sarbah or Casely Hayford had been alive to read these
statements and resolutions, they would have been astonished since the Commissioners,
stalwart protagonists for the status quo, were recommending the same policies, and in
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almost the same words, as those educated African lawyers had been advancing for the
prior half century. This is particularly true of the proposals to deprive administrative officials
such as the Commissioners of their judicial jurisdiction and confining that jurisdiction to
legally trained magistrates.
A repeated theme in the communications to the Governor was that justice suffered
because of the native tribunals’ need for fees to fund political support for the chiefs.35
Another was the paucity of District Commissioners who were too overburdened to supervise
too many tribunals and “the many errors and instances of injustice and corruption which
occur.”36
Sir Alan Burns, the newest Governor of the Gold Coast, determined to appoint yet
another committee to investigate the native tribunals and to “report on the necessity for
reform in the administration of justice in native tribunals.”37 The Secretary of State, Lord
Moyne, perhaps subtly attempting to prevent Burns from wasting time and money,
suggested that he first look at and consider Hailey’s Report focusing on the Gold Coast
without reference to the other colonies.38 Burns agreed but insisted that he wanted to
reform native administration generally.39
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By this time, Britain was fully engaged in World War Two and was, understandably,
not focused directly on colonial judicial issues. Nor does the historiography of the period
discuss domestic Gold Coast issues other than to point out that economic austerity and
regulation similar to that imposed in Britain were extended to the Empire. Thus the entire
Gold Coast cocoa crop was purchased by the metropolitan Ministry of Food.40 Rather it
engages with matters related to contributions by Gold Coasters to the war effort.
Conscription for military labor service was resisted in the Gold Coast often by men fleeing
from their villages into the bush, but nevertheless began in late January 1942, although
unlike in Nigeria where men were conscripted for work in the tin mines, there was no
conscription for non-military labor in the Gold Coast.41 As Nancy Ellen Lawler points out, the
Gold Coast was mobilized for war.42 David Killingray also, like Lawler, focuses on the
African soldiers and their experiences fighting for Britain and her allies. He also looks at the
question of whether returning soldiers contributed inordinately to post-war nationalist
agitation and concludes that they did not. There is little evidence, he says, to support a
view that Gold Coast soldiers learned new political ideas or the manner in which to express
them from their military service.43 The war also gave rise to a more intense interest in
nationalism and post war reforms. A delegation of Gold Coast journalists reminded the
colonial power of the words and meaning of the Atlantic Charter and of a statement by
40
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Prime Minister Churchill that the terms of that document were “not inconsistent with the
declared Colonial policy” of the British Government. Self government looking to responsible
government was stated as a critical objective, starting as soon as the war was over.44
In late autumn 1942, Governor Burns appointed a Native Tribunal Committee of
Enquiry to be chaired by the Attorney General Harry Blackall and consisting of the Acting
Secretary for Native Affairs, two chiefs, J. B. Danquah and J. C. deGraft Johnson to
consider (A) the constitution and procedures of Native Tribunals; (B) the working of Native
Tribunals in urban and mixed tribal areas and the suitability therefor; C) procedures as to
land disputes, including appeals; and (D) generally such reforms in the administration of
justice in Native Tribunals as seemed necessary and desirable.45 As we shall, the
recommendations of the committee’s report were almost entirely carried into the ordinance
that was enacted in 1944. The Secretary of Native Affairs, T. R. O. Mangin, handled the
debate on behalf of the Government while opposition was desultory at best, being limited to
a single, readily defeated motion to refer the bill to a select committee.
In a major departure from tradition, Attorney General Blackall gave a radio address
encouraging his listeners to contact the committee with their comments and/or desire to
testify. Beyond what Blackall said in his address, the record in barren of evidence as to his
motives in reaching out to the population in this unique manner. We can speculate that
seeking popular involvement in an issue clearly of concern to them fit into the Government’s
plans to mobilize the people for war.
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In his address, Blackall specified a number of the issues that his Committee would
consider, among which were whether continued membership on Native Tribunals by reason
of birth was an “entirely satisfactory arrangement nowadays” or should another method be
used to get suitable people on the courts; whether Native Tribunals should operate in the
larger towns; whether Native Tribunals should try cases involving a stranger as one party;
whether Tribunals should be graded and have differing powers; whether fees and fines
were fair and reasonable and whether Native Tribunal proceedings were unreasonably
delayed.46
Hundreds of documents and memoranda were received and thirty eight witnesses
gave evidence, among whom were colonial officials, traditional chiefs and two current and
former Registrars.47 Prior to commencing hearings, the Committee prepared a
questionnaire with thirty five questions and asked that it be sent to all Provincial and District
Commissioners. The Committee received fifty seven responses and memoranda with
suggestions. The questions posed dealt with the issues raised by Hailey and the
Commissioners’ Conference, e.g., how judges should be appointed; should Tribunals be
graded with jurisdiction according to grade; should the number of judges be limited and, if
so, to what number; should judges be paid and, if so, whether monthly or by sitting fee;
were Tribunals suitable for large towns; should there by a Judicial Advisor to review Tribunal
judgments; should native law be codified; should there by a Land Judge; should there be
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representation in a Tribunal by a certified pleader; and should Provincial Councils of Chiefs
continue to have any judicial function.48
Over the course of many sittings, after having heard the witnesses and reviewed the
written evidence, the Committee discussed all of the issues mentioned by Blackall in his
radio address and discussed by Lord Hailey and the conference of Commissioners.49 Each
issue was addressed separately and a recommendation decided on. For example, Atta and
Kole both said that judges in their Tribunals were paid from their State Treasuries, Atta by a
monthly salary and Kole by “sitting” fees neither of which were related to the fees and fines
collected by the Tribunals. The Committee agreed to recommend payment by one method
or the other at the choice of the State Council.50
In considering the role of chiefs as the heads of Native Tribunals, the Committee
heard the President of the Native Administration Ordinance Staff Association who testified
that having sitting chiefs on a Tribunal lead to trouble and that chiefs became unpopular
through the exercise of their judicial power and were always fearful of being destooled by
making a judgment that offended some influential subject, so they should be “divorced from
their judicial functions.”51 Practically all of the witnesses and those who sent documents
favored having a Judicial Advisor, continuing to permit the District Commissioners to review
and revise Tribunal criminal judgments, but under the supervision of the Judicial Advisor
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and that revisory power should be extended to civil cases.52 The Committee agreed to
recommend the appointment of a Judicial Advisor in light of the success had by this official
in Uganda. They agreed to recommend that no Tribunal be permitted to function unless it
employed and paid “a properly trained registrar.”53 The Committee also agreed that Native
Authorities, organs of local government to be created under a new ordinance reforming
customary government, should prepare rosters of people qualified to serve as judges from
which panels would be drawn and to recommend a minimum of three and a maximum of
five judges. Appointments to Native Tribunals should be made by the Governor-in-Council
in consultation with the appropriate State Council. The Governor-in-Council would also
have the authority to constitute courts and grade them with jurisdiction for each grade being
set out in a schedule to the proposed Ordinance. The courts should have both hereditary
and non-hereditary members, but all would have to be “suitable,” although no definition was
given to that term. All judges, who, as noted above, would be paid, would be paid at the
same rate as all other judges of the same grade.54
There should be a Land Judge, the Committee decided, who would sit with
assessors on interstate land disputes but alone as an appellate judge whose decision on
questions of law only in cases of lesser value would be final but in larger cases would be
appealable to WACA.55 In a significant proposed change from the current practice, the
Committee discussed having the Magistrates, not the District Commissioners exercise
revisory powers in both criminal an civil cases.56 In personal cases, appeals would be to
Magistrates’ Courts where the amount in issue was between £50 and £100, to Divisional
52
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Courts with leave to appeal granted by the Magistrate or the Divisional Court on questions
of law only in cases where the amount in issue was between £100 and £300 and to WACA
where the amount in issue exceeded £300.57
The Blackall Committee Report
In late May 1943, the Committee issued its Report and Recommendations. Each
paragraph focused on a particular issue and recommendation, most if not all of them
consistent with the discussions held during their meetings.58 Its view of the Native Tribunals
was extremely negative, sounding much as former Chief Justice Griffith, Jr., had in the first
decade of the twentieth century: “In the Colony alone [Ashanti and the Northern Territories
having long had more controlled Native Tribunals] the old pernicious system remained.
Sheltering under the doctrine of ‘inherent rights’ – and as it seemed the ‘divine right of King
to govern wrong – were many corrupt, inefficient and redundant tribunals.”59 The Committee
condemned the sharing of fees among the members of a court as a “pernicious practice”
and the most “fruitful source of abuse and one of the chief defects of the present system”
leading to imposition of excessive fines and costs and encouragement of frivolous litigation.
Although the situation had improved, the Committee found, since the implementation of the
Native Treasuries Ordinance No. 10 of 1939, it persisted, principally where no such
Treasuries existed. No Tribunal should be permitted to function unless there was a State
Treasury from which payments could be made by either a monthly salary or sitting fees.
Judges would sit in rotation for a month at a time and get paid only for that month. It should
be up to the State Councils to choose the method of payment, but it should be only for
services performed. Where there was a permanent President, he should get an annual
57
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salary. All compensation, the Committee recommended, should be considered as
honoraria and not as a means of making a living. As to fees charged by the Tribunals, the
Judicial Advisor whose appointment the Committee recommended should review and
prescribe fair fees that would be simplified and reduced from current levels.60
All courts should be graded with the higher grades having greater jurisdiction in
amount and geography. The number and location of courts was related to politics and not
to the judicial requirements of the people and were all out of proportion to the public needs.
Native Tribunals were “falling all over each other to attract business” which encouraged
frivolous litigation and wasteful competition. Accordingly, the number of courts should be
reduced. Moreover, the requirement that each State had to have a Paramount Chief’s
Tribunal and a State Council irrespective of size and population “fosters and prolongs the
existence of petty states incapable of undertaking the civic responsibilities which nowadays
devolve upon Native Authorities.” Thus the Committee recommended merger of “‘pocket
States’ into confederations of workable extent.”61
Too often, the Committee found, the Registrar was the only literate person in the
court and then was usually only semi-literate. He had to interpret “intricate provisions” of
the Native Administration Ordinance to the illiterate members of the court and too frequently
did so incorrectly. Many were corrupt and wrote down judgments in favor of those who paid
them. Often they were hired by Tribunals despite convictions for bribery and/or theft.
Often as well, they were poorly and uncertainly paid, generally from the fines and fees
collected. The Registrar’s appointment and dismissal should be subject to the approval of
the Provincial Commissioner. Those convicted of crimes involving dishonesty during the
prior five years should be disqualified from employment, and after a date to be specified by
60
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the Governor, no Registrar could be employed unless he had been certified after having
taken a training course and passed an examination.62
The Committee agreed that Native Tribunals were best suited to try land cases
where native tenure was involved. It recommended that the top level courts to be
established should have jurisdiction in land cases with appeals to lie to a native court of
appeal and from there to the Land Court and thence, if large enough, to WACA. A Land
Court should be established to hear cases between states in situ and with assessors whom
they would be able to consult in private as to the customary law involved and the testimony
heard concerning such customary law. The Committee decided that the Provincial
Commissioners should be relieved of all jurisdiction in land cases as they took up too much
time. This recommendation would respond to criticism, particularly from attorneys, who, for
years, pressed for cases to be heard by British judges and not by executive officers.63
The Committee’s consensus was that Native Tribunals were insufficiently and
inadequately supervised by administrative officers. However, it was cheaper and more
expeditious to have District Commissioners supervise and they had an educational function
to perform as well. Thus, the Committee recommended, albeit not unanimously, extension
of the District Commissioners’ review and revisory powers to civil cases and to authorize
them to suspend sentences of Native Tribunals in criminal cases pending confirmation by
the Judicial Advisor, because it afforded poor people a free appeal.64
The question of attorneys appearing in the Native Tribunals on behalf of litigants still
roiled the Native justice system sixty years after the first Native Jurisdiction Ordinance. The
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Committee heard considerable evidence concerning “Bush lawyers” who pretended to be
litigants’ family members in order to be able to appear as such family members were
allowed in most Tribunals to speak on behalf of their relatives. Some witnesses testified
that attorneys should be permitted or that “bush lawyers’ should be trained and certified
after testing as to their knowledge of customary law and procedure. However, the
Committee consensus was that no lawyers, “bush” or otherwise should be permitted
because they were unnecessary as witnesses knew the facts and “native law was not a
technical matter which called for expert advocacy, as it was usually a matter of common
knowledge.” While that statement might have been true for the Native Courts, it ignored
completely the related question of the ability of litigants to organize the presentation of their
evidence, properly question their witnesses and make coherent arguments, all skills in
which attorneys were trained. Nevertheless, the Committee adhered to the rule against
appearance by counsel and recommended that anyone claiming to be a family member
should be required to prove the relationship before being allowed to be heard.65
The Committee reported that educated members of the community, by which they
meant those who were literate and had received some degree of advanced education, were
excluded from participating in the administration of justice unless they happened to be stool
holders or had been appointed councillors, which was not often the case. It heard evidence
that to appoint educated men would generate opposition from conservative elders who did
not want to see anything changed, but the great majority of tribunal members were illiterate
and unable to understand most of the laws they were asked to enforce, such as, for
example, sanitation by laws, except customary law. The members of current Tribunals
combined executive and judicial functions that empowered those members to create a
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“formidable weapon against anyone who offends them.” On the one hand, the problem with
appointing too many educated judges was that they would have a tendency to ignore the
elders in whom the ordinary people reposed great confidence. On the other hand, if too few
were appointed, the current unsatisfactory situation would continue. It would not be enough
to create courts per native custom, “there must be a more enlightened superior authority
who is in a position to ensure that the most suitable local elements are represented.”
Therefore, the Committee recommended appointment of Tribunal members by the
Governor-in-Council, after consultation with the State Council, that would create panels
from which judges would be chosen to sit for a specified time, e. g., a month. Existing
courts with fifteen to twenty five councillors were too large and often its members were
uninterested in the case being tried before them, with judges leaving and returning or even
sleeping. There should be a minimum of three and a maximum of five to seven members of
each Court.66
Usually, the Committee found, the Chief was the ex officio presiding officer of the
Tribunal whether or not he was qualified. There was a strong consensus on the Committee
that a Paramount Chief should not sit on a Tribunal, so that the members of the Tribunal
could discharge their executive and administrative duties and “avoid incurring the enmity of
those they convict or against whom they give judgment.”67 One might ask what changes
had occurred during the prior decades that would suggest to the chiefs that they should no
longer sit in their Tribunals. They always had executive and administrative functions to fulfill
and they always risked alienating powerful subjects or their friends and retainers by giving
judgment against them. Why now? The answer that most prominently suggests itself has
to be that presiding over the Tribunal was no longer as profitable as it once was because of
66

Ibid., 15-16, ¶¶60-62.

67

Ibid., 11, ¶63.
-389-

the implementation of limitations on sharing fees. Although representatives of the
Provincial Councils told the Committee that the Councils agreed that Paramount Chiefs
should no longer sit, the Committee felt that it might become necessary or desirable for
them to preside from time to time on some important cases, so that the Committee would
not recommend an absolute prohibition, but only that as a general rule they should not sit.
The Committee suggested that the State Councils should choose the presidents of the
tribunals with the approval of the Governor-in-Council, and some states might want to
provide for multiple presidents so courts could sit in divisions. In any event, the presidents
should be men of good character, literate and versed in customary law and court procedure.
It would help if they had taken and passed a registrar’s training course.68
Perhaps the most significant recommendation dealt with creation of the position of
Judicial Advisor. Somewhat akin to the nineteenth century role of Judicial Assessor who sat
with the chiefs and advised them on the criminal cases before them, the Judicial Advisor
would be a “‘guide, philosopher and friend’ to the Native Courts” as he was in Uganda
where the system worked well. He should have legal qualifications but not have “too
legalistic: an outlook. He should have a general knowledge of customary law and local
conditions , so that someone with an administrative background would be a good candidate.
He should be required, inter alia, to advise with respect to improvement of the
administration of justice in Native Courts by preparation of model rules of procedure and
evidence, suggest to State Councils declarations of customary law to be made and edit
those the Council has produced. He would have final review authority, direct Registrar
training and liaise with the Native Courts, the Supreme Court and the Executive.69
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The Governor caused the Committee’s Report to be published, as it was in the
Gazette as well as in several consecutive editions of the popular press. A Bill would be
drafted to establish courts where the population was at least ten thousand and two hundred
cases per year would be heard so that the courts would be kept busy. In fact one court was
created for every 15,147 people and that heard and average of two hundred ninety three
civil and criminal cases in 1944-45.
The Blackall Committee had rejected appointment of judges by State Councils lest
conservative chiefs and councillors failed to appoint educated men. Although the
Government would be required to consult them, in practice it was expected, and this was
the way it worked out, that the State Council would nominate panel members, District
Commissioners could comment or make their own nominations and the Governor-in-Council
would accept them.70
While the Bill was being drafted, Governor Burns wrote to Acting Chief Justice
Doorly, reminding him that the Blackall Committee Report had recommended establishment
of a Land Court with a Land Judge. The Governor told Doorly that he wanted the Land
Judge to have the “prestige that attaches to the office of Puisne Judge” and he asked for
Doorly’s views on whether the Land Court should be separate or part of the Supreme Court.
Doorly expressed his opposition to an independent Land Court and argued that a Land
Court Judge could not be equal to a Puisne Judge unless he actually were a Puisne Judge.
Moreover an independent court would require a separate and expensive staff and the Chief
Justice and the Puisne Judges could not substitute for the Land Judge to assist him or act
for him while he was on leave.71 The Governor accepted Doorly’s arguments and the Bill
creating the Land Court did so as a division of the Supreme Court.
70

GNA ADM 5/3/80, 9.

71

Ibid., 10.29.1943.
-391-

The Native Courts Ordinance
In November 1943, Arthur J. Loveridge, who subsequently was appointed Judicial
Advisor, reported to the Governor that all the recommendations of the Blackall Committee
had been adopted and incorporated into a proposed Native Courts Ordinance insofar as
possible.72 The reaction of the Colonial Office to the proposed bill was mixed. While giving
approbation to the idea of a Judicial Advisor, Sir Sidney Abrahams, formerly a Gold Coast
Attorney General and now a Colonial Office advisor and A. Russell, an Undersecretary of
State, both objected to an independent Land Court. They also objected to the extent of the
power the Governor was to have over the operation of the Native Courts, a power that they
believed should be vested in the judiciary. The Secretary of State, Oliver Stanley, adopted
this critique and requested that the bill be revised to reflect these criticisms and to make the
powers of the Judicial Advisor less vague. The debate in the Legislative Council, led by
Secretary of Native Affairs, T. O. Mangin, was not at all contentious and after some minor
amendments, the Ordinance was adopted.
Loveridge had stated in his report to Governor Burns, that the Land Court was to
displace the Provincial Commissioners’ courts in land cases, Native Courts were to be set
up such that the Governor had full control of them. He continued that the draft Bill followed
the recommendation of the Committee that anyone who was subject to customary law in his
own community would be subject to Native Court jurisdiction. However, he said that draft
would not follow the Committee recommendation as to making those who had entered into
Christian marriages and custody matters as to their children subject to Native Court
jurisdiction, nor did the draft proscribe Registrars convicted of crime as recommended by
the Committee because the Provincial Commissioners appointed Registrars in their
72
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discretion and they could be trusted to exercise that discretion wisely. Finally, he advised
that he believed that the Committee’s recommendations as to appeals were too restrictive,
conflicted with generally accepted standards and would be revised.73
In December 1943, the Acting Governor sent the two draft Bills dealing with the
Native Courts and the Land Court to the Colonial Office. Explaining the need for two Bills,
he said that Governor Burns wanted the Land Court to be separate and independent from
the Supreme Court and exclusively to exercise appellate jurisdiction in land cases appealed
from Native Courts as well as plenary jurisdiction in land cases where no native court had
jurisdiction and land cases transferred from native courts by the Land Judge on cause
shown. Where English law, concession issues or interpleader were involved, jurisdiction
would remain in the Supreme Court with appeals to the WACA. In creating the Land Court
as a separate institution, the draftsmen of the Bill rejected Judge Doorly’s arguments as to
making the Land Court a division of the Supreme Court but provided for a separate Land
Court that would displace the Provincial Commissioners’ courts, have the same rules and
practices as the Supreme Court and be under the Courts Ordinance. Although all land
cases pending in the Supreme Court, the Provincial Commissioners’ courts, the Provincial
Councils or the State Councils would be subject to Land Court jurisdiction, the draft was
silent on transferring them to the Land Court leaving a big question yet to be answered.74
If the Courts Bill were to be enacted in the form submitted to the Colonial Office, the
Governor would have had complete control over native courts: he would constitute them
and appoint their judges after consultation with native authorities; the native authorities
would have had to satisfy the Governor as to their means to pay court members, Registrars
and other staff before their courts could be constituted; fees and fines would have had to be
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paid into native treasuries; courts would be graded with different levels of civil and criminal
jurisdiction for each grade; appeals would be from lower grade to higher grade courts with
appeals from highest grade courts to Magistrates’ Courts if the sum involved exceeded a
specified amount or to the Land Court in land cases; and appeals from Magistrates’ Courts
would lie to the Divisional Court and from the Land Court to WACA. 75
Abrahams, now part of the Colonial Office staff, and Sir A. Russell, one of the
Undersecretaries, questioned the necessity for an independent Land Court, to which no
answer was forthcoming. They thought that it should be a division of the Supreme Court
with a Puisne Judge in charge. Abrahams charged that Burns was seeking to diminish the
prestige of the Supreme Court. Russell also questioned the apparent restrictions on the
right of appeal specified in the bill: “a right of appeal to a court of justice is an inalienable
right of every British subject,” he said. Russell also said that he agreed with Williams that
the Land Court should be subject to oversight by the Chief Justice. They questioned the
role of the Judicial Advisor as set forth in the draft Bill. The only apparent role he had was
to approve prosecutions of people fraudulently holding themselves out as members of a
native court, exempting certain Africans from native jurisdiction, confirming a District
Commissioner’s decision to review a Native Court judgment and acting as amicus on
appeals. Russell pointed out that the Committee’s report recommended a much more
expansive role as a guide to Native Courts, to inspect Native Court records and be the final
reviewing authority, yet no explanation was given as to why the Bill failed to provide for
these roles.76
Russell also questioned why it should be the Governor and not the Chief Justice that
was to make technical rules for operation of the Land Court. It was “essential” he said for
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all courts, indigenous and native to “be under the general supervision and guidance of the
Judiciary. The carefree pioneer days of the District Officer sitting under his palm tree
administering rough and ready justice undeterred by the thought that a judge might wish to
look at his proceedings are gone beyond recall; and I very greatly deprecate any attempt to
return them.”77
He recommended that the Governor be told that the Land Court should be part of the
Supreme Court and that the Supreme Court would be authorized to intervene in Land Court
operations, as it was in Uganda, to prevent and correct any miscarriage of justice. Duane,
an Undersecretary, agreed with Russell and Abrahams and said that it was unfortunate that
this struggle between the executive and the judiciary had reemerged. He suggested that
the Bill should be submitted to the Acting Chief Justice as well as to the Attorney General
for revision and comment. Another official, Williams, minuted his wonder as to how one
Land Judge would deal with the work now occupying seven Puisne Judges even with help
from the Judicial Advisor. He wouldn’t permit publication of the Bill until Burns commented
on the Land Court issue.78
Oliver Stanley, the Secretary of State, telegraphed Governor Burns that the Colonial
Office saw difficulties in separating the Land Court from the Supreme Court and his
apparent intention of subjecting it to the Executive and asked for his reasons.79 Two weeks
later, Stanley, in the terms of Russell’s minute, told Burns that the Judicial Advisor’s powers
were very vague and limited and did not carry out the Committee’s recommendations. He
should be given access to Native Court records and powers of revision as in the Uganda
Ordinance. It was undesirable, Stanley continued, for the Judicial Advisor to act for the
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Land Judge, that task should be fulfilled by another judge. Moreover, the Supreme Court
should have the power to deal with injustice as in the Uganda Ordinance. Finally, he told
Burns, it was preferable for the Provincial Commissioners and the Chief Justice to make
rules for the Native Courts rather than the Governor.80
Burns responded denying that the Land Court would be subject to the Executive.
The Land Court Judge, he said, would be as independent as a Supreme Court Judge, but
that he wanted a Land Court Judge with some administrative experience that was as
important as his legal qualifications and if the Land Court were part of the Supreme Court,
the judge assigned by the Chief Justice might not have that administrative experience. If
the Land Court was to be part of the Supreme Court it should be as a Land Division with a
separate Judge who could not be assigned without the Governor’s approval.81 A Colonial
Office telegram approved a Land Division, but Stanley told the Governor that he would not
have any power to approve the Judge as that would appear to subject the Judge to the
Executive, but “It should be an established matter of practice and convention that Puisne
Judges not specifically appointed to the Lands Division should not sit in that Division.”82
Burns’ telegram in response acknowledged defeat. He agreed to a Supreme Court Land
Division with “such Puisne Judges as necessary.” If a temporary vacancy arose, he agreed
that, in consultation with the Chief Justice, he would appoint a “fit and proper person” to act
per Section 9 of the Courts Ordinance.83
Previously the Colonial Office had advised Burns that it liked the proposal for a
Judicial Advisor (“a very useful innovation”), but said that the powers of that officer were not
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clearly set forth in the current draft and appeared to be much less than what was
recommended in the Blackall Committee report. He should be given access to all courts
and powers of revision, he should not be an Acting Land Judge as that would conflict with
his other functions. Lastly, the Supreme Court should be empowered to redress
miscarriages of justice in Native Courts as is the High Court under the Uganda Ordinance of
1940.84
Shortly thereafter, Stanley approved a revised draft Native Courts and Courts
Amendment bills save for Section 29 of the proposed Native Courts Bill, requiring that it and
the Courts Amendment Ordinance Bill be reconsidered to clarify that the Lands Division
would hear pending cases de novo. The revised Native Courts Bill added a new section
giving the Judicial Advisor power to revise on his own motion any Native Court decision and
to reverse, remand or modify it to the same extent as could a District Commissioner. A new
section sixty three also gave the Judicial Advisor access to Native Courts and their records,
and despite the prior comments from Colonial Office officials, the revision retained the
provision authorizing the Governor, not the Chief Justice, to make procedural rules for the
Native Courts. The Courts Amendment Bill added three sections creating the Land Division
with exclusive jurisdiction over native land cases, the Judge to sit with assessors and
appeals to lie to WACA.85
Secretary for Native Affairs, T. R. O. Mangin introduced the Native Courts and the
related Courts Amendment Bills into the Legislative Council in June 1944. He emphasized
the important fact disclosed during the Committee’s hearings of the desire of the Paramount
Chiefs and to a certain extent the Divisional Chiefs as well to be dissociated from most of
the judicial functions that they now performed under the Native Administration Ordinance.
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Mangin told the Council that Native Authorities created under the Native Authorities Bill also
being introduced that day were to nominate men to the Governor-in-Council to serve on a
panel from which three or five people would be chosen from time to time to constitute the
Court. Jurisdiction of the newly graded courts “is in many respects considerably greater
than jurisdiction of the existing four corresponding grades of Native Tribunals.” 86
The classes of people subject to Native Court jurisdiction would be persons of
African descent, provided that the mode of life of such persons would be that of the general
community, and that such persons are in their country of origin subject to African customary
law however that customary law might be modified or applied.87 The Bill carried out the
recommendations with respect to the Judicial Advisor and his powers and authority are
spelled out that he may be, in the words of the Committee Report, “‘guide, philosopher and
friend’ to the Native Courts which is the intention he should be.” Registrars, Mangin went
on, would be required to pass courses designed by the Judicial Advisor to improve their
status and efficiency. Finally, appeal procedures were the same as under the Native
Administrative Ordinance except that Land Appeals would go to the Land Court rather than
to the Provincial Commissioners. After completing this introduction to the Bill, its
consideration was adjourned to the October session.88
During the summer, A. C. Smith, one of the Puisne Judges, reported to Chief Justice
Harrigan with questions as to whether the draft Bill gave a right of appeal in paternity or
divorce cases and whether interlocutory appeals were permissible. In addition, he said that
he did not believe defaulting parties should have a right of appeal on other than questions
of law after leave granted. He suggested to Harrigan that the Bill should be redrafted to
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deal with those and other issues. Just before the autumn legislative session began, Smith
wrote again, saying that there was an enormous problem underlying the entire Bill, the
uncertainty as to state and divisional boundaries, so that before the Bill was considered, a
Boundary Commission should be set up to resolve these uncertainties.89
The Government declined to defer consideration of the Courts Bill to take care of
boundary issues that might be years in the resolution. Rather, on October 4, 1944, the
Mangin moved the second reading. The Municipal member for Accra moved to refer the Bill
to a Select Committee, which motion was defeated without a division. The Bill was read a
second time and referred to the Committee of the Whole. Several amendments were
accepted by the Government, among which was one enabling a defaulting defendant time
to move the Native Court to review, vary or discharge the default judgment and to permit
him to appeal the denial of such motion; another to give parties and witnesses in the Native
Court the right to decline to answer questions the responses to which “in the opinion of the
Native Court, is likely to incriminate them;” one requiring court Registrars to provide records
of the proceedings of his Court and its judgments to the District Commissioner on demand
in default of which, or if he provided false records, he would be punishable summarily by jail
or fine. Finally, the Bill submitted to the Council having inexplicably failed to contain it, an
amendment was passed directing the Governor to appoint a Judicial Advisor and his
assistants. The Bill was then read a third time and enacted as No. 22 of 1944.90
The Native Courts Ordinance of 194491 represented a totally different approach to the
organization of indigenous courts in the Gold Coast from any prior effort to provide native
justice. At the same time, it imposed much tighter restraints on the Native Courts and
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effectively dissociated the hereditary chiefs from any control of the native justice system.
Firstly, the Ordinance did not compel the establishment of a native system of justice at all.
The operative language, Section Three, gave the Governor discretion (he may, not he must)
provide for the constitution of Native Courts, including native appellate courts, to exercise
jurisdiction in areas that the Governor-in-Council specified.92 Rather than being obliged to
deal with the personnel of the Courts who sat as a matter of hereditary right, as discussed
above, the Ordinance authorized the Governor-in-Council to appoint the judges who would
constitute the Native Courts not only from chiefs but others upon taking “advice and
considering” the recommendations of Native Authorities by which he was not legally bound.
Moreover, these judicial positions, even those held by the chiefs, were not permanent, but
were held at the discretion of the Governor and who could revoke the appointments at any
time. There could be no stronger indication of a lack of judicial independence that being
subject to removal, apparently without cause. Thus, woe unto the Native Judge who
offended the British Governor.93 To emphasize the power of the Administration over the
Courts, Section Six prohibited anyone not appointed by the Governor to sit as a member of
a Native Court. No chiefs sitting ex officio here. Again contrary to history and tradition, a
quorum for the Court consisted of three or five members, and rather than requiring a
unanimous decision as was formerly the case, a simple majority could reach a verdict.
Section Nine embodied one of the potentially most effective measures to prevent
corruption, the requirement that the Governor not create a Court unless and until he was
assured that provision had been made for the members of the Court and the staff to be paid
from a Treasury maintained by the Native Authority into which all fees and fines imposed by
the Court were to be paid. Thus the incentive to extort litigants by imposing excessive fees
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and fines was reduced, if not eliminated because no longer would those fees and fines be
shared among the members of the Court.
Section Thirteen told the Governor to grade the Courts as “A,” “B,” “C,” and “D” with
varying jurisdiction specified in the First and Second Schedules, the “A” courts having the
broadest jurisdiction and the “D” courts having the most narrow.94 As in the past, customary
law had to be administered in Native Courts, but customary crimes were not justiciable
except for those few specified on the First Schedule, such as putting in fetish, seducing the
Chief’s wife, etc. As with all prior legislation authorizing native courts, this Ordinance
prohibited lawyers from appearing, acting for or assisting any party or from acting in any
matter or cause or assisting in seeking a transfer to a British Court, except in this latter
case, with the consent of the Supreme Court. Perhaps recollecting the cocoa hold up of
1931 when oaths were used to enforce the boycott, the Ordinance criminalized swearing an
oath for an unlawful purpose and both the party administering and the one taking the oath
were deemed to be liable. The Ordinance specifically outlawed fetish and personal oaths
and said that they were not binding.95
As to Appellate jurisdiction, the Ordinance for the first time created native appellate
courts to hear appeals from most lower courts. All appeals might, but were not required to,
be heard de novo and all appellate courts were to have full revisory power.96
The statute had tighter control provisions than any of its predecessors. Thus,
Section Fifty Nine required monthly reports to the District Commissioner as to all cases.
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Section Sixty authorized the Judicial Advisor to review anything occurring in a Native Court
on his own initiative without the necessity of giving notice of his intention as required of a
District Commissioner. The Judicial Advisor had standing without the necessity of applying
to the Appellate Court to appear as amicus curiae on every case on appeal.97
If the Government expected popular support for the Native Courts Ordinance, it was
sadly mistaken. The Gold Coast Independent, the largest circulation English language
newspaper in the Colony and one read by almost the entire African mercantile and
professional community, characterized the Ordinance as utterly contrary to the principles of
British justice.98 In speeches to a rally of the Gold Coast Youth Conference, Accra on
August 1, 1944. The introductory speaker said that the Bills deprived the “natural rulers” of
their rights. If by this he meant traditional rights, he was absolutely correct as the British
rigidly tightened the regulatory noose around the native justice system and its courts. The
principal speaker said that the power of Judicial Advisor and the District Commissioners to
enter Native Tribunals, demand records and revise decisions was “detrimental to the honour
of the Elders. Dr. Danquah, who chaired the meeting, disagreed and said that Government
appointment of Tribunal members was necessary and proper and was subject to
consultation with the Chiefs, his argument was rejected and the meeting resolved to object
to this provision, one speaker saying that it “was a mean trick.”99
In early 1945, the Governor issued the first of nine Orders constituting and grading
Native Courts.100 There were sixty eight in the first group, of which there were only four “A”
Courts belonging to four Native Confederacies - consolidations of smaller states – created
97

GNA ADM 6/139, 11.28.1944, 588-613.

98

The Gold Coast Independent, Vol. XXVII, No. 39, 9.30.1944, 236.

99

Ibid.

100

GNA 6/140, 2.35.1945, 216-235, 358-367, 397-404, 457-461, 498-505, 531-534, 553-554, 600601, 812-813.
-402-

under the Native Authorities Act, fifty one “B” Courts, fifty seven “C” Courts and thirty three
“D” Courts. A few of the higher graded courts were designated as both Native Appeals
Courts as well as graded trial courts. He also issued an Order (No. 10 of 1945) setting
forth procedures for the Native Courts. Most of those procedures were the same as those
under the Native Administration Ordinance and were similar to comparable procedures in
the Supreme Court under the Courts Ordinance, but there were fewer requirements in the
Native Courts for writings and alternative provisions for oral motions and pleadings, claims
or charges were required to be read to defendants and Registrars were obliged to record all
oral testimony. The Court was required to exhibit to the public in a prominent place all of
the fees set forth on the Second Schedule to the Regulations. As was the rule in the
Supreme Court, judgment debtors could, in the discretion of the Court, be arrested for debt,
but such discretion was to be exercised in light of the debtor’s ability to pay, whether he had
purposefully moved money or property in order to defeat his creditors, whether the
judgment against him was based on fraud or breach of trust, whether the debtor willfully or
negligently refused or failed to pay and whether he had incurred the debt knowing that he
couldn’t pay it. Imprisonment did not discharge the debt but with his consent, the debtor’s
property could be sold within one month of his entering prison to pay or reduce the debt.
The Regulations authorized interpleader with respect to attached property and writs of
possession and permitted third parties with claims to the property for which possession was
sought to challenge the right to possession.101
Several months after passage of the Native Courts Ordinance, Governor Burns
reported to the Colonial Office about organization of the Courts in Accra. He noted that as
a precondition to organization of the Courts under the Ordinance, Native Authorities had
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first to prove that they had made adequate financial provision for the courts and that
revenue from those courts could be guaranteed to be properly administered. These
conditions had yet to be met in Accra, he said, so no Native Courts had been established in
the Ga State or in a number of other states as of May 1945. The number of Native Courts
had been reduced to eliminate competition and jealousy between chiefs and had been
limited to those necessary to serve the people “and not to constitute them as marks of
personal dignity of the Chiefs of a certain State.” Burns said that many chiefs had stopped
presiding over Native Courts because fines and fees were no longer being made available
to them to share as they were being paid into Native Authority treasuries and because they
didn’t want the fall out from unpopular decisions – something that never seemed to bother
them before as long as the fees were coming in.102
Burns reported that £61,000 in fees and fines received by native courts equaled
those received by British courts. Since the costs incurred by the Courts were less than
£37,000, £24,000 was available to be used by the Native Authorities. He estimated that
Native Courts would handle about 45,000 cases relieving the Supreme Court and
Magistrates’ Courts of considerable work and settling almost all the cases according to
native law and custom. In the near future, Burns said that eight “B” courts were to be regraded to “A” courts covering fifty per cent of the population. He was pleased to report that
the number of complaints of tribunal corruption had fallen, but there still was a “glut” of
unqualified registrars the number of which should be reduced by introduction of certification
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procedures.103 He went on to say that the Native Courts were taking advantage of the
Judicial Advisor provisions by seeking his help and advice.104
Although the Gold Coast had changed substantially since the creation of the Colony
in 1874. For example, the life expectancy of British officials in the Colony had increased
substantially as the cause of malaria had been determined and the treatment of that
disease had improved. Railroads into the interior and motor roads had been constructed
and exports had increased exponentially along with the living standards of the population,
albeit they were still extremely poor by European measures. Despite these changes, until
1944 the system of indigenous judicial administration had changed only incrementally and
complaints as to oppressive conduct by judges of the Native Tribunals had hardly
diminished. As we shall see below, despite the almost radical reforms of the Native Courts
Ordinance of 1944, fees charged and fines imposed by the Native Courts remained a
source of complaint right up to the date of independence.
Subsequent Events
After the close of the period under study in this dissertation, three studies of native
justice took place. The first, by G. R. Havers, a barrister, looked at the cost of litigation in
the Gold Coast and recommended limiting attorneys’ fees and adjournments of cases and
implementation of his recommendations did, in fact, reduce costs somewhat. The second,
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a Committee headed by Puisne Judge J. H. Coussey that recommended placing the
traditional courts under the direct supervision of the Chief Justice and separating the chief’s
administrative role from his judicial one by removing him from the courts. It suggested a
further study which was carried out in 1951 by Commission headed by another Puisne
Judge, K. A. Korsah. This group reorganizing the native courts into District and Area courts
presided over by professional magistrates with appeals to the British courts.
Shortly before the Native Courts and Native Authorities Bills were introduced into the
Legislative Council, Burns complained of the high cost of stool litigation and proposed a
Commission to Inquire into the problem. Stanley proposed a single commissioner who
would be a lawyer.105 Burns reluctantly accepted a single commissioner, but so as not to
insult the new Chief Justice, Walter Harrigan, he suggested that he or Stanley first consult
Harrigan before appointing a commissioner so that Harrigan didn’t get any idea that they
were hostile to a Bench that Burns previously characterized as “weak.”106 At a conference in
the Colonial Office also attended by Harrigan and Colonial Office officials, Burns told them
that he wanted the initiative to come from the Colonial Office so that it wouldn’t be seen as
another Gold Coast Government attempt to get control of land. The Colonial Office
suggested that G. R. Havers, K. C. would be agreeable to do the job.107
The Governor explained Stanley’s terms of reference for the Commissioner implied
criticism of current court procedures and proposed a more general reference to inquire into
costs and to make recommendations, including those affecting court procedures, to
facilitate the expeditious settlement of disputes and the reduction of the cost of legal
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proceedings.108 Havers was appointed on December 27, 1944 and came to Accra almost
immediately. He sat for thirty days, heard one hundred two witnesses and received seventy
memoranda and documents.109 The Governor advised the Colonial Office that Havers was
doing a good job and that the enquiry was being supported by the press and public and that
the Bar seemed to have been intimidated into not protesting.110 Havers prepared an
extensive report in which he concluded that fees in the Native Courts were still
unreasonably high. Fees such as oath fees should be no nigher than those for a summons
and hearing and judgment fees should be done away with entirely, as should those charged
for visiting land and granting adjournments. Witness fees should be no higher than they
were in the Supreme Court.111 He recommended limiting adjournments to those instances
where good cause was shown112 Havers concluded that legal fees were excessive and
should be limited by enforcing the Legal Practitioners Ordinance and a scale of fees as
established by the Ordinance should be exhibited to all litigants and published or,
alternatively, fees should be set by the court on taxation of costs.113 He also recommended
that proposed stool litigation should not be permitted to be financed by stool treasuries
unless an independent legal practitioner of five years standing had opined that the claim or
defense was valid and that the District Commissioner concurred since land title disputes
were still “a curse of the Gold Coast.”114 Adjournments should be required to be reported on
each Court’s monthly return and appeals in land cases should lie directly to the Land Court
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and should be final except for questions of law that could be appealed to WACA so as to
reduce costs further. Moreover, parties should be permitted to waive appeals in advance
and a Boundary Commissioner should be appointed to fix disputed boundaries in non-stool
cases. Finally the Land Court should be authorized to direct that a survey be made showing
the boundaries decreed by the Land Court and to order that the judgment embodying such
survey be registered.115 Havers’ report produced a substantial decrease in fees, but not
enough to make Native Court litigation inexpensive enough to eliminate complaints that
continued during the remainder of the Colonial Period and even after the independence of
Ghana.
In 1949, the Governor appointed a committee under the chairmanship of J. H.
Coussey, a Puisne Judge to recommend constitutional changes in both colonial and native
institutions. Insofar as Native Courts were concerned, the Committee pointed out that
despite the Native Courts Ordinance provisions for appointment of judges, there had been
little separation of the judicial and administrative roles of traditional government and that the
Native Courts were still distrusted by the indigenous population.116 The Committee
recommended appointment of unpaid lay magistrates from outside the traditional ruling
families except in the cities where full time professional magistrates should be named to
preside over the traditional courts.117 Control over the Native Courts should, the Committee
suggested, be vested in the Chief Justice and officers appointed by him for that purpose
with appeals from all Native Courts to lie directly to the Supreme Court,118 Finally, the
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Coussey Committee recommended the appointment of a separate commission to examine
native justice.119
Following the Coussey Committee’s recommendation, in December 1950, the
Governor appointed a Commission under the Chairmanship of Mr. Justice K. A. Korsah to
examine the Native Court system and make recommendations as to reorganizing it.120 Thus,
less than seven years after passage of what was then considered to be the “radical” and
final change to the native justice system and less than nine years after the extensive inquiry
conducted by the Blackall Commission, the indigenous courts were again considered to be
in need of reorganization.
The Commission criticized the manner of appointment of judges because
consultation with traditional authorities prior to appointment resulted in naming only the
most conservative persons who were too often closely associated with and politically
acceptable to the chiefs and their intimate councillors.121 Accordingly, the Commission
recommended that all indigenous courts be divided according to the geographical area they
would cover into Area and District Courts, the former to have limited and the latter unlimited
jurisdiction over land cases, the former to have limited jurisdiction over personal, paternity
and matrimonial actions while the latter’s jurisdiction would cover the same matters of
greater value. The judges of the Area Courts would be one full time stipendiary lay justice
or two or three part time honorary judges. The District Courts would be presided over by
either a full time paid professional magistrate or a stipendiary lay magistrate.122 All these
judges would be appointed by the Chief Justice on recommendation of local committees,
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and could be demoted or dismissed by the Chief Justice who would also have complete
control over the personnel and operation of the local courts.123 Finally, appeals would lie in
most cases only to the Supreme Court, but in larger personal actions and land cases to the
Supreme Court and then to WACA.124 Moreover, despite British efforts to eliminate all those
aspects of corruption about which the British had complained for more than sixty years, the
Korsah Commission found that the Native Courts continued to exploit litigants corruptly, that
is to render decisions for political reasons rather than on the merits, to extort fees and fines
unjustifiably large in relation to the matters before them and to favor friends and relatives of
the judges in deciding cases.125
This exposition illustrates a theme of British rule: the colonial administration
complained bitterly about the fact that native judges rendered decisions based on matters
and influences arising from political and social considerations rather than the merits of the
cases before them as well as their exploitation of the people through extravagant fees and
fines. Yet elimination of such corruption and exploitation required intervention by colonial
officials on a level in which the administration was unable or unwilling to engage. It was
thus caught between what McLaren called the “Scyilla of Imperial Politico-Legal Aspirations
and the Charybdis of Colonial Micro-politics,”126 between a desire to support the traditional
authorities through whom it wished to rule and the felt necessity to control their judicial
actions thereby undermining them. As In so many other matters, until 1944, the British let
things slide and the often corrupt manner in which indigenous authorities administered their
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courts continued to Independence and beyond. Toward the end of the period under study,
it became apparent that a strong intervention, one that had been suggested throughout the
period, was required if the traditional courts were to operate in a fashion with which the
British could live. Thus the Native Courts Ordinance that reduced, the role of chiefs and
traditional councillors in the administration of justice with the expectation, or more likely the
hope, that the provisions of the Ordinance would substantially resolve Britain’s dilemma. As
we have seen, that expectation was not fulfilled.
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CHAPTER X – CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Perhaps the most important aspect of the British administration of justice on the Gold
Coast was the manner in which crimes were dealt with. T. O. Elias has written
comprehensively of the substance and administration of criminal law in the British
dependencies in Africa, noting their similarities and differences.1 As discussed below these
similarities and differences relate to the availability of trial by jury and the right to counsel.
Thus, in Ashanti, until the middle of the 1930's an accused, even in a capital case, whether
European or African, had neither the right to a jury trial nor to counsel to assist him. In
Central and East Africa, trials, even in capital cases were usually by the Court sitting with
assessors, although Europeans were most often tried by juries.2
Dr. Elias argues that purposefully or incidentally the history of British administration
of justice was moving toward a fully integrated common law, that is, a common law including
both British principles and those of customary law. Moreover, he contends, the influence of
English law on African societies and polities was both inevitable and salutary “if orderly
development in social and economic life were to be ensured.”3 Antony N. Allott agrees with
Elias’ views and notes the creation of what I describe here and in other chapters as a hybrid
common law, that is one formed by judges with common law training who viewed local
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custom from an alien perspective and infused it with ideas unknown to traditional law.4 As
may be seen below, this hybridization was most evident in land law and was least evident in
criminal law, the latter being almost entire English in content and form. In this chapter I
confirm Elias’ and Allott’s views, particularly with respect to the right to trial by jury and to
counsel, and evidence the critical role of British criminal justice in establishing a stable basis
for development of the Gold Coast. Mark J. Roe argues that Britain did not transplant jury
trials to most of its colonies, even in criminal cases as its experience with jury nullification in
Ireland conflicted with its ability to run a colonial empire.5 This view is contradicted by the
facts discussed below and the arguments of historians and jurists such as R. Knox-Mawer
who point to the extension of jury trials to the Empire during the Victorian era where they
were received “with great enthusiasm” in West Africa, albeit the use of juries in civil cases
was eliminated later.6 Berthan Macaulay notes that although jury trials were available in the
Gold Coast, trial by the court with assessors was authorized in the Gold Coast by the
Criminal Procedure Ordinance of 1876, having which incorporated provisions of the Bengal
Regulation of 1832. In both the Bengal and Gold Coast legislation, the role of assessors
was to give opinions that were not binding on the judge presiding.7 From the Gold Coast
Criminal Procedure Ordinance, principles of criminal procedure migrated to East Africa
where they were incorporated into the East African Criminal Procedure Code. Thus, as
Ibhawoh argues, rather than administering British principles of criminal procedure, the
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British courts of the Gold Coast were operating under Indian legal procedures that “provided
the required imperial standards.”8
Criminal justice was seen by the Britains as being the jewel in the crown of British
colonial administration and the principal element in demonstrating to the Africans the
superiority of British justice. Martin J. Wiener quotes James Fitzpatrick Stephens, a long
serving civil servant and professor of law, who said that the “‘administration of criminal
justice is the indispensable condition of all government, and the means by which is in the
last resort carried on.” Accordingly, law “lay at the heart of the British imperial enterprise.
And criminal justice was at the core of law.”9 Indeed, this was the essence of the Bond of
1844 executed by then Lieutenant Governor Hill and a number of Fanti chiefs, discussed in
Chapter II; an agreement that criminal matters were to be determined by British magistrates
according to the principles of English law. Up to the date of independence, British judges
continued to administer English common and statutory criminal law. However, as shall be
seen, not all of the strictures of English criminal procedure were applied to or followed in the
Gold Coast. Indeed, in Ashanti, until the 1930's criminal cases were determined by a judge
without juries and without the defendant having the benefit of counsel. In the infamous
case of Rex v Knowles, however, the defendant was an Englishman and the outcry among
metropolitan newspapers after his conviction for murdering his wife as to the unfairness of
trying an Englishman without counsel or jury, something not heard at all when the defendant
was an African, led to a reform of the law. Clearly, Knowles demonstrated that English law
was not so color blind as the colonial power expressed it to be.10
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That English law was to govern criminal procedure was true throughout the Empire.
Thus, although much civil jurisdiction was accorded to customary courts in the rest of Africa
and India, criminal justice there and in the Caribbean was, with very minor exceptions,
retained by British courts with British judges.11 As a result of the Bond of 1844, the
agreement among a number of Fanti chiefs and the British to permit British judges to try
felonies, criminal cases were almost dealt with by the British courts. The indigenous
authorities retained jurisdiction to deal with minor crimes such as simple assault, petty theft
and offenses traditionally dealt with by customary law such as oath violations, insulting the
chief or seduction of a chief’s or elder’s wife. All other crimes were handled by British
judges sitting at assizes or by District Commissioners sitting as magistrates.12
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Several different areas of the Empire contributed to the development of criminal law
in Africa. Thus, the Gold Coast Criminal Procedure Code of 1876 derived from that of
Bengal. Its 1890 amendment originated in that of Queensland via St. Lucia and became
the model for subsequent procedural codes throughout Africa.13 Morris suggests that the
migration of criminal procedure legislation was approved, if not instigated, by lay District
Commissioners who knew little of the common law and found it difficult to apply.
Nevertheless, as Morris points out, English common law remained the basis for both civil
and criminal procedure in the Gold Coast, and formed the matrix of the Criminal Code and
Criminal Procedure Code adopted in 1876. It remained in effect, with a minor amendment
in 1890, until 1935 with little reference to the Indian models in part because of the antipathy
of Sir Julian Paunceforte and his successors as Colonial Office Legal Advisors, Risley and
Bushe to Indian codes.14 In 1935 as part of the reform initiated by Bushe following his West
African inspection tour discussed above, the Criminal Procedure Ordinance was entirely
replaced by one modeled on a relatively new “more up-to-date model, that of the Gambia.”15
Unlike the situation in the British colonies, up to 1946 the French did not maintain a
monopoly on enforcement of criminal law. Until the passage of a new constitution in 1946,
“the criminal law applicable to persons of customary status was also based on local
custom.” While accusations of major crime were within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal de
Cercle and the Cour de Cassation and all citizens faced trial in French courts under French
law, subjects, that is most of the population, could be tried pursuant to customary law.16
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The British were absolutely certain that their law was superior to that of any
indigenous group in the Gold Coast and that they were entitled to alter the common law to
enable them to rule the local population more easily. Indeed, this view was sustained by
the Privy Council, which ruled in 1939 that local colonial ordinances could properly expand
liability under English criminal law so that eliminating violence as an element of the crime of
sedition as in the Gold Coast Criminal Code was lawful.17 The Gold Coast Criminal Code
fully states its law of sedition, the Court said, and is not subject to any “glosses or
interpretation of the law of England or Scotland.” Thus, proof of incitement to violence, a
necessary element of the crime of sedition in Great Britain is not an element of the offense
in the Gold Coast. Moreover, the West Africa Court of Appeal had held that even if
incitement to violence were to be considered necessary to prove the crime, the opinion of
the Secretary for Native Affairs that the “local inhabitants (the mass of the people) believe
every word they see in the paper” was properly admitted as expert opinion on the issue of
incitement because it is his duty to study such opinion and therefore he qualified as an
expert as to popular reaction.
In this chapter, I discuss some of the most important themes of British criminal justice
and procedure in the Gold Coast: common law defenses in a non-common law community,
jury trials, availability of defense counsel and appeals. However, like much of British policy
with respect to justice generally, the administration of criminal justice was fraught with
inconsistencies. Thus, British judges were unable to come to terms with certain defenses
asserted in circumstances with which the judges had no experience. Moreover defense
counsel in capital cases at state expense were provided in some places whereas
defendants were often tried without any professional representation in others. Trial by jury
17
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was available in capital and specified other cases in some places whereas capital cases
were tried without jury in others. Lastly habeas corpus was always available as a remedy
for Europeans but not for Africans.
In dealing with the issue of the “superiority” of English criminal law, we should briefly
examine the application of British law to some widely employed defenses to criminal
charges in an African context. A mistake of fact was a valid total or mitigatory defense to a
charge of murder under the common law, but British courts refused to accept the most
common reason asserted by Gold Coast defendants for mistake as a defense against a
charge of murder when the victim was claimed to be a “witch,” because they could not
acknowledge that an uneducated African could reasonably believe in witchcraft or the
supernatural and no reasonable Englishman (emphasis mine) would accept the reality of
witchcraft. Similarly, self defense was not accepted when the alleged aggressor was
claimed to be a witch because the courts held that “the threat must be physical, not
metaphysical.”18 Seidman notes that the Colonial Criminal Codes “assume a system of
beliefs at war with that of the indigenous population . . . the defendants are convicted
without any subjective appreciation that what they have done is wrong, let alone criminal.”
British courts “deny the world view of the ordinary African and hold him rigidly to a foreign
[i.e. English] standard” as to what an Englishman would consider to be reasonable.19
Moreover, the British courts ignored proof that the killer of someone alleged to be a witch
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truly believed the victim to be a witch holding that mens rea (intent) was an objective, not a
subjective, test. They similarly refused to accept delusion, insanity or provocation as
defenses, even in mitigation.20
Right To Counsel
In the Gold Coast Colony, as well as in the Protectorates other than Ashanti and the
Northern Territories, it had been accepted from the date the Colony was created that those
accused of capital and some other serious crimes in the British courts had the absolute right
to be represented by counsel. Indeed, as early as 1893, the Governor had accepted the
suggestion of Chief Justice Hutchinson that Puisne Judges be permitted to authorize
payment to local counsel from public funds to defend accuseds in murder cases of up to
five guineas for each case.21 In Ashanti and the Northern Territories from their annexation
in 1902 to their absorption into the Gold Coast Colony in 1935, criminal cases were tried
only by the Chief Commissioner and/or the Circuit Judge without either jury or Assessors
and the accuseds were not entitled to be represented by counsel. This disparity in
treatment between the Colony on the one hand and Ashanti and the Northern Territories
was most often explained by the paucity of potential jurors who could understand English as
well as the hostility of the English authorities to local barristers who, it was believed, would
merely obscure the facts of any particular case.
The Government’s policy with respect to criminal cases in Ashanti and the Northern
Territories aroused a great deal of popular opposition, albeit somewhat muted opposition.
T. Hutton Mills and J. E. Casely Hayford, eminent Gold Coast Barristers and once and
future members of the Legislative Council, attended a conference in London between
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representatives of the National Congress of British West Africa and the League of Nations
Union where they attached British criminal justice in West Africa for British refusal to permit
counsel to represent criminal defendants.22 Condemned by the Gold Coast Colonial
Secretary for his assault, Hutton Mills defended his statements pointing out that his remarks
were aimed at the situation in Ashanti and the Northern Territories and alluded to the
Congress’ Petition to the King seeking discontinuance of these practices, which Petition,
needless to say, was summarily rejected.23 In 1925, W. H. Stocker, KC, a former Nigerian
Puisne Judge attacked courts of administrators such as that of the Chief Commissioner of
Ashanti where capital cases were heard without counsel or jury or any right of appeal other
than to ask the Privy Council for leave to appeal.24
Shortly afterward there arose a case that set on the road a new policy as to counsel
for criminal defendants in Ashanti. In 1928, Dr. Benjamin Knowles, a physician employed
by the Government and based in a small town not too far from Kumasi, the capital of
Ashanti, was accused of murdering his wife. The couple had entertained some friends for
lunch and had imbibed a considerable amount of wine before retiring to their bedroom for a
nap. A few moments later, the house servants heard what they thought might be a gunshot.
One of the servants summoned the District Commissioner who came to the house but was
assured nothing was wrong. Sometime thereafter, a surgeon from Kumasi arrived at the
house and learned that Mrs. Knowles had been shot. In response to his questions, she said
that she had been examining Dr. Knowles’ pistol, sat on it and when trying to remove it from
beneath her, the trigger got caught in her clothing and it fired. Taken to a hospital in
Kumasi, Mrs. Knowles repeated her explanation under oath and shortly thereafter, she
22
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died.25 Dr. Knowles was charged with murder and brought to trial before the Ashanti Circuit
Judge without a jury or counsel.26 Dr. Knowles was convicted of murder and sentenced to
be hanged, but the sentence was commuted by the Governor to life imprisonment and an
appeal was taken to the Privy Council, the only court to which an appeal could not be
prohibited as were appeals to the Full Court of the Gold Coast.27 Knowles’ counsel
specified four grounds for appeal: failure to try him by jury; lack of evidence upon which a
verdict of murder could be based, I. e., malicious intent; the Acting Circuit Judge’s failure to
require the prosecution to bear the burden of proof; and his failure to transfer the case to
the Supreme Court of the Gold Coast for trial by jury.28 After an extensive hearing, the Privy
Council allowed the appeal and quashed the verdict but not on the grounds that Knowles
had been deprived of counsel or a jury trial, because, The Times reported, the Privy Council
could not put itself in the position of a local court to decide if a jury trial was practicable and
permitted by local circumstances and the right to a jury trial in the colonies is not a sine qua
non, but because the Circuit Judge, despite extensive evidence to support a verdict other
than murder considered only the possibility of murder and not manslaughter and
erroneously relied on the rejected dying declaration as evidence of murder.29 Thus, while
25
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(continued...)

reaching what most observers saw and a just and correct result, the Privy Council ignored
“the remarkable method of criminal procedure that deprived the prisoner of the right of
being tried by a jury and callously denied him the professional and skillful services of either
solicitor or counsel.”30 Stacey Hynd argues that this strange decision, as she characterized
it, was made under pressure to release Knowles while avoiding a requirement for counsel
and juries in colonial murder trials.31
In 1931, the Acting Circuit Court Judge reluctantly convicted two men of murder but
noted that the right to counsel was necessary to achieve justice in criminal cases.32 Sidney
Abrahams, a former Olympic athlete and brother of the one hundred meter dash gold
medalist in 1924 Harold Abrahams (“Chariots of Fire”) commenting on the Acting Circuit
Judge’s remark wrote that “What every fair-minded person, lawyer or not, desires to see in
the administration of justice is the 100 percent insurance against a miscarriage of justice
and without the aid of counsel on both sides it is accepted in all civilised (sic) communities
that this is unlikely to be achieved.”33
Ultimately the combination of public reaction to the Knowles case and pressure from
the legal officers in both the Gold Coast and the Colonial Office swayed the Secretary of
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State to agree to permit criminal defendants anywhere in Ashanti and the Northern
Territories to be represented by counsel. Even before the Privy Council’s statement of
reasons in the Knowles case had been made public, the Gold Coast Independent was
speculating on what the Privy Council might say as to the death penalty imposed without a
jury or counsel and suggesting that the shortcomings it expected the Privy Council to
describe should be rectified as soon as possible.34
In reporting to the Secretary of State, Hazelrigg of the Colonial Office minuted that
the Governor, Chief Justice Deane, Attorney General Abrahams, the Solicitor General and
three former Circuit Judges all agreed with Bushe that attorneys should be allowed in all
cases other than in Native Tribunals and, contrary to Bushe, would allow juries in capital
cases. Hazelrigg explained Bushe’s opposition to jury trials on the basis that cases needed
to be tried locally and that it was nearly impossible to empanel juries in Ashanti and the
Northern Territories with an adequate knowledge of English. Hazelrigg argued that Bushe’s
reasons were “conclusive.”35 Three weeks later, the Secretary of State accepted Hazelrigg’s
explanation and agreed to the admission of attorneys in Ashanti Circuit Court in all criminal
and civil cases except in land cases as well as Bushe’s reasons for not having juries.36 This
was not the end of the evolution of criminal procedure in Ashanti and the Northern
Territories as, in 1935, the jurisdiction of the Gold Coast Supreme Court was extended to
and amalgamated with that of the Circuit Court and all procedures applicable to the Colony
were applied in those territories as well, including jury trials for capital cases and, indeed,
lesser felonies to the same extent as in the Colony.
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As was exemplified by the Knowles case, race did not usually play a role in the
administration of criminal justice, but this was not always the case. Thus, in 1910, the Privy
Council ruled that the writ of habeas corpus was available only to Europeans and not to the
African subjects of the crown.37 This situation endured in the Gold Coast until 1935 when
Chief Justice Deane granted the writ of habeas corpus to two African men jailed by the
Accra District Commissioner.
The matter arose out of a contested election for the post of Ga Manche, the principal
chief of the Ga people. In accordance with the provisions of the Native Administration
Ordinance of 1927, the Provincial Council of Chiefs that had jurisdiction over native political
disputes found in favor of one of the contestants and preparations were made for his
enstoolment. The new Ga Manche’s Linguist swore an affidavit before the District
Commissioner in which he charged unnamed followers of the losing candidate with a desire
to disrupt the enstoolment ceremony. The District Commissioner asked, not summoned,
the men who ultimately sought the writ to come to see him where he met them in his private
office, not in his courtroom along with the Inspector of Police. He read the affidavit to them
and then asked them to sign a Peace Bond with sureties for £250. When they declined
saying that they had done nothing wrong, the District Commissioner summarily ordered
them to be jailed for three months at hard labor.38 They petitioned for the writ which the
Chief Justice granted.39 Deane wrote to the Governor saying that the case reinforced
Bushe’s recommendation, discussed elsewhere, that District Commissioners should not
37
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33.

retain jurisdiction in criminal matters, and that the case showed the problems that arose
where a District Commissioner acted as a judge in cases where he has a political interest.
Deane found that the Petitioners were imprisoned without being summoned, charged, or
given an opportunity to defend themselves, facts that the Solicitor General conceded on the
hearing of the application for the writ. Deane held that there must be a complaint that
shows that the accused is doing an act or has made a statement that can reasonably be
said to threaten a breach of the peace. Reading the Linguist’s affidavit as a complaint, it
shows no such act or statement and does not even mention the Petitioners’ names, avering
only that the followers of the Ga Manche’s opponents may threaten violence and the District
Commissioner should have known this as he was experienced in his position. The request
that the petitioners meet the District Commissioner in his office did not substitute for a
summons and a meeting in a private room is not a trial which must be in a public place. No
witnesses were present and thus Petitioners were deprived of their right to confront and
cross examine them. Deane decried the District Commissioner’s conduct, writing: that he
knew and should have known that a District Commissioner “is not supposed to interfere with
the criminal work of the Magistrate, [yet] he determines to deal with this matter himself, and
is so anxious to quell all opposition to the Manche that on the vague affidavit of [the
Manche’s Linguist], he proceeds to send for people whom [the Linguist] had not even
mentioned but which presumably he knew as opponents of the Manche.” In the future, the
District. Commissioner should leave criminal matters to the Magistrate “especially when
politics enter into the questions at issue and he himself is more or less concerned.”40
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Chief Justice Deane confirmed the trend toward a more liberal view of British
procedure seen in the spread of jury trial and availability of counsel that mirrored those in
the metropole. This will be seen again as we turn to a discussion of criminal appeals.
Jury Trials
Richard Vogler has argued that British imperialism was largely responsible for the
global development of jury trials.41 He points out that the effect of the right to jury trial
benefitted the colonial minority of white settlers. Accordingly, the right to a trial by jury came
first to Canada, Australia and New Zealand and was introduced into Africa in the Cape
Colony.42 Trial by a jury of one’s peers was not a common right in the Empire, however, but
available only where enacted by Ordinance as an exercise of the Royal Prerogative.43 The
1861 Indian Code of Criminal Procedure entitled Europeans to a jury trial where the panel
had a European majority and the judge was British. In 1883 the Code was amended to
permit Indian judges to preside over the trial of Europeans provided that the panel was
composed of at least an equal number of Europeans and Indians.44 In many parts of the
Empire, such as the East African Protectorates, Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, trial by
jury was made available only to Europeans and Americans. In West Africa, by contrast,
Africans in the Gold Coast Colony had such right and those who spoke English and met
local property qualifications were entitled to sit on juries.45
The Criminal Procedure and Criminal Code Ordinances of 1876, drafted by David P.
Chalmers, the first Chief Justice of the Gold Coast Colony, passed into law along with the
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Supreme Court Ordinance and were among the first enacted in the newly proclaimed
colony. The Criminal Procedure Ordinance established the manner in which all criminal
matters were to be handled from arrest and initial interrogation of the accused through trial
and appeal, capital cases and such other felonies as the Governor decided were to be tried
to juries. These juries were empaneled from Europeans and indigens who could read, write
and understand English. Although the Criminal Procedure Ordinance of 1876 authorized
jury trials for capital cases and many other felonies designated by the Governor, Chalmers
anticipated that most trials would be conducted by the court with Assessors, three in
number, chosen from the same panel as were juries, but whose determinations were
subject to being overruled by the presiding judge.46
While Vogler writes of the expressed policy of the Colonial Office favoring extension
of the jury system in West Africa, Wiener highlights the reluctance of local colonial officials
to promote jury trials because of their fear, justified in many cases according to them, of jury
nullification resulting from racial antagonisms. Wiener points to a substantial body of
evidence to show that the Gold Coast Governors were not at all happy with criminal
offenses being tried by juries or even by assessors.47 These expressions are not
necessarily inconsistent. The Colonial Office while concerned with “miscarriages of justice,”
was promoting a policy it deemed to be consistent with a desire to extend to its colonial
subjects the rights of Englishman, while local colonial Governors could and did state their
concern that Colonial Office policy would not work very well in their colonies.
Thus, Governor Ussher complained to the Secretary of State Lord Kimberly in
Summer 1880 about criminal proceedings on a trial for slave dealing held at Lagos [then
part of the Gold Coast Colony] “it has become more and more evident that it is impossible to
46
47

.

6.

. 8 8.

Wiener, 25.
-427-

rely upon an impartial decision from either a jury or assessors, in cases where the accused
[as in the case being discussed] can command local influence.” Only because the Puisne
Judge presiding, Macleod, overruled the assessors would there have been a guilty verdict.48
The Governor’s complaints about the difficulty in obtaining criminal convictions extended
beyond one particular case. The following month, Ussher again wrote to Lord Kimberly
noting that despite the prestige of his Queen’s Advocate as a prosecutor, convictions were
not forthcoming. Perhaps, he suggested, if an experienced barrister to assist in prosecuting
criminal cases was sent to him, the Administration would be more successful.49
Eighteen months later, Governor Rowe also complained that there were too many
acquittals despite “most positive evidence of the guilt of the prisoners and noted a Lagos
Times leader saying that such verdicts were a “serious and painful miscarriage of justice.”
At the request of the Colonial Office, he asked the judges to comment on the workings of
the jury system. They replied that they believed that the juries in Cape Coast were as good
as those in England but were indifferent in Elmina and bad in Accra while in Lagos they
were no better than those in Ireland. One Acting Puisne Judge, Watts in Lagos,
complained of juries acquitting obviously guilty accuseds and enclosed with his response a
news clipping attacking such verdicts as “iniquitous.” Mcleod said that he was “highly
dissatisfied with the moral qualifications of the men on the Jury List in Lagos” and that he
tried cases there with assessors and rejected many of their “not guilty” verdicts. He
recommended that only Cape Coast cases should be tried with juries.50
Governor Rowe wrote to Chief Justice Marshall, telling him that Lord Kimberley was
concerned about “miscarriages of justice” because of the “unwillingness of juries to convict
48
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although clear evidence of guilt has been presented to them.” He asked the Chief Justice’s
opinion on the issue to be sent as soon as convenient directly to the Secretary of State.51
Dissenting from the views expressed by McLeod and Watts, Chief Justice Marshall said that
during his service on the Gold Coast since 1873, he had much experience with juries of
both Europeans and educated Africans and had “a very agreeable surprise at the intelligent
attention they exercised and the real assistance they were to me in criminal trials.” He said
that when the Court summed up impartially at Cape Coast and elsewhere, juries responded
properly with “less danger of any miscarriage of justice” than in England. Now that jury
panels had been expanded to include all men in the District not just those able to
understand English, juries are even more effective, although it is more work because of the
necessity for interpreters, but jurymen who speak English watch and check that the
interpreter does his work properly. Interpretation also encouraged counsel to speak to the
jury more simply. Moreover, including chiefs and all natives on jury lists worked particularly
well in Accra and some other coastal communities by breaking down “prejudice and bias”
among the “small educated clique” against the traditional people. He stated his belief that
the assessor system should be abolished in criminal cases and that all such cases should
be tried by juries, because, since most defendants are unrepresented, juries were an even
more important aid to the Court as the judge had to act at times to assure that the
defendant’s case is presented properly. Marshall disagreed with a statement made by the
Queen’s Advocate, Collyer, that Accra residents would not convict because they were
hostile to the Government. The Chief Justice noted his concurrence “without reservation”
with the views expressed to him by Puisne Judge Smalman Smith as to the value of juries
as well as similar views expressed by then Puisne Judge Bailey. With respect to slave
51
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cases heard by Macleod where Macleod overruled the Assessors’ verdict to acquit, Marshall
said that while he could not challenge the trial Judge, he urged that such cases should be
appealable on the facts as well as the law to a Full Court to allay public concern as to the
propriety of the Court’s action.52
Marshall went on to note that jury verdicts depended not only on the evidence before
the jury but the manner in which it was presented, thus indicating that verdicts which may be
unsatisfactory to the Administration derived as much from the manner in which the
prosecutor presented the case as from any possible jury prejudice. He recommended that
the jury system be maintained throughout the colony with appeals to a Full Court from
verdicts where the judge overruled the Assessors.53
Perhaps trying to mollify his Chief Justice, Governor Rowe advised the Colonial
Office that he’d never had any complaints of dishonest juries in Cape Coast or Elmina. He
was aware of anecdotal evidence of bias in acquittals in murder cases but had no evidence
that any such bias was systematic.54 However, the Governor disagreed with his Chief
Justice and concurred in the opinions of Bailey and Macleod against permitting appeals
from judgments overruling assessors’ verdicts on issues of fact because, in part, of the
difficulty in convening a Full Court. He would rather extend the jury system if necessary
since the majority of the judges say that it worked well.55
The Acting Governor, W. Brandford Griffith, Sr., reported that two of his Puisne
Judges, Bailey and Macleod, opposed Marshall’s proposal as did he. Bailey said that the
Full Court was no better in these cases than a single judge. He had no objection to appeals
52
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on questions of law, as would be the case in England, but “as a matter of expediency and
practicability” not where the facts are disputed, since convening a Full Court, even on an
expedited basis, took weeks and required judges to stop all their other work. Macleod noted
that if review were to be decided upon, it should be by a Court and not the Executive.
Herbert and Wingfield of the Colonial Office, agreed with the judges’ objections that it was
too difficult to assemble a Full Court as one Puisne Judge was always on leave. Lord
Kimberly, decided that it would be inopportune to alter the jury system at that time.56
Despite the views of a majority of the judges, the Governors of the Gold Coast
continued to echo complaints, primarily from Europeans as the operation of the jury system.
In June, 1891, Governor Griffith, Sr., reported complaints from local Europeans as to, inter
alia, “the abuse of trial by jury” and “defects in the law and practice of the jury system.”
Francis Smith, then the Acting Chief Justice, denied for himself and his colleagues the
charge of showing “indifference” in selecting juries “irrespective of their fitness or
relationship to prisoners to be tried.” Smith said that the complainant was ignorant of the
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance relating to juries and their qualifications,
that jury lists of people to serve for one year were prepared by the District Commissioners,
were publicly posted and revised if necessary in accordance with any objections to any of
the individuals listed. He went on to note that panels and petit juries were both drawn
blindly. In the one case specified in the main complaint to Griffith, Sr., the relationship by
marriage of a juror to the accused in the case was not brought to his attention until almost
the end of the trial when he could do little or nothing except to direct a mistrial and order a
new trial, which he had done. Smith, responding to a further complaint about the inability of
jurors to understand the proceedings, said that illiteracy was not a basis for disqualifying a
56
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juror, because the natives are “shrewd and not lacking in common sense, and, in these
particulars, they compare favourably with the so-called educated gentlemen.”57 Whether
because Judge Smith convinced Governor Griffith, Sr., and the Colonial Office that Africans
made more than adequate jurors or because of the inertia so often displayed by the
Colonial Office in London as well as officials in Accra, no changes were made to the jury
system in response to any of the complaints then made as to its alleged inadequacy.58
Determined to reduce the number of acquittals in cases of felony, in 1896 the new
Governor, William Maxwell, submitted a proposed amendment to the Criminal Procedure
Ordinance to reduce the number of jurors from twelve to seven. Despite the seeming
simplicity in the amendment, it took two years to push it through the Legislative Council, in
part because, the Acting Governor, Frederick Hodgson, subsequently explained, Chief
Justice Griffith, Jr., objected to the draftsmanship of almost every clause in the Bill resulting
in a totally revised draft and the withdrawal of the Bill and submission of a totally new bill
prepared by the Attorney General, Nicoll. It was finally passed and sent to the Colonial
Office as Number 37 of 1898 in January of that year.59
Issues relating to the operation of the jury system inevitably became enmeshed with
questions as to different treatment of Europeans and Africans. In a letter sent by the Chief
Justice to the Colonial Office, Griffith, Jr., made an effort to deal with such questions,
pointing out that no one, white or black, might be tried by assessors alone, whom, it was
57
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feared would be biased against the former and in favor of the latter, but only by assessors
with a judge who could and often did override decision of assessors. Yes, the Chief Justice
admitted, white men could from time to time be tried by a black jury, e.g. at Accra where
there were no Europeans on the jury list, and might have been wrongly convicted. Griffith,
Jr. said that he knew of one European convicted by a black jury, who, he believed would
have been acquitted had he been black, although it must be said one cannot tell whether
such a conviction or any hypothetical acquittal would result from prejudice or the evidence
before the jury. That problem could be cured if the Attorney General were to arrange “that
no white man be tried at any place where it is not practicable to obtain a reasonable number
of white men on the panel”60 He went on to recommend that defendants should be allowed
to elect trial by the Court and assessors at the time they were called upon to plead rather
then when arraigned before a Magistrate. Indeed, he permitted a defendant to choose his
method of trial even where he had previously stated a preference before the Magistrate for
a trial by the Court and Assessors. The Chief Justice expressed his disagreement with Mr.
Justice Gough’s suggestion that Judges should not be permitted to order a jury trial in cases
usually tried with Assessors. Finally, he noted that he opposed the view of the Attorney
General that such official should have the right to require a trial by the Court and Assessors.
Much to the apparent displeasure of the Gold Coast Administration, the Secretary of State,
Lord Crewe, told Governor John Rodger, that he agreed with Chief Justice Griffith and,
once again, that the current system would be continued without change.61
Still concerned with the prevalence of acquittals, in 1915 the Colonial Governor,
Hugh Clifford, proposed an amendment to the Criminal Procedure Ordinance providing as
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requested by the Colonial Office, for majority, rather than unanimous, verdicts in all criminal
cases triable by jury except for capital cases. However, Governor Clifford reported, as an
additional safeguard against “improper” acquittals, his Chief Justice, Philip C. Smyly, and
Attorney General proposed that any acquittal by a majority verdict as provided for in the
proposed amendment to the Criminal Procedure Law should be contingent on the judge’s
concurrence. Such a condition would make jury trials no different from those conducted by
the Court with Assessors where the judge could overrule an Assessors’ verdict of not guilty.
This fact seemed apparent to the Colonial Office Legal Advisor, Risley, who expressed his
“grave doubts” that the judge should have a right to approve a majority verdict of acquittal.
Risley noted that the Straits Settlement law which was a model for the proposed
amendment provided that a majority verdict of acquittal was to be final, and that requiring
the Court to concur in a verdict, strained the whole principle of jury trials. But the opinion of
others in the Colonial Office differed. While E. W. Flood did not want the judge to be
involved in any manner without “overwhelming evidence of chronic perversity on the part of
Gold Coast juries,” W. D. Ellis disagreed with Flood and Legal Advisor Risley and agreed
with Chief Justice Smyly. Risley reposted at length and, ultimately, Secretary of State
Harcourt agreed with him so that the dispatch sent to Governor Clifford agreed to the
proposed Amendment and said that it was “right and proper in the interests of justice to
require the Judge’s concurrence in a majority verdict of ‘guilty’” but not so with a majority
verdict of “not guilty.” Such an acquittal, Harcourt said, should be “absolute and final.”62
Nor, Harcourt wrote the next month, was he prepared to accept a provision that
would allow the Attorney General to require a trial by a Judge and Assessors if the Attorney
General thought that such a trial would be fairer to the defendant, stating that it was not the
62
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role of the Attorney General to limit a defendant’s options. He asked Clifford to provide him
with the opinions of all the judges on that point. He stated that he was very reluctant to
interfere with the jury system where it was widely being used as in the Gold Coast, but
would consider a 5-2 majority verdict to prevent a “failure of justice” due to bias, but only if
unanimity could not be reached after a specified period (he suggested two hours) of
deliberation, and even then only in non-capital cases.63
In October, Clifford reported as to the opinions of the judges sought by Harcourt to
the new Secretary of State, Andrew Bonar Law, as to whether or not the Attorney General
should be authorized to seek a trial by Assessors in lieu of a jury trial.64 Chief Justice Smyly
and Judge Gough opposed any such restriction on trial by jury, while Judges Hawtayne and
Watson favored trial by the Court or the Court with Assessors because they believed that
there were too many “perverse” jury verdicts. Judge King Farlow Nettleton (only appointed
in February 1915) changed his opinion from opposing restriction to favoring it because, he
said, of his recent experience with “glaringly perverse verdicts” “entirely against the weight
of the evidence.”65 Governor Clifford added that he was convinced that juries were
unreliable (as, he also said, were Assessors) because in part of “tribal hostility” toward
strangers (e.g. against Ashantis and other Africans from outside the Gold Coast) and feeling
in favor of local men. In a December dispatch, Bonar Law said that he would approve the
proposed Amendment only if it was explicitly made clear that jury trial must be available in
capital cases. He also acknowledged the opinions of the judges who differed as to trial by
Assessors, saying that he would accept such a trial only if so requested by the defendant,
not the Attorney General, or if the judge had discretion to require a jury. He asked that the
63
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proposed amendment be redrafted because as written it appeared to apply to capital cases.
As to a 5-2 verdict to convict that would be acceptable if the Court agreed, otherwise there
would have to be a new trial with another jury. 66
The amendment as passed (Criminal Procedure Amendment Ordinance No. 12 of
1916) demonstrates again the inconsistency and frequent changes of policy in both the
Colonial Office and the Gold Coast Administration. Whereas Bonar Law had disapproved
the concept of the Attorney General being able to seek non jury trials, he now accepted an
Amended Ordinance that permitted the Attorney General to move the Court to order a trial
by Assessors rather than a jury if the prosecution believed that “a more fair and impartial
trial” could be had, that is to say one which would more likely to convict a defendant than
would be the case with potentially hostile juries. The Amendment permitted the information,
the pleading setting forth the allegations as to the facts of the offence, to be amended by
the Court at any time and authorized the Court to waive irregularities in “form, procedure
and substance (emphasis mine)” provided that the prosecution could show that there was
no prejudice to the defendant. As had been thoroughly discussed, It provided for jury
verdicts in non-capital cases by a 5-2 majority, but allowed the judge to refuse to accept a
majority guilty verdict and to direct a new trial. The Amendment authorized a retrial after a
hung jury, a provision that one would think to be vital but that had never before been part of
the Ordinance. Finally, provision was made for applications by the Government to dismiss
an appeal despite errors in law or reception or non-reception of evidence or in jury
instructions if the Full Court was satisfied that “no substantial miscarriage of justice has
actually occurred,” a very subjective standard that satisfied once again the Administration’s
desire for more convictions. Even in the event that the Full Court determined that the
66
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standard had been met, it was obliged, except in the case of errors of law, to order a new
trial.67
Two years after enactment of the Ordinance, Chief Justice Smyly reported on behalf
of the judges as to the manner in which the 1916 Amendment was working. He told the
Government that no non-capital case at the six Assizes the judges held in 1917 that were
triable by jury were tried with Assessors, only one case had a majority verdict, a 6-1
conviction with which the judge agreed. The Acting Attorney General also reported that no
applications had been made by the Attorney General for trial by Assessors.68 Thus after
months of lobbying for strengthening the Government’s position viz à vis criminal
defendants, the result was little if any more advantageous to the Government than if nothing
had been done.
The system created by the 1916 Amendment Ordinance continued essentially
unchanged until 1932 when it was again amended in a manner to secure juries more
favorable to the Government’s position. It authorized Government officials to sit on juries.
Nana Sir Ofori Atta, a long time unofficial member of the Legislative Council complained
bitterly about the Government’s transparent attempt to load the dice against defendants.69
The Acting Governor, Geoffrey Northcotte, blandly and quite weakly denied Atta’s
accusations, saying that Government officials sat on juries throughout the Empire and that
he was sure that the performance of Gold Coast officials on juries would prove such
accusations to be wrong. He was supported by his Attorney General who asserted that by
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increasing the number of “intelligent and responsible” individuals on jury panels, the
administration of justice would be improved.70
The issue of the availability of jury trials remained contested even into the 1930's. In
1934, writing as to jury trials in Ashanti and the Northern Territories, Woolhouse
Bannerman, the Acting Circuit Judge, minuted opposing jury trials because there were too
few literates and those few were mainly foreigners.71 Nevertheless, in 1935, the Criminal
Procedure Code was once again amended in connection with the Courts Ordinance of that
year to extend the system of criminal trials by jury or the Court with Assessors to the entirety
of the Gold Coast including Ashanti and the Northern Territories.72 Capital cases were to
be tried by juries and the Governor in Council was authorized to specify which non-capital
cases might be tried by juries. At the same time, it provided three peremptory challenges
for each defendant and for the prosecution as to potential jurors but not as to Assessors. In
trials with the latter, the judge continued to have the final say and was not bound by findings
of the Assessors notwithstanding the decision of the WACA in 1933 holding that a
unanimous verdict of not guilty by the Assessors in a murder trial constituted conclusive
evidence of the existence of reasonable doubt requiring reversal of the Court’s judgment of
conviction.73 In so holding, the WACA effectively stripped the trial court of its unfettered
discretion to ignore the Assessors’ verdict without touching the terms of the Criminal
Procedure Code that embodied such discretion.
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Perhaps to encourage defendants to opt for trial by Assessors, the Criminal
Procedure Amendment Ordinance (No. 21) of 1936 expanded the universe of potential
Assessors to include all males between the ages of twenty and sixty and directed the
Sheriffs to prepare panels of potential Assessors to serve when called upon in the same
manner as they prepared panels of potential jurors.74
In 1938, the Gold Coast Government reopened its attack on the jury system. The
Acting Governor Northcotte sent the Colonial Office a memorandum dated 8.21.37 from
Attorney General Blackall in support of a Bill to reform the jury system. Blackall noted that
jury trials were not inevitable even in England, but were suspended from time to time where
local conditions required ( e.g. when agrarian crime broke out in Ireland in the 1880's) and
were not universal in the colonies. He grudgingly acknowledged that in the Gold Coast the
system worked “tolerably well” unless the accused could, he asserted, corrupt the jury, the
case is a party feud, the accused had a relative on the jury or was someone who knew a
juror. Thus, he said, “trial by jury often degenerates into a solemn farce; an Accra defendant
charged in front of an Accra jury “would be very unlucky if he found himself convicted by
such a body,” and no member of the Aborigines Rights Protection Society would be
convicted by a Cape Coast jury.75 Nevertheless, he wanted authority to change the venue of
trials without the necessity of an overwhelming showing of prejudice as had previously been
required. Blackall said that he had received a number of suggestions from Puisne Judge
Savary, among which were to disqualify anyone convicted of any crime involving dishonesty
and not just serious felonies. He asked to be permitted to introduce a property qualification
because, he said, a person of means is more likely to be impartial although he put forth no
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evidence for this conclusion. Blackall went on to assert that the preparation of jury lists was
slipshod and omitted many possible good jurors, in part because the qualifications of
proposed jurors was not investigated by the District Commissioners and that too many
people of means, both European and African were exempted. In a rather radical proposal
for the time, he suggested that European and educated African women should be called to
serve on equal terms with the men. He went on to argue for the elimination of peremptory
challenges in favor of having questionable jurors “stand by” until the entire panel was
exhausted, because, he asserted, accuseds challenged as many Europeans as they could,
and, since each accused had three challenges, most Europeans in cases of multiple
accuseds were removed. If challenges were to be kept, he proposed to preclude
defendants from challenging jurors of a race other than that of the accused. He asserted the
need to have the authority to require a trial by the Court with assessors in lieu of a jury
rather than to leave that determination to the discretion of the court. Blackall argued that
cases to be tried without juries should be specified in the Ordinance or by rule and not be
subject to the Governor’s determination.76
While on leave in London, Blackall met with the Colonial Office legal advisor, Bushe
and Jones, his assistant. Bushe expressed his opposition to making trial by Judge and
assessors mandatory on the Attorney General’s application as this would be seen as an
attack on the jury system. It would be better to leave such determination to the Court’s
discretion. Blackall told Bushe that he would not pursue qualification of women as jurors for
the time being. Finally, Bushe told Blackall that he would recommend against eliminating
peremptory challenges but would suggest that both sides be limited to the same number no
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matter how many defendants there were, effectively giving the Government an advantage in
the prosecution of multiple defendants.
Seeking more and more control, Blackall now pressed for an amendment permitting
him to set in the venue of a trial to any part of the Gold Coast that he chose or, once having
set it, to seek a change if he believed that his chosen venue would not afford the
Government a fair trial. In addition, he proposed disqualifying from jury service anyone
convicted of an offense, misdemeanor or serious felony of any sort and raising the age for
jury service to twenty five. His proposals were enacted as The Criminal Procedure
Amendment Ordinance (No. 42) of 1939.77
Later in 1940, the Government, following up on Blackall’s 1938 memorandum,
proposed another Amendment to take away the right to challenge jurors peremptorily in
capital cases.78 The abolition of peremptory challenges would apply to the prosecution as
well as to the defense, but in non-capital cases would apply only to the prosecution which
would rely on its common law right to “stand by” or wait until the entire panel was seated
and then accept or reject the entire panel.79
In 1944, the Administration was making the same complaints about the jury system
that it had been making since the foundation of the Colony in 1874. Recalling Blackall’s
faint praise for juries and specific complaints raised in his 1938 memorandum, Governor
Burns recommended that jury trials be restricted to capital cases and some cases
punishable by life in prison, all others to be tried by the court with or without assessors at
77
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the judge’s discretion.80 The Chief Justice, Harrigan, supported the Governor, saying that
the consensus of opinion overwhelmingly condemned the jury system: “In the Colonies
often everyone of those engaged in a case are known (perhaps intimately) to each other
and the idea that independent fair-minded unbiased judgments can be give is a myth.”81
Attorney General Arthur Lewey added that in the colonies, corruption, partiality and bias
were difficult to root out so that the jury system should be severely limited. It is very hard,
he went on, to find impartial, intelligent jurors and, moreover, juries waste time and money
and lower the prestige of the court82 Pointing out that the unsatisfactory state of the jury
system is not a new issue, has been considered several times previously and has never
been changed because of political considerations, a Colonial Office official recommended
doing nothing because the same political considerations still prevailed.83 Although he
agreed with the Governor’s recommendations the Secretary of State declined to authorize
implementation of those recommendations, saying they should be deferred until the war is
over when they may be revisited.84
This survey of the history of the jury system in the Gold Coast clearly evidences
some of the inconsistencies of colonial governance and a rare instance of the Colonial
Office refusing to go along with the recommendation of its principal agent on the scene.
Thus, despite repeated criticisms of juries by the Gold Coast administration, some justified
but most not, and efforts to restrict an accused’s right to trial by jury, the Secretaries of
State and the principal policy makers in the Colonial Office refused to accede to the views
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of the Governors in Accra to take the final step to eliminate what had come to be seen as
one of the British subject’s most basic rights. In so doing, the Colonial Office appears to
have ignored claims by the administration of corruption among jurors, to which Governors in
the Gold Coast attributed so many refusals to convict where the evidence in their view
appeared to be overwhelming. I submit that the archival evidence shows that the jury
system in criminal cases worked exceedingly well and that administrative complaints about
improper acquittals were too often mere whining. The Colonial Office’s insistence on
preserving the right to jury trials confirmed Vogler’s view that British imperialism led to the
spread of jury trials and prevented its local administrations, at least in the Gold Coast, from
eliminating what the latter deemed to be endemic corruption. If British colonialism had any
residuary positive effect, it was in passing on to Ghana the system of trial by jury.
Criminal Appeals
In my earlier discussion of the creation of a WACA, I wrote of the problems arising in
dealing with criminal appeals in the different member states. Insofar as the Gold Coast
was concerned, these problems were of long standing. As early as the last decade of the
nineteenth century, local barristers and particularly John Mensah Sarbah were expressing
their objections to the often arbitrary and illegal actions of the District Commissioners,
actions that the Attorney-General defended because of the necessity to maintain British
prestige. Sarbah proposed permitting defendants to appeal to the Full Court from the
Divisional Court’s affirmance of a District Commissioner’s conviction and to permit the Full
Court to require Divisional Courts to refer cases to it where the District Commissioner had
sought advice from the Divisional Judge, because, Sarbah argued, no judge should hear a
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case in which he had given advice. As might be expected, the Government rejected
Sarbah’s proposals on the stated grounds of expediency.85
Until the late 1920's, criminal appeals from the judgments of the Divisional Courts
rendered during Assizes to the Full Court were permitted only by leave and then only on
questions of law. In connection with the negotiations for the creation of the West Africa
Court of Appeal, the representatives of Sierra Leone pushed for the Court to have complete
criminal jurisdiction, a proposal that the Gold Coast representatives resisted until almost the
end of the negotiations. Then, in early 1929 Governor Slater advised the Colonial Office
that he had receded from his prior views and agreed that the West Africa Court of Appeal
should have jurisdiction over criminal appeals from the Gold Coast Supreme Court on the
same terms as specified in the English Criminal Appeals Act of 1907 (7 Edw. VII c. 23
[1907]. That is, appeals as of right as to questions of law and by leave of the Divisional
Courts of the appellate court as to questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact.86
Slater’s views as to the extent appeals should be available were embodied in the
Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Ordinance of 1929 that provided for appeals from the
District Commissioner to the Divisional Courts on a case stated, that is, on questions of law.
If the District Commissioner refused to state a case, to set forth the question of law to be
considered, he could be ordered to do so by the Divisional Court. The Divisional Court
could decide the question of law or refer it to the Full Court which could decide it or reserve
it for the West Africa Court of Appeal, but in the hopes of precluding unworthy appeals, the
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Divisional Court was given authority to dismiss an appeal even if error below was
established if “no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred.”87
In late 1931 and early 1932, Grattan Bushe, the Colonial Office Legal Advisor, made
a tour of the British West Africa colonies to examine into the administration of justice, and
particularly criminal justice. He made a number of recommendations, one of which, Number
Five, pertained to criminal appellate jurisdiction. In the summer of 1932, the Secretary of
State sent Bushe’s report to the Acting Governor Northcotte. Bushe concluded that
appeals from the courts of summary jurisdiction, i.e. the Police Magistrates’ and District
Commissioners’ Courts, should not be limited to questions of law on a case stated because
to state a case (and thus pose a question of law) is not easy, particularly for a non-lawyer,
as were most of the District Commissioners. He recommended adoption of the so-called
East African System of appeals which permitted appeals alleging errors of fact, law and/or
in the sentence with the safeguard of summary dismissal if the appellate court felt that there
was no reasonable ground shown for the appeal.88
Later that year, the Assistant Colonial Secretary reported to the Gold Coast Colonial
Secretary and Acting Governor Northcotte, summarizing Bushe’s appellate jurisdiction
recommendation. He noted that the existing scheme on appeals from the assize court
permitted appeals as of right on the facts, the law and the sentence, but only on the law on
a case stated from the courts of summary jurisdiction, i.e. those of Police Magistrates and
District Commissioners, a distinction that the Assistant Colonial Secretary said was
“illogical.” Bushe had recommended that appeals from Police Magistrates’ and District
Commissioners’ courts be on the same basis as those from assize courts with the Appellate
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Courts being authorized to dismiss frivolous appeals summarily, the so-called African or
Kenyan system. Chief Justice Deane said that he preferred the “Trinidad” system where
the prosecutor could appeal from a failure to convict, there would be no appeal from a guilty
plea, no appeal from a fine of less than £5 but an appeal as of right on all grounds from any
sentence of imprisonment. The Appellate Court would be authorized to increase the
sentence in order to deter frivolous appeals and would require a costs bond. The Attorney
General noted his agreement with Bushe’s proposals as well as some, but not all of the
Chief Justice’s recommendations. Of the four Puisne Judges, the Attorney General
reported that Michelin and Sawrey Cookson concurred with Deane, Howe would permit
appeals by the by the Attorney General only, and Yates wanted a “judicious blending” of
both the two systems but no costs bond requirement.89 Attorney General Abrahams
minuted that he was not afraid of frivolous appeals and would not permit summary dismissal
or require a costs bond, saying that “I do not believe in administering justice as if it were a
concession to the public,” but that the Attorney General should be able to appeal a failure to
convict, an anathema to those trained in American law and criminal procedure. Abrahams
urged that the Divisional Court Judges should be given the authority to examine the
proceedings before any Police Magistrate on their own initiative to “satisfy himself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety of any judgment or sentence,” but such powers of revision
should be exercised only in cases of “manifest injustice” and not without hearing both sides.
He recommended that appeals from courts of summary jurisdiction be permitted on all
grounds even from fines of less than £5, but that the Attorney General should be authorized
to appeal from a failure to convict and that the Appellate Court be permitted to increase the
penalty that had been imposed below as a deterrence to unnecessary appeals. Finally,
89
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Abrahams would also give a general power of revision to the Supreme Court with respect to
all matters in the courts of summary jurisdiction. There was time to consider these
proposals, Abrahams noted, as they would require.90
The new Governor, Shelton Thomas, told the Secretary of State that he accepted
Bushe’s recommendations to permit appeals from judgments in summary criminal
proceedings in Magistrates Courts to the Supreme Court on the same basis as from the
Supreme Court to the West Africa Court of Appeal. He reported that all his advisors were in
favor although the judges disagreed with the Attorney General and one Puisne Judge on
the procedure to be followed. Governor Thomas said that Abrahams, the Attorney General,
wanted a free appeal in all cases where a fine £5 or more was imposed and the right to
appeal an acquittal. In addition, in order to deter frivolous appeals, he wanted the appellate
court to be able to increase the punishment, ideas with which the Governor said that he
agreed.91 Chief Justice Deane, in his letter to the Governor, agreed that a complainant
(private or public) should be able to appeal a refusal to convict but he wanted bail pending
appeal to be conditioned on a bond of at least £25 and he concurred with Abrahams that
the Supreme Court should be able to increase the penalty.92 As noted above, Attorney
General Abrahams opposed a bond requirement for costs as a condition for appeal as, he
contended, it would discourage valid appeals and work against the poor. Summary
dismissal, he argued, was sufficient to deter frivolous appeals.93 Bushe minuted that he
agreed with Abrahams as did the Secretary of State who also concurred in Abrahams’ view
that the matter could be deferred until a new Criminal Procedure Ordinance was drafted in
90
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connection with the extension of Supreme Court jurisdiction to Ashanti and the Northern
Territories.94
In late 1932, perhaps in response to the widespread opposition of the farmers in the
cocoa boycott of the prior year, the Gold Coast Government began working on an
Amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code that provided, inter alia, for arrest without
warrant if the Police knew of “a design to commit any indictable offense” and commission of
the crime could not be otherwise prevented, retrial of a defendant on any offense would
have been the basis for a separate charge at the former trial. It should be noted that United
States law provides that Jeopardy attaches to any charge arising from the same facts. The
proposed amendment confirmed that all trials were to be by jury, by the Court with
Assessors or by a Judge alone and that the Governor-in-Council could Specify non-capital
cases that would be triable by jury. It authorized the Attorney General, if he believed that a
fairer trial could be had by Assessors, to move the Court for such a trial, although whether
or not to grant the motion seemed to remain within the Court’s discretion. All cases not
specified to be triable by jury were to be tried with Assessors unless the Judge ordered a
jury trial; all capital cases were to be tried by seven “special” jurors, men with special
qualifications, such a superior education and language abilities, i.e., people that Americans
would consider to be “blue ribbon” jurors, including educated Chiefs with a good reputation,
to be marked by the Registrars as being suitable to be “special jurors. Despite the trauma
of the Knowles case, there would still be no juries in any case in Ashanti or the Northern
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Territories. The Attorney General could authorize an appeal from a Magistrate’s or District
Commissioner’s refusal to convict. A defendant convicted by a court of summary
jurisdiction where the sentence was imprisonment or the fine was more than £5 could
appeal on the facts as well as the law and on the sentence. On any such appeal, the
Divisional Court could hear additional evidence to direct the Magistrate or District
Commissioner to hear additional evidence, but appeals from an Assize Court to the West
Africa Court of Appeal were to be on questions of law only.95
Supporting the Bill, The Attorney General wrote to the Legislative Council that the
1876 Code was out of date and “hopelessly inadequate in certain respects.” He said that
the proposed Amendment followed those of former Attorney General Abrahams’
recommendations with respect to appeals that Bushe had approved. He acknowledged that
the Bill made no provision for jury trials in Ashanti or the Northern Territories but suggested
that the Council should so provide in capital cases “to save the Government from the odium
which results from trials such as that of Doctor Knowles.”96
Michelin, then acting as Chief Justice, minuted that he wanted to retain a right of
revision to enable the Divisional Courts to monitor the decisions of the Magistrates and
District Commissioners based on the monthly reports that they had been submitting since
the early days of the Colony, because these summary magistrates were still too
inexperienced.97 Chief Justice Deane minuted his agreement with Michelin against the
provision authorizing the Court to decide whether or not, after a mistrial because of a hung
jury, a defendant should be retried. It should be a law officer, not the Judge who should
make that decision since it would be “inconsistent with a judicial role if he has to preside at
95
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a trial he has himself ordered.”98 On March 27, 1934, after an extended debate and a
number of amendments responsive to the comments made by the Attorney General and the
Judges, the Amendment Bill was passed and sent on to the Colonial office.99
Blackall, the new Gold Coast Attorney General, wrote to Bushe complaining about
delays in hearing capital appeals and slovenly granting of applications for leave to appeal in
criminal cases by the West Africa Court of Appeal without, he said, adequate consideration
being given to the substance of the appeal and requiring the Attorney General and his staff
to waste time dealing with frivolous appeals.100 Bushe replied, essentially telling Blackall to
moderate his criticism of the Court and of the judges, that the delays were unavoidable and
that Donald Kingdon, Nigeria Chief Justice and West Africa Court of Appeal President, told
him that he had taken steps to eliminate delays and suggested that criminal appeals could
be expedited if heard by all three Chief Justices to insure as far as possible uniformity of
decisions on the same or similar issues.101
In March 1938, Governor Hodson proposed an amendment to the Criminal
Procedure Code doing away with the right of juvenile offenders to appeal a sentence of
whipping. In his dispatch to the Colonial Office, he wrote that the Chief Justice had written
to him saying that preserving an appeal from a sentence of whipping compelled the judges
to sentence juveniles to fines or imprisonment, although why that should be so or should be
any different from a sentence of fine or imprisonment was not explained. “[W]hipping,” said
the Chief Justice, “is a wholesome deterrent to potential young African criminals,” but the
delays associated with appeals vitiates the effect of the sentence. Again why the effect of a
98
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penalty of fine or imprisonment should be affected by delays in the appellate process any
more or less than one of whipping was not explained; there is no archival evidence of an
increase in juvenile delinquency or urban disorder among youths, nor was whipping
unknown to traditional law as administered in the Native Tribunals. Nevertheless, the
Hodson agreed with the former Chief Justice Deane that whipping was better than
imprisonment and if appeals were allowed, courts would have to free or jail the convicted
accused pending the outcome.102 The Colonial Office accepted the recommendation of
Governor Hodson and former Chief Justice Deane, but asked Hodson to redraft the
amendment to keep the right to appeal but to provide for execution of the sentence before
the expiration of the ten day appeal window if no notice of appeal filed (as in the Northern
Rhodesia Ordinance), effectively reducing the time to appeal to a single day or two.103 After
agreeing to an amendment permitting a stay of execution upon the posting of a bond, the
Amendment was enacted, No. 30 of 1938, but approval was denied at Bushe’s behest,
ostensibly because he thought the amendment was poorly drafted.104
Complaints about the efficacy of the appellate procedure and the need to deter
frivolous appeals continued into the 1940's. As with similar complaints about the jury
system, the Government tried to deal with the issues by repeated amendments to the
Criminal Procedure Code. The last during the period under consideration here added to the
time of any sentence the period during the pendency of an appeal, even if the defendant
was not on bail. This stringent provision not only would affect so called frivolous appeals
but all appeals, so that even if the Court were to grant an appeal and reduce a sentence,
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the time during which the appeal was being considered would be added to the reduced
sentence.
During the period under study, British enforcement of criminal law became both more
stringent and, at the same time, professedly closer to the standards enforced in the
metropolis. However, the deference granted to the concept of trial by jury was often offset
by a proclivity toward trial by assessors where the court could, and often did, overrule the
opinions of the assessors. More offenses were added to the list of those triable by jury and
the assistance of counsel became more available. At the same time, albeit theoretically
universal, appeals of convictions were deterred by provisions adding the time during which
an appeal was pending to the sentence where an appeal was denied. That regulation
together with the cost of appeal deterred not only appeals that the colonial administration
deemed to be frivolous but undoubtedly many that were substantive and valid. In sum, the
British formulated rules of criminal procedure that reinforced their concepts of order far
more strenuously than were to be found in the metropole.105
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. .

CHAPTER XI - MARRIAGE AND DESCENT OF PROPERTY
In this chapter, I use the issue of marriage and the descent of property to evidence
the inconsistency of British policy. I discuss the origins of the Marriage Ordinance, its failure
to achieve the level of popularity among the people that the British envisioned and hoped
for, the agitation extending over twenty years to amend it to accord traditional families the
right to participate in the estates of intestates and treatment of children born within
customary unions later regularized under the Marriage Ordinance.
The issue of whether and how marriage should be regulated by British law roiled the
indigenous coastal community of the Gold Coast for about thirty years at the end of the
nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century and exposed the differing
approaches to property distribution and treatment of children between British missionaries,
the colonial authorities and many of their Gold Coast subjects. The former, as might be
expected, favored monogamous marriage and property distribution as was provided for by
English law, that is, to surviving spouses and the issue of a marriage, while most of the
latter adhered to traditional polygamous marriage and a matrilineal system of inheritance
whereby the decedent’s property descended to his or her matrilineal siblings and/or his or
her nephews and nieces leaving the surviving spouse, most often the wife, dependent for
support on her blood relations. Moreover, English law treated children born to couples who
subsequently converted to Christianity as illegitimate. Christine Oppong contends that
discontent with matrilineal inheritance was widespread among the coastal elite and such
discontent was a factor leading to a Marriage Ordinance under which inheritance would be
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patrilineal.1 Shirley Zabel argues that the purpose of regulating marriage and inheritance
was to replace as soon as possible the provisions of customary law unsatisfactory to the
British while avoiding social upheaval, that is agitation and possible violence among the
indigenous population whose matrilineal customs extended back for millennia. At the same
time the intention was to promote succession rights of wives that were unavailable to them
under customary law except through their matrilineal families.2
By contrast, Kofi Awusabo-Asere contends that regulation of marriage by ordinance
was necessitated by the rejection by members of the extended family of marriages
celebrated according to Christian rites without the consent of the families.3 Marriage
regulation, according to Martin Chanock, enabled courts to control both the parties and the
property they wished to distribute rather than leaving it to customary law.4 John Luluaki
argues that the Marriage Ordinance inferentially recognized customary marriage and
customary property distribution by differentiating it from the regime prescribed under the
statute.5 Kwame Opoku takes the position that the assumption underlying creation of a
Marriage Ordinance was the “inferiority of traditional marriage and the need for its
replacement by a system inspired by European law.”6 This last view is not supported by the
facts; had the British wished to replace traditional law, they would have legislated an
1
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ordinance that did away with traditional marriage entirely. Rather, the archival evidence
tends to support Zabel in part, but only with respect to those Gold Coasters who chose to
accept English law to govern their familial relationships. Chanock’s thesis is not supported
by the archival evidence in the Gold Coast.
Moreover, the vast majority of the people chose to marry according to traditional
custom and law. I demonstrate that the coastal elites while accepting British determination
to accord surviving spouses a definite share of the property of their deceased spouses,
insisted on maintenance of the traditional forms of marriage and succession that had an
intestate’s property pass to his matrilineal relations.7 They ultimately succeeded in
ameliorating what they claimed to be the negative effects on the matrilineal family of
deceased husbands and wives of having all property pass to his or her spouse and children
by convincing the Government to amend the law to provide for a division of an intestate’s
property between the spouse and the matrilineal family. The debates concerning regulation
of marriage were almost entirely limited to those in the coastal communities who had been
educated in England or in English schools on the Gold Coast and who engaged in the
professions or mercantile endeavors and who constituted an elite. Many of these people
were Christians but whose inheritance rights were governed by customary law.
With few exceptions, such as among the Ga people of Accra and portions of eastern
coastal regions of the Gold Coast, the indigenous population of the Gold Coast followed a
matrilineal system. A person belonged to his or her mother’s family and remained part of
that family throughout his or her life. Succession to chiefdoms came through the chief’s
7
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mother’s family, so that usually, the eldest son of the chief’s eldest sister succeeded him on
the stool. Similarly, as briefly noted above, upon the death of a man, his property, unless
he had made an enforceable testament, passed to his mother’s family, the assumption
being that his wife and his children would be cared for by the wife’s family. This system fit
will with existing customs of polygamy, the children of each wife being considered part of
that wife’s family. Thus the father could pass his property to his mother’s family and not
have to be concerned about his multiple wives and children. Of course these customs were
deemed to be anathema to Europeans in general and Christians in particular whose lives
were based on patrilineal and monogamous traditions and who abhorred the idea that the
welfare of a widow and her children would depend on collateral relatives.8 Thus Christian
missionaries, if not always the converts themselves, lobbied to legislation that would subject
Christians and any others who might be convinced to do so to provisions of English law
governing marriage and property distribution.9 However, polygamy was never prohibited nor
was it deemed to be repugnant.
This chapter discusses the regulation of marriage and the descent of property by
English law among the small minority of those who entered into monogamous marriages.
8
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Until several years after creation of the Gold Coast colony, marriage was totally unregulated
by the colonial authorities. Pressure from missionaries for legislation legally requiring
monogamy among their converts as well as questions dealing with marriage among
foreigners led in 1884 to a Marriage Ordinance that its proponents hoped would promote
marriage along European lines. This hope was not realized. Moreover, agitation began to
amend the ordinance to permit the matrilineal families of those married pursuant to its terms
to share in the estates of intestate decedents. In 1905 a special legislative committee
reviewed the claims of traditional families and proposed a compromise that satisfied both
those agitating for change as well as the colonial government. In addition, the suggested
amendment provided for legitimizing the offspring of parents who married under the
Ordinance after their births. This latter amendment delayed enactment of an amending
ordinance until the opposition from Secretary of State, Lord Elgin, was overcome. Unlike
most other pieces of colonial legislation, the Marriage Ordinance as amended in 1908
remained in force, without substantial change until today, thus my discussion of the issue
ends in that year.
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Missionary Pressure and the 1884 Marriage Ordinance
Legislation regulating marriage in the Gold Coast had its origin in agitation by
Protestant missionaries seeking to encourage Christian marriage.10 In1878, in response to
a question from the Colonial Office, David Chalmers, then Chief Justice of the Gold Coast
Supreme Court, told the Governor that no law then dealt with Christian marriage in the Gold
Coast and that an Ordinance would be necessary to deal with issues such as civil
marriage.11 Indeed, up to that point, only Church of England clerics had been authorized to
celebrate marriages.12 The following year, the Colonial Secretary, Michael Hicks-Beach,
asked the Governor to have one of his Puisne Judges, Thomas W. Jackson, draft such an
Ordinance for his consideration, using the Hong Kong Ordinance as a model.13 Jackson’s
draft was circulated among the missionary and merchant communities and comments were
collected.
This 1879 draft regularized all Christian marriages and made all ministers registrars
for purposes of certifying marriages, thus achieving one of the Basel Missionaries most
important objectives. Further, in order to encourage religious marriage, the 1879 draft,
which was approved by Chief Justice Sir James Marshall, required celebration by an
ordained minister as being the essence of marriage because a mere civil rite would
damage, so it was thought, Christian marriage among the Africans.14 However, the Colonial
10
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Office rejected this provision, because Colonial Office policy expressed in 1863 was that
marriage should be civil with religious celebration to be optional.15 When the Queen’s
Advocate, John Woodcock, expressed his doubts as to the advisability of enacting such an
Ordinance at that time, the matter was temporarily dropped.16
In May, 1882, the Governor sent a draft of a Marriage Ordinance Bill to the Colonial
Office that Jackson, had revised.17 Chief Justice Marshall attacked the proposed ordinance
because it would have legitimate children inherit per customary law, thus, he said,
destroying the principal benefit of the ordinance since under native law children do not
inherit from the fathers, rather nieces and nephews do.18 Governor Rowe strongly objected
to Marshall’s use of the word “illegitimate” with respect to children of native marriages,
since, he said, one of the main purposes of the proposed Ordinance is to afford children a
right of succession.19 Hector Bailey, Acting Chief Justice since Marshall’s retirement, also
criticized Jackson’s draft because it ignored the issue of succession in native marriages; he
thought that the English Statute of Distribution should apply to personalty and that all real
property should go to the eldest son with dower payments made annually to the widow and
younger children. He acknowledged the disadvantage of it creating two systems of
succession, but, he said, he expected natives to flock to Ordinance marriages to obtain a
better deal for their children.
The issue of the succession to real property of decedents’ marriage under the
proposed Ordinance became the centerpiece of discussions in the Colonial Office, all other
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matters being considered as merely technical. In September, 1882, Moloney, the
Administrator of the Gold Coast Colony sent another revision of the Marriage Bill to the
Secretary of State with a dispatch saying that his main concern was the retroactive effect of
the bill on Christian marriages already celebrated because the Bill would affect native law
now governing descent of property of intestates.20 He explained that the intent of the Bill
was to permit property of an intestate Christian to pass to his children rather than to his
sister’s sons as would be required by native law. Indeed, it would be good to strengthen
parent-child relations in all marriages by requiring descent of property to the decedent’s
children, but it would not be prudent to make such change to customary law in native
marriages at present.21 Thus the new Secretary of State, Lord Derby, expressed his
preference for real property to descend per customary law if it were family property and per
the Marriage Ordinance if it were individual property.22
The Ordinance as passed by the Legislative Council in November 1884 provided that
it would extend to the entire Colony as well as to the protectorates. The only role of the
courts would be to determine the validity of any objections (“caveats”) to a marriage. The
determination of the Supreme Court would be final. This provision giving the judiciary the
final word rather than the Executive was inserted at the request of native barristers and
demonstrated once again the unwillingness of the Administration to challenge the people’s
affinity for judicial rather than executive decisions. In a nod toward traditional custom,
Section 32 permitted a widower to marry the sister or niece of his dead wife, but otherwise
English law of affinity would govern, and no marriage would be allowed if either party was
still married to another person under customary law. In what became the most crucial
20
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provision of the Ordinance, Section 41 provided that the moveable property of an intestate
decedent as well as such of the real estate that was within the power of the decedent to
bequeath would descend according to English law, that is to his or her spouse in its entirety
if there were no children or one third to a surviving spouse and two thirds to surviving
children, except that land that could not under native law be alienated by will would descend
according to the rules of customary law, that is to the decedent’s matrilineal line.23
Despite having required the Legislative Council to pass the Marriage Ordinance, the
Governor expressed uncertainty as to the various local customs relating to marriage,
something he clearly should have investigated during the five years that such an Ordinance
was under consideration, and requested that the Colonial Office delay seeking the Queen’s
assent to the Ordinance until he could collect and forward to the Secretary of State the
desired information.24 Edward Wingfield of the Colonial Office responding to Governor
Young’s objections to the property succession sections of the Marriage Ordinance that
Young felt would arouse objections among the indigenous population, said that he saw
nothing in the reports submitted by Young as to native custom to support the Governor’s
objections and that the property disposition section should be left as written. The Secretary
of State said that he would not advise disallowance.25
Passage of the Marriage Ordinances led to unforeseen consequences insofar as
customary law was concerned.26 Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that oral wills, the most
common way in which indigenous people transferred property to the next generation were
23
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invalid where made by people married under the Ordinance because such nuncupative
dispositions were illegal under English law.27
Much confusion initially occurred with respect to the status of persons married to
each other under customary law who subsequently entered into a marriage under the
Ordinance. If they had recorded their customary marriage under Section 36 of the
Ordinance, Colonial Office policy, albeit one not ruled upon by the courts, prohibited a
subsequent marriage, neither party could marry another person under the Ordinance until
the death of one party or a divorce that would be valid under English law.28 There was
difficulty even as to a subsequent marriage between two people who were already married
to each other pursuant to customary law. In Re Isaac Ammetifi [1889] Redwar’s Comments,
157, the Supreme Court held that subsequent Christian marriage (equated by the Court to
an Ordinance marriage) by natives previously married to each other pursuant to customary
rites prior to the effective date of the Marriage Ordinance did not change the status of the
parties and the estate of the deceased husband passed in accordance with customary law.
Four years later, Francis Smith, then the Acting Chief Justice, reversed prior law that had
held that Christian marriage was deemed to be merely a blessing and could not affect a
prior marriage between the same couple, holding that under the Marriage Ordinance, a
couple previously united under customary law could validly remarry pursuant to the
Ordinance and thus agree to have their personal and property relations governed by English
law and that a Christian marriage entered into prior to the effective date of the Ordinance
27
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conferred the same rights and obligations.29 Indeed, in Cole v. Cole,30 the Court held that
Christian marriage gave the parties and their children a status unknown to customary law
and it would be repugnant to equity and natural justice, and thus illegal, to apply customary
law to the succession to the property of a deceased party to such a marriage.
Married Women’s Property 1890-1908
T. C. McCaskie points out that the status of women, particularly in Ashanti, related
primarily to their economic value as evidenced by the amount of damages awarded to their
husbands in cases of the wife’s adultery. He argues that marriage was a “factor of privilege,
ideology and differentiation.”31 The question of succession to a woman’s property did not
cause problems because under customary law, particularly in areas and among those with
matrilineal rules, a woman’s property passed in the same manner as a man’s. Prior to
1870, a married woman in England had no control over her property which passed to her
husband upon marriage. Equity provided some relief for the apparent injustice of this
common law rule by imposing a constructive trust upon the husband for the wife’s benefit in
appropriate cases such as his abandonment of his spouse.32 Reform of the English
common law as embodied in the Married Women’s Property Act of 1870 (33 &34 Vict. c. 93)
was only partial, applying only to wages earned after passage of the Act and only to money
deposited into savings banks, etc. and even then only if she applied to have registered as
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hers.33 This statute was not considered one of general application because it was not
embodied in Gold Coast law under the Reception provision of the Supreme Court
Ordinance and was never applied to Gold Coast marriages under either customary or
English law.34 However, unlike the situation in the United Kingdom prior to the enactment of
the Married Women’s Property Acts, 1870 and its 1874 amendment (37 &38 Vict. c. 50) or
its1882 successor (45 & 46 Vict. c.75), a woman’s property among the Akan was
customarily considered to be hers and passed to her successors in the same manner as did
a man’s.35 Moreover, she was entitled under customary law to own property in her own
name, to contract and to sue for debt. She was liable for her debts as well.36
To remedy the disparate treatment of married women under customary and English
law, the Gold Coast Legislative Council enacted a Married Women’s Property Ordinance,
No. 6 of 1890, enacting for the Gold Coast all of the essential provisions of the English
Married Women’s Property Act of1882.37 The Ordinance, consisting of only three
substantive sections, confirmed that a woman’s wages and earnings from any gainful
employment carried out apart from that of her husband along with any investments of those
earnings were hers alone. It authorized her to sue and be sued in her own name to recover
33
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earnings and wages, chattels, and real property and to obtain specific relief and damages in
such actions.
The rush of Christian converts and others to marry under the Ordinance hoped for by
Gold Coast missionaries did not come about. Indeed, in 1890 the Methodist missions
complained to the Governor of the paucity of such marriages, only 268 in the five years
since the Ordinance came into effect.38 This seeming unwillingness of people to marry
under English law was attributed to the property disposition provisions of the Ordinance
which disinherited the matrilineal relations of decedents and agitation to amend those
provisions soon arose.39
After almost twenty years of pressure, primarily from the respected Cape Coast
barrister, John Mensah Sarbah, who had become an unofficial member of the Legislative
Council and who regularly spoke in Council meetings of the need to amend the Marriage
Ordinance distribution provisions, the Administration responded. In February 1905, the
Acting Gold Coast Colonial Secretary suggested the appointment of a Commission of
Enquiry to look into questions affecting the Marriage Ordinance, particularly those relating to
the descent of property of intestate decedents and the legitimation of children born to
parents in a customary marriage before they remarried under the Ordinance, whose status
had always been seen as illegitimate although they were the full siblings of those born after
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their parents’ Ordinance marriage. The Chief Justice, W. Brandford Griffith Jr., was to Chair
the Commission and Sarbah and three others would be members.
In a letter dated January 20, 1905, Sarbah wrote to the Gold Coast Colonial
Secretary asserting without any specification of evidence that few marriages were
contracted under the Ordinance in part because of the existing rules of intestate
succession; despite churches’ influence and education, the feeling generally was that
“family” means one’s maternal family. He said that the Ordinance caused serious ruptures
between the wife and children on the one hand and the deceased’s mother who depended
on her son for support and gets nothing.40
Shortly thereafter, the Gold Coast Attorney General, presumably expressing the
Administration’s views, wrote to the Secretary of the Commission agreeing with Sarbah’
views and arguing that the overwhelming evidence demonstrated that the succession
provision of the Ordinance deterred marriage. He reported that there were about 17,000
adult Christians in the Colony but in 1903 only 176 of them married under the Ordinance,
because monogamy was contrary to tradition (an unacceptable reason, it seems, since
monogamy was enforced by the churches); divorce was too difficult under the Ordinance
and the succession rules ran counter to “tradition of family on which the whole social fabric
of Coast natives is constructed and tend to cause family problems between family [meaning
the matrilineal family]” and the surviving spouse and children. Nevertheless, he said, no
“case has been made out for a general condemnation of Section 39 on this ground.” No
universal law of succession, he went on, was “feasible”or “desirable.” It is unclear what the
Attorney General meant by the words “universal law of succession.” He did not explain, so
that we can only speculate that he referred to the English law of succession and its
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applicability in the Gold Coast Colony and Protectorates. In any case, he recommended
that Section 39 be amended so that the matrilineal family could share, one third to the
spouse, one third to the children and one third to the matrilineal heirs. If there were no
children, the share of the matrilineal family should be two thirds. In addition, he
recommended that provisions should be added legitimating children born to the couple prior
to their Ordinance marriage so that they would be treated on the same basis as those born
after Ordinance marriage. Finally, he expressed the Administration view opposing any
legislation easing divorce for those married under the Ordinance.41
The Commission delivered its report in May 1905. It concluded that the Ordinance
was unpopular because of the expense and difficulties with complying with the statutory
requirements of registering marriages for people living far from the Registry offices,
obstacles in obtaining a divorce and primarily because, as Sarbah had been arguing, of the
succession provisions that were contrary to the traditions of family law and custom. It
proposed amending §39 of the Ordinance to permit the maternal family to share in the
estate of an intestate in accordance with customary law. Although concurring in the
Commission’s recommendations, Griffith was only lukewarm as to those proposing a
division of the intestate’s property between his lineal and matrilineal families. He said (in a
separate statement) that most people who have property knew how to make a will and
could provide for its disposition as they wished and the burden of making such
determination shouldn’t fall on the State. Such opinion is difficult to understand, as it
ignores the fact that English law assumes such a burden and allocates the shares of an
intestate’s property between a surviving spouse and children in the same way as did the
provisions of the original Ordinance. Nevertheless, Griffith, stating that he did so in the
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interests of comity and promptness, signed the report.42 Perhaps anticipating Griffith’s view
concerning testamentary dispositions, Osborne, the Attorney General had previously argued
that most people die intestate in the Gold Coast as they practice of making wills, even oral
testaments under native law, was exceedingly rare, probably because so many people
married under the Ordinance were illiterate.43
In November 1906, the Governor recommended acceptance of the Report of the
Commission as to division of intestate estates. He was, he said, “strongly of the opinion
that effect should be given to native law and custom” as to issues regarding descent of
property. Responding to Griffith’s statement that “‘we must advance a step in civilization
toward individualism,’” Governor Rodger said that “it may well be questioned whether, in the
best interests of civilization, unbounded individualism is not rather a step in retrogression
than one in advance.” Regrettably this expression of sympathy with the collective nature of
indigenous society was a singular exception and did not reflect British policy.44 Moreover, he
urged the legitimation of children born to parents who married under customary law before
they remarried under the Ordinance as was, he argued, the case in Scotland, Queensland
and Ceylon and, indeed, practically everywhere except in England. Governor Rodger
reported that he would soon submit to the Legislative Council rules drafted by the Chief
Justice relating to divorce and as soon as the Colonial Office approved the principles to be
embodied in the bill, he would have an Ordinance prepared.45 The Secretary of State, Lord
Elgin, advised the Governor that despite his doubts as to the distribution proposals, he was
willing to approve them since opinion both within the Colonial Office and the Gold Coast
42
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seemed to be for such an amendment. However despite the unanimous recommendation
of the Commission, he was unwilling to accept legitimation of children born prior to an
Ordinance marriage as being unjustified except in monogamous communities and not from
polygamous unions in which the Gold Coast natives engage. Indeed, he explained, his
predecessor had rejected just such provisions proposed in Sierra Leone.46
As may be seen, it took two more years before the Secretary of State agreed to
permit amendment of Section 39 in the manner that the Commission had recommended but
he once again declined to authorize adding provisions to legitimate children born prior to an
Ordinance marriage.47 Responding to the Governor’s request for comment on the Secretary
of State’s decision, Griffith told the Governor that he could not understand the Secretary of
State’s objections, so that he could not respond properly but that he believed that a
Marriage Ordinance without a legitimation amendment to be very unfair to children born
prior to their parents’ Ordinance marriage.
Still trying to change Lord Elgin’s mind, Governor Rodger sent him a resolution of the
bishops of the Church of England in West Africa supporting the proposed legitimation
provisions, stating that their resolution was concurred in by the representatives of the other
Christian denominations.48 Despite this strong evidence of religious feeling, Elgin
maintained his refusal to accept legitimation.
Rodger asked Elgin to reconsider his views on legitimation and, in September 1907,
the latter agreed.49 Roger had sent the Secretary of State letters from Sarbah, Griffith,
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Puisne Judge Francis Smith and Attorney General Osborne, all seeking to provide support
for the Governor’s efforts to change Elgin’s mind. Sarbah wrote arguing that the Supreme
Court had ruled well before passage of the Ordinance that children born prior to conversion
to Christianity were to be considered as legitimate.50 Not to treat such innocents as being
legitimate, Sarbah urged, could prevent further Ordinance marriages. The others
expressed similar views. Osborne reminded his correspondents that the Supreme Court
Ordinance required the British courts to apply customary law in marriage cases. He noted
that the Anglican Diocese of West Africa recognized customary marriages and their
offspring as legitimate. Griffith wrote that he could not understand the opposition of the
Colonial Office to legitimation of offspring of a legal, moral albeit polygamous marriage and
if children born after an Ordinance marriage refused to share the property of their late
parent with their older siblings, it would strike “a serious blow to Christian marriage.”51 Now
opinion within the Colonial Office began to change, the Legal Assistants, Cox and his
assistant, Risley, argued that since conversion to Christianity and Ordinance Marriage
meant a new start, children born prior to conversion or Ordinance marriage should be given
the benefit of such actions. Cox reported a conversation with Francis Smith, P. J., in which
the latter told him that before a man could remarry a wife under the Ordinance, he had to
divorce all polygamous native wives but that their children were still to be considered to be
legitimate under customary law. The only stigma, according to Smith, came from European
ideas.
Elgin asked Governor Rodger to pose certain questions to his Attorney General who
responded in April 1908 that the diversity of the people on the Gold Coast made impossible
any hard and fast rule of customary law so he had asked Francis Smith and other Puisne
50
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Judges for their opinions. He said that he agreed with Judge Smith and Sarbah that in
Akan society the status of children was unaffected by the divorce or remarriage of their
parents under customary law as the child belonged to the mother’s family and not the
father’s. In Accra, among the Ga, Osborne opined, the father’s son got his self acquired
property but family property and that which he inherited went to the father’s maternal
collaterals, According to Sarbah,52 a son lost any right in his father’s property by divorce and
remarriage, but the Attorney General doubted that divorce or remarriage rendered children
illegitimate. Indeed, Osborne said, he couldn’t see how one born legitimate could be made
illegitimate. Since children born before the Ordinance marriage of their parents were
recognized by the community as being legitimate, they remained legitimate after that
marriage. All agreed that Section 39 of the Marriage Ordinance as it now stood excluded
children born before an Ordinance marriage from taking in intestacy. The draft amendment
altered Section 39 to provide for a division of the intestate’s property between his spouse
and children and his maternal family and that children born prior to the Ordinance marriage
should take an equal share with their younger siblings as if they, too, had been born after
the Ordinance marriage.53
On August 21, 1908, the Secretary of State communicated his agreement that
children born both before and after Ordinance marriage should inherit on the same basis
and should be treated “on the same footing” and that he would consider a Bill providing for
legitimation of children born prior to an Ordinance marriage.54 A bill that had been read for
the second time and submitted to the Committee of the Whole for clause by clause
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consideration, was now recommitted for amendment to provide for legitimation of children
born prior to an Ordinance marriage and passed as Ordinance No. 2 of 1909.55
The odyssey of the Marriage Ordinance and its Amendment evidences the repeated
irresolution demonstrated by the Colonial Office, its inability to come to a conclusion as to
colonial policy without extended consideration, intense and prolonged pressure by
indigenous actors as well as local officials and, ultimately, the willingness, albeit often
reluctant, to give in to the demands of the colonial government.
Passage of the Marriage Ordinance Amendment did not mean that those who had
not married under the provisions of the Marriage Ordinance would be treated as equal to
those who had. Thus, for example, the English common law privilege preventing one
spouse from testifying against the other was only applied to those married under the
Marriage Ordinance and/or pursuant to Christian rites.56 Responding to a dispatch from
Governor Rodger, the Secretary of State drew a distinction between European and native
marriage, the latter not being considered by him to be a marriage at all. However, he said,
Muslim marriage should be considered in such a light as to require that the spousal privilege
be applied to it. Thus, with this exception, he approved the Ordinance compelling spousal
testimony previously sent to him.57
The passage of the Marriage Ordinance and, more particularly, its amended version,
exemplify the manner in which the colonial authorities responded to pressure from different
constituents, the missionaries in the first instance and the indigenous leadership in the
55
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second. They were not absolutists but demonstrated a willingness to listen and respond
when it became apparent to them that a positive response would lead to calm among the
population, even if only a small segment of that population. As we shall see in the next
chapters, British formulation of a land policy and their response to challenges to that policy
were neither firm nor consistent.
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CHAPTER XII - LAND TENURE: THE ROLE OF JUDGES
Colonial regimes throughout the world gave particular attention to land tenure. In
French West Africa, French policy was to recognize customary tenure as to all transactions
involving land owned by indigenous people, a policy formalized by decrees handed down in
1900.1 At the same time, the French colonial state claimed land not then having been in use
for a defined period as belonging to the State which could be granted to individuals for
private use.2 The Dutch recognized indigenous land tenure in Indonesia which was, as in
the Gold Coast, essentially communal with individuals having rights to use land but not to
alienate it. However, the colonial authorities maintained the right to declare land
unencumbered by indigenous rights, a vague term never adequately defined, to be “Crown
land” that might be leased to outsiders for commercial development.3 In Surinam as well,
the Dutch respected communal land tenure.4 By contrast, the Portuguese claimed title to all
the land by virtue of a 1901 statute of the Portuguese parliament turning the African
inhabitants into squatters or tenants whose land could be alienated from under them5.
Finally, in German Southwest Africa, the Government tolerated alienation of agricultural
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land by the chiefs to private German interests and then, in 1905, expropriated the remaining
land requiring indigenous farmers to obtain permission of the Governor to farm their land.6
British land policy was similar throughout its African dependencies. Similarly to those
of the Dutch and unlike those of the French, Portuguese and Germans, Britain favored
customary tenure and opposed individualization of title. Indeed, in 1889, in the aftermath of
the Berlin Conference, the Colonial Office advised the Foreign Office that the crown made
no claim to land ownership anywhere in Africa.7 Moreover Chanock reports three decisions
of the Privy Council in 1919, 1921 and 1926 upholding customary tenure in Southern
Rhodesia, Nigeria and generally wherever in the Empire it may have been the rule.8
Scholars have debated what if any impact traditional land law had on the economic
development of the Gold Coast without any of them making a compelling case. Polly Hill
argues that neither traditional rules of land tenure nor social organization impeded
commercial agricultural development but permitted economic organization that actually
intensified such development.9

Samuel S. K. Asante, pointed to inconsistent British policy

as to collective tenure, arguing that initially British courts, that, Asante asserts, were acting
politically, encouraged commercialization and commodification of land before the colonial
authority changed course because the gradual Anglicization of land policy was undermining
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the chiefs through whom the British wished to rule.10 Austin and Sugihara point out that
communal tenure empowered local and regional lenders because European banks were too
frequently unwilling to lend on the insecure collateral of land held under indigenous tenure
whereas the former were prepared to make short term loans to peasant producers on the
basis of traditional security, the nature of which is discussed below.11
By contrast, J. M. Lee urges that social and political advance seemed to be
impossible while dual systems of land tenure and law for natives and Europeans existed
and that the problem for the British was to find a way to introduce individual land tenure and
English law without alienating the indigenous population.12 Kimble contends that customary
land law was “too uncertain and localized” to provide a legal framework for a commercial
economy.13

Gordon Woodman, contrary to Hill’s view, argues that access to land and

resources was a central theme in Gold Coast history and that the failure of the British to
impose their view of proper land tenure impeded the economic development of the colony
and was a mark of the inconsistency of British colonial policy.14 Grove and Falola argue that
the disputes as to control of the land actually represented a fight to retain control over
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“commercial potential and incoming capital.”15 Finally, Lord Hailey, in his monumental study
of the British sub-Saharan territories, concluded that lack of clear land titles militated against
the development of commercial agriculture, discouraged agricultural credit with consequent
very high interest rates.16
British inconsistencies in its land policies, particularly in its inability or refusal to move
toward individual land titles prevented the diversification of agricultural production as
European investors were unwilling to put their money into land when title was collectively
held except for mining concessions. Also, to the extent that special legislation was
necessary to protect the cocoa crop upon which the well being of most of the rural
population depended, it was forest legislation to keep and develop reserves and prevent
dessication of the land on which cocoa was planted, yet such legislation only came late and
without the control of professional foresters that these experts thought was required.
These inconsistencies were not resolved during the period under study. It is true that
large scale commercial agriculture was discouraged because of native tenure, but such
development was consistent with colonial policy of encouraging small holders, perhaps
because such policy advantaged European buyers of cocoa and other commercial
agricultural products in dealing with indigenous producers. Given the paucity of local capital
to enable Gold Coasters to engage in large scale exploitation of agricultural and other
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resources, the uncertainty of title did prevent most Gold Coast land from falling into the
hands of Europeans.17
In this chapter, I demonstrate that the British were never able to settle on a single
approach to dealing with native tenure. From the attempt in the 1890's to gain control of
native lands, an attempt that the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain vetoed at the
behest of representatives of the newly formed ARPS, through several commissions and
committees that studied customary law and made recommendations to adopt a specific
approach, which recommendations were ignored, through abortive efforts in the 1920's to
create a registration system supported by a statute of limitations, nothing substantive was
done to alter customary tenure. This policy, if it can be called that, of inertia supports
Woodman’s view that in this critical area, the British failed to use law to encourage
economic development beyond that necessary to support exploitation of the country’s
natural resources.
Antony Allott specifies the six principal characteristics of African land tenure, and
particularly Gold Coast land tenure, as follows: land was allocated by political or social
unites, e.g. the kingdom or chiefdom and or family units; land was usually sued for shifting
cultivation because of the abundance of uncleared land the relative poverty of the soil; land
was most usually used for subsistence farming; the was a general vagueness in the
definition of boundaries; there was the absence of commercial transactions in land, again
because land was plentiful and thus there was little or no need to purchase or lease; and
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It is interesting to note that the dispute continues to this day as evidenced by an article appearing
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land had religious significance: it was said to belong to the tribal or family ancestors as well
as the current occupants.18 Each of these criteria are discussed in more detail below.
Arguably, the issue of land tenure affords the best example of the manner in which
justice was administered by the British in the Gold Coast as well as of the continuing
struggle between the executive and the judiciary of the Gold Coast colonial government as
well as the inconsistent attitude of the Colonial Office toward Gold Coast administration.
However, it must be pointed out that the dispute just mentioned was not one between
individual officers of the executive and judicial branches, but was between administrators
who viewed the judicial process as obstructing control over an important issue of colonial
administration and the indigens who saw the judges as their main line of defense against
what they perceived to be British desire to appropriate their land. I show how the British
courts created a customary common law by interpreting traditional rules without reference to
the manner in which the Native Tribunals of the Gold Coast chiefs expressed and enforced
those rules.
The initial context of the struggle to impose British control over land use involved the
manner in which the chiefs granted to Europeans the rights to exploit surface assets such
as palm oil as well as sub-surface rights to mine minerals such as gold and bauxite. Seeing
uncontrolled disposition of such concessions as a threat to expanding food and, later, cocoa
production as well as depriving the Colonial government of a source of revenue, it first
sought control through enactment of legislation, the Land Bills of 1895 and 1897. Having
failed to achieve its objective through these proposals, the Colonial government passed a
Concessions Ordinance that, while extending a measure of regulation to the disposition of
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“Modern Changes in African Land Tenure,” in Readings in African Law, edited by E. Cotran and N.
N. Rubin, Vol. 1, New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1970, 236-242, 237-238.
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real assets, placed most of such regulation in the hands of the judiciary, a result strenuously
opposed by the executive authorities.
As shown above, customary tenure was collective, but until well into the twentieth
century, the British courts on the Gold Coast altered a number of customary rules to
introduce European concepts alien to traditional law, such as prescriptive rights after a long
period of occupation. In addition, the colonial administration in the 1890's attempted to gain
control of the disposition of land by traditional authorities through two land bills, the first of
which would have given title to unused land to the sovereign and the second of which would
have placed management of such unused land in the hands of the Government while
ostensibly permitting the traditional owners to retain title. When both these efforts failed
because of widespread and well organized opposition led by the newly formed Aboriginal
Rights Protection Society (“ARPS”), a Concessions Ordinance was enacted which
controlled the manner in which traditional land was alienated to mining interests.
This Concessions Ordinance introduced another dispute, this one between different
elements of the colonial administration: who was to control the concessions process, the
executive or the judiciary. The original Ordinance responding to local pressure gave control
over approval of concessions to the Supreme Court. Over time European interests and the
executive became disenchanted with the manner in which the courts handled concession
applications. A special commissioner, H. Conway Belfield, and the draft report of a
committee of the Colonial Office both recommended transfer of control of approval of
concessions to the executive, but these recommendations were never carried out. Indeed,
Governor Thornton and his successor, Hugh Clifford, objected to pressure from the Colonial
Office to effect some or all of those recommendations.
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Land Tenure on the Gold Coast in the Nineteenth Century and Beyond
In this section, I describe in some detail the nature of customary land tenure on the
Gold Coast as well as the manner in which the British courts interpreted the customary
rules, in many instances altering them to accord with European concepts of property tenure.
In West Africa, and particularly on the Gold Coast, almost all of the land was held
communally.19 Tenure was said to derive from an ancestral trust for the benefit of the living
and those yet to be born.20 Chiefs and family heads were more than trustees, they were
arbiters and rulers and governors with the final say; they controlled but did not own the
property, ownership and the right to beneficial use remaining in the stool or family. The
British courts would not overrule the decision of the stool or family head concerning land
made with appropriate consent unless it involved a “flagrant abuse of fiduciary powers.”21
Custom provided that the stool should allocate land to any adherent of the stool on his
request for land to cultivate, but British courts converted the normative into a mandatory
requirement that stools allocate land on terms no more onerous than what the British court
held should have been the case. Whatever these terms were could not be changed
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unilaterally and courts would not permit dispossession except in strictly limited cases such
as nonpayment of agreed rent, more accurately tribute, or denial of owner’s title.22
The term “communal tenure” often meant different things to different indigenous
groups. Most commonly it was used to signify “group control, reflecting some group interest
over land that is apportioned for the relatively exclusive use of individuals or families of the
group.” 28-29 Traditional land tenure changed often with migration, conquest or population
or climate change.23
Although there is evidence of substantial sales of land by chiefs in the 1860's, most
such sales were to other chiefs.24 While not entirely unheard of, sales to individuals were
uncommon and generally limited to home sites in towns and appurtenant grounds.25
Indeed, in the first decade of the twentieth century, less than four per cent of the land in the
Gold Coast colony and only a little more than one and one half per cent of the land in the
Ashanti protectorate was held in fee simple.26 In Ashanti, and in most of the Fanti
kingdoms, the King was the “owner” of all the land. He was the living embodiment of the
state, the corporation of all souls, living, dead and yet-to-be.27 But such ownership rights did
not vest in the King or chief as an individual, but, more accurately, in his office, the Stool.
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He held the land as “a trustee or steward for the nation.”28 All land belonged to the King and
any member of the nation had the right to cultivate unoccupied, uncultivated or unreserved
land. Each stool subject had the right to occupy vacant land owned by the stool and to use
it free of charge so long as he used it personally or through an agent by farming it or
building on it. Cultivation of the land had to be regular and sustained to preserve the
usufructory right of the cultivator, but natural produce, such as coconuts, that were not
cultivated, firewood, game, timber and minerals belonged to the community and might be
taken by anyone. A usufructory right could be lost if the usufructory possessor denied the
title of the overlord or stool unless the acts constituting denial did not seriously infringe upon
title.29
Customary law protected the product of one’s right to cultivate land almost in
perpetuity. Such a right was transferable, but only to another member of the family or the
community. A stranger might obtain cultivation rights from the family or chief, but only with
the consent of members of the family and the heads of the community, the chief’s senior
councillors. Concomitantly, the Stool ( i.e. the chiefly authority) could not evict the occupant
or alienate the usufruct without the occupant’s consent. But the Stool retained all subsurface rights, rights that were to become very contentious in the last decade of the
nineteenth century.30 The King had the right, indeed the duty, to defend the land and to
grant rights in the land to his chiefs and sub-chiefs for further distribution to the members of
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the community so that they might till the soil and provide for themselves and their families.31
Land had religious, political and social significance as much as or more so than economic.
Thus, no one, not even the King or Head Chief, could dispose of the land or grant it to
someone outside the community without the consent of the most senior person (headman,
chief or king) as well that the senior person’s council.32 However sale of land often took
place and was permitted if it was conducted in accordance with customary ritual involving
the presence of witnesses to payment of consideration, the formal placement of the
purchaser in possession, the marking boundaries and the giving of notice of the transaction
to the community.33 These rites, often called “Guaha” in Akan, were necessary to placate
the ancestors whose spirits would have to leave the land when it was sold.34
All land acquired with family resources such as money, materials and labor owned or
contributed by family members, was considered to be family land.35 Where property is
acquired by multiple members of a family, there was an almost conclusive presumption that
31

Ibid.
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the property is family property, not merely that of the family members in whose name the
property is acquired, particularly where the property is purchased with monies derived from
other concededly family properties and such presumption is almost impossible to rebut.36
The British courts interpreted these customs to hold that family land belonged not
just to the nuclear family but to the entire lineage claiming descent from a common
ancestor.37 Such land was indivisible and inalienable except by the head of the family with
the consent or concurrence of the principal members. The Court made it a part of the
hybrid Gold Coast common law that members of the family had full rights to use their
allocated portion of the land, which rights were descendable to their heirs, and to alienate
the produce of the land as well as the buildings they had constructed on the land, but not
the land itself. Alienation of family land required the consent of the family elders.38 So, too,
the British courts, applying customary law, ruled that if land were used to secure a family
debt, such use had to be with family consent because a creditor might sell the land.39 Such
consent had to be expressed by the head and the principal members of the family given at
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a family meeting provided that the proceeds were used to benefit the entire family. A
minority would not be permitted to obstruct alienation so approved so long as the meeting
represented the entire family.40 It must be emphasized that such unapproved sales were
not void, but voidable, requiring prompt action by the stool or family to set the sale aside
and then only in circumstances that permitted the stool council or family to argue
successfully that it did not know and could not reasonably have known of the sale and that
the buyer could be restored to his previous position.41
Tenure was not immutable and could and did change. Thus even where tenure was
held by an individual, upon his death intestate it would descend to his heirs, his brothers
and nephews in matrilineal societies or his sons and daughters in patrilineal society and
thereby become family land.42
From the creation of the Supreme Court in 1876, litigation between natives and
Europeans as well as between natives and natives as to title and occupation of land
constituted the majority of cases in the new court. The increasing number of cases gave
pause to the Governor who expressed to the Colonial Office his concern that an increasing
backlog of land litigation in the Western Province, at that point one year in arrears,
constituted a serious problem because, “if unsettled they lead to local disturbances.”43
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In many of the cases brought before the Supreme Court dealing with land titles, the
Court was obliged to deal with the effect of prescriptive rights to title by reason of
continuous occupation of the land. The reader should once again be reminded that the
Supreme Court Ordinance required British judges to apply customary law in land cases, but
permitted those judges to determine for themselves what that customary law was. In so
doing, the British courts transformed pragmatic, situational customary rules into rigid
common law ones.44
Although customary law lacked any doctrine of prescriptive rights, in the early years
of the Colony, some British courts indirectly gave credence to such a doctrine via the twin
concepts of estoppel and acquiescence, deciding that those concepts were part of the
customary law. In 1890, the Court held that Fanti custom forbade one who had alienated
land to another from recovering such land after inducing the acquiring party to obtain the
land under the belief that he was obtaining absolute title and not merely a possessory
right.45 Similarly, the Full Court ruled that, as a matter of Fanti custom, permitting one in
possession of property to remain in possession while he believed himself to be the owner
without the claimant asserting a contrary claim for an unreasonable period of time
amounted to the claimant’s acquiescence in the possessor’s claim of ownership.46
44
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Concomitantly, where the owner asserts rights of ownership, such as entering into
the property and demanding payment from the occupier, a mere possessor was estopped
from denying the owner’s title.47 But something more definite than a mere oral claim of use
and occupancy of an indefinite tract had to be shown to establish title.48 What that
something could be was indicated in Kodedja v. Tekpo, D. C. ‘29-‘31 [1931] 45 (G. C.
Deane, C. J.). An execution creditor attached land claimed to belong to the stool to satisfy
a stool debt. The long time occupant of the land argued that the land belonged to him and
not the stool, saying that he had possessed and occupied the land for more than thirty years
and that it had been given to him by his father. The execution creditor asserted that land
had been in the father’s possession only as a trustee for the stool. The claimant proved
that he had openly occupied and farmed the land full time during the reign of three chiefs
and used it as his own for thirty three years. Relying on Lokke v. Kanklofi, Renner’s
Reports 450, affirmed by the Full Court, Chief Justice W. B. Griffith, Jr. held that stool
allowed the land to become the private property of the claimant by not asserting stool title,
i.e. the various stool occupants consented to ownership passing to the claimant by
permitting undisturbed and exclusive possession for thirty years during which the claimant
made improvements to the land and cultivated permanent crops. In order to establish title,
possession, even long possession had to be under a claim adverse to the title of the stool.
46
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Thus non-adverse possession for four generations was insufficient to oust the stool from
title to the land in issue.49 In sum, while absolute alienation is not to be presumed, rather
there is a strong presumption against alienation, that presumption can be overcome by long
time adverse possession under circumstances that would make it inequitable to require the
long time occupant to return the land so that mere usufructory rights could ripen into
freehold rights.50
Another issue in judicial dealings with land transactions was whether or not
customary law applied at all.51 British courts were inconsistent as to whether writings in
connection with a land transaction oust native customary law and jurisdiction. When
customary ceremonies were carried out, courts have held that writings may merely be
evidentiary.52 But where several documents were involved and decision of the case
required construction of the documents, it was considered that the matter was “quite
unsuitable for decision by a Native Tribunal.”53
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The consequences of this determination were significant. Thus the availability of the
remedy of specific performance of a contract depended on whether or not the parties
intended to have customary law govern their relations because specific performance was
not a remedy available under customary law.54 Determination of the parties’ intent was not
easily made, particularly where intent was contested. The mere fact that an agreement was
not under seal was not conclusive of intent to be governed by customary law. Other
evidence, such as a writing in English form or that included a provision for English remedies
upon breach, was required.55 Over the course of the twentieth century African and
European merchants and lenders more and more began to insist on writings as means of
conveyances and to create security interest, with consequent increasing application of
English law. This, in turn, Asante argues, lead to increasing and “inordinate accumulation
of property,” absentee ownership and tenantry, a cleavage between ownership and use and
damage to soil fertility.56 Moreover, such concentration of ownership threatened
Government policy encouraging small holders and the creation of a landless proletariat.
Efforts to Change Land Tenure Through Legislation
In the late 19th century, cocoa farming became common on the Gold Coast and
brought with it a modernizing economy where agriculture was in transition from subsistence
farming to commercial production. As noted above, a weak effort at plantation production
was discouraged by the colonial government so that small producer holdings became the
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rule. This commercialization of agriculture encouraged a change in the traditional land
tenure system as newcomers sought to obtain land for cocoa production and Europeans
sought concessions for timber and mineral exploitation.57 European investors wanted
security in the identity of an owner who could grant rights to use the land or could convey
secure title.
Evidence was accumulating of improper alienation without necessary consent by sale
and lease of stool lands and the granting of mining concessions primarily to Europeans
upon payments to the chiefs that found their way only into these grandees’ pockets. At the
same time, litigation was increasing between chiefs of adjoining territories over concessions
claimed by one or the other to be on his land because of uncertainty as to boundaries and
as to what had already been granted.58 The Gold Coast Government proposed to send a
circular dispatch to District Commissioners giving notice to chiefs as to the best way to deal
with agreements for the lease or sale of land that had been prepared by Europeans. Acting
Governor Hogdson said that it was necessary to take steps to see that the chiefs “are
treated with fairness and not imposed upon.” Chiefs would be told to apply to the District
Commissioners if they had any doubts or questions as to the papers presented to them by
would be lessees, but that any decision they would make would be their own and “entirely at
your own risk.”59
Over the course of the last decade of the nineteenth century, Governor Griffith
caused studies to be made of the land tenure issue and draft legislation to be prepared to
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deal with that issue. His successor, William E. Maxwell, pushed for legislation that would
place control of most of the land of the colony in the hands of the Government. His initial
effort, which would have placed title to all land not then in cultivation in the Sovereign,
raised such opposition by both the educated elite, and the traditional chiefs that it was
withdrawn before consideration by the legislative council. A second effort that permitted title
of unused land to remain with its traditional owners but would have permitted the
Government to administer such land, including leasing it to third parties on such terms as
the Government desired with only small compensation being paid to the traditional owners
passed the Legislative Council but, after a meeting of an African delegation with Secretary
of State Joseph Chamberlain, failed to obtain Royal Consent. As a consequence of that
meeting, a Concessions Ordinance that was intended to limit alienation of indigenous lands
and to prevent fraud on the chiefs was enacted. At the behest of the same elements of
Gold Coast society that successfully defeated the second Lands Bill, control of the
concession approval process was placed in the hands of the judiciary.
In 1891,The Governor, William Brandford Griffith, Sr., asked Chief Justice Joseph
Hutchinson for a memorandum proposing a solution to the problem posed by uncertain and
insecure land titles. Hutchinson proposed legislation that would not interfere with existing
rights that were not “permanently abandoned,” rights to land not under cultivation or
otherwise being used that he called “‘waste lands’” as to which the Crown would take
“immediate possession” and would “assume the ultimate Lordship of all of the land in the
Colony and Protectorate.60 He told the Governor that he believed that “all of the land in the
Colony and the Protectorate, whether occupied or not, has according to Native law an
owner. Some of it is stool land, some family land, and a very small part is private property.”
60
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Land, he went on, was alienable absolutely but only for particular purposes such as paying
off stool or family debt but generally only conditionally for occupation and cultivation by
stool adherents in return for a rent or a portion of the crops with a reversion to stool or
family when no longer occupied for this purpose.61 Discussing the benefits of expropriating
“waste land,” Hutchinson noted that revenue to the Government derived from sales and
leases could be used for public purposes and would benefit the community through creation
of indisputable titles.62 Since all land, even “waste” land, was owned, he assumed that
compensation for land expropriated pursuant to his proposed legislation would be paid in an
amount, that, if generous enough, might “reconcile” the chiefs and family heads to the loss
of their land, but would probably not yield a profit to the Government.63 Creating definite and
indefeasible titles would be “a great benefit to the community” in making credit easier, since
at present would-be lenders had a hard time determining who owned land offered as
security and what the extent of the land being offered as security actually was and complete
surveys were much too expensive to conduct.64 However, expropriation would permanently
“lower the dignity and importance, and therefore the power of the Chiefs and heads of
families” as they would no longer have power to make grants or receive rents and tribute
from expropriated land. “This consideration alone would, in my opinion, be enough to make
us reject the proposed legislation, unless the reasons in favour of it are overwhelmingly
strong.”65 Thus, the Chief Justice concluded, on balance, any gain from expropriation would
be “doubtful” and negative consequences to prestige and power of traditional authorities as
well as the likelihood that a “sense of injustice and consequent hostility to the Government”
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that would be raised “outweigh any probable gain that could accrue to the Government from
it.”66 Nevertheless, Government should take control of minerals and of the unoccupied and
unused forest lands which afford no revenues to most of the chiefs or their people and so
would be unlikely to engender hostility to the Government if taken for public benefit.
In the same dispatch to the Colonial Office, Governor Griffith enclosed an 1892
memorandum prepared by his son, William Brandford Griffith, Jr., later to become Chief
Justice of the Gold Coast, written in Jamaica where Griffith, Jr. was serving as a judge in
that colony. Griffith, Jr. told his father that the land did not belong to the government but to
the people albeit “[a]s to the vast majority of the land the claims of ownership are to say the
least very difficult to fix.” “I think it may safely be said that all the land is held jointly or in
common and that it belongs generally to classes of natives but to no individual in particular.”
He opined in terms similar to those expressed by Chief Justice Hutchinson that it obviously
would be better if land were owned by “particular and definite owners,” but that while “it
would be a policy of injustice and spoliation for the Crown to endeavour to dispossess the
natives of their undoubted rights and take the land without compensation,” it would not be
unjust if the land were taken for the benefit of all the people of the Colony and Protectorates
to be used for the benefit of the Gold Coast and the revenue went to the natives.67 He
suggested that the policy might be carried out by imposition of a tax on land, which land
would be forfeited if the tax were not paid in a specified time. This would force claims to
land to be formulated and fixed. Proceeds from the tax could be used to survey the land.
Chiefs who paid the tax would be seen as the principal owners with the power to dispose of
the freehold or rights in the freehold. Of course difficulties would arise but better “that the
present wretched system of land tenure should be got rid of as soon as practicable and
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before a mixed application of English land and native custom gets things into an inextricable
tangle.” A law such as he proposed should first be applied only to the coastal lands
constituting the Colony and only later to the Protectorates. It would operate, he said, as “a
gigantic partition suit gradually working itself out with little friction.” Contrary to Hutchinson’s
suggestion, Griffith, Jr. proposed that waste land would not be paid for and would gradually
fall into Government hands.68
The First Lands Bill
Until 1894, the Colonial Office was unwilling to press for control of land alienation by
means of timber and mining concessions primarily for fear of violent resistance. In January
1894, the Secretary of State finally gave in and advised the Governor that “the time had
now arrived when the Colonial Government should seriously consider what are the best
means to be adopted for regulating the mining and timber industries.”69 He suggested that
the Governor issue a Notice to chiefs and concessionaires that no concession would be
recognized unless approved by the Government within one year of the grant.70
Since such a notice was of dubious legality, Governor Griffith requested Chief Justice
Hutchinson to draft a Crown Lands Ordinance that would vest all unoccupied land, forests
and mineral rights, described as “waste lands” in the Crown.71 The Governor said that he
had been thinking for three years about how to acquire such waste lands. Having consulted
the Secretary of State and obtained his approval, Griffith gave Hutchinson the go ahead.72
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Hutchinson saw it as the object of the bill to control the forests and minerals without
imposing any hardship on the indigenous population.73 One of the benefits of the Bill would
be to permit the Government to create indisputable title to the lands coming under its
control.74
Governor Griffith sent Hutchinson’s draft bill to the Colonial Office in August 1894
where it received favorable attention.75 One official noted in a minute that it was “very
desirable” that the Government be in a position to regulate concessions and said that
Hutchinson’s draft bill is a “fair and reasonable way of doing so.”76 A senior official also
approved the draft, noting in a congratulatory manner that Hutchinson had got around the
issue of all land being owned by providing that land not cultivated or otherwise used for
thirty years was waste land, implying that ownership rights were lost by such lack of use and
therefore vested in the Government.77 The London bureaucrats suggested several changes
one of which would increase the Governor’s discretion to make grants or have them
registered under certain conditions and concluded that the Gold Coast Government should
be authorized to pass the bill, but that it should be Gazetted for three months first to allow
for consideration of public opinion in the Colony. The Secretary of State, Lord Ripon,
approved and the Bill was first read in the Legislative Council in January, 1895.
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The Bill defined “waste lands” as those lands which had not been cultivated,
inhabited or had been used to collect or store water for a period of thirty years preceding the
effective date of the proposed ordinance.78 The Governor was authorized to dispose of
such lands, as well as forest lands and the minerals underlying them, as he saw fit on such
conditions as he in his sole discretion imposed, except as to those lands and forests already
being used by natives or which had already been granted by the chiefs and families
claiming them.79 No provision was made for payment to the indigenous claimants for land
not in actual use or cultivation, but they would be permitted to cultivate, cut timber and mine
lands not yet granted by the Governor.80 Concessions would thus be made by the colonial
executive subject to royalty payments to the Government which, in turn, would use them for
whatever purposes it chose. Disputes over priority of grants or whether or not the land was,
in fact, “waste land,” would be decided by the judges of the Supreme Court with the
claimant bearing the burden of proof.81
The Lands Bill was based on the proposition that land not used land for the
prescribed period had been abandoned, belonged to nobody and thus should belong to the
Crown. This proposition ignored the fact that most of the Gold Coast lands subjected to
British rule were not part of the Colony but were situated in protectorates over which the
indigenous chiefs properly exercised sovereignty.82 Moreover, Hutchinson himself had
expressed the opinion as far back as 1891 that all of the land, even that which was
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unoccupied was owned by some stool or family, an opinion in which the younger Griffith had
joined.83

Moreover, most of the witnesses before a Government Committee created to

consider land issues testified that all the land, even so-called waste land was owned.84
The almost unanimous opposition to the Land Bill from both traditional and
European-educated Africans was immediate and vociferous and seemed to justify
Hutchinson’s warning.85 Thus, in a petition drafted by John Mensah Sarbah on behalf of the
chiefs and townspeople of the Central Province, the petitioners took the position, one to
which they adhered during the entire period of British colonialism, that every inch of land on
the Gold Coast was owned, whether or not it was being cultivated, by the stools, or
chiefdoms or was family land into which cultivation could be expanded as required by
increased population or the necessity of allowing existing cultivated land to lie fallow. They
reminded the Colonial Office that in 1887 that it had communicated to the people of the
Gold Coast that “‘the soil being in the hands of the natives under jurisdiction of the native
chiefs,’” there was no British claim to the land. Every member of a tribe, family or company
had “‘an indefeasible right to a portion of said land in each year for the purposes of
cultivation paying therefor a small tribute to the head of his tribe, family or clan . . . .’” The
Petitioners argued that non-use did not portend abandonment. Rather, because of shifting
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cultivation and the necessity to allow for an expanding population, there was no so-called
“waste land” as all land would be cultivated sooner or later. The proposed Ordinance, the
petitioners argued, would deprive the people of their “‘immemorial and hitherto undisputed
position as owners of the Soil of their Native Country and reduce them to that of mere
squatters at and during the good will of the Governor.’” The Government’s proposal, they
argued, constituted expropriation, out and out theft.86 James Hutton Brew, a solicitor and
editor of an English language newspaper, the Western Echo, wrote to the Colonial
Secretary, Lord Ripon, emphasizing that the people of the Gold Coast were able to manage
their own land, all of which, cultivated and uncultivated, they alone owned, and that they did
not need or desire British involvement in such management.87
Governor Griffith’s successor, William E. Maxwell, vigorously contested the
indigenous argument. Branney argues that Governor Maxwell wanted to discourage shifting
cultivation and to encourage more permanent cultivation of commercial crops so he wanted
people who worked the land to own it free of customary law.88 Moreover, Maxwell objected
to the role of the courts in dealing with land, saying that Supreme Court recognition that
customary law governs would “imperil the working of any system [of land regulation] by
making it liable to be modified at any time by any proposition or doctrine accepted by a
Judge as ‘native law.’”89 Chiefs, he went on to say, should not be permitted to deal with land
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without Government approval since the latter, as Protecting Power, had rights of
sovereignty which chiefs should not be permitted to contravene.90
Maxwell advised the Colonial Office that the opponents of the Bill should be told that
the Bill would not affect any rights to land in use but that “Native Chiefs are entitled to the
protection which they receive only so long as they accept and act upon the advice of the
Controlling power” or else suffer removal from office.91 Colonial Office minutes reveal an
intense debate between those officials who supported Maxwell’s view as “sound and logical”
and those who saw the Bill as an effective but unauthorized annexation of the land of the
protected states. The more influential officials feared the vehemence of the native
opposition and directed Maxwell to hold things in place while they considered the issue.92
In the end, Maxwell was told to withdraw the Bill while the Colonial Office sought the opinion
of the law officers and considered all of the potential consequences.93 Maxwell decided not
to dispute this directive, but rather, to withdraw the Bill and redraft it in accordance with his
own ideas.94
In the interim, in accordance with the Secretary of State’s order, he directed his
District Commissioners to conduct a survey of land tenure in their districts.95 Attorney
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General Hindle warned the Governor and Colonial Office not to place too much reliance on
the returns as respondents were often reticent or misleading as to their customs regarding
land tenure. He noted that the testimony of “expert” witnesses in cases before the Supreme
Court as to applicable custom “differs markedly” so that the decisions of the Court as to
customary rules of tenure were often just “leaps in the dark.” Hindle conceded that all land
was attached to a stool or a family,96 and Acting Chief Justice Smith pointed out that despite
their differences as experts on customary law, all those who testified before him agreed that
all land was owned by some stool or family, so that there was no such thing as “waste
land.”97
The Second Lands Bill
In early 1896, Hindle drafted a new Lands Bill that provided for the Government to
administer on behalf of the native owners the lands defined as waste lands in the earlier
proposed legislation and to require Government approval of any concession to be granted
by a chief. Indeed, all new concessions were to be negotiated by the Government acting
along with the chief. The Government was to be authorized to grant monopoly rights on
conceded land but the chiefs were to receive only such consideration as the Government
were to decide, but no concession would be permitted to interfere with native holdings on
customary tenure of twenty acres or less.98 In acknowledging a report of recent concessions
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covering over 9,600 acres, the Secretary of State said that the quantity of land now under
concession underlined the necessity to “get on with the Lands Bill.”99
In November 1896, Governor Maxwell had said that legislation was necessary to
“render impermissible” concessions except on terms to insure payment to the government
of substantial fees to be shared with the chiefs. In order to calm growing public unrest, in
March 1897 he made public provisions of the proposed bill. He said that Government had
given up on the idea of vesting title to “public land” in the Crown, but insisted that such land
had to be administered for the general advantage. The “Paramount protecting power,” he
asserted, had to guarantee all public rights and exercise all authority on behalf of chiefs and
people as necessary to prevent “improvidently” created private rights on public land. The
indigenous occupants, he continued, would retain all rights to farm, fish, hunt and gather
forest produce and to mine (“in the native manner”) and would be better off because they
would be entitled to get a Land Certificate that would give them a “permanent, heritable and
transferable right of proprietorship.” The chiefs would still be able to allocate “Public Land”
and would continue to exercise their traditional allotment power, albeit concurrently with the
Government. The latter would consult the chiefs before creating private rights on stool land.
In order to prevent impropriety in the concession process, he told his listeners, direct
native-European dealings as to concessions would be forbidden. Maxwell promoted his
project, and his ill concealed desire to convert tenure in the colony to European freehold
tenure by providing for Land Certificates that would be subject to English law making title far
more marketable. He would deal with family land by giving the Supreme Court authority to
partition such land to protect third party rights, e.g. those of judgment creditors. An
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administrative concessions court would be created, the only appeal from which would be to
the Privy Council and as to any matters within its purview, the Supreme Court would have
no jurisdiction.100 A new bill introduced into the colonial Legislature in 1897 embodied these
provisions and Maxwell’s view that title in the Crown was not necessary as long as the
principle was established that waste land was public land and might be administered by the
Government for the public good.101 Thus, as can be seen above, the new Bill conceded
what its opponents claimed to be the chief’s primordial right to ownership, but gave the
government the right to administer unused land purportedly on the owners’ behalf.
Accordingly, this concession did not concede much, since the Government reserved to itself
the power to determine what share of the revenue to be derived from such administration
was to be paid to the owners. Most importantly, It also provided that anyone who held a
right of occupancy of land continuously cultivated or worked would receive heritable and
transferable title.102 The Bill contained provisions creating a Concessions Court that would
have authority to modify terms, conditions and scope of grants “to impose equitable
limitations, restrictions, and conditions” will appeals only to Privy Council to be allowed.103
Maxwell addressed the Legislative Council on the provisions of the proposed
Ordinance and particularly with respect to the proposed Concessions Court that would be
composed not of judges but of Commissioners appointed by the Government who would
conduct proceedings “on the model of those of the Supreme Court” to decide if the grantor
“really had any right to grant land or make concessions,” if concession was made with the
100
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express consent or concurrence of the Chief’s councillors, if it had been made with
adequate compensation and without fraud, if grantor understood the terms of the grant, and
if these terms had been performed.104 One can see the Governor back peddling from his
prior insistence that Government be part of the negotiation process since there would be no
need for review of terms that the Government had itself negotiated.
In April 1897, Joseph Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, told
Maxwell that he generally approved of the Bill because it substituted “a regular and defined
system of law for the vague and uncertain native customs, while at the same time protecting
the interests and rights of individual natives.” As we shall see, within four months he moved
180 degrees from this position.
Meanwhile, opposition to the second Lands Bill mushroomed throughout the Colony.
According to Nti, “intellectuals” in Cape Coast had obtained a copy of the draft bill that had
been submitted to the Legislative Council and organized against it, an opposition that soon
spread to other communities on the coast as well as to many of the traditional authorities of
the interior. This, Nti says, was the origin of the ARPS founded in Cape Coast whose
purpose to oppose the Lands Bill was published in the Gold Coast Express and the Gold
Coast Independent.105
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Chamberlain and the Lands Bill
Chamberlain’s principal comment as to the draft Bill related to appeals from the
Concession Court. Clearly relaying advice received from his legal advisor, he told Maxwell
that the Gold Coast Legislative Council had no power to provide for appeals to the Privy
Council, as that power could only be granted by an Imperial Order-in-Council. However, if it
chose to do so, the Council could permit appeals from the Concessions Court to the Full
Court of the Supreme Court from which Court appeals would lie to the Privy Council.
Subject to these comments, Chamberlain said, the Bill could proceed “if [emphasis mine] no
appeals or protests against it have been received or sent home for consideration.” As in
fact we shall see that they were.
The Bill received very rough handling from the Unofficial Members, of the Legislative
Council, that is those not holding any Government Office but who were appointed to
represent various segments of the community. Initially, the unofficial African members
moved to refuse leave to introduce the Lands Bill. Of course this proposal was rejected.106
In an effort to mollify the opposition, three extraordinary members were appointed to the
Council, only one of whom was an African. At the same time the Council received a
petition from a number of chiefs against the proposed Bill.107 On June 1, 1897 the Council
agreed to hear counsel representing chiefs at its Bar. The minutes noted that J. M. Sarbah
opened his argument reiteration the contention that the Chiefs and families owned all the
land in the entire country not owned by individuals as representatives of their tribes and
family members. He listed the occasions on which the British acknowledged such
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ownership and urged that the rights of the stools and families could not be destroyed by the
transparent ploy of acknowledging ownership but seizing control of administration, the prime
characteristic of ownership.108 Sarbah was followed by his co-counsel, Peter A. Renner and
C. J. Bannerman. The Bill was then read for a second time and moved into the Committee
of the Whole in which the African members futilely opposed passage of each section and in
which every one of their proposed amendments was defeated, including one to provide for a
civil cause of action for violation of the Ordinance. However, the royalties provision was
amended at the behest of the Mining Member to reduce royalties to 2 Ω% of gross value
from 5%.109 Continuing to ride roughshod over the native minority, a motion by the African members to
record their objections was defeated by the official majority, although on the next day, the Council received
more petitions against the Bill.110

While under consideration by the Legislative Council,

Maxwell had reported to the Colonial Office concerning the increasing opposition to the
Lands Bill. He said that it was “much exaggerated”and was focused on Cape Coast,
Elmina and Axim in the Central Province where the population included many educated
Africans who were, he reminded the Secretary of State, usually opposed Government
initiatives and where natives who worked with English speculators were based. There had
been much wilful misrepresentation on the part of “interested persons,” he claimed. People
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were being told that their lands were to be taken from them but that as the Secretary of
State knew, that was not so and there was no reason to fear disturbances.111 Of course as
the Secretary of State well knew that was exactly the effect the Lands Bill would have as it
would tightly restrict the manner in which the indigenous owners could deal with their land to
the point of taking the principal criterion of ownership from them. Oddly, just a month
previously, Maxwell had reported that he thought that opposition was too strong to permit
the Bill to be implemented but that it had to be passed in order to protect the prestige of the
Colonial Government and if it was necessary to prevent violence, the Secretary of State
could use his veto.112 The manner in which the Lands Bill was presented and managed
through the legislative process evidences yet again the inconsistency of British policy and
the weakness of the Colonial Government.
At the end of 1897 Governor Maxwell left the Colony for London planning to meet
with the Secretary of State to finalize plans for passage and implementation of the Lands
Bill. Three days later came the shocking news of his death while at sea en route to England
and the Council adjourned without taking any further action on the Bill for the moment.
Frederick M. Hodgson, now Governor since Maxwell’s death, reported to Chamberlain that
nothing had been done as to pressing for a third reading and passage of the Lands Bill. He
said that he had spoken with W. Brandford Griffith, Jr., the Chief Justice since September
1895, about the Bill and that the Judge was anxious that it be amended to do away with
what he said were “‘insignificant looking ambiguities, small slips, petty inconsistencies and
inaccuracies and inattention’” that make a judge’s job almost impossible in trying to
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construe a statute. Hodgson continued that he had referred Griffith’s proposals to his
Attorney General, William Nicoll, who prepared an amended Bill that the Governor now
wanted authorization to recommit to the Committee of the Whole for consideration of the
new amendments. Finally, he told the Secretary of State, Griffith had said that with one
more Puisne Judge, he could arrange for all the work of the proposed Concessions Court,
that the Government agreed to be manned by judges rather than executive officers, to be
done without interfering with the Supreme Court’s usual work.113
Despite opposition to this revised ordinance only slightly less vehement than that to
its predecessor, the Bill was permitted to be enacted, but was not placed into effect pending
further study by the Colonial Office.114 In June 1898, the Governor transmitted a petition
from five chiefs against the Lands Bill. While reporting that the chiefs accepted that part of
the Bill dealing with concessions and the Concessions Court, he said that it would be
difficult to convince the natives that the changes the Bill made would “necessarily be
extremely gradual” and that “no interference with existing arrangements is, for some time, at
any rate, likely to occur to any appreciable extent. However, the veiled threat of violence
that the Governor saw in the petition was, in his view, without substance.115
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At the behest of the newly formed ARPS, Secretary of State Chamberlain agreed to
meet a deputation of Gold Coast native leaders to discuss the Lands Bill. The deputation,
consisting of three Africans, a Solicitor, and C. Grant, a Barrister, for whom Sarbah had
prepared a compelling brief, arranged to meet with Chamberlain. The meeting took place
on August 15, 1898 and was also attended by the Parliamentary Undersecretary, Edward
Wingfield, the Permanent Undersecretary, and Reginald Antrobius, Assistant
Undersecretary. Thomas Cochrane, a Liberal member of Parliament sympathetic to the
Africans’ cause, also attended. Grant presented the Africans’ objections, reminding
Chamberlain that there was no waste land in the Gold Coast, that British courts as well as
colonial officials had repeatedly recognized this fact and that such an ordinance would
destroy not only the power of the traditional authorities but would lead to communal and
family strife. He strongly urged that land transfer matters, primarily those involving
concessions to Europeans should be handled by judges in whom the people reposed
considerable trust rather than executive officers. He also argued forcefully in favor of
treating land subject to the proposed Land Certificates according to customary rather than
English law. Chamberlain noted that Government’s intention was to protect native against
speculators and it wanted the interests of the whole tribe, not just those of the chiefs, to be
considered in making concessions. The Government was willing to work with the chiefs to
secure these objectives and the mechanics should be ones that would satisfy the chiefs and
the people. In response to British concerns over the granting of concessions by corrupt
chiefs, the African delegation proposed the creation of a special court to be manned by
Supreme Court judges to consider and approve, pursuant to customary law, all concessions
made by chiefs. Chamberlain expressed concern with the Supreme Court’s ability to deal
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with customary law if it were to be the concessions venue, but Grant pointed out that the
Supreme Court had been dealing with customary law for years. Grant said that the Court
should deal with every concession. Chamberlain said that the Court Grant was proposing
would have “immense” discretion to decide if concessions were validly made, however he
expressed the view that there should be no problem meeting the Deputation’s objections,
that utilization of a judicial court applying customary law rather than an executive officer
could be provided for, but that landowners would have to contribute to the cost of
administration through direct taxation. When asked whether the chiefs would consider such
taxation, the deputation deflected the inquiry.116
Shortly after the conclusion of the meeting, the Governor sent to the Colonial Office a
memorandum prepared at Antrobus’ request by the judges as to land tenure that confirmed
the Africans’ position that all land was owned by the natives who were “very jealous of their
rights of ownership” whether the land was cultivated or uncultivated, occupied or
unoccupied. Hogdson noted that the late Governor Maxwell steadfastly refused to accept
this principle despite all the authorities including Court decisions, but the issue was not in
doubt. The judges noted that the exact requirements for consent to sell land were vague
because the expert testimony they’d heard showed that native customs were neither
definite nor stable. However, since land was the basis of all property, Hogdson
emphasized, the more tribal land that was turned into individually held land, the more would
the chiefs’ influence be weakened.”117
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Chamberlain’s agreement with the African petitioners to reject the second Lands Bill
caused extreme annoyance to colonial administrators in Accra as it left their lands policy in
a shambles.118 Olufemi Omosini contends that Chamberlain’s decision not to allow the 1897
Lands Bill to go into effect determined a policy turning the Government towards indirect rule
and peasant agricultural production, a decision dictated by widespread resistance in the
Gold Coast to both land bills.119 Whether for fear of violence, as occurred in Sierra Leone
when the Government there attempted to impose a hut tax, or, as George Padmore argues,
because Chamberlain did not wish to court violence in West Africa where there was little or
no British settlement when far more substantial trouble was brewing in South Africa,
Chamberlain’s decision was almost a death blow to any substantial extension of English
tenure and set the tone for British land policy in the twentieth century favoring peasant
occupation on traditional tenure.120 The successful assault on the Lands Bill is explained at
least in part by the unity of the coastal educated elites and the traditional authorities thus
denying the colonial administration the opportunity to set one group against the other.121
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Administration of the Concessions Ordinance
The Land Ordinance was withdrawn. A Concessions Bill was drafted and redrafted
embodying the principles set forth in a December 1899 dispatch from the Secretary of
State. Chamberlain said that he had considered the views of the deputation expressed
during his meeting with them, that it was necessary to supervise land grants to protect
against fraud and misrepresentation but that he did not want to make any “fundamental
alteration in the rights of the natives” such as the deputation said they feared and that he
had abandoned the idea of vesting control over unoccupied land in the Government. He
said that the natives would be able to make any deal they wished subject to conditions the
Government might impose on a grantee, that the term of a grant should be limited to ninety
nine years and the area of a grant to five square miles for mining and twenty square miles
for timber, rubber or forest products grants and that the number of grants to any one
concessionaire had to be limited. He asked that Chief Justice Griffith prepare a
memorandum on whatever revisions to the Concessions provisions he proposed to be sent
to the Governor and the Legislative Council which had to maintain the principles of the Bill
but would have a free hand as to details.122 A Concessions Bill based on Grant’s proposal
at the conference with Chamberlain was drafted in the Colonial Office by H. B. Cox and
William Mercer of the West African Department.123 It was repeatedly revised as much for
the purpose of securing he rights of foreign concessionaires as for protecting indigenous
chiefs.
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As was typical of important Gold Coast legislation which rarely satisfied everyone or
got it correct the first time, the Concession Bill introduced in 1898 was withdrawn and a new
completely redrafted Bill read for the first time in early 1900. At a meeting of the Legislative
Council on February 26, 1900, the Attorney General moved the second reading which
motion Mensah Sarbah seconded, a signal that the Government had negotiated with and
obtained the approval of the African leaders. The scheme of administration provided by the
Bill required that every concession be submitted to a Concession Court comprised of
Supreme Court judges for approval to be signified by a Certificate of Validity.
In the Committee of the Whole the next day, Sarbah moved an amendment to
Section Twelve of the Bill requiring the Court to be satisfied before granting a Certificate of
Validity that native rights with respect to shifting cultivation, collection of firewood and
hunting and snaring game were protected. The amendment was rejected. At the next
session, he moved another amendment to give grantors a right to reenter after a certain
period of nonpayment of rent or other violation of the terms of the concession, to permit
distress for rent and to terminate a concession in substantial breach of its material terms,
which amendment was also rejected. However another amendment moved by Sarbah
authorizing the Court to cancel a Certificate of Validity on the application of the grantor for
breach of the Lease was accepted, probably because the Unofficial Member representing
the mining industry co-sponsored the amendment. The Bill was reported out but
recommitted to Committee at the next session to permit an amendment, such as Sarbah
had previously moved, to require as a condition of granting the Certificate of Validity that
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native rights to shifting cultivation, collection of firewood and hunting and snaring game be
protected.124
The Ordinance was passed as No.14 of 1900 in March 1900, but it was not until
November 16th that rules for Concession Court procedure made by the Chief Justice and
Stanley Morgan, P. J. and mimicking those of the Supreme Court were submitted to the
Legislative Council. Then, in December an Amendment Ordinance was introduced because
no provision had been made in the original Ordinance for appeals from Concession Court
judgments. In addition, at the instance of the Chief Justice and the Attorney General a
provision was added to provide for Court approval of surveys that should be made by
concessionaires with the imprimatur of the Government surveyors.125
The Concessions Ordinance thus gave legislative recognition to ownership of all
land by traditional authorities, while providing for the colonial government to have a
supervisory role over non-agricultural exploitation of the land through the Supreme Court
that would determine questions of ownership and boundaries by customary law and give
final approval to all concessions.126 This would assure that grants by the stools were limited
in area and duration and would not interfere with the Africans’ traditional rights to shifting
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cultivation, hunting and fishing. The Ordinance provided that rents and royalties would be
shared with the Colonial Government and would be used to benefit the community as well
as the individual king or chief.
Despite those of its provisions seemingly designed to protect the chiefs from
exploitation by European interests, the Colonial Government’s capitulation to native
demands that British Supreme Court judges approve all concessions and the insertion of
provisions designed to protect traditional use of the land, the Ordinance did not receive
unalloyed support from the chiefs. They resented what they deemed to be interference with
disposition of land within their control as well as the amount of concession fees taken by the
Government.127 Nor were the concessionaires happy with the expense and delay involved in
obtaining the required surveys of the concession properties and the expense and delay of
litigation arising from numerous disputes as to ownership of conceded property.128 Indeed,
by 1902, Chief Justice Griffith was complaining to Governor Nathan that concession work
was overwhelming the judges and cases were repeatedly being adjourned -- only six of
twenty on his docket were ready for hearing. He reported that six hundred cases had been
filed and two hundred noticed for hearing in accordance with the Concessions Ordinance.
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He told the judges he would try to get them help for which he now applied to the Governor,
but no immediate help was forthcoming.129
Griffith indeed sought additional help but not additional judges. In early 1902 he told
Governor Nathan in response to his inquiry as to whether there were sufficient judges and
staff to handle the concession work that there were an adequate number of judges and
clerks but was needed were more surveyors. Over one hundred cases were awaiting
survey. Only three of those were opposed but the judges dealt with those cases as well as
the ninety seven unopposed cases more quickly than the surveyors did. He pointed out to
the Governor that surveys were vital because of the “complete ignorance of a native land
owner as to where his land ends and his neighbour’s begins,” so that the Judges had
decided to require a survey in every case, not just opposed ones as a condition to granting
a Certificate of Validity. This requirement, Griffith added, would also deter most of those
applications which were never seriously meant to be pursued. The Government should not
complain about how long the process takes, he concluded, nor be upset by complaints from
concessionaires, since it was the policy of the Colonial Office to require Court approval to
protect native rights and such approval is dependent on proper surveys.130
Throughout the first decade of the twentieth century, the colonial administration
sought ways to improve the operation of the Concessions Ordinance in order to expedite
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the approval of concession applications.131 Most suggestions involved limiting the
jurisdiction of the courts and increasing the authority of the Executive. Faced with criticism
that the judges were approving applications for Certificates of Validity without conditioning
the granting of such Certificates on the required respect for native rights, even Chief Justice
Griffith argued that it was the obligation of the Executive, not the Judiciary, to determine if a
particular concession did not comply with the statute.132 This was a peculiar and clearly
erroneous interpretation of the statute that the Chief Justice and his colleagues had been
administering for almost ten years. Moreover, as much as it may have desired more
administrative involvement, the Colonial Office regarded that obligation to be one for the
Judiciary not the Executive, albeit one that in London’s view was being laxly discharged.133
Governor John Rodger wrote to the Colonial Office in 1908 reminding the officials
there of the failure to obtain approval of an ordinance that would confide administration of
unoccupied lands to the Government for the general benefit of the community and that he
considered it to be futile to try now to reopen the issue. He enclosed a Minute from his
Acting Attorney General, F. H. Gough, saying that courts had recognized that all lands were
owned by native stools and/or families or individuals, citing Obi v. Solomon, Full Court
[1905], a Minute from his Acting Colonial Secretary, noting that Obi had confirmed the right
of a Paramount Chief to dispose of unoccupied land for purposes of cultivation and a long
memorandum from Chief Justice Griffith opining that the Concessions Ordinance implied
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recognition of ownership of native lands by the stools, reciting the history of British-native
relationships as to land, the payment of rent by the British to the stools for occupation of the
forts, a practice that existed from the outset of British trading on the Gold Coast until 1826
when Britain and the Fantis defeated the Ashantis, noting recognition by various British
Governors and other authorities of the rights of Paramount Chiefs; opining that the Public
Lands Ordinance implied that the Crown had no rights to native land generally but only for
specific governmental purposes and that the Concessions Ordinance acknowledged the
Chiefs’ claims to title, albeit “to the great detriment of the country.”134 One would think that
these seemingly authoritative statements would lay to rest the issue of land ownership on
the Gold Coast, but, in fact, such issue was always close to the surface whenever
discussion of land rights took place and would be brought up again and again.
For example, repeated attempts by Gold Coast officials to obtain Colonial Office
approval for permission to amend the Ordinance to permit District Commissioners to assure
that concessions provided for enforcement of customary rights failed in the face of
indigenous opposition based on the belief that more administrative control was merely the
camel’s nose under the tent in depriving the chiefs and families of their property. Had the
populace at large known that officials in the Colonial Office had expressed their principal
motive for Government’s desire for more effective enforcement to be to minimize the
influence of native lawyers and to assure that “a reasonable field should be offered for
European enterprise,” its skepticism as to the good faith of its colonial overlords would
surely have been enhanced.135 Indeed, throughout the period under consideration here, the
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colonial authorities, both in Accra and London frequently expressed their disdain for lawyers
in general and African lawyers in particular attributing to them the litigiousness of the
indigenous population and the immense cost of litigation.
Colonial administrators continuously complained about the quantity and cost of
litigation related to land transfers, both as to concessions to Europeans as well as transfers
between and among indigenous peoples. In an effort to limit litigation, the Attorney General
recommended to the Governor the appointment of a Commissioner of Lands who would
keep a record of all land in the Gold Coast, whether Government, stool or private, and
would act as a Registrar of Deeds. Any action in the Supreme Court or a Native Tribunal
relating to land would be reported to him and noted on the record. He could act as a
referee or arbitrator, taking evidence and fixing boundaries. All court decisions about land
would be reported to him and recorded, and after the time for all appeals had run, he could
issue a certificate with respect to boundaries that would amount to a Certificate of Title.136
The submitted proposals were not well received. The Governor said that it would cost too
much money and require too much legislation, the enactment of which would generate
considerable opposition by both chiefs and educated Africans for what Secretary for Native
Affairs Francis Crowther described as only a “tentative” step to limit litigation. Until detailed
surveys were completed, it would not be a good idea to try to put them into effect, an
opinion in which the Governor concurred.137
Until mid-1910, the Colonial Office staunchly resisted the Gold Coast Government’s
demands for a change in policy as to control of the concessions process, only agreeing to
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relatively insignificant amendments to the Concession Ordinance designed to increase
government revenues and expedite approval of concessions without taking from the courts
the jurisdiction to approve concessions. Then the Secretary of State expressed concern as
to alienation of native land and asked the Governor to recommend whatever amendments
to the Concession Ordinance he thought desirable, including whether approval of
concessions should be handled by an Executive Officer rather than by a Supreme Court
Judge or whether it could be dealt with by the appointment of a dedicated Judge . In
addition he asked the Governor’s opinion as to whether law officers should appear on all
concession inquiries, opposed or unopposed to assure that the rights of the natives were
protected.138
Responding to the Colonial Office’s invitation for his opinion, the Governor suggested
that in order to protect native rights, judges “should be invited to standardize their
requirements and that the District Commissioners should be directed to enforce them.” But
the Governor felt that the judges would never agree on a standard definition of “reasonably
protected” as that term was used in §11(6) of the Concessions Ordinance. John Anderson
of the Colonial Office minuted that the late Governor, Rodger said that elsewhere the
question of approval of concessions was dealt with by an Executive and standards
developed. Anderson wanted a good land officer to examine into and report on the working
of the present arrangements and to make recommendations for the future.139
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Studying the Land Tenure Question
Between 1912 and 1914, the Colonial Office caused two extensive studies of land
tenure in the Gold Coast to be undertaken, the first by a Commissioner, H. Conway Belfield,
and the second by a departmental committee. Belfield recommended removal of the
judiciary from the concession approval process and the appointment of an executive
Commissioner of Lands to deal with concessions. Rather than implement this
recommendation, the Colonial Office appointed a committee to look into tenure issues not
only on the Gold Coast but in all of the West African dependencies. At the conclusion of
the taking of evidence, a subcommittee prepared a draft report that, perhaps because of the
onset of World War One, was never considered or approved by the full committee, but that
had some influence on Colonial Office thinking nonetheless. It, too, recommended making
the concession approval process administrative rather than judicial, but, once again, nothing
was done to amend the Concessions Ordinance to remove the judges from their role in the
approval process. Rather, the next amendment was designed to redress the problem found
by the Privy Council in its 1914 decision holding that leases did not fall within the definition
of concessions in the Ordinance. A short amendment included leases and rentals within
the definition of concessions.
In May 1911, the Colonial Office sent a Circular Dispatch to the Governors of each of
the West African colonies detailing a Parliamentary request for particulars as to area,
ownership and restriction on alienation of land in their colonies.140 Perhaps with the
intention to preempt any unfriendly inquiry by members of Parliament, Secretary of State
Harcourt advised the new Governor, James Thorburn, that he thought it to be desirable to
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get a report on how the Concessions Ordinance was working and about the alienation of
property by chiefs from someone “who has had experience of similar problems in other
parts of the world.” He said that he had chosen H. Conway Belfield who had had much
experience in land questions in Malaya. He continued that he didn’t think that Belfield
would need to take evidence under oath, that he’d come to the Gold Coast in January 1912.
He said that Charles P. Lucas, a senior official, wrote to Belfield in September and laid out
what he, the Secretary of State wanted, a report on the extent of alienation and its effect on
subsistence farming by the natives, whether it helped the natives by introducing them to
new industries and higher wages, was control by the Supreme Court satisfactory or should it
be transferred to the Executive, were chiefs consulting with their people before entering into
concessions, was the consideration for concessions adequate and was that consideration
being spent for the benefit of the people.141
Shortly thereafter, Lucas wrote the Governor that Belfield had accepted the position
and would take evidence in London of officers on leave in the United Kingdom, but that he
didn’t think that W. B. Griffith, Jr., the former Chief Justice would be very pleased to learn of
the inquiry since he had been largely responsible for the working of the Ordinance, however
W. D. Ellis of the West Africa division requested that Griffith meet with Belfield anyway.
Belfield heard a number of witnesses on each of the issues presented to him. As to
the role of the judiciary, the Chief Commissioner of Ashanti and now Puisne Judge Gough
both testified that regulation of alienation should be in the hands of the Executive, not the
Judiciary. F. C. Fuller, the Ashanti Chief Commissioner said that the Concession Ordinance
was too “legalistic” and rigid. Such regulation required elasticity which could not be found in
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treatment by judges. Moreover, he continued, the judicial process resulted in too much
delay and, in his opinion, was unfair to concessionaires. Gough said that the process would
be more expeditious if it were in the hands of the Executive and that it was placed within the
jurisdiction of the Court for political reasons because the judges were more popular and the
people trusted had confidence in the decisions of the Court. To the contrary, the President
and First Vice President of the ARPS, J. P. Brown and T. F. E. Jones, testified that the
judges were most able to determine concession issues and that the District Commissioners
who were the executive officials who were proposed to handle the issues were incompetent
to decide these issues and whose role should be limited to offering advice to chiefs on how
to negotiate concessions.142
Belfield delivered his report in June 1912.143 He concluded that the crown had no
ownership rights except as to land taken for public use despite having extended “its
protective authority to all places and persons in the Colony. . . . and any endevour to extend
these rights otherwise than by legal process of acquisition would amount to a breach of faith
with the people.”144 He found that “in consequence of their own ignorance, and the
reluctance of the tribe to press their elders unduly, concessions have been granted upon
terms which are unfavourable to the people.” Moreover, he went on, the chiefs had no real
idea as to how much land was being granted so that overlapping grants were often made
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and concessions granted in which the grantor had no rights.145 Thus, he felt that the lack of
government control and involvement in negotiations opened the chiefs and other grantors to
exploitation since they often fail to understand the terms of the proposed concession until
“matters have progressed too far for alteration.” Natives should never be left alone to
negotiate but should be given official advice and representation.146
As to the vital issue of administration of the Ordinance by the judiciary, Belfield found
that the judges were not given any standard by which to measure adequacy and fairness of
consideration as they were required to do and no evidence was required or usually taken on
such issue, yet despite such lack of standards, the court were authorized to modify in any
way they choose the terms of the concession.147 He pointed to the Ashanti Ordinance
where the Provincial and District Commissioners acted as both judge and executive offered
a better result.148 Belfield claimed that no reasons had been stated to him for involvement of
the judiciary, an involvement, he asserted, that was unique in the Empire. However,
adverting to the testimony of Mr. Justice Gough, he conjectured, that their involvement
derived from popular pressure because the people had greater confidence in the judges
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than in executive officers.149

He concluded that the system of concession validation by the

judges was unduly expensive and dilatory and did not assist the grantors’ needs in
negotiating concessions. He recommended that a Commissioner of Lands be appointed
and given the responsibility, along with the Provincial and District Commissioners, of
advising the grantors as to the fairness of the proposed concessions. No appeals to the
Supreme Court from the Concession Court, he recommended, should be permitted.150
On June 26, 1912, shortly after receipt of Belfield’s Report and before it could be
published or even given anything more than a cursory review, Lewis Harcourt, the Secretary
of State determined, at the behest of E. D. Morel, so Casely Hayford says, to appoint a
Committee to examine into issues of land tenure and alienation in all of West Africa. The
Committee on the Tenure of Land in the West African Colonies and Protectorates
(hereinafter referred to as the “WALC”), was to be chaired by Sir Kenelm E. Digby and
consisted of Sir F. M. Hogdson, former Governor of the Gold Coast, a Labor member of
Parliament, Josiah C. Wedgwood, Morel, Sir W. Taylor and three officials of the Colonial
Office, C. Strachey, Ellis and R. E. Stubbs.151 In so doing, the Secretary of State utterly
rejected the work and the report of his chosen delegate and opened anew all of the issues
Belfield had investigated. The record does not disclose Harcourt’s motives or reasoning for
rejecting the report of his chosen commissioner or for initiating yet another investigation of
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land issues. Yet, given some of the evidence heard by Belfield as to the confidence placed
by the people of the Gold Coast in the judges, one can readily conclude that he was looking
for further support to removing the judiciary from the process while fearful of the uproar
such a move might bring about.
Shortly after the WALC’s hearings began, Acting Governor Bryan reported to the
Colonial Office that statistics as to land alienation confirmed his view that the procedure by
which land alienation was handled under the Concessions Ordinance should be transferred
from the judiciary to the executive. London responded with an inquiry as to how soon the
Court might be expected to act on applications for validations, noting that E. D. Morel, a
member of the WALC, was pressing for an immediate prohibition of further Supreme Court
approvals but that the rest of the Committee thought that such a prohibition would be unfair
to concessionaires prosecuting claims under the existing law. The Colonial Office said that
it had told Morel that the Governor had power to forbid any more agricultural concessions
and that he should do so. Morel and the Secretary of State suggested an amendment to
the Concessions Ordinance forbidding any concessions of land under cocoa cultivation.152
The WALC received hundreds of documents and heard seventy nine witnesses from
all of the West African colonies in fifty two sessions. Griffith told the WALC that he
believed it would be “a great mistake” to preserve land as communal. Disregarding the
evidence of hundreds of years, he said that individuals wouldn’t work as hard if land were
not theirs; he recommended that unrestricted land transfer be permitted but only between
and among natives.153 He testified that he disliked the idea of family property because “lazy
152
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member[s] get more than they ought to get” whereas a system of individual tenure “rewards
energy and industry.” Finally, he said that he did not believe that widespread individual
tenure would necessarily undermine chiefly authority because natives would still have to
bring their land disputes to the Chiefs’ courts.154 Griffith’s views were his own and there is
no evidence in the record from which to conclude that the members of the WALC or the
Government shared those views. As I’ve noted above, family property had been an
institution in the Gold Coast for a very long time and had resulted in a substantial annual
cocoa crop that contributed to significant export earnings.
Belfield told the WALC that attorneys promoted litigation and the best way to avoid
prolonged litigation would be to have the Executive do most of the concessions work; since
the District Commissioners were on the spot it would also diminish uncertainty.155
Reinforcing the argument that litigation was bankrupting the indigenous population, Giles
Hunt estimated that of the approximately £100,000 received by Grantors from
concessionaires, £30,000 went for legal fees.156 He said that the Chiefs of the Western
Province had “begged” the Secretary for Native Affairs, Francis Crowther, for an alternative
tribunal to deal with concession matters in a less expensive way.157
Testifying in favor of the current system of validating concessions, Emanuel J. P.
Brown, a native Gold Coast barrister, told the WALC that it was not necessary for a District
Commissioner to be involved in the negotiation of concessions as the Concessions Court
was required to assure itself that the grantor’s rights were protected as condition to approval
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and issuance of a Certificate of Validity. Moreover, the cost of obtaining such a Certificate
was not so great as the only witnesses necessary were those to prove title and consent.158
This testimony must be considered somewhat disingenuous as Brown must have known
that the Concessions Court required an expensive survey to be made of the land subject to
the concession.
Giles Hunt, responding to a suggestion from the Committee that an executive officer
could better determine boundaries than a judge, said that it was useless for a District
Commissioner to look at the land unless he could survey it since the density of the forest
prevented seeing the extent of the supposed grant, although he would prefer executive
control. Nevertheless, he opined, the Governor-in-Council should not be a court of appeal
to have the final say. Finally, he agreed that Gold Coast natives would prefer a judicial body
to oversee concessions and appeals to the Full Court rather than to the Governor-inCouncil.159
The Secretary of Native Affairs, Crowther, opined that the Supreme Court would not
always protect customary rights as it would allow a village to be moved if it determined that
such a move was necessary to protect the health of villagers from mine tailings. Alienation
of land, he argued, required more control because alienation led to individual ownership that
would undermine social forms and only the Executive had the foresight to see the
consequences of uncontrolled alienation and to prevent them, so that concessions should
be subject to approval by the Governor and not the Supreme Court.160 In this testimony, we
can once again see the superior attitude of the British administration toward the indigenous
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population, its conviction that only it knew what was good for them and its indifference to
their desire to have access to the only British instrument of government that the people
trusted.161
Casely Hayford reminded the WALC that the deputation to Chamberlain on the
Lands Bill had urged that land control should be in the hands of the Judiciary not the
Executive, that Chamberlain had accepted that position, that he preferred judges to
administrators and that the people did too. He explained that things were working out well
in the Concessions Court and averred that litigation was not the main cause of stool debt.
Insofar as having an executive officer deal with concessions, he said that District
Commissioners often were forty miles or more from the land under concession and had
poorer knowledge of the land than a Court had after receiving evidence, Moreover, the
Court had much experience with these cases and the District Commissioner usually did not
have any. He acknowledged that there were inexperienced judges just as there were
inexperienced District Commissioners, but the former, who care, make the effort to learn all
the circumstances, get plans and have counsel available to guide them whereas District
Commissioners went on leave and moved from district to district often, sometimes after as
little as six months. Thus, he disagreed with Gough’s view that the executive should deal
with alienations and said that Gough may have been influenced by his experience as an
executive himself.162
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Chief Assistant Colonial Secretary, F. A. C. Robertson, told the WALC that he
approved of Judicial jurisdiction over concessions but would prefer a separate Land Court
because he was “not content with the executive administration of the land.” He would
suggest empowering officers with both judicial and executive functions such as those
possessed by Provincial Commissioners.163 He was satisfied that the Judges looked after
native rights but he would expand the jurisdiction of the Concession or Land Court to permit
it to determine if a concession was in the best interests of the people.164
Griffith denied to the WALC that the Concession Court had any arrears during his
tenure or any problem in keeping up with the cases noticed for hearing. An application
could be heard and decided in six to ten days unless a survey was required and had not yet
been done. He noted that there were many “hung” applications where the concessionaire
was not prosecuting the application but delayed having a hearing held. The former Chief
Justice admitted that he had occasionally consulted with executive officers with respect to a
concession application, but insisted that he had always noted the fact and the content of
each such consultation on the record. He conceded that if they were drafting the Ordinance
ab initio he would have concessions dealt with as an Executive matter, but given the time
the Ordinance had been in effect and the experience attorneys and concessionaires had
had with it, people were used to the existing system. If, however, the Ordinance were to be
repealed and a new one enacted, he thought that the Governor should have the authority
for and the responsibility of dealing with concessions and should decide if a concessionaire
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were a fit and proper person. He warned however that the people would be upset if the
Ordinance were repealed and would feel that their land were being confiscated.165
Sir P.C. Smyly, the Chief Justice of the Gold Coast since September 1911, testified
that the Concessions Court was not in a good position to decide boundary issues that would
best be done by local executive officers. He told the WALC that he largely agreed with
Belfield’s recommendations: executives should deal with uncontested applications with
appeals from disputed applications to be to the Governor or the Governor in Council and not
to the Supreme Court even if the Executive altered the terms of the concession. The
judges’ role should be limited to deciding title. Finally, Mr. Justice Gough submitted a
statement in which he opined that regulation of concessions should be by the Executive
because judges were not subject to any control and had too much discretion.
In Ellis, minuted that under the “lead” of E. D. Morel, the majority was inclined to stop
acquisition of private property in land by natives and to transfer concession validation to the
Executive. Only Ellis and Sir W. Taylor wanted a different result. But there was difficulty in
getting the majority views on paper in a form on which they could all agree and that was
causing delay in the preparation of a report and recommendations. Ellis didn’t see, now
that war had come, how the Committee could meet again. Moreover, he noted, Morel had
been accused of aiding the enemy with propaganda and Wedgwood was with the army in
France. Ellis believed, he said, that the Colonial Office couldn’t wait for the Committee to
prepare a final report but now had to decide how to proceed. He noted that the only thing
about which the Committee was unanimous was that the tasks given to the Supreme Court
were not “proper to be exercised by judicial officers” and that all the judges who appeared
165
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before the Committee wanted to get rid of concessions work “as not being properly
judicial.”166
In March 1914, Kenelm Digby, Chairman of the WALC had written to Secretary of
State Harcourt saying that the WALC would unanimously recommend the repeal of the
Concessions Ordinance but that a detailed proposal and report might take much time. He
explained the WALC’s finding that unrestricted concessions threatened the people’s needs.
He urged the Secretary of State to suspend the power of alienation immediately, i.e. no
more concessions should be granted and validation proceedings should be suspended
pending delivery of the WALC report. “Judicial and Executive functions of the Government,”
Digby wrote, “should be readjusted so that such concessions should from the first be under
proper supervision and control.”167
Governor Clifford, in an undated demi-official letter to the Secretary of State, wrote
that the situation was nowhere near as critical as Digby suggested and that concessions
had no impact on most Gold Coast farmers.168 Harcourt suggested that an ordinance
suspending alienation should be enacted as soon as possible.169 Clifford replied that he
was unwilling to act until he saw the entire WALC report as such action would lead to a
charge of breach of faith and assumed that the Gold Coast Government would agree with
166
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such a recommendation. “[H]asty” legislation, he wrote, would cause much unrest and he
and his entire Executive Council unanimously opposed enactment of such an Ordinance at
that time. There simply was no emergency justifying such drastic action at that time. He
emphasized that such an Ordinance would be seen as a “blow” to natives’ inalienable rights
in land and would cause the Government to suffer a “fatal” loss of prestige. To support his
position, he enclosed the written opinions of each of his Executive Council members as
well as of Provincial Commissioner Harper.170 As it always seemed to do when the local
government stood up to London and strongly opposed its expressed desires, the Colonial
Office backed down and said that enactment of such an Ordinance could await the
Governor’s arrival in London on leave and face to face consultation with the Secretary of
State.171
No final report of the entire WALC was ever prepared. Rather, a draft by a subcommittee of four of the WALC members made its way to the Colonial Office and
disappeared into its files. Nevertheless, the influence of that draft report on the thinking of
various colonial officials about land tenure and the relationship between the judiciary and
the executive as to land issues was profound and long lasting. Accordingly, it is worth while
to examine that draft report in some detail.
Initially, the drafters asserted the power of the Government to regulate “in the public
interest the use to which an owner may put his land or to prevent him from using those
lands in a way calculated to prejudice the welfare of the community.”172 In making this
assertion, the drafters utterly ignored the repeated admissions by the British Government as
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to ownership of the land by indigenous people and Joseph Chamberlain’s agreement that
the Colonial authorities would not seek to take from such owners the innate right to alienate
their land in their own interests.
Insofar as the role of the Judiciary in the regulation of concessions was concerned,
the drafters argued that the Supreme Court had been burdened by its past decisions
concerning alienation under native customary law and now had to deal with incessant
boundary disputes in addition to concession cases. They noted that Belfield described
litigation as one of the natives’ “joys of life.”173 Land litigation clogged the courts through,
inter alia. interpleader on execution, foreclosure cases and contested succession. Quoting
Crowther, they wrote that “‘[t]he three most obvious forces which wear down the communal
system of tenure are firstly judicial practice . . . attributable to the want of knowledge and to
the want of machinery for gaining knowledge of native law and customs.’”174 The Colonial
Legislature had charged the judges with duties properly belonging to the executive, noting
that Belfield had said that only a minority of the witnesses before him, and none whose
opinion he valued, favored continuation of judicial involvement in concession validation.175
He and they, despite evidence of the dilatory actions of the concessionaires, the problem of
obtaining proper surveys and the view of Griffith and other witnesses, continued to assert
that the validation procedure was unduly prolonged and expensive. Ignoring fourteen years
of experience of successful enforcement of the terms of the Concession Ordinance, they
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concluded that only issues of title were fit for judicial resolution. All other matters, such as
defining who owned the land and what land was covered by a concession were executive
functions best carried out by local District Commissioners who knew the people, not by a
judge dependent upon evidence that might not be adduced. These were executive
questions that should be determined before and not after the grant of a concession. “The
Legislature has laid upon the Supreme Court of the Gold Coast an almost impossible task
of which it should be relieved and that the superintendence of the matters to which we have
referred should be placed in the hands of the Executive.”176 In their zeal to strip the
Judiciary of its functions in the Concession process, they ignored the simple expedient of
having the District Commissioners testify to the Court as to their supposed superior
knowledge of the land and the people under the safeguards of an oath and cross
examination.
The drafters recommended that native tenure should be encouraged as it was a
natural means of administering land. They recognized that permanent cultivation (as, e.g.
by cocoa) encouraged mortgaging and sale of land in a manner inconsistent with native
tenure and encouraged litigation that was detrimental to development. They expressed
their view that communal tenure required careful supervision of Native Tribunals to prevent
wrongful deprivation of individual cultivation holdings, especially where such holdings might
be replaced by permanent cultivation. They recommended that there should be no
transfers of agricultural land to non-natives except via leases on specific terms that were
contracted through the District Commissioners and approved by the Governor-in-Council
after approval by the Attorney General. Only title questions should be referred to the
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Supreme Court for resolution. There should be no transfers that would interfere with preexisting occupancy. Land would be presumed to be communal or family land held for the
benefit of the community or family. All tribal boundary disputes should be resolved
summarily by the Governor and the Court should be obliged to stay boundary litigation until
he had decided. In a radical change from existing precedent, Courts would be authorized to
take judicial notice of customary law rather than to require proof and native authorities
would be encouraged to decide and record native custom which need not be ancient.177 The
drafters would have mining leases limited in term to fifty years and incidental surface rights
in mining leases would have to be specifically defined and limited. Finally, timber licenses
would be limited to places where natives were not collecting forest produce and to ten year
terms renewable for five year terms.178
It is unclear as to when, if ever, the Draft Report was delivered to the Gold Coast
Government. Whether it was or its recommendations were conveyed in summary form by
the Colonial Office, we know that the Governor and his advisors opposed them and that
they were never implemented, at least in part because of fear of popular opposition to any
claim to control indigenous land or to remove the judiciary from its role in the concession
process.179 The inconsistencies between the assumptions found in the Draft Report favoring
maintenance of customary tenure and those of many of the colonial officials on the Gold
Coast favoring individual tenure were evidenced in a memorandum that Commissioner
Harper, now Assistant Colonial Secretary wrote to himself in 1914. “ [C]ocoa farms are
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appearing everywhere and farmers are dealing with them permanently so the idea of
exclusive continuing ownership, fairly well established in the Coast towns and their
neighborhood, began to take its place in the ‘bush’ by the side of customary tenure of land.”
Moreover, he wrote, this tendency, a favorable one he suggested was supported by the fact
that many farmers had become Christian and wanted land to pass on to the sons and not to
enate nephews.180
The failure of officials in the Colonial Office to pursue the recommendations
contained in the Draft Report of a committee that the Colonial Secretary insisted be formed
is yet another example of Britain’s inability to formulate and execute a consistent policy as
to issues critical to the governance of the Gold Coast dependency. Both Belfield and the
WALC Draft Report recommended making the Executive responsible for administration of
most of the responsibilities imposed on government by the Concessions Ordinance yet
nothing was done, likely for fear, as Governor Clifford had expressed, that Britain would be
seen as engaging in a theft of indigenous land, of acting in bad faith and that its prestige
would suffer. One cannot say what the actual result would have been had the Colonial
Office pursed the recommendations of its Commissioner and its departmental committee,
but the mere suggestion of opposition caused it to back off.
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Post WALC Developments
In April 1914, the Privy Council temporarily knocked the entire concession scheme
into a cocked hat by ruling, in Wassaw Exploring Syndicate, Ltd. v. The African Rubber
Company, Ltd., that leases and similar conveyances were not concessions within the
meaning of the Concessions Ordinance and therefore need not be approved by anyone
other than the parties thereto. In June, Secretary of State Harcourt sent Governor Clifford a
memorandum prepared by former Chief Justice Griffith pointing out that in view of the Privy
Council’s holding a lease could not be validated by the Concessions Court. The local courts
and the Legislative Council had always believed to the contrary but had to follow the Privy
Council ruling.181 Now one might think that the Privy Council ruling offered the opportunity to
revise or even to repeal the Concessions Ordinance in accordance with the Draft Report of
the WALC. To the contrary, that document seems to have been ignored. Rather, Griffith
recommended that the Ordinance simply be amended, as the Secretary of State suggested,
retrospectively treating leases as concessions.182 Governor Clifford expressed concern that
if retrospectively considered to be concessions, those that had not been validated would
have to be submitted to the Court for a Certificate of Validity causing a lot of work and
considerable expense. He suggested exempting transactions involving less than five acres,
thus limiting the number of concession enquiries that would have to be conducted.183
Acting Governor Bryan telegraphed the Colonial Office in July, concerned that the
Privy Council ruling “enables land to be taken from natives to a large extent without control”
and proposed amendments to the definitions section of the Concessions Ordinance to
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include agreements to sell as well as to leases of rural lands.184 J. A. Calder minuted his
superiors commenting on Bryan’s suggestion that the definitions section should make it
perfectly clear that “any demise of land whether by sale, lease or gift, except land situate in
a town or village” falls within the definition of a concession. Ellis agreed and suggested that
the amendment be made retrospective. Harcourt approved the suggested amendment.
Despite this opportunity to redo its entire regulatory scheme and achieve the frequently
proposed objective of transferring the primary responsibilities for approving concessions
from the judiciary to the executive, the colonial authorities merely corrected the definition
section of the Ordinance, so that the existing system continued in operation to the apparent
dissatisfaction of colonial administrators but to the equally apparent satisfaction of their
African subjects.
In mid March 1915, the Governor sent the Colonial Office a bill embodying all the
amendments to the Concessions Ordinance discussed during 1914. A concession was
retrospectively redefined to get around the Privy Council decision in the Wasaw Exploring
Syndicate case. In addition, it authorized the Governor to exempt small transfers of land
outside the towns from the provisions of the Ordinance, confirmed Certificates of Validity
already granted so that the confirmation process need not be repeated, added provisions
against future combinations of concessions (a practice called “dummying” that had already
been sustained by the Supreme Court as complying with the letter if not the spirit of the
Ordinance) and applied the area limitations of the Ordinance to options going forward
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because the Supreme Court had held that the original Ordinance area limitations did not
apply to options.185
In a minute on the proposed amendment, Ellis expressed his unhappiness as to the
continued role being given to the Supreme Court, a role that he continued to think was an
administrative not a judicial one.186 The Colonial Office approved the Bill being introduced
and read the first time with certain alterations and minor additions but most importantly,
directed the Governor to prepare a Land Code taking control of the concession process
from the judiciary and putting it in the Governor’s hands, to be sent to the Secretary of State
for approval. At last it seemed that concession approval was to be remade into an
administrative process from a judicial one.
Almost a year later, nothing had yet been done to consummate the plan to transfer
concession approvals to the executive. A Bill to amend the Ordinance to overrule the
Wasaw decision had been drafted by the Attorney General.187 But, Governor Bryan reported
to the Colonial Office, he had not yet been able to draft a comprehensive Land Code
transferring to the Governor-in-Council control of future land transfers and saw no way he
could do it in the foreseeable future, as he had yet to initiate the preliminary studies.188
Although he gave no reason, the demands on the Governor of the war and fear of native
opposition offer plausible possible explanations. Thus, nothing more was heard concerning
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a transfer of responsibilities for concession validation for a number of years despite the view
of authorities in both Accra and London that judicial independence was an ”anomaly”
unsuitable for a basically authoritarian colonial government.189
Land policy did not occupy much of the time of the Gold Coast Government again
until the end of 1917, at which time Governor Hugh Clifford sent a Secret Dispatch to the
Secretary of State covering a sixty three page printed detailed report on the land question in
the Gold Coast and British attitudes and responses. Complaining that the British officials
served much shorter terms in the Gold Coast than in Asia or the West Indies, he said that
official memory was short and people forget Chamberlain’s pledge never to take native
land. He reminded the Colonial Office that W. Brandford Griffith, Jr. had criticized the first
draft of a Forest Ordinance Bill on grounds similar to those set forth in opposition to the
1897 Land Bill “in so trenchant and unanswerable a fashion that the draft was forthwith
withdrawn” because the Bill deprived the natives of the right to clear forest land for
cultivation thus violating the spirit if not the letter of Chamberlain’s promise and people
believed the Government was guilty of bad faith.190
Commenting on Clifford’s dispatch, Risley concluded as a matter of law that land
owners owned the minerals under their land and should receive the rent or other proper
189
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compensation but that minerals under unoccupied land should be considered to be Crown
land with compensation to natives only for disturbance of surface rights. The Secretary of
State agreed and so told Governor Clifford who could not have been happy at this result as
it amounted to an iteration of the discredited principles rejected by Joseph Chamberlain in
1897, for, after all, if the natives owned unoccupied land, as all seem to agree, surely under
well known English legal principles, they owned subsurface rights as well.
Clifford argued that land policy should be directed at the development of agricultural
resources through the agency of indigenous inhabitants. They wanted their own land, he
believed, but were characterized by “indolent and casual” attitudes towards farming and
wouldn’t work to a clock. He pointed out that the Gold Coast and Nigeria occupied radically
different economic positions. Whereas the Gold Coast was dependent upon a single crop,
Nigeria was self contained and was independent of European markets. He noted that the
Gold Coast’s economy was inelastic with its population refusing to cultivate oil palms even
when the demand and price for cocoa was low as during the 1914-1918 war and that for
palm oil was high, because, he asserted, the population found that it was easy to cultivate
cocoa and hard to work palm oil and cotton fields; He concluded that the Government had
to continue to respect and support traditional communal tenure and not push development
to the point where farmers turn into rural wage laborers.191
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The battle for control of the concession process between the executive and the
judiciary persisted into the 1930's, at least from the perspective of the Gold Coast educated
classes that opposed a Concession Amendment Bill that was designed to minimize
speculation would add a provision requiring the Governor’s approval of the concessionaires’
means and ability to develop the concession before it could be submitted to the Court for
validation.192 The Bill was bitterly attacked by the press. Thus, the Gold Coast Times,
11.21.31 wrote of the Bill as an attempt to oust the court’s jurisdiction and to make approval
of concessions an executive function: “The result of the whole enquiry would be made
dependent upon the will of the Governor which renders the amendment particularly
odious,.” and “the issue of the concessionaires’ ability to develop the concession should be
resolved by the court not the executive.”193 The Governor defended his proposal, one he
actually thought would be applauded by the public, by saying that the court was not charged
with investigating concessionaires’ financial condition, a task that would be better done by
the executive. The Colonial Office agreed that the Executive was better suited to conduct
this inquiry, and in this instance ignored public opposition and permitted the Bill to be
passed as No. 12 of 1932.194
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CHAPTER XIII – LAND ISSUES – THE FOREST ORDINANCES
AND EFFORTS TO FORMULATE A LAND POLICY
This chapter discusses two different efforts to control land use through legislation.
The first, a subset of land tenure issues, involved protection of the Gold Coast rainforests.
In this chapter, I discuss the failed efforts to establish effective regulation of forests through
legislation in 1912 and 1927. As described in the previous chapter, British policy with
respect to rain forest protection vacillated between efforts to promulgate legislation that
would prevent deforestation, an objective they considered necessary for the public good, on
the one hand and their desire to prop up the authority of the chiefs through whom the British
wished to rule.1 The ecological consequences of British reluctance to impose their will on
the indigenous authorities were perceived by them to be almost catastrophic, the
destruction of a substantial portion of the forests with resulting reduction in lumber and
cocoa exports.2
In 1908, the Government enacted an ordinance prohibiting the cutting of immature
trees, a first step toward forest regulation. It was opposed by some of the educated class
on the grounds that it trespassed on the rights of the chiefs by failing to discriminate
between cutting for commercial and personal use. Over the next four years, the
1
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Government worked toward formulation of a Forest Ordinance that would halt deforestation.
Opposition based on the claim that the Government was confiscating land owned by the
chiefs was widespread, but an Ordinance establishing forest reserves and prohibiting
concessions on reserved land passed the Legislative Council and was sent to the Colonial
Office for Sovereign approval where it died because of the intense local opposition. Unlike
the instances that William Beinart and Lotte Hughes describe in other parts of the Empire,
opposition in the Gold Coast was not violent and was, apparently far more successful.3 For
fifteen years, nothing was done and the unregulated cutting of trees continued unabated.
The role of the judiciary was purposefully limited with all critical decisions to be made by the
Reserves Settlement Commissioner thus carrying out in this limited area the
recommendations of the Belfield Commission and the WALC. When a Forests Ordinance
was finally passed in 1927, its impact on the people of the Gold Coast was minimal.
The second issue discussed herein involves the colonial rulers’ efforts to formulate a
consistent and effective land policy, also through legislation, efforts that like most of the
British initiatives discussed in this dissertation never came to fruition. Efforts to reform land
tenure continued sporadically throughout the period covered by this study. During the
twenties, yet another committee studied the advisability of introducing a Torrens registration
system such as the French had put into effect French West Africa and to enact a statute of
limitations on land claims, both in an effort to make land more readily alienable. At the
beginning of the 1900's, the French had introduced a Torrens system of registration in order
to encourage conversion of tenure from collective to individual and to create secure title for
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those acquiring land from the State and from indigenous people claiming to own it.4
Registration was obligatory for those with French civil status who acquired land from one
subject to customary law.5
In the early 1920's, a three man committee was appointed by Governor Guggisberg
to study possible institution of a Torrens system of registration in the Gold Coast. The
Committee was divided in its conclusions, the Attorney General, R. W. H. Wilkinson, stating
his opposition to the proposed system in a minority report. As might be expected, no
registration system was implemented. Moreover, despite encouragement by the
Parliamentary Undersecretary of State, David Ormsby-Gore, a proposed statute of
limitations on land claims that would overturn customary law and tend toward alienability of
land, drafted and redrafted with the assistance of Chief Justice Smyly, languished and
ultimately disappeared.
All of the discussions as to forest legislation and land policy in general involve the
issue of who is to control the administration of whatever policies were to be adopted. As
has been seen in the earlier chapter on land disputes, the local population favored and
lobbied for control by the judiciary. As will be seen in the following discussions, the role of
the judiciary in overseeing operations of land ordinances and resolution of disputes was at
4

The Torrens system of registration discussed for introduction into the Gold Coast originated in
South Australia in 1858. Originally proposed by Sir Robert R. Torrens, this system established title to
property by means of registration rather than by recording deeds or other evidence of land title. It
eliminates the often tedious searching of all transactions involving the subject parcel as the Torrens
system grants title by means of registration. An application would be made to a court for a certificate of
registration and notice given to all potential claimants. After hearing any and all claims, the court would
rule on the question of ownership and the prevailing party would be enabled to register his title which
would be good as against the world. Olin L. Browder, Jr., Roger A. Cunningham and Joseph R. Julin,
Basic Property Law, (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1966, 1209. J. Stuart Anderson discusses the
failure to enact a Torrens system in England over the opposition of English solicitors concerned for the
income they derived from conveyancing as well as their professional status. J. Stuart Anderson, Lawyers
and the Making of English Law, 1932-1940, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
5

Salacuse, 57.
-546-

the heart of the debates, even those as seemingly remote from judicial concerns as a
Torrens system. The administration was never able to remove the judiciary from a
dominant role in concessions and forestry policy. The judges remained as the final arbiters
of claims and disputes.
Forestry Preservation and Land Law, 1897-1927
Well before the establishment of the Gold Coast Colony, the British were aware of
the detrimental consequences of deforestation.6 Grove says that “extensive descriptions”
can be found of the damaging effects of deforestation as far back as the 1300's on the
Canary Islands and the mid-sixteenth century in the West Indies.7 Their experience in India
and on the island of St. Helena taught the British that the loss of forest cover desiccated
agricultural areas and negatively affected the production of food and other crops.8 However,
in part because elsewhere in the Empire the British had greater control over the land,
nowhere did they face greater indigenous opposition to their conservationist policies than on
the Gold Coast. Nevertheless, the British were familiar with local hostility to their forestry
policies. Increased population due to Colonial peace and sanitary provisions, the demand
of mining companies for timber to shore up mine shafts and to fire steam machinery as well
as the overgrazing of cattle all had a most deleterious impact on the forests.5 Grove argues
that British policies as to conservation were not entirely without political objectives. Such
6
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policies, he says, were useful not only in ensuring a continuing supply of timber but to use
“the structures of forest protection to control their unruly marginal subjects,” that is to say by
requiring establishment and management of forest preserves by the colonial authorities to
keep those people of the south neither educated nor particularly responsive to the rule of
chiefs in line.6 Unlike those parts of the Empire, such as South Africa, where indigenous
peoples were barred from owning land in certain parts of the country, the people of the Gold
Coast kept ownership of their land from the earliest days of British colonialism and argued
successfully on numerous occasions against policies they perceived to be an attack on
such ownership, including those pertaining to conservation. Indeed, Beinart and Hughes
note that in parts of the Empire, including West Africa, “the exercise of colonial power was
highly constrained.”7
Forestry policy in Nigeria as well as in the Gold Coast exemplifies such constraint
and the inability of the British to implement a policy they believed to be correct and
necessary when faced with indigenous opposition. Indeed, Grove argues that contrary to
views of R. Guha and N. L Peluso, British conservation policy was not an instrument of
colonial oppression.8 Rather, he says, British forestry policy was “dictated far less by the
colonial state than by indigenous political interest groups in close alliance with metropolitan
capital.” He contends that this view accords with that of Polly Hill as set forth in her study of
migrant cocoa farmers.9 Prior to dealing with conservation issues in the Gold Coast, Britain
6
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created three separate forestry services for the three major parts of its dependencies in
Nigeria as a consequence of its efforts to protect and enhance the production of rubber, an
essential element along with hardwoods, to its export trade.10
Governor Roger decided that something had to be done to preserve the Gold Coast
forests and looked to the experience of Southern Nigeria to develop a forests policy. Yet, in
view of the Government’s experience being undermined by the Colonial Office on the 1897
Lands Bill, one would think that the local administration would not seek to interfere further
with the use by the natives of their land. Nevertheless, it did indeed do so in attempting to
preserve the forests of the Gold Coast.11 Whereas previously it had attempted to assume
the right to exploit indigenously owned, but yet to be developed, lands, now it attempted to
limit exploitation of those lands in the name of protection of the forests and cocoa
cultivation.12 As noted above, the Gold Coast government knew of and relied heavily on
what had been done in Nigeria to preserve the forests.
S. Ravi Rajan for the most part agrees with Grove’s analysis of British conservation
policies although he inferentially criticizes Grove for not looking at problem of deforestation
on a global basis, focusing rather on the interaction of scientists and colonial officials in the
colonies he studies and being vague as to the meaning of the scientists’ conservation ideas
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in terms of colonial agendas and ideologies.13 Rajan views British colonial forestry policy
throughout the Empire as ad hoc.14 The truth of this observation can be seen in what took
place in the Gold Coast at the end of the nineteenth century where the indigenous forests
were continually shrinking. In the earliest days, there was little concern for the
environmental consequences of deforestation until it began to be promoted, initially in India,
then in Burma and South Africa, by the need of the Royal Navy for teak to replace the
dwindling supply of native oak for its ships.15 But no consistent policy was promulgated.
Subsequently, forest conservators, particularly in West Africa, made the case for
preservation of forests in order to prevent dessication and to protect agriculture from a
feared decline in rainfall.16 J. R. Ainslie, a forestry officer from Nigeria pointed out that the
absence of imperial action had resulted in halving the forests of Nigeria due to shifting
agriculture, causing soil erosion and deterioration. Without its forests, Nigeria would lose
half its export trade.17 Concern for ecology in general would not induce imperial authorities
to deal with deforestation, Grove argues. The role that the scientific community played was
to convince colonial authorities that, prevention of deforestation was necessary to preserve
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the economic viability of the tropical Empire.18 However the approach of these professional
foresters to a solution to deforestation failed the test of political practicality. In West Africa
generally, and on the Gold Coast particularly, as we shall see, conservation could not, as
they proposed, be imposed on an unwilling populace.19
Forest departments first came into being in India but were not created in most other
colonies until the turn of the twentieth century. A bill to restrict the cutting of trees for
commercial purposes and to establish a forestry department for the Lagos Protectorate was
submitted in 1897 but was withdrawn as it was seen by the local people, similarly to the
response to the Gold Coast 1897 Land Bill, as a usurpation of land rights.20 A forests
department was finally created in 1899 but little was done because of a lack of sufficient
funding. A Forest Ordinance was enacted in 1902 that permitted the Governor to create
forest reserves but only with the consent of any chief whose lands were affected.21 By 1905
only five preserves had been established. The Lagos department was merged into a newly
created Southern Nigerian department in 1905.22 The Gold Coast was neither first nor last
to create a Forestry Department, but, as we shall see, that was only the first, and easiest
step toward conserving the indigenous forests.
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As early as 1900, the Government had regulated timber cutting, requiring a license
approved by the stool that owned the land and a new seedling for every tree that had been
cut.23 Chief Justice Griffith, in an unofficial communication forwarding a letter he had
received about the manner in which the natives were mistreating rubber trees, told newly
arrived Governor Nathan that the natives were “encroaching on the forest” and that the
issue of how to deal with such encroachments was “worth considering” so that the
Government could take steps as soon as possible “for their preservation.”24 Griffith’s
initiative did not produce any action and the issue of forest conservation seems to have
been ignored until, in the context of a Legislative Council discussion about judges’
modification of concessions to deprive mining concessionaires of timber rights, the Mining
Member, Giles Hunt, moved that it would be advisable for the Government to consider what,
if any, steps should be taken to conserve the forest and regulate the cutting of timber.25
People, he asserted, were cutting without licenses or concessions in a totally unregulated
manner. Timber cutting should be subject to the Concessions Ordinance in the same
manner as mining was. Chiefs should be regulated to the same extent as concessionaires
and not allowed to cut without a license in order to prevent destruction of the forests.26
Sarbah objected to imposing such a requirement on chiefs so that they might cut timber on
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their own lands. Such a restriction would be improper on the same basis as was the Lands
Bill. Cooling off the argument that seemed to be getting heated, the Colonial Secretary said
that the Government had been looking for a competent Forestry Officer and that it would be
premature to legislate until it could find one.27
Nevertheless, at the beginning of 1908, the Governor sent to the Secretary of State
an Ordinance, Number 20 of 1907, prohibiting the cutting of immature timber along with the
remarks Sarbah had made in voting against the Ordinance. He opposed because it did not
distinguish between cutting for export and for domestic use and therefore improperly
deprived the natives of their rights.28 Arguing in favor of obtaining the approval of the
Secretary of State for the Ordinance, Governor Rodger said that there was no distinction
between cutting an immature tree for export or domestic use and that there were more than
enough mature trees available for native use for building purposes. He strongly contended
that no one should be allowed to contribute to destruction of the heritage of the people, be
they foreigners or chiefs.29
Following up on that Ordinance, the Governor appointed a Commission chaired by
Puisne Judge Arthur R. Pennington to study timber cutting and licensing of the same. Its
report, sent to the Colonial Office in July 1908, recommended that natives be permitted to
cut mature timber on their own land for their own use without licensing if such timber was
not offered for sale. The Governor expressed himself to be “strongly” in favor of acquiring
land for forest reserves as soon as a Forestry Department could be established. Following
27
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the Commission’s recommendations, Roger proposed to give all revenue in excess of costs
to the communities on whose land the reserves were established as was being done in
Southern Nigeria and would exempt or acquire farms on land where reserves were
established with compensation to be paid to those whose land was acquired. Finally, he
would repeal the Immature Timber Ordinance of 1907 and enact its provisions as part of a
comprehensive new Forestry Ordinance.30 Also in 1908, Roger requested that the
Conservator of Forests of Southern Nigeria come to the Gold Coast to inspect and report on
the forests of the Colony and Ashanti and to make recommendations on preserving the
forests. He recommended creation of a forestry forest department and of forest reserves.
In 1909, his deputy in Nigeria, N. C. McLeod, was appointed to the post of Conservator of
Forests in the Gold Coast.31
After years of more or less fruitless discussion, Governor Rodger sent the Secretary
of State a draft Forests Ordinance that he said was based on that of Southern Nigeria, but
was nevertheless still not ready for consideration as the draft was being analyzed and
revised by his Attorney General. Rodger warned that “some of the principles involved will
probably give rise to considerable discussion in the Legislative Council,” that is, they would
engender a good deal of opposition.32 The draft Bill and Rules followed in October along
with an analysis of the Bill by the Attorney General which noted that the changes from the
30
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Southern Nigeria model were in accord with the recommendations of the recently appointed
Conservator of Forests. The Governor urged action now because so much land was being
alienated by concession.33
The Attorney General urged that attention should be given to the manner in which
the Southern Nigeria Ordinance worked before finally agreeing that the Bill should be
withdrawn and a new one drafted by Griffith and revised by the Executive Council and
differing mainly in the procedure for constituting reserves, designating how land to be
reserved would be acquired from tribal owners and exempted from the Concessions
Ordinance, exempting reserves created under by-laws by chiefs and prohibiting
concessions on reserved land without the consent of the Governor. Even then, the Attorney
General stated that some additional amendment in the Committee of the Whole would be
required.34
Leading articles in the Gold Coast Leader in early 1911 typified the publicity
campaign against the proposed Forests Bill, attacking on the basis of the same arguments
made in opposition to the Lands Bill, i.e. that it forcibly converted land belonging to the
chiefs and the people and saying that the people would be no better off than if the Lands
Bill had gone into effect.35 Even before the Legislative Council began consideration of the
Forests Bill, the ARPS had advised that it “emphatically” protested against the Bill as
impairing the chiefs’ “immemorial rights to lands.” The Governor told the Colonial Office
that the opponents would be heard before the Legislative Council and the latter replied that
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the Secretary of State would consider any petition against the Bill sent via the Governor
before advising the King whether or not to disallow any Ordinance passed.36
When the Forests Bill came before the Legislative Council, Francis Crowther, the
Secretary for Native Affairs expressed his concern about widespread propaganda against it.
“Some suspicion and fears were aroused in the minds of the chiefs and people with
reference to certain provisions of the Forest Bills with regard to the compulsory acquisition
of lands by the Government,” he reported, suspicion that was based on “unfounded rumour
(sic)” that had been “spread particularly in the bush that the Bill would require forfeiture of
crops and compulsory labor.“37 No matter how unfounded, the Administration still had to
consider the effect of such rumors and consequent possible violence, just as it had in the
late 1890's.
Casely Hayford appeared before the Bar of the Legislative Council on behalf of a
number of chiefs to oppose the Bill. As one of the leading barristers of the Gold Coast and
the author of a recently published attack on British land and forests policies, he was clearly
one whom the chiefs considered most able to present their case.38 He recapped the history
of land legislation since 1894, including the meeting of the Gold Coast deputation with
Secretary of State Chamberlain and charged that the Bill would enact “encroachments on
the people’s proprietary rights which they objected to in 1894 and 1897.” If Government
wanted to establish forest reserves, he argued, it should acquire the land under the Public
Land Ordinance and pay for it, although he candidly admitted that the chiefs would probably
36
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object to the application of that Ordinance outside the towns.39 Rather than create a
wasteful bureaucracy, Government should appoint forestry officers to work with the chiefs to
enable them to create reserves. Other lawyers and African Council members also spoke,
arguing that the Bill was too broad and did not define “forest.”40 In moving the second
reading, the Attorney General argued that the Government held the lands of the Colony in
trust not only for the benefit of the living but for those yet to be born and had to do what it
thought best to protect the estate from wastage and abuse.41 Sadly, given the decline of the
forests since 1911, the Government, as we shall see, was unwilling or unable to adhere to
these noble sentiments.
The Bill provided for a Reserve Settlement Officer who would determine all
objections to and disputes concerning creation of the new Reserves. Council Member T.
Hutton Mills, a barrister, urged an amendment to permit counsel to appear on behalf of
objectants in proceedings before this official. While noting that nothing in the Bill prohibited
such appearances, Acting Governor Bryan was unwilling to permit express authorization.
This official, like District Commissioners, would have discretion to permit (or deny) legal
representation.42 The Bill provided that no concessions for timber or other forest products
such as rubber would be valid unless more than half of the stool or family land involved was
reserved for agricultural use by the stool or family and that concessions would be limited to
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fifty years. In an effort to disarm the opposition, the Bill specified that the Government
would make no public acquisition of forest lands except on lease.43
During the pendency of the Legislative Council debate on the Bill, which passed
unanimously on November 7, 1911, the Government received notice from the ARPS of its
intention to send a deputation to the Colonial Office on behalf of the chiefs similar to that
which met with Chamberlain in 1897 if the Bill passed in the form then being debated. After
passage, with the ARPS continuing its opposition, London advised the Governor that it
would take no action to have the Bill approved pending receipt of an ARPS petition.44
When the Petition was received, specifically objecting to having an administrative official,
the Reserve Settlement Officer, rather than a judge of the Supreme Court decide contested
issues, a Colonial Office bureaucrat minuted his disappointment that after efforts to meet
the objections specified in the arguments before the Legislative Council and passage of the
Bill without opposition in the Council that “these people should still be irreconcilable. It is to
be feared that no concession would satisfy them.”45
In January 1912, the Governor transmitted the ARPS Petition to the Colonial Office
and noted its intent to send a deputation to meet with the Secretary of State. He suggested
that his Commissioner of Forests who was then in England be present if it were decided to
receive the deputation. He expressed his dismay at the Petition and said that its promoters
could not have studied the Ordinance since it was only passed in November and published
in the Gazette in December. Contrary to what the Petitioners said, the Bill as passed was
considerably modified from the one as introduced in September. As passed, only land
43
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found by the Reserve Settlement Officer to be unoccupied could be taken for a Reserve,
there would be no change of ownership, the Reserve would be managed by the Forest
Department with staff hired on recommendation of the owners and the Government would
only be the owners’ agents or lessees, but would have no ownership interest or option to
purchase.46 The Government repeatedly said that it had no intention to sublease and
agreed with the Petitioners that chiefs could make by-laws, but pointed out that they had not
done so with respect to reserves. Bryan cast doubt on the credibility of the Petition by
asserting that the Accra chiefs told him that they had never read the Bill as it had been
passed and thought they were protesting a prior version. Moreover, he noted that two
African members of the Legislative Council, T. Hutton Mills and Mate Kole, a traditional
chief, objected to the original Bill but supported the modified version that was enacted. The
Petition, the Governor asserted, represented a fear of what Government might do, not what
it was doing and the continuing fear of losing their land that harkened back to the 1897 land
Bill.47 Almost immediately, the Colonial Office responded that any decision as to approval or
disapproval of the Ordinance would await Belfield’s report (discussed above) and that the
Petitioners should be advised to talk to Belfield as soon as possible.48
It is unclear whether or not Belfield saw or spoke to the Petitioners as he was then in
London and they were in the Gold Coast. However, he did discuss the Forests legislation
and recommended a number of amendments, among which were ones to require the
Government only to administer the land and never to sublease any land in a reserve to
private parties, to pay all profits to the native owners and to limit the land taken from any
46
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one owner for purposes of establishing a forest reserve to no more than a minor percentage
of the total.49
The ARPS deputation included Casely Hayford and other “well connected natives.”
One Colonial Office official noted that Casely Hayford had handled many concession cases.
Harcourt agreed to meet the Africans and asked Bryan to provide him before the scheduled
meeting with a memorandum on the points at issue and the Government’s observations on
them.50
The petition against the Forests Ordinance was revised after the Belfield Report
became public and the deputation met with Harcourt. It made the following points: the
Conservator of Forests’ report as to destruction of forests was exaggerated – there were
huge tracts of untouched forest because there was as yet no way to get the timber out;
chiefs could just as well implement Belfield’s recommendations as to selection,
demarcation, constitution and maintenance of reserves under the Native Jurisdiction
Ordinance as Government could and Belfield was correct in saying that the people did not
trust Government not to sublet reserve lands to third parties.51 A supplemental Petition
went on to argue that a chief was not a trustee with sole decision making power over the
cestui qui trust, but a joint owner who could not act without the consent of other owners.
Further, the proposed transfer of jurisdiction over issues arising from creation and
maintenance of reserves from the courts to the executive “cannot be made without doing
violence to their sense of justice,” and since District Commissioners could not be trusted to
be impartial in advising chiefs and because their interpreters were ignorant as to legal
49
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terminology, the only protection for chiefs was a limited judicial inquiry, one that would not
infringe upon the prerogatives of the chief in attempting to supervise the manner in which
consideration was used and/or distributed.52
The deputation from the ARPS were represented by Michael Healy KC MP, who
challenged the jurisdiction of the Legislative Council to make any law touching the natives’
forest land. He reiterated that the people owned all the land and were as interested in
conserving the forests as was the Government which should assist the chiefs not take over
the land. He denied that the cocoa planters were destroying the forest, rather they were
using palm trees to shade the cocoa plants. Lastly, he complained that Belfield conducted
his inquiry behind closed doors and kept the evidence from the public which created
suspicion and mistrust.53
Hayford went immediately to the heart of the issue saying that even though the
Government would only acquire leaseholds rather than title, it would still prevent the chiefs
from control over their land. In this he was repeating the argument successfully made to
Chamberlain that even though Government would not acquire title, it would deprive the
indigens of the ability to use the land they owned for such purposes as they desired.
Beyond this quintessential point, the deputation objected to provisions permitting the
Executive to control forest concessions because people did not trust the Executive but only
the Supreme Court which had extensive experience in dealing with land issues that the
52
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Executive did not have. The Court, Hayford continued, could correct errors and violations of
the law as to the amount of land conceded or the rent to be paid, he argued, never
admitting that a specially trained administrator could probably fulfill such tasks equally as
well. Hayford sought indirectly to deflect that argument by claiming that District
Commissioners and Forest Officers had no knowledge of native law or custom (not a
certainty in the case of many District Commissioners by any means) and the Supreme
Court did (another assumption not always borne out by experience). The chiefs, he went
on, had authority under the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance to make by-laws providing for the
establishment and maintenance of forest reserves and allowing for shifting cultivation as
land unoccupied today might be occupied tomorrow. Secretary of State Harcourt suggested
that the Ordinance be amended to provide that all revenue above the amount necessary to
administer the reserves be returned to the chiefs and limiting leases only to Government
and never to third parties, but offered nothing responsive to the complaints about
administrative versus judicial control of the process of creating reserves.54
The deputation left without any resolution of the questions raised, but whether from
fear of violence or merely an indisposition to commit to a particular policy – the record is
silent on his reasons – Harcourt still hung back from making a decision as to whether or not
to seek confirmation of the Forests Ordinance while the Gold Coast Governor complained
bitterly of the “intolerable” dissemination of misleading propaganda against the Forests
Ordinance in mission schools, and reporting on his efforts to “dispel the distorted version [of
the Ordinance] disseminated.” Such propaganda campaign Colonial Office minutes
attributed to agents of the ARPS who, it was charged had made “unscrupulous” efforts to
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arouse ill feeling against the Forests Ordinance. It was having a bad effect on “ignorant and
credulous” natives in the Volta River districts.55
Acting Governor Bryan pled for the Colonial Office to make a decision as to whether
or not to approve the Forests Ordinance as soon as possible because the forests, he said,
were being irreparably harmed, destruction of trees was continuing apace and cocoa plants
were likely to die within five years as aridity spread because of deforestation.56 His
Commissioner of Forests, he said, strongly disagreed with Belfield’s recommendations as to
all proposed amendments to the Ordinance except the recommendation that reserves
should not take more than one third of any chief’s stool land and that staff working on the
reserves should be nominated by the owners, provided, the Commissioner said, that they
had to work under Forest Department direction and control.57
In November 1912, despite years of work, the Colonial Office effectively killed the
Ordinance, saying that it had sent the Acting Governor’s dispatch seeking a speedy
decision to the WALC which should be pushed for an interim report and advice on the
Forests Ordinance, but since the Ordinance was tied so closely to the issue of land
alienation it was not possible to decide on its approval or disapproval until the WALC made
its report. In the meantime, Harcourt suggested that the District Commissioners be directed
to talk to chiefs and convince them of the danger to the forests and that they and their
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people should not cut trees.58 Despite a recommendation of the WALC for implementation
of the Ordinance and state control of administration of forest reserves, the Colonial Office
continued to remain silent as to approval of the Ordinance. Thus ended for the next decade
or more the saga of the initial effort to preserve the Rain Forest, not, in T. S. Eliot’s immortal
words, with a bang but a whimper, an effort evidencing the mutual distrust of colonizers and
the colonized as to motives and methods as well as the unwillingness of the colonizers to
impose their will in the face of anything more than minimal opposition.59
Governor Clifford agreed with a number of the criticisms of the Forest Ordinance.
The WALC draft report, he said, adopted the position Belfield had taken and recommended
that the entire gross proceeds of land leased by the Government to third parties under the
Forests Bill 0f 1912 should be paid to the natives and even then compensation would have
been inadequate for the “sacrifice that had been demanded of them” (i.e. giving up their
rights to cultivate). Moreover, Clifford went on, any future Forests Bill should not require
some states to sacrifice for the benefit of all states without compensation from general
revenue of the Colony, such compensation to be negotiated at first but fixed by the
Supreme Court if agreement could not be reached, with the Government to pay the costs
of litigation. Finally, he concluded, if constituted forest reserves deprived a state of so much
land that expansion of cultivation was impossible, the state should be compensated with
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land from adjoining states (by negotiation if possible) for dispossessed neighbors with fair
compensation to the adjoining state for any land it had to give up.60
During World War One, the Gold Coast government engaged in few initiatives and
none that might engender wide scale opposition. Yet even after November 1918, the
Government did not seek to resurrect the dormant Forests Ordinance. It was not until
Clifford’s successor as Governor, Sir Frederick Gordon Guggisberg, had been in office for
four years that pressure to establish forest reserves once again arose. Reporting on his
Government’s activities for 1923, he said that upon his arrival on the Gold Coast, he had
promised the chiefs the opportunity to effect reserves themselves but only a few chiefs had
taken advantage of the opportunity. He offered cooperating chiefs Government assistance
to mark boundaries of proposed reserves and to give them technical advice, but warned
that if no progress were made, he would propose a compulsory Ordinance, because prompt
action was necessary to prevent the land from drying out and destroying cocoa production.61
Guggisberg’s biographer, Ronald Wraith, argues that the Governor overestimated his own
ability to convince the chiefs to set aside reserves without compulsion or underestimated
the suspicion harbored by the chiefs that had been created by prior Administration’s land
policies.62
Unhappy that the chiefs did not react positively to his invitation that they set aside
reserves of their own volition, Guggisberg began preparations for enactment of a new
60
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Forests Ordinance. His Commissioner of Forests set forth a definition of lands subject to
protection, i.e. where water supply or cultivation of neighboring lands would be
jeopardized.63 The Forests Commissioner met with the Attorney General and drafted a new
Forests Bill that he presented to the Colonial Secretary with the recommendation that all
references to Government leases be eliminated because such leases were impracticable
and would cause trouble.64 Writing of proposals to make payments to the holders of
cultivation rights in the proposed reserves, the Attorney General said that they are not
legally required but voluntary and would be useful to tamp down expected opposition.
However he had to insist on his own language about appeals because language in an
earlier draft limiting appeals was beyond the competence of the Legislative Council which
could not prevent appeals to the Privy Council as the Forest Commissioner wanted to do.65
The new Bill was introduced at the end of August 1926, but no further action was
taken on it and it was withdrawn following a conference of Chiefs at the end of December.66
A modified Bill was prepared providing for reserves to be established at the request of
chiefs and private owners and for mandatory reserves if the Government determined it to be
necessary to protect water supplies, prevent injury to agriculture or prevent imperiling of the
supply of forest products to nearby land owners and villages. It authorized the Reserve
Settlement Commissioner to inquire into claims to land with a reserve and to refer title
issues to the appropriate Native Tribunal whose decision would be binding on him. He
would decide which rights in the reserve, such as rights to cultivate and/or to collect forest
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produce or firewood would be permitted or accommodated, or, at the Government’ option,
be acquired in return for monetary compensation. Appeals from his rulings or those of the
Native Tribunal as to title would be permitted to the Supreme Court. An annual payment of
£1 per square mile would be made to the owners of lands situated within the reserve.67
Public opinion as reflected in the local press was not favorable, with leading articles
attacking the proposed Ordinance as another threat to native land rights to the same extent
as were the Lands Bills of the 1890's and the Forests Ordinance of 1911. Moreover they
noted that the Provincial Councils of Chiefs of the Central and Eastern Provinces had
resolved to oppose the new legislation.68
Nevertheless, the Government determined to go ahead and the Forests
Commissioner moved the Bill at the March 1927 meeting of the Legislative Council.69 He
told the Council that he had accommodated the objections of the two Provincial Councils of
Chiefs by exempting reserves created by stools pursuant to by-laws they had enacted so
long as such reserves were administered satisfactorily in accordance with Government
rules. Title issues would be submitted to the Native Tribunals of the Paramount Chiefs and
would be subject to the provisions of the Native Administration Ordinance.70 The Ordinance
sought to protect 6,000 of 28,000 square miles of forest in the cocoa growing zone but, he
acknowledged, such area might have to be enlarged if it were shown to be insufficient to
protect water supplies and cocoa agriculture.71 After its second reading the Bill was
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amended slightly in the Committee of the Whole at the behest of some of the chiefs and
reported out to be passed with the votes of all of the rural members of the Council as No. 13
of 1927.72 So after years of futile effort to achieve a result that the colonial masters insisted
was necessary to the welfare of the entire community, after backing and filling and refusing
to insist that the population accept the Government’s policy, after claimed untold damage to
the rain forests, the Government finally achieved approval of a law that would, it was hoped,
stem the continuing damage to the environment and the feared reduction in the cocoa crop
the export taxes on which were necessary to keep the colonial government’s accounts in
the black.73
Efforts to Formulate a Land Policy 1920-1944 – Registration and a Statute of
Limitations
As noted above, the problems of difficulties in alienating land were considered to
pose obstacles to economic development. Accordingly two proposals were mooted to deal
with that problem: the first originally raised in 1922 by the Registrar of Lands, was
institution, as the French had done, of a system of land title by registration that would
ensure purchasers of land with good title as against all challenges; and, second, proposed
in 1926 by Parliamentary Undersecretary for the Colonies, was enactment of a statute of
limitations as to claims relating to title to land to prevent ancient claims from being asserted.
The educated elite opposed both proposals, but, significantly, institution of a registration
system was also opposed by an important member of the Gold Coast administration.
Neither proposal was ever adopted.
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A deed registration Ordinance was enacted in 1883 (Nos. 8 and 12 of 1883) which
was replaced in 1895 by a substantially similar Land Registry Ordinance (No. 1 of 1895).
However, both of these enactments required a proper description of the land and
registration did not cure any defects in the description or the documents purporting to
establish title.74 As surveys of land were rarely made due to cost and the uncertainty of the
extent of communal land, the registry system afforded little security of
title. Up to the period now under consideration, Torrens registration had not been
successfully implemented in British West Africa.75 During Guggisberg’s Administration, the
Surveyor General, Rowe, proposed to establish a system of land registration that ultimately
would lead to certainty of title and, inevitably, to the break down of the communal nature of
land ownership. The Governor appointed a committee of three people, Rowe, the Acting
Commissioner of the Eastern Province, H. S. Newlands, and the Attorney General,
Wilkinson. The two former officials prepared a majority report from which the Attorney
General dissented.76 The Governor pointed out that the WALC had recommended that a
registration system be put in place but only for transfers by non-natives because the issues
of native tenure and who had individual title as opposed to family tenure were too difficult
and would lead to extensive litigation. The draft WALC Report recommended that in the
towns on the coast, tenure should be determined according to English law whereas the
74
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current majority report, the Governor said, recommended registration for all parties, native
and non-native albeit voluntary. It should be introduced first in a town such as Accra and
then gradually extended to the whole Colony; it would not apply to leases or mortgages
unless the land to which they pertained had been registered. Governor Guggisberg thought
that registration would make the title to registered property “unassailable” and “more readily
negotiable. Whether this would be an unmixed benefit may be doubted.”77
The Governor disagreed with the Majority Report view that land held under native
tenure could be registered because, he said, the Chief, contrary to the view expressed by
the majority, held title as a trustee only colloquially not legally and there was no generally
accepted definition of the nature of such “Trust” as it varied from tribe to tribe and even
within tribes. If land so held were attempted to be registered, it would generate litigation
over who had rights in the “trust” and what its exact nature was, or even whether the chief
had authority to register the land without the consent of his councilors. Even individual
tenure couldn’t always be relied upon because it might have evolved into family tenure as
when an individual title holder died intestate. Guggisberg said that he could not recommend
the proposals of the Majority as they did not promote good title or security for lienors and
would not slow down alienation of native lands, but would accelerate such alienation since
good title would promote attempts to buy and sell and would promote even more litigation
and strong local opposition. Wilkinson’s Minority report argued that the current “politicallegal conditions” were “markedly unfavourable” to title registration. Native opposition to a
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Torrens system in the Legislative Council would be strong and would inevitably be tied to
the questions of “Jurisdiction of Native Tribunals and to native customary law.”78
The differences set forth in the two reports of his Registration Committee continued
to be unresolved into 1927. Guggisberg told the Secretary of State early in that year that he
was “seriously disturbed” by the unresolved difference of opinion between Wilkinson on the
one hand and Rowe on the other about proceeding toward a land registration program
particularly since his Colonial Secretary, J. C. Maxwell agreed with Wilkinson, so he’d
delayed any decision to go into it further.79 Moreover, he said that he was deferring seeking
approval for a Land Court, as Ormsby-Gore had also recommended, pending consultation
with Chief Justice Smyly, but thought that at least two itinerant judges would be needed who
would be lawyers of high standing and considerable experience in land law and
conveyancing to be judges. The court he was considering would consist of a judge, an
assistant lands commissioner and possibly another member. The judge would decide land
questions in situ with the assistant lands commissioner acting as am assessor. It would be
necessary, the Governor said, to alter the law so that the judgments of the Land Court could
have in rem effect, that is they would attach to the land, with appeals to be limited to
questions of law.80 Even this skeletal proposal failed to consider how such a Land Court
would work with the Native Tribunals since the proposed Native Administration Ordinance,
that the Governor was seeking to enact in the face of increasing opposition, would give
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving the title of land to such Native Tribunals and,
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together with registration legislation would undoubtedly increase fears of a new land seizure
by the Government already raised by the new Forests Ordinance.81
The Governor was also pressing for the establishment of a Land Department right
then no matter what system of registration was adopted since “it is obvious that some
system regulating land tenure must ultimately be adopted.” Preparatory work had to be
done as soon as possible, he argued because title issues were multiplying even with
respect to proper title on land purchased by the Government.82 Meanwhile the merchants of
the Colony represented by the Accra Chamber of Commerce were petitioning the
Government to enact some law dealing with land tenure so as to provide “protection to
merchants and others” by requiring compulsory registration of title and that only land that is
registered would be eligible to serve as security for debt. Unable to afford the merchants
any satisfaction, the Government responded only that land issues were under
consideration.83
In the previous year while Guggisberg was on leave, Colonial Secretary Maxwell,
then acting as Governor, prepared a dispatch saying that it was most important to pass an
ordinance imposing the English Statute of Limitations on all land transactions and creating
prescriptive rights in land that would be applicable to Native Tribunals as well as to the
Supreme Court.84 He noted that the Supreme Court, as a court of equity, would probably
find reason not to disturb long and continuous possession (as we have discussed above)
but native custom, designed to deal with shifting cultivation, had to be modified to deal with
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continuous [commercial] cultivation of commodities, e.g. cocoa. A statute should be passed
enabling a person to obtain a declaration of individual ownership although it might revert to
being family land if he died intestate unless the succession laws were changed as well.
Maxwell argued that the Provincial Commissioners, acting as appellate judges under the
Native Jurisdiction Ordinance, did a good job on appeals of land cases from the Native
Tribunals, suffering only nine reversals and seven remands of their decisions by the Full
Court of the fifty appeals in the decade from 1912 to 1922. Therefore he wouldn’t
recommend that the Executive replace the Full Court as the final Court of Appeal in land
cases, as such a move would not only be a political mistake but “a serious administrative
blunder.”85 Nevertheless, appeals to the Full Court or the proposed West African Court of
Appeal should be limited to questions of law only just as Chief Justice Smyly had
recommended to the WALC in 1912. Following up on Governor Guggisberg’s proposal for
a Land Court, Maxwell said, as a division of the Supreme Court, it could determine
questions of fact in situ or better, a Lands Board could meet with the parties before hearings
by the Provincial Commissioner or the Supreme Court to narrow issues and get as much
agreement as possible to the facts, get the land surveyed and determine what customs
applied.86
While some tepid consideration was being given to Maxwell’s proposals, Chief
Justice Smyly was redrafting a proposed statute of limitations bill specifying differing time
periods for commencement of differing actions. It provided for a limitation of twelve years on
actions relating to land and trespass on land, notwithstanding any customary law to the
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contrary.87 Public reaction was not positive. The Provincial Commissioner of the Central
Province said that the Chiefs were not happy but grudgingly agreed to consult their
counselors.88 The Acting Commissioner of the Eastern Province advised that no limitations
bill be passed until customary law was codified pursuant to the new Native Administration
Ordinance, because he was convinced that the chiefs would not agree to administering
English law in their Tribunals.89 Finally, the chiefs of the Central Province passed a
resolution against a limitations bill saying that it would destroy mutual assistance among
natives, because they wouldn’t lend to each other, and cited Sarbah’s Fanti Constitution
and Laws for the uncontested and incontestable proposition that there was no limitations
period in customary law.90
In late 1927, Guggisberg’s successor, Alexander Ransford Slater, submitted a 114
page Memorandum on Reforms Required in Respect of the Land Legislation of the Gold
Coast Primarily In Order to Promote Security of Title that included memoranda and
dispatches on the subject created over the prior five years.91 Slater said that throughout the
Twenties, Executive Officers had considered the necessity of some kind of legislation to
provide greater security of title, because questions of whether land was communal, family or
individual and whether proper consents had been obtained for alienation all too often made
title inalienable. He recapped Rowe’s December 1922 memorandum laying out the
technical problems and proposing a solution including a three year survey of the entire
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colony and stool boundaries; the history of the committee to look at the possibility of
enacting a Torrens Registration system, Attorney General Wilkinson’s dissent from Rowe
and Newlands’ majority report because it did not provide for a statute of limitations, his
feeling that Native Tribunals couldn’t deal with issues related to registration and the likely
strong native opposition in the Legislature. He attached to his Memorandum a dispatch
from Maxwell, dated June 6, 1923, reminding the Colonial Office that the WALC had
recommended that land held under native tenure should not be brought within the sphere of
registration legislation. Guggisberg, Slater said, declined to go along with the Majority
Report recommendations because European mortgage and lease holders got no protection
unless all underlying titles that had first been registered by their owners had had all title
questions cleared in a judicial proceeding. Slater agreed that the Gold Coast was not yet
ready for a Torrens Registration system as to which there would be much opposition from
native members of the Legislative Council.
Then, in connection with Ormsby-Gore’s visit, Maxwell, then Colonial Secretary,
wrote another memo, March 13,1926, saying that judicial proceedings were not satisfactory
because the claims dealt with were considered to be personal to the claimants and not
attaching to the land and were often improperly defined. Accordingly, until that problem was
corrected, registration should be limited to ownership, not possessory claims, under English
tenure and that it would be necessary both to bar stale claims and create Land Courts.
Slater reminded the Colonial Office that Colonial Secretary Maxwell, acting as Governor,
had Wilkinson prepare a draft Statute of Limitations bill that was sent to the Colonial Office
in May 1926, was approved by the Secretary of State and was to be submitted to the
Legislative Council at its next sitting and that Ormsby-Gore regarded “the introduction of
-575-

legislation of this nature [i.e. a statute of limitations] as an essential change.’” The
Undersecretary, Slater said, was convinced that a Torrens Registration system could not
help deal with land issues until existing title problems had been dealt with. The first step in
this process was to bar stale claims.92 Slater noted that a Statute of Limitations bill was
read for the first time, but the second reading was deferred in view of the opposition of the
Provincial Councils of Chiefs.93
R. S. Rattray, anthropologist and a District Commissioner in Ashanti, thought
registration of land held under native tenure to be a bad idea that would destroy the
authority of the chiefs, lead to rapid alienation of land and create a landless underclass of
impoverished paupers. First, Rattray recommended, the land should be surveyed then
communal land should be vested in chiefs and family members as true legal trustees.94 Mr.
Justice E. Gardiner Smith thought Maxwell’ recommendation of a Land Board to be
unhelpful as it would merely add an unnecessary additional layer of bureaucracy.
Moreover, even if created, Provincial Commissioners should not be members because that
would make them judges as well as administrators, for which former position they were not
trained. He agreed with Justice Hall and Chief Justice Smyly that judgments relating to land
should be deemed to be in rem so as to bind everyone claiming the same land or that
claims should be subject to a statute of limitations, but not both.95 It took Central Province
Commissioner Jones to pop the balloon of fantasy about creating a Land Court by pointing
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out to his colleagues that they could not promote a British Land Court when they had just
caused to be enacted a thorough going reform of the native courts granting them exclusive
jurisdiction in all land cases and to the Provincial Council of Chiefs exclusive jurisdiction
over boundary disputes. In any event, he would prefer land disputes to be handled by an
executive officer with the aid of assessors as needed. If there is to be a judge, he should
have local experience and the authority to make judgments in rem. Chief Justice Smyly
agreed with Jones that in view of the Native Administration Ordinance, a Land Court was no
longer feasible and judgments could not be in rem if jurisdiction in land cases would be
limited to determining appeals from Native Tribunals. To achieve these desired results
would requirement amendment of the Native Administration Ordinance to authorize nisi
prius jurisdiction.96 Slater also sent a volume of comments on his Memorandum from
various Gold Coast officials.97 Wilkinson urged that the pending statute of limitations bill
moved to passage.98 To the contrary, Provincial Commissioner Jones said that he would
not suggest enacting any statute of limitations until the opposition to the Native
Administration Ordinance died down and the “political atmosphere clears.”99 Justice A. B.
Howes wanted a statute of limitations for all cases but at least for personal suits such as for
tort and debt.100
It should come as no surprise given the history of inaction by both London and Accra
governments, that nothing should have come from this mass of proposals. Even the Civil
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Limitations Bill that was published in the Gazette on February 5, 1927 and that would have
limited the time in which to commence actions in both British Courts and Native Tribunals in
both land and personal cases such as tort, contract and debt went nowhere. The Attorney
General told the Legislative Council that the Bill responded to the complaint by
Undersecretary Ormsby-Gore as to the lack of finality and to ”safeguard the title to property
and the enjoyment of individual rights and the fruits of individual enterprise from the
assaults of those who have unreasonably delayed in asserting their claims.” Prosperity he
said, is dependent upon the security of property and the “sanctity of contractual rights.”101 It
is not difficult to see that enacting these principles of English law would have utterly
destroyed some of the basic tenets of Gold Coast customary law that held that no debt was
ever extinguished by time and no title could be obtained prescriptively. The Central
Provincial Council of Chiefs promptly expressed its opposition to the Bill as not only contrary
to custom but because it was impossible for illiterate people to administer and would
encourage fraud being perpetrated on these same illiterates.102 So, too, the Eastern
Provincial Council of Chiefs resolved to oppose the Bill. It would not limit litigation, but
rather would encourage the filing of more cases in order to avoid actions being defeated by
inexact time limits while accelerating the replacement of customary law by English law.103
Nor did Government officials deny such charges. Indeed the Commissioner of the Eastern
Province wondered aloud if it were not time to do away with customary law altogether as
being an obstacle to progress and the people’s welfare. Individual tenure was rapidly
increasing, he argued, undermining customary tenure, which latter would disappear entirely
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if a limitations bill were enacted.104 The Assistant Secretary of Native Affairs, more than a
year after the Colonial Office determined not to proceed with limitations legislation because
of the opposition, was still pressing for such a Bill. Foreign capital, he argued, requires such
a statute to justify investing in the country. The average educated African, who engages in
business or the professions, supports such a law when it was explained in clear language.
Fear of exploitation of illiterates is overstated, in part because education was spreading and
land owners were becoming more sophisticated. The could be no land registration and no
certainty of title without stifling stale claims through limitations legislation. For all these
reasons, he urged reconsideration of legislation that might be offered in two parts, one for
personal actions and one for real action.105
Another Ordinance enacted in 1929 demonstrates the inconsistency of British policy
in the administration of law. At that time, the Government introduced a Bill as a
consequence of a Supreme Court decision that the English Statute of Limitations was a
statute “in force” as that term was used in the Supreme Court Ordinance, to which native
law was subject and was incompatible with customary law so that it had to be applied in
Native Tribunals. “It is undesirable that the English law of limitations should be brought in to
control native transactions” at that time, said the Attorney General, Sidney Abrahams,
declaring the object of the Bill to be the overruling of the Court decision and prevention of
possible application of other English statutes that might “frustrate Native Law.”106
Thus while promoting enactment of a statute of limitations in order to make land titles
more secure, the Government sought legislation to prevent a limitations period from being
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imposed by the courts. This one hundred eighty degree change in policy seems to have
derived from Colonial Office fear of the opposition of the chiefs and other traditional
authorities despite the arguments that failure to impose a limitations period would continue
to make land title cloudy and deter foreign investment.
Conclusion
In 1930, the Colonial Office once again examined the issue of land tenure on the
Gold Coast. At its request, the Governor sent to London a compilation of all material related
to land tenure through l928. J. A. Calder noted that the issues were complex and difficult to
resolve the question being whether “Govt (sic) should facilitate or obstruct the tendency of
tribal and family lands being converted into individual ownership.” E. W. Flood opined that
the Supreme Court had “unintentionally increased the problem by dealing with land matters
in a sort of compound of native customs overlaid with English law, with resulting confusion.”
Flood feared that only compulsory registration would have any positive effect, but knew that
it would be seen as government “confiscation and would provide quite a sufficient battle cry
to stir up much mischief in West Africa.” He said that only complete surveys and
registration of stool land stands a chance of quieting title, but the amount of work involved
and the expense would be “prodigious,” since surveys of all stools, paramount and
divisional, would be necessary and would produce an “immense amount of litigation” before
final settlement. Assistant Undersecretary of State Charles Bottomly suggested
appointment of a commission to examine titles. He believed that if chiefs would bring
problems to the commission, they would come to believe it to be “prudent” to have land
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“ascertained and confirmed.”107 Picking up on that suggestion, the Colonial Office
suggested that the Government proclaim all land to be stool or family land and that all
persons, including companies and corporations, claiming land to be individually owned
would have to prove their claim before a quasi-judicial commission to which chiefs might
bring their land problems and who might then want to have their land “ascertained and
confirmed.”108
In late 1931, Governor Slater advised the Secretary of State against implementing
the latter’s suggestion that anyone with a claim to individual title to any land should prove it
before a quasi-judicial commission and then register ownership at that time as it would
encourage floods of litigation and would complicate, not simplify the title issues. Via the
Governor, Attorney General Sidney Abrahams also advised that introduction of a statute of
limitations would be a “most unfortunate step” as the people would consider it unknown and
“distasteful.” It would advantage the sophisticated at the expense of the simple, Abrahams
continued, and would provide terrible problems for the Native Tribunals attempting to apply
it. Rather, Abrahams concluded, “gradual pervasion of equitable principles will eventually
bring about the desired effect and enable suitable enactment to be introduced.”109
M’Carthy, the Acting Solicitor General, supported Abrahams’ view based on his
reading of the Full Court’s decision in Aduwah V Nindom.110 M’Carthy reminded his readers
that the doctrine of long possession applied, albeit sporadically and inconsistently, for a long
time, but now was well established. He described a recent (unnamed) case affirmed by the
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West African Court of Appeals that gave title to one in undisturbed possession without
payment of rent or tribute for fourteen years. He pointed out that this doctrine gave voice to
an equitable concept without a “rigid time limit” with roots in indigenous law. He was
certain, M’Carthy said, that it would “inevitably” come to be applied by Provincial
Commissioners deciding appeals from native tribunals in land cases and ultimately
influence those Tribunals.111 Jones, the Secretary of Native Affairs agreed that if the
Provincial Commissioners followed such equitable principles in their consideration of land
cases, no statute of limitations would be necessary. The Colonial Office minuted that the
Governor made a good case against land registration/limitations legislation at that time.
Alexander Fiddian, a senior official in the West African Department, concluded that
ownership issues “should as far as possible be allowed and encouraged to evolve from
within” [i.e. be left to the courts].112 As was often the case with policy initiatives intended for
implementation in the Gold Coast, considerations of potential opposition as well as
increases in cost and reduction in staff made going forward with a statute of limitations, now
deemed to be “inexpedient,” undesirable and the issue disappeared from view.
In 1940, the Secretary of State proposed once again to conduct an inquiry as to
native land tenure in West Africa. In connection with this inquiry, he requested and received
all of the materials developed during the 1895 Inquiry, Belfield’s investigation, the WALC
hearings (and the documentary evidence adduced therein) as well as all of the reports,
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memoranda and correspondence compiled with respect to possible land law reform in the
1920's. In providing all this information, Governor Arnold Hodson advised the Secretary of
State to be very cautious before undertaking any inquiry, as the people of the Gold Coast
were hypersensitive about land issues and it was not then a good time to ask questions
about land when, the Governor noted, the institutions of native administration were unstable
due to the war.113
Still the issues of individual versus communal tenure, and executive versus judicial
control were roiling the Colonial Office. At a meeting with Lord Moyne, the Secretary of
State, and other Colonial Office officials, in early 1941, Lord Hailey opined that
individualization of land tenure was a “natural process of economic development” but the
recognition of proprietary rights without restriction on the power of alienation or mortgaging
land might lead to a dangerous situation of rural indebtedness, particularly in the Gold
Coast where it had already gone to great lengths. Some stools, he pointed out, had sold off
nearly all of their land to “stranger natives.” The difficulty was that there was no land record
and no system of registration so that it was not possible at any one time to say without a
detailed investigation what was really being sold.114
Despite this mass of information, more data was sought to get at the facts as to
alienation of native land. On November 25, 1943, Lord Hailey chaired a meeting
addressing the need for information on land tenure so that the courts could handle land
questions effectively. The consensus of the meeting was that each colony should create an
agency to advise “how best existing systems of land tenure should be adapted or modified
113
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to meet the needs of society and economic progress.”115 In A subsequent meeting on Lord
Hailey noted the role of the courts in shaping land tenure systems and suggested the
possibility of establishing “guiding principles” for courts to follow.116 That suggestion quickly
fell by the wayside. A Colonial Office minute notes that the consensus of this second
meeting was that it was “undesirable” for courts to handle land questions because judges
had little practical experience with African customs and tended to interpret tenure “in terms
of European law” – a statement that was dubious at best. The meeting participants
recommended establishment of a land tenure committee within the Colonial Office [echoes
of WALC] as well as of an outside advisory group.117
So at the end of the seventy year period of this study, we find that as to the
relationship between judges and the executive concerning land tenure, nothing had
changed. Multiple studies had been conducted, almost all of which recommended that the
judiciary be removed from involvement with land issues. Many bills designed to achieve
reform of land law along English lines (at the same time that officials complained that the
courts were interpreting the law too much as if it were English law) had been proposed.
Few if any of the studies’ recommendations were carried out, and certainly none of the
material ones. Little if anything was done to slow the seemingly inevitable trend toward the
“Anglification” of customary law.118 Their dealings with the land issue demonstrate in the
starkest fashion the inconsistency and weakness of the British colonial state in the Gold
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Coast, primarily because of their unwillingness to “risk uprisings in order to achieve the
development of mines and plantations. “119
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CHAPTER XIV – CONCLUSION
This study, a case study of British colonialism as it was practiced in the Gold Coast, a
relatively small non-settler dependency, demonstrates that Britain was never able, nor even
willing, to impose its most important policies on its colonial dependents. The story of British
rule was one of an inability to take a firm stand as to policies that administrators in Accra
and/or London were convinced were good for the British and for their Gold Coast
dependents. It was full of variations, inconsistencies and reversals of course in the
administration of justice as in most other areas. Thus the answer to the question whether
the colonial state had the power to implement its policies consistently over time and whether
its policies were coherent and coherently applied, must be a qualified negative. Although
Britain undoubtedly had the power to impose its will, it was often unclear as to what that will
was and even when determined upon a course of action, it was also too often unwilling or
unable to use its power.1
British inconsistency goes back to the early nineteenth century when government of
the settlements was placed in the hands of merchants, then the metropolitan government,
then back to the merchants and then back to the government once more. In neither case
was the British presence adequate to staff the governing of millions of dependents. Indeed,
as G. B. Kay argues, due to the small number of British administrators in the Colony who,
he notes, were “instinctively aware, if not fully conscious, of the frailty of their position and
knew they could never maintain their power in the face of organized opposition,” the British
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exercised “deliberate restraint.”2 Nor, as Sara Berry has said, was such number sufficient to
exercise, with rare exceptions, effective control in order to carry out what the administration
set out to do.3 As a consequence, as Richard Grove and Toyin Falola have noted, the
people of the Gold Coast had space in which to manipulate the colonial state to their
advantage.4 The existence of such space gave rise to an unresolved British dilemma: the
colonial power was obliged to rely on traditional authorities that they never fully trusted or
were able to control. This dilemma is best seen in the problem of the administration of
justice in the traditional courts where they could not reconcile British concepts of equity with
African notions of fairness that all too often seemed to result in oppression of litigants.
Frederick Cooper has described this space as one of power relationships between colonials
and colonized and argues that they were not entirely one way.5 Thus, the traditional
authorities, understanding that the British needed them, were able to obtain concessions
because of that need that the educated elites of the coastal communities, with whom the
chiefs vied for the role of representatives of the people, could not obtain.
Richard Rathbone persuasively argues that law was a language in which Africans
spoke to the colonial state. I have shown in this dissertation that the law was also a
language in which the colonial power spoke to its dependents. As Richard Roberts and
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Kirsten Mann have argued, British law both facilitated and restrained colonial power. It
subjected the colonial people to its sometimes arcane rules while forcing the administration
in Accra as well as the indigenous litigants to follow those rules. It spoke in terms of
access to British courts and, albeit less effectively, control over traditional tribunals. This
dialogue developed continually over the seventy year period considered in this dissertation.
African barristers developed great skill in representing their clients’ interests in the colonial
courts. They understood and played an important role in the development of an imperial
common law in the Gold Coast. Similarly, the Supreme Court, in its rulings on appeals from
Native Tribunals, taught the traditional authorities what rules the latter could impose without
fear of British intervention, although it all too often appeared that those authorities did not
learn the lesson. Nevertheless, by retaining the final word as to decisions of the traditional
courts and the meaning of customary law, the colonial state assured its domination.
Indeed, as Björn Edsman argued, toward the end of the period considered in this
dissertation, rule was becoming more and more direct, particularly with respect to the
operations of the traditional courts since the chiefs had utterly failed to accept British
limitations on their ability to coerce excessive fines and costs from indigenous litigants.
Crawford Young has argued that the criminal and civil law brought to the Gold Coast
from England “was clearly an arm of the overall relationship of dominance between
European and African, as the European in most instances held all the trump cards through
superior access to and familiarity with the legal framework.”6 While that may have been true
in settler colonies, my research leads me to conclude that with respect to the Gold Coast,

6

Crawford Young, African Colonials State in Comparative Perspective, New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press 1994, 115.
-588-

Young has overstated his claim. African barristers, along with their British counterparts,
ably represented their clients, whether European or African, in the British courts and
prevailed often enough to annoy the colonial administration thoroughly. African barristers
represented an elite with whom the colonial administration had to contend. Indeed,
Edsman argues, the most famous of Gold Coast barristers, John Mensah Sarbah and J. E.
Casely Hayford, saw themselves as modern Africans, British educated and imbued with the
principles of the common law and the society that such law represented. Their desire was
primarily to take part in the governance of the colony and not, until the very end of the
period under study, to separate from Britain. In their ongoing struggles with the traditional
chiefs, these educated lawyers saw English law as an engine of social change by which the
Gold Coast would come into the modern world. Customary law, they argued, had to be
adapted along English lines.7 Their view never prevailed against the opposition of the
colonial government and codification of customary law had to await the work of postindependence jurists. Indeed, it was just this opposition to modernizing that Frederick
Cooper saw as the dead hand of tradition and protection of traditional elites that colonialism
advanced and supported permitting the chiefs to exploit their subjects while maintaining
their privileges.8 This dissertation demonstrates the essential dilemma of colonial rule
exemplified by administration of justice: the British needed the traditional authorities and
thus were obliged to permit them to operate courts, courts that the British tried but could not
successfully control and whose limitations they never really accepted.
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Following on the work of Henrika Kuklick and Anthony Kirk- Greene, I have shown
that the judges of the Gold Coast, including those who manned the inferior courts, the
District Commissioners and District Magistrates, came from the same strata of British
society with essentially the same educational background as those who engaged in purely
administrative duties and, quite unsurprisingly, held the same innate view of Britain and
English law, as Allan Mcphee noted earlier, that such law was the best for any country, not
merely England and was superior to that of all other nations and their laws. This
assumption enabled the colonial authorities to ignore the necessity for legal knowledge
among the men chosen to apply the law in the Gold Coast. Indeed, as Charles Jeffries
aptly noted, in selecting the officers of the inferior courts, the Colonial Office deemed legal
knowledge and credentials as of lesser importance than their personality and ability to get
along, reflective of the Colonial Office’s “anti-vocational prejudice.”9 Too often they were
men who had failed in their profession in Great Britain but who, as Sir Alan Ward has
written, came into the Colonial Service with the support of a patron rather than on their own
merits.10 Despite repeated demands from the colonial administrations for men trained in the
law, the Colonial Office sent out non-lawyers with only superficial and inadequate training in
legal subjects. They were primarily administrators who performed magisterial duties that
often conflicted with their administrative roles. Thus, the vast majority of the men who
served as judges, who oversaw the native tribunals in the first instance, the judges of the
inferior courts, had no judicial independence and no tenure. They were subject to removal
and transfer at the whim of the senior executives. Only the judges of the Supreme Court
9
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had a substantial measure of independence and a limited form of tenure , but even they
were subject to transfer.
I have also shown that the appointment process, open to men of color in the mid and
late nineteenth century when Charles Bannerman served as Chief Magistrate and Governor
of the British settlements and Francis Smith was a Puisne Judge and Acting Chief Justice
during a twenty year career, became tainted with a racism expressed as concern that an
African judge might be influenced corruptly by friends and family resulting in decisions
determined by personal connections rather than the evidence. No evidence of any such
corruptly influenced results were seen in the archives, but the calumny persisted. Thus
despite a goodly number of indigenous barristers with excellent legal educations and skill as
advocates and even intellectuals – John Mensah Sarbah and J. E. Casely Hayford to name
but two – only a few Africans were appointed to positions as inferior court judges and the
naming of Woolhouse Bannerman to a position as Puisne Judge was held up until 1935
after he had served with distinction as a Police Magistrate and Acting Puisne Judge on
numerous occasions for sixteen years.
Until 1910, the Supreme Court asserted plenary subject matter jurisdiction in the
Gold Coast, a state of affairs that Chief Justice W. Brandford Griffith, Jr. felt to be one that
served the people. Thereafter, it had only appellate jurisdiction as almost all personal and
real disputes, the latter, discussed below, being dealt with by indigenous courts subject to
appeal to District and Provincial Commissioners, administrative officers, who could retry the
cases de novo. Even when it did have jurisdiction, the British courts were obliged by the
Supreme Court Ordinance to decide cases involving indigens on the basis of traditional
custom and law. The courts were thus obliged to determine what the applicable custom
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was, a determination that was deemed to be one of fact to be proven by evidence. The
evidence they heard was often faulty and incomplete and the courts were compelled to
create a hybrid common law that incorporated indigenous custom and English juridical
principles that were felt to comply more with the ideals of English equity than traditional
custom would permit. The Supreme Court exercised ultimate control over customary law
through application of the repugnancy doctrine that permitted the judges to apply their own
moral views to traditional mores that may have endured for hundreds of years but which did
not align with British values. Moreover, in part because of their unfamiliarity with customary
law, the British courts asserted the applicability of English law whenever the opportunity
arose, such as where they decided that evidence of custom was insufficient and in cases
where the judge could conclude that traditional law did not encompass the matter in issue,
corporations, for example, that the courts claimed were unknown to traditional custom.
Even such restraint as the Supreme Court Ordinance imposed on the colonial courts
in civil litigation tended to disappear in criminal actions where the Supreme Court continued
to exercise an almost complete monopoly on the enforcement of criminal law as it had done
since execution by Fanti chiefs of the Bond of 1844 that authorized decision in criminal
cases on the basis of rules and principles imported from the metropole that were often at
utter variance to those by which the indigenous people had lived for centuries. English
procedure required the trial of most felonies by juries, but the colonial administration, fearful
of how local barristers might influence local juries, favored trial by a judge with assessors
whose opinions might be disregarded by the presiding judge. Such a procedure reduced
the space in which colonial dependents could act while seeming, at least to the British, to
allow them rights similar to, if not the same as, those exercised by the citizens of the
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metropole. English criminal procedure, together with the repugnancy doctrine, also limited
the space in which Gold Coast Africans could engage the colonial power and insured that
ultimate control over the provision of criminal justice remained in British hands.
The weakness of the colonial administration in dealing with the chiefs and native
judicial functions had great consequences. For the entirety of the period under
consideration here, colonial administrators complained of corruption and injustice through
political decisions and imposition of excessive costs and fees seen by them to be rampant
in the native judicial system. Moreover, these administrators often stated that they knew of
the reasons for such conditions. Yet they took no effective steps to eliminate oppression of
indigenous litigants by traditional tribunals because they could not afford to undermine the
prestige of the chiefs through whom they had decided to rule, albeit toward the end of the
period under consideration, they did mitigate the problem by reducing the role of hereditary
chiefs and their councils in the formation of native tribunals.
The archival evidence shows repeated efforts to limit the ability of chiefs and their
advisors to oppress litigants. Yet even when such efforts resulted in legislation, limitation of
fees and fines were ineffectively enforced, if at all. District Commissioners to whom fell the
task of enforcing such limitations were too few in number and too often absorbed in
administrative tasks to review the records of native tribunals that were themselves
incomplete. Moreover, the administration responded to chiefly complaints that fees and
fines were necessary to finance their local government and that too much pressure on them
would disable them from carrying out the governing role the British assigned to them. In
addition, the British seemed to have one eye fixed on the coastal intellectual elite, men with
European education and often substantial financial means, whom they feared as a locus of
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anti-colonial agitation. They chose to rely on the chiefs, the traditional rulers of the people
rather than coastal men, owners and editors of the newspapers that molded public opinion
among their readership and lawyers who held themselves to be the leaders of the people
and who resented the traditional authorities whom the coastal elite saw as retrograde and
ignorant. Consequently, the British could not or would not bring themselves to take the
steps necessary to eliminate perceived corruption effectively and to bring to the people the
justice they so loudly and frequently proclaimed to be their right and one of the main
purposes of British colonialism on the Gold Coast.
Differently from the manner in which the French viewed the educated elite in its West
African dependencies, the British disdained and resented the educated class in the Gold
Coast and particularly the lawyers. To the extent Britain rationalized its imperial rule there,
it did not do so to make Gold Coast indigens into Britons or to engage these educated Gold
Coasters in governing the colony on any superior level until relatively late in the colonial era.
Rather, as I’ve repeatedly noted herein, Britain turned to the traditional authorities, whom it
saw as the natural leaders of the people, to act as its agents. Yet, it simply could not
reconcile its perceived need to rule through these traditional authorities with its repeated
proclamations of the importance of delivering justice to its Gold Coast dependents. It could
not exercise the required close supervision of the manner in which the chiefs conducted
their courts without undermining the latter’s prestige and status that the chiefs remonstrated
were necessary to permit them to maintain the respect and obedience of their subjects.
The colonial authorities repeatedly condemned the imposition of fees and fines deemed to
be excessive, yet it deprived the native authorities of revenue adequate to support their
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traditional states and left them only with those same fees and fines with which to finance
local government.
By contrast, Alice Conklin argues that prior to World War One, bringing to its
dependents in West Africa French educational and judicial policies constituted what it
meant to be “civilized, French and republican.” Africans, particularly those in the so-called
Quatre Communes of Senegal, were to be assimilated and were encouraged to seek a
French education and to adopt the cultural mores of the colonial power. It was not until
after World War I that the metropolitan authorities altered their views of their African
dependents and gave up on assimilation, turning to a policy of “association.” The French
determined to keep the chiefs in their traditional positions where, having received the
benefit of French training, they in turn could “civilize” the Senegalese masses. They would
be consulted but not really be involved in policy decisions.11 Nevertheless, some Africans,
principally the “originaires” of the Quatre Communes, would be entitled to vote in local and
imperial elections. Men, such as Blaise Diagne, engaged in politics and won a seat in the
French National Assembly.12 No Gold Coaster ever sat in the British Parliament although,
after passage of the Native Administration Ordinance of 1927, chiefs were consulted as to
legislation that directly affected them. It would be interesting to compare the attitude of the
British and the French toward their educated African dependents and to examine why the
French were prepared to accept Africans as metropolitan legislators and even ministers of
the metropolitan government, roles that subsequent African leaders such as Leopold Sedar
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Senghor and Felix Houphouet-Boigny played in the 1950's, while the British were
unprepared until the eve of independence to give Africans a significant role in their colonial
governments, much less that in London.
Sometimes it seemed that the British were frustrated at their inability to convince the
traditional authorities whom they wished to support to adopt British ethical notions, to
separate their personal interests from their obligations as judges. Yet this frustration
derived from their inability to understand the role that the chiefs had played throughout their
history as mediators and conciliators who rendered decisions for one side or the other only
as a last resort and who were deeply involved in the outcome of the disputes brought to
them. The British wanted them to act like European judges, independent of the parties,
while carrying out traditional roles. These inconsistent roles could not be easily, if at all,
reconciled even had the colonial power made the effort to do so.13 The primary
consequence of Britain’s weak and inconsistent judicial policies was exactly what the British
did not want: reduction of the stature of the chiefs to the point where by 1944 they were
ready, indeed eager, to cede all but a symbolic role in the operation of Native Tribunals. At
the same time, perhaps not intentionally, it allowed the indigenous courts to continue to
impose excessive fees and costs such that perceived corruption in the administration of
justice outlived the reforms of the 1944 Native Courts Ordinance (as the Havers
Commission sadly learned) and apparently continues to this day. Indeed, in 2013, large
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billboards dotted the City of Accra, Ghana advising the people that they were entitled to
justice and that they did not have to pay bribes to judges or court officials in order to obtain
it. Crawford Young argues that “personalization of power by the ruler,” something that the
traditional chiefs manifested from pre-colonial days, persisted into the era of Ghanaian
independence. Inextricably connected to this exercise of personal power was the corruption
of absolutism expressed in clientism where loyalty was exchanged for material advantage.14
He also points out that post-independence judges could not always be relied upon to
cooperate with prosecutions initiated for political reasons as “the culture of the law [inherited
from the British] retained its hold on many judges (often still expatriate) long after other
components of the state had been placed under party command.”15 Nevertheless, he goes
on, judicial personnel felt the same “survival pressures as other state agents” so that “the
administration of justice became more subject to monetary intervention or social power
disparities.”16 Thus, one can see the line drawn from the failure of the colonial power to
eradicate corruption to the problems of the postcolonial state.
Kwame Nti argues that colonialism in the Gold Coast was, as elsewhere, a “project of
control,” with land as the objective of colonial economic and political power, but a project
that failed in the face of tenacious resistance.17 The Administration’s policy as to
14
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concessions for mining and forest conservation is evidence of British weakness in the face
of concerted opposition. For example, British experts claimed that the rain forests were
being destroyed by thoughtless lumbering, but the colonial government could not bring itself
to put into effect legislation necessary to preserve the forests, forests that they asserted
were vital for cocoa cultivation. A weakened bill was passed in 1912, but despite repeated
remonstrations from the colonial administration in Accra, the Colonial Office dithered about
seeking sovereign approval of the legislation and eventually allowed it to lapse. Only after
another fifteen years was an ordinance enacted and put into effect, and then only after the
proposed legislation was amended to reduce control by the government over proposed
forest reserves. In part this weakness was a result of the control of the land by the
traditional chiefs. They, not the British, owned the land and retained and exercised their
power to allocate parcels of land to their subjects for agriculture or to award concessions for
mineral or palm oil exploitation. In part also, the ineffectiveness of both concessions and
forest legislation may be attributed to the dispute between those who favored administrative
control and the indigenous population who steadfastly opposed removal of the judiciary
from their role in approving concessions and forest preserve creation and operation. In the
latter case, the executive was able to minimize the role of the judiciary by limiting its
jurisdiction to review of decisions of a quasi-judicial forests commissioner, but despite
almost unanimous recommendations of a specially appointed Commissioner and a
departmental committee and the testimony of some of the judges, including the former
Chief Justice, W. Brandford Griffith, Jr., that much of what the courts were being asked to
do was properly and better done by administrative officers, the executive could not dislodge
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the judiciary from the work of approving concessions, primarily because the Gold Coast
peoples trusted the judges far more than they did the administration.
During the later 1920's the Government once again proposed a firmer land policy that
would allow for greater security of title, an objective sought by European mining and other
business interests. A Statute of Limitations on land claims, a proposal favored by the
Parliamentary Undersecretary at the Colonial Office, but that was utterly contrary to
customary law was drafted and placed before the Legislative Council where it met the
opposition of the African members. Once again, the Government backed away from taking
the steps necessary to implement a policy that it was convinced was the correct one.
Proposals to permit registration of land titles did not even make it that far. These failures
clearly support Berry’s argument that colonialism was “a process prone to contradiction,
fragilities, and deep structural weaknesses.”18
I have argued in this study that the colonial judiciary was not independent of the
Administration. This lack of total independence continued during the entirety of the period
under study. District Commissioners were political officers who exercised judicial functions
both directly and as supervisors of native tribunals in contravention of British beliefs of
judicial independence even after the 1935 reforms that created the post of District
Magistrate and granted a substantial jurisdiction to those officials. This lack of
independence was readily acknowledged by Colonial Office officials such as Grattan Bushe,
the Colonial Office Legal Adviser, as well as people such as Sidney Abrahams, who served
as Gold Coast Attorney General. Yes, they acknowledged that it was wrong but accepted
such lack of independence because the British were unwilling to spend the money
18
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necessary to separate the executive from the judiciary. Moreover, the power to transfer or
compulsorily retire judges, a power that the Colonial Office was not loathe to exercise as we
saw in the case of Chief Justice Deane, hung over the heads of judges with what effect we
cannot prove. Moreover, the Colonial Executive all too often exerted undue influence on
judges for political purposes. Indeed, some District Commissioners made no bones about
bringing and deciding cases in order to make political points.
It is difficult to determine the basic reasons for British behavior in administering
justice in their dependency on the Gold Coast. They proclaimed the necessity for the rule of
law, but their conduct ofttimes belied that proclamation. Some historians, such as Anthony
Haydon, assert that Britain’s primary interest was to maintain peace and order at the least
possible cost and that all else took a back seat.19 We have seen how Britain compromised
its principles almost continually in order to achieve the objectives that Haydon noted.
Nevertheless, the British brought to the Africans the traditions of the British courts and
English law, setting before the native tribunals the model of organized procedure that
constituted a unifying force and a tendency toward cohesion.20
British administration of justice on the Gold Coast destroyed much traditional
behavior and encouraged corruption by indigenous authorities, yet the echos of British legal
imperialism may be heard in post-independent Ghana where English common law governs
most civil disputes and British style courts continue to exercise a measure of control over
those traditional tribunals that still function. This is not to justify British legal imperialism
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uncritically. Yet the British, despite having replaced many traditional legal concepts with
cognate English rules, left a heritage that the independent successor state valued and
continues to value. Resort to a judicial process, either traditional or British, for the
resolution of disputes in place of violence became the habit of the indigenous people
previously accustomed to settling disputes through violence as witness the many violent
acts between Fanti states and the many nineteenth century Ashanti incursions, protection
against which was a rationale for British intervention in the first place. However, problems
with the traditional tribunals that existed at the outset of the colonial venture in the Gold
Coast remained until the close of the period under study and even afterward. The British
repeatedly enacted legislation purportedly designed to overcome those problems but
declined to establish a corps of administrative officers large enough to require the chiefs,
who were their clients and agents, to abide by such legislation systematically, thereby
encouraging, at least indirectly, the kind of corruption it proclaimed to be attempting to root
out.
The British were caught in a dilemma between their belief in the rule of law and their
need to rule their dependents authoritatively, between the pressure applied by educated
attorneys, merchants and ministers for a greater role in government and less reliance on
traditional authorities and their commitment to indirect rule through those authorities. Their
inability to resolve this dilemma produced less than perfect justice, but was, I conclude,
sufficiently satisfactory from the British perspective to resolve most legal disputes while
maintaining a relatively peaceful and stable society in which small farmers could raise and
sell their cocoa and coastal merchants and lawyers could prosper at the least cost to the
British taxpayer. The dead hand of tradition that Frederick Cooper has argued was
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imposed on Gold Coast society was, in the final analysis, really not so very different than
that which was imposed on English and other common law societies by a legal system of
reliance on precedent. As a technique of colonial administration it was, despite the fits and
starts of colonial policy and a failure to eradicate seeming oppression of litigants in
traditional courts, one that was reasonably effective.
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